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Handbook on planning and action for Crime Prevention in Southern Africa and the Caribbean Regions

CRIMINAL JUSTICE HANDBOOK SERIES

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Contents

Introduction

The present handbook forms part of a series of tools developed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to support countries in implementing the rule of law and the development of crime prevention and criminal justice reform. It can be used in a variety of contexts, including as part of UNODC technical assistance and capacity-building projects, both as a reference document and as a training tool.

The preparation of this handbook was driven by the principle that prevention is the first imperative of justice.[1] The handbook is one of the outcomes of the United Nations project on "South-South Regional Cooperation for Determining Best Practices for Crime Prevention in the Developing World". The "South-South" crime prevention cooperation project identified a total of 40 crime prevention projects (20 in Southern Africa and 20 in the Caribbean) to be reviewed, with the aim of building and enhancing the crime prevention knowledge base in the developing world. These projects were reviewed and the lessons learned are reflected in the handbook. Both the "South-South" project and the handbook were funded by the Development Account—technical cooperation programme of the economic and social entities of the United Nations. Development Account projects aim at capacity-building through subregional, regional and interregional economic and technical cooperation among developing countries.

This handbook seeks to meet a distinct development impact by recommending to the reader practical action to prevent crime in Southern Africa and Caribbean—two regions that suffer greatly from violent crime. Project participants from these "South-South" countries, researchers and policymakers have contributed their academic and practical knowledge to it. The "South-South" project was implemented by UNODC.

[1] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, United Nations document S/2004/616, para. 4.

1. The aims and background of the handbook

This handbook is aimed at policymakers (within government and collaborating partners), practitioners, community groups, academics as well as victims and potential victims of crime.

The principal aim of the handbook is to serve as a reference tool to policymakers and practitioners engaged in actions to reduce the burden of crime on the poor, especially the poor of Southern Africa and the Caribbean, and thereby improve their quality of life and mitigate their poverty. The handbook is intended to increase knowledge about levels of crime, successful practices in reducing crime rates in developing countries, and multi-actor crime prevention actions.

The handbook also discusses how to build capacity to reduce crime and how to sustain efforts in the—often dispiriting—long term. The handbook uses, wherever possible, experience from the developing world (especially from the Caribbean and Southern Africa); however, when literature or other sources of information on such experience were lacking, the best available evidence was drawn from sources outside the regions.

The handbook attempts to show that there are effective policies and actions through which crime can be reduced and prevented and so hopes to inspire people to do so.

This handbook is the culmination of work that started in 2004. It is part of the United Nations programme to strengthen cooperation among developing countries—particularly in this case between Southern African countries and the Caribbean—to encourage crime prevention. It is intended to reduce the impact of crime on people, communities and on development.

The United Nations programme has two drivers.

The first is the United Nations Millennium Declaration. The Declaration was passed in 2000 and reaffirms and clarifies the values of Member States. The prevention of crime is implicit in its fundamental beliefs. For example, it states that:

> "We recognize that, in addition to our separate responsibilities to our individual societies, we have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human

> dignity, equality and equity at the global level. As leaders we have a duty therefore to all the world's people, especially the most vulnerable and, in particular, the children of the world, to whom the future belongs."

and

> "We consider certain fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the twenty-first century […] Men and women have the right to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice."

These fundamental rights cannot be achieved unless crime is reduced and prevented.

The second driver is the body of resolutions passed on "action to promote effective crime prevention".

The underlying assumption of the handbook (expressed well in the Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC] resolution 2002/13 with the "Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime") is that "crime prevention strategies not only prevent crime and victimization, but also promote community safety and contribute to sustainable development of countries. Effective, responsible crime prevention enhances the quality of life of all citizens. It has long-term benefits in terms of reducing the costs associated with the formal criminal justice system, as well as other social costs that result from crime." The handbook also represents a step towards the implementation of ECOSOC resolution 2005/22 which requests the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to rebalance the criminal justice and crime prevention aspects of its work, i.e. to give crime prevention a higher priority than in the past.

The United Nations crime prevention guidelines set several principles for successful crime prevention:

- Crime prevention should enhance the rule of law;
- It should serve socio-economic development and inclusion;
- Evidence and not ideology must drive crime prevention;
- Crime prevention should be community-centered;
- Governments, civic and business communities should establish and foster partnerships among themselves;
- Crime prevention should be developed and promoted on the basis of sustainability and accountability.

These principles have guided the format and content of this handbook.

The special circumstances and needs of the developing countries in the Caribbean and Southern Africa are also an essential part of the context for the handbook. Many Caribbean countries will meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), but

they will continue for some time to have problems related to their position in the global illicit drug trade, their gang culture and their high homicide levels. The Southern African countries have different problems but problems which may be even more difficult to solve—the problems of extreme poverty and slow social change. A United Nations progress check in 2007 predicts that some of these countries are not expected to meet any of the MDGs.[2]

Both regions, therefore, need crime prevention and reduction programmes which take their special problems into account.

Finally, the handbook will take into account the South-South exchange programme and the work which has been done on this project since 2004. It will draw lessons from the 40 crime prevention projects which have been evaluated to see the extent to which evidence will allow lessons to be drawn, and where evidence is lacking, it will see if they provide any pointers for further action, either for research or experimentation.

[2]See the United Nations' 2007 update *Africa and the Millenium Development Goals*. www.un.org/millenniumgoals/docs/MDGafrica07.pdf.

2. How crime can be prevented

This section examines why crime takes place and what works in preventing crime.

Why crime takes place

Only if it can be understood why crime happens, can it, even theoretically, be prevented.

For there to be crime there need to be people who are willing to break the law, a lack of an environment (disincentives or people) to stop them and the availability of suitable targets (people or things).

Any anti-crime strategy must address these factors.

The willingness or propensity to break the law

If people were not willing to break the law, there would be no crime. But reducing the propensity of people to commit crime seems to be the most difficult task in crime control. And many of the possible solutions are long term and uncertain.

Some of the reasons why people are willing to break the law are:

- Lack of cognitive skills—i.e. they lack the ability to think ahead and see the consequences of their actions or to empathize with potential crime victims;
- Family and peer criminality—because the influence of relatives and friends is very difficult to resist;
- Lack of a stake or involvement in the community or society—i.e. they are alienated from that society (possibly by social exclusion or racism), so they see no reason why they should abide by its rules;
- Greed, selfishness and hubris—possibly a subset of cognitive incapacity;
- A feeling of relative deprivation—i.e. youth feel that the world is unjust and unfair to them because they see other people with the possessions which they

feel they are entitled to. Highly unequal societies are breeding grounds for relative deprivation, as is unemployment;

- Poverty—because poverty can contribute to chaotic and disorganized parents who are more concerned about the day-to-day problems of existence than the difficult job of bringing up children. In later life it means that people can be driven to crime because they do not have the basic necessities for life or because they feel excluded and marginalized;
- Poor parenting—because poor parenting, particularly in the form of harsh or erratic discipline, leaves the child insecure and confused as to acceptable behaviour;
- They have learned that violence is a legitimate way to solve problems through corporal punishment either at home or school;
- The belief that the probable gains from crime are worth the possible risk of being caught;
- Being bored and wanting excitement;
- Being socialized into values of deviant behaviour;
- Living in a highly volatile post-conflict society with conflicting values and easy access to arms;
- Poor self-esteem—because lack of self-confidence means that the person can be open to suggestions which they will not have the confidence to judge the merit of for themselves. Poor self-esteem can be the result of abuse and violence in the home. And it can also result from a cultural history which includes colonialism and racism;
- Educational failure. This is a very important criminogenic factor because educational failure is associated with low incomes, feelings of relative deprivation and low self-esteem;
- The abuse suffered by children today is likely to translate into future violence in the families that these children will form. Child abuse can be associated with dropping out of school. Abused children, many of whom are already at a disadvantage because they come from poorer and less educated families, are likely to earn less as adults. This pathway reinforces the poverty cycle;[3]
- Taking substances containing chemicals which break down crime inhibitors. The effects of alcohol and some other drugs can cause a reduction of psychological inhibitors to antisocial behaviour and result in violence and other crime.

This is not an exhaustive list, but it does suggest why it is a complicated task to reduce the propensity to break society's written rules. However, because this is an area with theoretically the greatest payoff, and is based on the almost certain truth that virtually no one is born criminal (this may not be true of some psychopaths—but even that is not certain), one should try it. Twenty years ago, in a time of deep pessimism, it was believed "nothing works" in this area, but

[3]Knaul, F. and M. Ramirez (2005). *Family Violence and Child Abuse in Latin America and the Caribbean, The Cases of Colombia and Mexico*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, pp. 17-18. www.iadb.org/sds/doc/SOC-FamilyViolenceandChildAbuse-e.pdf.

research over the past 20 years has shown that this is not true. It has also shown what can work, as will be discussed later.

The risk factors (those factors which increase the likelihood of experiencing negative outcomes) that are associated with or cause criminality and the protective factors which counterbalance such risks are also known. It is because one believes that something is now known about these factors that action can be taken to protect our youth and improve the quality of life for all.

An excellent analysis of these factors was published by the World Bank[4] and it will be drawn on to help in the formulation of the strategies proposed in this handbook.

Risk and protective factors act at three levels and they must all be tackled if one wants to have a real impact. The first level is the macro level—these are the institutions and systems that affect an individual but with which the individual has only indirect contact on a daily basis. The second level is the micro level—the institutions and individuals with which people interact on a personal basis. The third is the individual level—namely the individual characteristics of people which affect everything they do.

Macro environmental factors include:

- The state of the national economy;
- Poverty and inequality levels;
- The institutional framework;
- The political environment;
- The cultural and historical background;
- The media;
- Gender;
- Social exclusion.

Micro environmental factors include:

- Families;
- Peer groups;
- Role models;
- Schools;
- Churches;
- The physical environment.

[4]Fajnzylber, P. et.al. (1998). *Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World. An Empirical Assessment*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Individual factors include:

- Physiological characteristics;
- Cognitive skills;
- Behaviour patterns;
- Learned reactions to the social environment.

A brief description of the risks and protective factors associated with the factors listed above will be helpful in understanding what a strategy for interventions with youth at risk must include.

The macro environment

The state of the economy is crucial for the lives of all people.

It is protective when it is a source of well-paid jobs, tax revenues and financial resources.

It is a risk factor when it is volatile, uncertain and does not provide opportunities for young people.

The state of public institutions is also vital for our strategy for youth. Institutions are protective if they are efficient, effective and supportive. They increase risk if they are corrupt, unresponsive, inefficient and perceived to be distant from the needs of the people.

The mass media can be protective if they underline or reinforce the cultural norms and values which are necessary for the society's healthy survival. They are risky if they impede schoolwork and if they portray violence and life-styles (including individualism and poor sex-role stereotypes) that undermine or are inconsistent with society's values.

The cultural and historical background is also a major factor. Obviously, one cannot change it, but one can be aware of its protective side (parliamentary traditions, the rule of law, mutual supportiveness and sporting values) and its risk factors (divisiveness, racism and the undermining of self-esteem, and family values).

In the macro-environment, the primary risk and protective factors that contribute to or impede positive youth development are:

- Weak demand for skilled workers;
- High youth unemployment;
- Poverty;
- Income inequality (demonstrated by drug dealers, tourists and the mass media);
- An academic education—which can both give skills and deny more practical education;

- School uniforms—which can either mark the members of the elite or those who have failed;
- Health care systems which lack confidentiality for young people fail to realize their potential for reducing the numbers of unwanted pregnancies and the spread of HIV/AIDS;
- The slave/colonial culture of aggression, substance abuse, adolescent parents, distant fathers and splintered families can all lead to risky behaviour with a very high negative impact.

The micro environment

There are two factors here of overwhelming importance—the family and the school. The family is critical to development.

Protective factors include:

- "Connectedness" with other positive family members;
- Discipline;
- Resources such as time and money;
- Cohesiveness;
- Family roles which stress equality and caring.

Risk factors include:

- Low parenting skills;
- Criminal family members;
- Erratic discipline;
- Parental absence due to migration or abandonment;
- Abuse and violence in the household;
- Parental drug abuse.

Schools are probably as important as families. Their protective factors include:

- "Connectedness";
- Providing relevant curricula for academic, technical and life skills;
- Access to positive peer groups and friends;
- Activities for social development.

Risk factors are:

- School failure;
- Suspensions and exclusions;
- Bullying and discrimination;
- Undermining confidence;

- Increasing social distance;
- Opportunity for negative peer influences.

Next come social networks, peers and role models.

Positive factors include:

- Having peers, networks and role models that are positive and provide connectedness;
- Peers and models with pro-social views and actions.

Risk factors include:

- Participation in deviant subcultures;
- Perception of threat from peers;
- Music promoting violence, alienation and negative sex roles.

Communities and neighbourhoods are also crucial for development. They are positive if:

- They are a source of informal social control;
- They are supportive and welcoming;
- There is intergenerational interaction;
- They are safe and clean;
- They function well.

Communities, though, can increase risk if:

- They are violent;
- They are fractured and threatening;
- People don't care about their neighbourhoods;
- They are a source of drugs and criminal income.

The factors in the micro-environment which are particularly important—for both protection and risk—include:

- Parental connectedness. This is crucial for without it the child is adrift and susceptible to most temptations and lacks self-esteem. With it they can resist most negative influences in the adult world;
- Parenting skills. Children who are raised in families characterized by weak parenting skills are much more likely to engage in criminal and anti-social behaviour, and to perpetuate the cycle of early pregnancy, weak parenting and the consequential social problems;
- Physical, sexual and emotional abuse in the home;

- Risky or criminal parental behaviour clearly has a huge negative impact not only through the demonstration effect and weak social modelling by significant others, but also through direct exposure to anti-social behaviour;
- Presence of two biological parents—this is obviously a preferred household structure in both financial and emotional terms especially in a context of increased social pressures at the broader societal level;
- Household income and the capacity to satisfy basic needs of household members;
- Peers and social networks can be either positive or negative (gang membership is essentially a social network);
- Presence of role models;
- School atmosphere—especially since feeling connected to school can be one of the most powerful protective factors;
- Community organizations—membership of youth, social and community groups is universally acknowledged to support critical social skills such as a sense of identity, the development and formation of loyalty and decision-making;
- Physical environment—because the "broken windows" research has shown how important graffiti, litter and decay can be in actually generating crime and delinquency.

Risk factors in Jamaica[a]

A recent United Nations/World Bank study has used the three crime surveys carried out in the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica to study the relationships between demographic and economic factors and certain crimes.

In Jamaica, the crimes were murder and robbery.

Murder was higher:

- In families which were female-headed, where there were young men, and where education levels were low; and
- In communities which were poorer, had a high proportion of young males, had more female heads, where education levels were low, which were urban and where population density was high.

Robbery was higher:

- In wealthier areas and families, in less educated areas and in female-headed families;

but

- Was lower in families with more males.

All crimes were higher in areas with a low reporting rate to the police.

[a]UNODC and The World Bank (2007). *Crime, Violence and Development: Trends, Costs and Policy Options in the Caribbean.*

Individual factors

Risk factors include:

- Low IQ;[5]
- Characteristics that can be discriminated against (some disabilities, "wrong" colour);
- Rage and aggressive behaviour;
- Being unmotivated and ambivalent;
- Feeling no connection with others;
- Lack of self-confidence and self-worth.

Protective factors include:

- High intelligence;
- Positive self-esteem;
- Social skills;
- Self-confidence;
- Enterprise;
- Resilience.

At an individual level, the factors which have the greatest negative or positive effect include:

- Self-esteem—mostly generated or destroyed at home or at school;
- Rage—a primary factor behind youth tobacco, alcohol and drug use. It is produced by school expulsion, relative deprivation, physical abuse at school or home, and a feeling that life is unfair;
- Self-centredness—where young people do not understand anything but their own personal needs.

The more of the negative factors that there are in a child or young person's upbringing, the greater the predisposition of that child or young person to engage in anti-social and offending behaviour.

The lack of disincentives to crime and of people to intervene to prevent it

If one fails to prevent criminal intent (criminality), then one will have to depend on ways to try to stop that intent being turned into action. This section deals with disincentives to crime and the guardians of our communities. These include:

- Punishments for criminal acts which are intended to deter offenders from offending again and non-offenders from starting to offend;

[5]See Moffit et al., (1993). "Explaining the relation between IQ and delinquency: Class, race, test motivation, school failure, or self-control?". *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, vol. 102, No. 2, pp. 187-196.
Webster, C., MacDonald, R., and M. Simpson (2006). "Predicting Criminality? Risk Factors, Neighbourhood Influence and Desistance". *Youth Justice*, vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 7-22.

- The effect of having a criminal record on finding jobs etc.;
- The police;
- Other criminal justice personnel;
- Private security personnel;
- Prison and other ways of incapacitating offenders;
- Organized members of the community;
- Local government;
- Schools;
- Informal social control;
- Sustainable livelihoods allowing individuals to lead a life in dignity.

All of these disincentives and guardians can prevent crime (as will be shown below), but currently at best some do it imperfectly and at worst they exacerbate the problem. Available evidence coming, however, mostly from the developed world, suggests that:

- The use of severe sentences to deter crime very largely does not work. In addition, it is costly and, even worse, long sentences may well increase the risk of ex-prisoners re-offending;
- Capital punishment does not deter murder any more effectively than other punishments and may have a "brutalization effect", that is increase the likelihood that some other people may kill;
- Corrupt, violent, inefficient, ineffective policing will increase crime;
- Prison can incapacitate offenders, but it may cost up to 5 times as much to prevent a crime through the use of prison as it does by good opportunity reduction methods;[6]
- Small reductions in recorded crime rates may be achieved by considerably increasing the prison population;
- Local government and schools will not prevent crime under normal conditions—they have to be specially trained;
- Communities can prevent crime but not through Neighbourhood Watch schemes—often the preferred method;
- Informal social control will not work unless a community has social capital and works together—most do not.

The above may sound discouraging. However, some of these factors can be addressed as it will be demonstrated in the discussion which follows.

[6]Nuttall, C. (director), Goldblatt, P. and C. Lewis (eds.) (1997). *Reducing Offending: an assessment of research evidence on ways of dealing with offending behaviour*. Home Office Research Series 187. London: HMSO.

Suitable targets

Crime cannot take place if there are no targets—i.e. things to be stolen or people to be victimized. There is good evidence now that one reason crime has gone up in developed countries over the last 50 years is because of the large increase in the number of stealable goods in them. One reason people could leave their doors open all day in days gone by was that there was often little in their house to tempt a burglar. Now houses are full of objects—many of which are small, portable and valuable—perfect material for the thief.

There are, however, large numbers of available targets all of which encourage and result in crime:

- Shops which display their goods in such a way as to tempt people to buy (and steal);
- Cars left with keys in them or other weak security;
- People who walk around in poor areas showing off their jewellery and watches;
- People who walk in dark places at night in high crime parts of town;
- Mobile phones without disabling chips;
- Football grounds that do not segregate fans who are known to fight;
- Bars that do not use plastic glasses;
- Neighbourhoods which are allowed to become derelict;
- Countries which do not have no-drink-and-drive laws;
- Banks and other financial institutions with poor anti-fraud procedures;

These are situations that can be addressed. However, there seems to be some resistance to situational crime prevention (SCP) on the grounds that if you stop a crime here, it will only go somewhere else. This is not so. It has been found that most crime stopped by these methods is not "displaced" somewhere else.

Opportunity reduction is also seen by some as amoral. However, it does not make moral judgments about crime, it just tries to stop it. It gives advice that some may not like to receive.

What works in preventing crime?

At the very highest level, it is known that reducing poverty, unemployment which produces feelings of relative deprivation, inequality which produces the feeling of being treated unfairly, alienation and anomie may limit incentives for people to turn to crime—violent, property or drug.[7] National, social and situational crime

[7]See Islam, R. (2004). "The nexus of economic growth, employment and poverty reduction: an empirical analysis". Geneva: ILO. www.employment-policy.net/uploads/documents/docs/Economic_Growth_Employment_Poverty_Jan2004_Islam_1.pdf.

prevention, in their own ways reducing exclusion and marginalization by excessive inequality in one form or the other, is at the core of success, as emphasized by the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime. The government, therefore, must have a central role in crime reduction.

The previous section offers an explanation and a catalogue of reasons why crime takes place. This is essential for crime prevention as it provides the basic logic and rationale for our efforts.

In 1998, the U.K. Home Office produced a publication which summarized interventions which had been demonstrated to work in reducing or preventing crime. In summary the publication concluded:

> "The criminal justice system has a central role in providing the sanctions to enforce or reinforce compliance with the law, on which other crime reduction initiatives depend.
>
> Efforts to redirect funds to more effective crime reduction tools, within or outside this system, will only have a gradual impact in reducing crime. However, if the reductions claimed by the most promising approaches are realised, the long-term reductions in crime that would be achieved are substantial.
>
> None of the initiatives identified as promising will reduce crime on its own. An effective crime reduction strategy is one in which an integrated package of best practice is developed and delivered consistently over time."[8]

The components an effective and integrated strategy would draw on are:

- Intensive interventions among children and families at risk;
- Increasing informal social control and social cohesion in communities and institutions that are vulnerable to crime, criminality, drug usage and disorder;
- Intervention in the development of products or services vulnerable to crime so as to make them less so;
- Incentives to individuals and organizations to reduce the risk of crime;
- Targeting situational prevention measures on hotspots and areas of high risk generally;
- Reducing repeat victimization;
- Placing greater emphasis on problem-oriented and community policing;
- Extending the range of effective interventions with offenders and drug users;
- Making more use, in appropriate circumstances, of penalties such as fines and curfew orders with tagging; and
- Improving the consistency of sentencing.

[8]Criminal Justice Review Group (1998). *Review of Criminal Justice in Northern Ireland*. A Consultation Paper. London: Home Office.
www.nio.gov.uk/consultation_paper_on_review_of_criminal_justice_system.pdf.

Any portfolio should combine long-term investment in children and families with actions that would yield more immediate, though probably smaller returns (such as situational prevention). It would also include activities aimed at achieving gains that accumulate steadily such as offender programmes, community action and improved product design, i.e. target hardening. There is evidence that such an approach would be cost-effective throughout its life, with substantial cost benefits in the long run.

What works to reduce the propensity to commit crime?

Government programmes which:

- Reduce poverty;
- Increase employment;
- Strengthen the rule of law;
- Reduce inequality; and
- Give people a feeling of being included.

These programmes would probably reduce crime. Their aims are central to any democratic government and are good in themselves. Therefore, they should be pursued more actively. But there is also a caveat to add. Increasing prosperity may bring with it more crime (especially property crime) as there become more things to steal and more spare money to spend on alcohol. This is the experience of rich countries and should be borne in mind.

Other programmes that research shows will work to prevent criminality include:

- Programmes to enhance parenting skills;
- Preschool literacy programmes;
- Home visiting programmes for vulnerable mothers;
- Clinics for family therapy;
- Drug and alcohol treatment programmes;
- Family preservation programmes;
- School-based programmes based on “what works” principles;
- Anti-bullying “whole-school” programmes;
- Family/school partnerships;
- Peer-group community anti drug programmes;
- Paying pupils to stay at school after 16;
- Life skills and employment training programmes.

These programmes are all aimed at increasing the likelihood that people will not become offenders. There are also successful programmes which reduce the likelihood

of offenders re-offending, i.e. successful rehabilitation programmes. Research suggests that to be successful, corrections programmes should:

- Be based on the measured risk of the offender and the most intensive programmes should only be available for high-risk offenders;
- Be targeted at factors present in prisoners known to contribute to criminal behaviour;
- Match teaching styles to prisoners' learning styles;
- Be skills-based, designed to improve problem-solving and social interaction;
- Preferably, be community based;
- Be properly carried out by trained staff with aims and objectives that do not change.

Rehabilitation is a process of change that involves the individual, family, services, the programme and a community structure that support law-abiding behaviour in the community.

The effectiveness of correctional treatment is dependent upon what is delivered to whom in what setting.

The current approach to rehabilitation recognizes that offenders are seriously disadvantaged in very complex ways and that the rehabilitation process requires time, effort, resources and people who are knowledgeable, skilled and compassionate to do the work.

If, however, correctional treatment can halt a criminal career, it can save people from being victimized and society a great deal of money. It has, for example, been calculated that an unchecked burglary career in the United Kingdom can cost society £1,000,000 over an offender's life-time. This value may well be different elsewhere in the world, but in any country the cost of unchecked criminal careers will certainly be a burden to society.

Given these pre-conditions, a number of different programmes have been shown to be successful. They include:

- Cognitive skills training programmes;
- Basic literacy programmes;
- Life skills programmes;
- Work training with employment following;
- Social work in prison;
- Drug treatment;
- Sex offender treatment;
- Intensive probation with suitable offenders; and
- Parole.

What works to increase the efficacy of disincentives and the effectiveness of the guardians?

This and the next section deal with factors which can minimize criminal behaviour after society has failed to dissuade people that it is wrong to commit crime. In this case a different set of mechanisms operate to prevent or reduce crime, and many of them are the traditional methods of the criminal justice system.

As already indicated, incapacitating offenders in order to reduce crime is a very expensive option. Indeed, the least expensive option of all—the fine—appears to be at least as effective as imprisonment in discouraging further offending.

Deterrence is the classical crime prevention practice of the justice system. It is assumed that if penalties are harsh then offenders will be deterred from offending again, and others will be deterred from starting a career of crime. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to show that harsh penalties have a unique ability to prevent crime. This area of research has a very extensive literature and is still controversial, but evidence for the preventive effect of harsh penalties does not appear to exist except in some very limited and special circumstances (for example, it can, apparently, reduce tax evasion).

Therefore, countries should be discouraged on evidence grounds from using severe sentences as a deterrent. The extreme case, of course, is the death penalty, and even though there is absolutely no evidence, overall, that capital punishment reduces murder rates, millions believe it does or would.

Other aspects of deterrence do, however, seem to be effective. For example, while the severity of sanctions does not appear to work as deterrent of crime, the speed and certainty of capture appear to.[9] This means:

- The greater the chance that someone will be caught and dealt with for an offence and the faster this happens, the lower crime will be pushed.

The police, therefore, have a crucial role in crime control; improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the police could produce great dividends. As police forces may be corrupt and ineffective, helping them to be less so and to improve detection rates and the speed with which they clear crime would be an excellent use of resources. Therefore:

- Reducing corruption in the police is a prerequisite for reducing crime as a corrupt police force undermines respect for the law and the fundamental requirements for civil peace;
- High detection rates and conviction rates will reduce crime;
- Directed patrol aimed at crime hot spots is effective;
- Inter-agency working is effective;

[9]Cutting Crime – A New Partnership 2008-2011. London: Home Office. www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/crime-strategy-07/crime-strategy-07?view=Binary.

- Problem-oriented policing can be effective;
- Community policing with a clear focus can be effective (see below);
- Targeting repeat offenders can be effective;
- Targeting repeat victims can be effective;
- Improving police legitimacy with the community can have positive results;
- Success in policing needs effective management and the use of resources.

Community efforts which target high crime communities and apply comprehensive initiatives to tackle the interlocking problems of social dislocation can be successful.

Community involvement[a]

"Community participation is an essential tool in changing attitudes, and empowering and mobilizing its members. The Inter-American Development Bank is supporting various projects, two of them in Uruguay. Between 2000 and 2002, these projects provided services in more than 1,000 cases related to domestic violence and legal disputes between neighbours. In addition, the establishment of 180 neighbourhood safety commissions has rapidly expanded to other areas of the country. This indicates an increase in citizen and community participation in solving crime."

[a]Inter-American Development Bank (2005) *Emphasizing Prevention in Citizen Security, The Inter-American Development Bank's Contribution to Reducing Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, DC, page: 8, 15-17.
www.iadb.org/topics/subtopics.cfm?language=English&SUBTOPICID=SEC&TOPICID=DS.

Informal social control, that is the effective voluntary action of local residents to exert control over the behaviour of other residents and non-residents, can be an extremely powerful inhibitor of both property and violent crime.

There is now strong evidence from the 15-year Chicago Project that informal social control is a powerful disincentive to crime. The researchers have found that violence rates are 50 per cent lower in neighbourhoods with community cohesion and effective informal social control than in comparable neighbourhoods where informal social control is weak (Earls and Visher, 1997).

What works to reduce opportunities for crime?

A great deal of research has been carried out over the last 30 years to show how important opportunity is in causing crime and how, through opportunity reduction or "situational prevention", crime can be significantly reduced quickly. It can work at a local or national level.

Situational crime prevention (SCP) does not, on the whole, aim to affect an offender's propensities or motives, but after an analysis of the circumstances giving rise to particular crimes, it introduces specific changes to influence the offender's decision or ability to commit those crimes.

It has been shown that SCP can reduce crime through:

- Target hardening (e.g. steering column locks on cars—one of the first evaluated uses; very successful);
- Controlling access to crime targets (e.g. entry phones);
- Deflecting offenders from targets (e.g. segregating football fans);
- Controlling crime facilitators (e.g. photographs on credit cards);
- Screening entrances and exits (e.g. automatic ticket gates at stations);
- Formal surveillance (e.g. speed cameras);
- Surveillance by employees (e.g. guards on gates);
- Natural surveillance (e.g. street lighting);
- Target removal (e.g. providing women's refuges);
- Property identification (e.g. cattle branding);
- Reducing temptation (e.g. rapid repair);
- Taking away benefits (e.g. disabling cell phones);
- Setting rules (e.g. harassment rules);
- Alerting conscience (e.g. roadside speedometers);
- Controlling factors that undermine restraint (e.g. laws on drunk driving).

It is noted that SCP can be applied to any kind of crime—not just opportunistic ones, because it is an approach or method, not an end in itself. It has been very successfully applied to aircraft hijacking, bank robbery, homicide, domestic violence and sexual harassment.

Evaluations of, for example, well organized and run anti-burglary programmes show net 30 to 70 per cent reductions in burglary (and some additional benefits). Displacement of crimes to other areas can happen, but only when the programme is of low intensity.

There is no doubt that SCP is the most immediate and cost-effective form of crime prevention—at least in the short and medium term. Only the most successful criminality reduction programme (the Perry pre-school programme) shows an equally good return. (Schweinhart and Wierkert, 1993).

Actions to recuperate decayed urban spaces, Bogota, Colombia[a]

In the 1993-2002 period, homicide rates in Bogota plunged from 80 to 28 homicides per 100,000 people. Two of the most violent areas in Bogota, Avenida Caracas and the Cartucho zone, underwent urban and transport infrastructure renewal. As a result, levels of crime and violence declined substantially in both areas. In Avenida Caracas the levels of homicide declined by 60 per cent from 1999 to 2003. At the same time, in the Cartucho zone, robbery went down by 70 per cent between 2000 and 2003.

[a]Inter-American Development Bank, *Emphasizing Prevention*, op. cit.

3. Programmes for crime prevention in the developing world

Programmes for crime prevention depend for their success on functioning justice systems and involved communities as well as the efforts of individuals. They depend on and enhance the rule of law. This is absolutely fundamental. They also depend on recognition that repression and enforcement are not the most effective ways to prevent crime and reduce victimization.

Crime will not be reduced by:

- Corrupt, inefficient, violent, ineffective, underpaid, low-morale police forces;
- Overstretched, poorly trained, under-resourced prosecution services;
- Slow, corrupt, overcrowded, inefficient courts;
- Lengthy periods of remand in custody while awaiting trial;
- A dependence on prison as the primary means of punishment;
- Insufficient and poorly trained community corrections staff;
- Overcrowded, unsanitary, violent prisons which have no capacity for rehabilitation programmes;
- Governments which believe that the criminal justice system is among their lowest priority for resources;
- Citizens who believe crime is just the business of the justice system and that greater use of prison is the way to their security.

This handbook is not the place to lay out the details of a law reform programme, but it is the place to say that without an efficient, effective, accountable and incorrupt justice system nothing substantial and sustained can be achieved.

The bedrock of law reform and therefore crime reduction and prevention is:

- Above all, respect for human rights;
- Political will;
- An assumption that accused persons are innocent until proved guilty—with all that it implies for their treatment;

- Aligning the work of the different institutions within the system;
- Integrated reform systems within the criminal justice system;
- Minimum standards legislation enforced by honest, effective courts;
- Timely, consistent, useful, dependable, published information on and from all parts of the justice system, including the prisons;
- Effective performance measurement systems;
- An evidence base for decisions;
- Police forces which see that their primary role is to prevent crime and which realize that they have to work with the community to achieve this;
- An independent body to investigate complaints against the police;
- Bail systems and legally restricted periods for remand in custody;
- Good legal representation guaranteed for all but the most trivial offences;
- Well-run, trusted, well-resourced community punishment systems;
- Specialized juvenile corrections systems which assume juvenile delinquency and crime are symptoms of social and personal problems not wickedness;
- An understanding that community action is almost always going to be more cost-effective than institutional solutions;
- An acceptance that accused persons have the right to be treated quickly and decently;
- The realization that inhumane prisons not only trample on human rights but are also breeding grounds for crime;
- Dedicated, well-paid, honest staff at all levels;
- A committed community, willing to be involved.

Within a context of law reform and a commitment to human rights, this section will suggest some practical ways to reduce or prevent crime in the Caribbean and Southern Africa.

The full project "South-South Regional Cooperation for Determining Best Practices for Crime Prevention in the Developing World" evaluated 40 crime prevention programmes in the regions hoping to find models which could be used more generally. However, few of the programmes had been designed or implemented in such a way as to enable the project to assess what their impact on crime had been (see below for some promising results). The authors of the evaluation reports drew up a list of "lessons learned" from the programmes for implementation of new programmes in the future. These lessons are very valuable and are reproduced below. They may be used to inform the design of a crime prevention programme.

1. Thinking and understanding the problem and programme

1.1 A programme should be devised round a sound theory based on a specifically defined crime problem and a detailed study of it both in terms of local conditions and of effective interventions elsewhere. It should be expressed in the form of a "logical framework".

1.2 A detailed risk/resilience analysis that can help to identify the most appropriate programme participants and to define the intervention elements appropriate to them should be carried out.

1.3 Both theory and risk/resilience analysis should be linked to objectives and programme elements that can address both the crime problem and target group. The objectives should also be:

- Impact oriented: representing desired changes in critical threat factors that affect the project goal;
- Measurable: definable in relation to some standard scale (numbers, percentage, fractions, in any case to some form of baseline data);
- Time limited: achievable within a specific period of time;
- Specific: clearly defined so that all people involved in the project have the same understanding of what the terms in the objective mean;
- Practical: achievable and appropriate within the context of the project site.

1.4 Data should be collected that will allow objectives and programme elements to be linked to outcomes.

1.5 Plans should be devised for cost-effective interventions that can be replicated because they fit both within the capacity of the implementing organization or government body to deliver and with practical realities and perceptions on the ground.

1.6 There should be a clear idea in advance of the intervention as to how the outcomes can be measured and evaluated, including developing alternatives to formal evaluations since these are not always feasible in view of the costs involved.

2. Implementation and reflection on the programme

2.1 There should be negotiations, around research findings, with all stakeholders on a problem in order to build consensus, a shared understanding of the problems and a shared perception that working together benefits all parties and then designing very specific objectives (short-, medium- and long-term) that fit with both the research findings and what the implementers and participants can actually accomplish.

2.2 Participants and/or a target site which can contribute to meeting programme objectives, especially in terms of reducing level of risk of a type of crime or offering lessons (a pilot) for replication, should be selected.

2.3 There should be an identification of examples of appropriate, cost-effective crime prevention practices that can be replicated.

2.4 Monitoring mechanisms, such as oversight committees, or inter-sectoral meetings that allow for quality control to ensure that each objective designed for a crime prevention impact is being achieved should be established.

2.5 Independent impact evaluations, which can tell us if an intervention has the actual effect of reducing crime and that includes a clear plan for integrating the findings into the programme, should be carried out.

3. Sustaining the impact

Define the group and method by which the achievements will be sustained at the planning stage and then engage a plan that empowers those role-players (often the most local ones) who can sustain the intervention because they best understand the physical, social, economic and political environment in which they live or are situated.

The project participants very realistically recognized, however, that for many developing countries these standards might be very difficult to maintain in the early stages of a crime prevention strategy and they devised a set of minimum standards for use in developing countries. They are:

4. Minimum standards of good practice in developing countries

4.1 Be very specific about objectives (what is going to be achieved) and how they will be achieved, so that success is defined and measurable.

4.2 Identify and promote low-cost and yet effective interventions that are already an established social, cultural, institutional or legal practice and can be sustained and replicated with minimal government support.

4.3 Develop structures, partnerships and opportunities wherein both government and non-government organizations can cooperate around a common strategic plan that is area-based for a greater concentration of expertise and inputs.

4.4 Identify, develop and engage user-friendly ways to share information about good practices from ongoing interventions, since many organizations do not have the capacity for ongoing research and analysis.

4.5 Advocate and focus on integrated, national, five-year development plans to create clear and permanent conduits for the flow of monitoring-based information and to reduce the number of monitoring bodies while improving the level of integration among role-players.

Crime prevention programmes

Basic needs for crime prevention:

Factors such as poverty, inequality, greed, relative deprivation, unemployment, lack of primary education, state violence, corruption and disregarding the rule of law have been identified as some of the drivers of criminality. They will not necessarily result in crime, but they are major risk factors and they do increase the possibility that people will turn to crime. Preaching at governments is unlikely to make much progress as they will either be trying hard to rid their societies of these problems or they will say they are, because no one can say they are in favour of them. However, political support both from the international community and from national governments is needed for programmes and policy development.

In addition, violence resulting from unhealthy social environments in marginal urban areas is taking a deadly toll. […] Governments and the health sector in a number of Latin American countries are growing increasingly concerned about juvenile

violence, which is leading to the formation of gangs that conduct transnational operations such as kidnapping, human trafficking, and weapon and drug smuggling.[10]

What follows are some examples of approaches and interventions which have proven to yield satisfactory results.

Some projects to tackle criminality

Enhancing parenting skills has been shown to work in reducing violence.

This would include:

- Training on discipline;
- Health;
- Nutrition;
- Financial management; and
- The need for reason and fairness in child/parent relationships.

It would stress the importance of a warm, loving environment which gradually began to demonstrate to children how important and highly regarded they were. The skills can be taught at school, in correctional institutions, in parenting classes, in polyclinics and by trained personnel as a post natal home service. However, there seems to be good evidence that home visits are very effective and therefore recommended.

This is an area which will need good preparation as most parents do not think they need lessons in parenting. Thus, the process should start by getting the support of:

- Health ministries;
- Health professionals;
- Clinic workers; and then
- Potential parents and their immediate families during the antenatal period.

Clients to concentrate on would be young mothers with little experience and, if possible, their partners and close relatives if they were going to be involved in the upbringing of the child.

If possible, the visits should be weekly to start and last for at least six months. There should be refresher visits until the child reaches at least the age of two.[11]

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[10]Pan American Health Organization, *Health in the Americas 2007*, vol. 1, pp. 10, 21. www.paho.org/English/DD/PUB/csp27-stp622-e.pdf.

[11]Sherman, L. et al. (1997). *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.

The results for the child of success of parental training would be:

- Increased cognitive skills;
- Less physical and psychological abuse;
- Enhanced self-esteem;
- Less educational failure;
- Greater feeling of belonging.

For society, the gains will be lower crime rates—particularly violence.

Preschool literacy programmes for children who will be attending primary school

Programmes lasting two years, which teach disadvantaged preschool children basic literacy and, more importantly, how to learn, have been demonstrated to have a positive effect on the child's educational attainment throughout the whole time they are in school—and beyond. It has been shown to save seven dollars in long-term costs (including reduced crime and violence costs) for every one dollar spent on the programme.

The programme:

- Starts two years before primary school;
- Is aimed at children from poor disadvantaged communities;
- Is full-time;
- Preferably has specially trained teachers.

The aim is to teach the children basic literacy skills and how to learn—because this has been shown to be their biggest deficit on arriving at school at the normal time.

This might seem utopian for some developing countries—they would like to give all children some primary education—but when the basic needs have been met such preschool education should have the highest priority.

The results for the child are:

- Greater educational attainment;
- Significantly reduced chances of becoming delinquent;
- Higher lifetime earnings;
- Reduced feeling of relative deprivation;
- Greater chance of being employed.

A school curriculum based on "what works" principles

School is obviously one of the most important factors influencing the development of young people.

It is known that schools which are characterized by:

- High quality classroom management;
- Good leadership and organization;
- Emotional and educational support; and
- Policies and programmes designed to promote a pro-social, non-sexually and physically violent environment in classrooms and throughout the school;

Are those best-placed to protect their children from engaging in criminal behaviour.

Young people should come out of school with a sense of self-worth, better able to resist the pressures to use drugs and to reject the drug culture, able to communicate well, intellectually stretched, socially and emotionally prepared for adult life, imbued with an enterprise culture, with pro-social attitudes, trained in non-traditional skills such as art, music, design and sport, and ready to use their leisure constructively.

In order to do this, schools should:

- Promote cooperative learning techniques;
- Monitor student supervision;
- Increase student engagement by making the curriculum relevant and engaging;
- Reduce bullying;
- Involve parents/caregivers;
- Improve the quality of teachers through training;
- Introduce cognitive skills training;
- Improve social skills training;
- Introduce life skills training;
- Give emotional skills training including conflict resolution;
- Include health training (including HIV/AIDS);
- Work to enhance self-esteem through drama etc.;
- Include programmes on diet and fitness;
- Ensure confidentiality in pupil/teacher discussions;
- Assist parents of children with behaviour problems by creating a supportive network of parents;
- Tackle truancy and expulsion by examining their causes and providing solutions;
- Enhance remedial training for those with learning difficulties;
- Produce a better balance between academic and skills-based education.

The results for the pupil would be:

- Cognitive skills;
- Greater self-confidence;
- Ability to communicate;
- Ability to resist delinquent pressure;
- Pro-social attitudes;
- Understanding of cultural heritage and greater feeling of self worth;
- Better employment prospects.

A promising programme from Jamaica which involves changes to the school curriculum and teaching methods is described in the box.

Change from Within (CFW) – Jamaica, reports as follows:

"The project aims to change schools from their current culture of violence by demanding leadership of principals, adjusting the curriculum to meet the interests of students, training teachers to become mentors and involving students and parents in the process of change. One of the interventions used is the regular meeting of principals called the Circle of Friends. The process of respectful intervention is used in the schools whereby children are shown respect, which turns the teachers from transmitters of information into mentors guiding total development. This connects with an important CFW demand for leadership at every level, starting with the school principal, without whose leadership the change from within cannot proceed, but extending down the line to the students, who must be given the opportunities to exercise leadership. The results are seen in behaviour change with the curriculum being adjusted to meet the interest of the students, moving teachers to become mentors and involving students, parents and the community in the process of change. For example to reduce extortion, administration increased their presence on grounds during breaks and met the students at the gates. To decrease marijuana (ganja) smoking, student-teacher discussions were held and then sports equipment was placed where smoking used to occur and the rule against smoking was publicized to ensure that students knew that smoking was not allowed.

Reduction in crime has been measured in several CFW schools. In one inner city high school, interventions were carried out during the 2002/2003 to 2006/2007 period. Changes in weapons seizure, gang activity, extortion and marijuana smoking were measured and all appeared to have fallen significantly."

A restorative justice system for juveniles

At the moment, most juveniles are dealt with in the normal adversarial justice system. This reinforces their idea that life is about conflict and exclusion. It also often leaves victims with the feeling that they have been ignored and victimized again.

A restorative justice system where all the parties agree that the function of the process is to restore the offenders to their communities through mediated community discussions and meetings (which involve the victim) has been shown in some

countries to be highly successful in reducing offending behaviour. The principles and assumptions behind it are:

- Most crimes are against identifiable people and communities;
- Victims and the community are central to judicial processes;
- The first priority of the justice processes is to assist victims;
- The second priority is to restore communities;
- The offender has personal responsibility to victims and communities;
- Offenders will develop improved competencies and understanding through a restorative process.

If restorative justice is in the tradition in a developing country, then one would particularly expect it to have positive results.

However, adversarial justice (where the prosecution tries to prove an accused guilty and the defence that the prosecution has not succeeded in proving guilt) now has deep roots in our regions and introducing restorative justice is not easy.

- Courts have to agree to give up some of their jurisdiction (never an easy thing) and agree to a new role;
- The police must buy-in to the new approach;
- There has to be agreement as to the type of offence that can be dealt with through the new system;
- People have to re-think their attitudes to current forms of punishment;
- Communities have to agree to take responsibility for young people;
- Victims have to agree to be involved.

The expected positive results for the victim are:

- They feel that people will understand how they feel;
- They will get some direct form of recognition and recompense;
- They will get any necessary assistance.

The expected positive results for the offender are:

- A greater feeling of being treated fairly;
- A feeling of more stake and involvement in the community;
- Improved cognitive skills resulting from meeting the victim and seeing how they were affected by the crime.

Treatment-based corrections

It was shown in the last section that, with proper implementation processes, rehabilitation programmes can work for juvenile and adult offenders in correctional

institutions and in the community if tailored to the right offender. A one-fits-all approach will fail.

After providing for the basics of living—a decent room or dormitory, sufficient food, hygiene and health care—the programme should involve:

- Basic literacy programmes for those who need them;
- Cognitive skills training;
- Life skills programmes;
- Drug and alcohol treatment;
- Work-preparation programmes, including enhancing skills;
- Pre-release employment programmes for prisoners;
- Support for job placement after release;
- Specific programmes should be extended to the close family members and/or relations of the offenders, as applicable.

Basic literacy programmes

A majority of offenders lack basic literacy skills. Some prison testing has indicated that as many as 60 per cent of prisoners are functionally illiterate in developed countries—i.e. they lack the skills to deal with everyday situations.[12] Besides, not being able to fill in a tax form, understand a menu in a café and read a bus time-table they can only function at the level needed for unskilled jobs. Ex-prisoners who successfully complete such programmes have a lower reconviction rate than a matched sample who do not.

The training should be for:

- Prisoners below level 1 in reading, spelling, punctuation or numeracy;
- At least 30 hours and may have to be 100 (the amount of training necessary will vary with age).

Clearly the basic needs for the programme are:

- The ability to test literacy levels;
- Trained teachers;
- Classrooms; and, if possible,
- Employment schemes.

Prisoners who drop out early have reconviction rates as high as those who take no training and therefore special efforts should be made to encourage all who start to finish the course.

[12]See, for example, the Dalguish study (UK), in: Holme, R. (2004). *Literacy: An Introduction.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p. 20.

Cognitive skills training

It has been demonstrated that many offenders lack the thinking skills to live a crime-free life. They:

- Often cannot see the likely effects of their behaviour;
- Cannot think ahead;
- Cannot see how their actions will affect others.

Cognitive skills training tries to correct these deficiencies.

Two programmes that have been shown to reduce the chance of reconviction are:

- Reasoning and rehabilitation (R&R); and
- Enhanced thinking skills (ETS).

R&R has 36 two-hour sessions and ETS has 20 two-hour sessions.

The treatment targets are:

- Self-control (thinking before acting);
- Interpersonal problem solving skills;
- Social perspective taking;
- Critical reasoning skills;
- Thinking style;
- Understanding the values which govern behaviour.

The course needs specially trained teachers and it seems particularly susceptible to implementation failure—i.e. it seems to lose its effect if the course is not followed faithfully. Part of the problem seems to be that some teachers think they know better what will work and go off on their own path. Such an approach has proven to be ineffective.

Drug and alcohol abuse treatment programmes

Given the significant rise in the number of recorded drug crimes in the regions, there is a huge need for demand-reducing treatment programmes administered either in an institution or in the community, as both can be successful.

Institution-based programmes

Programmes based in institutions (usually prisons) are of four main types:

- Therapeutic communities;
- Cognitive skills training;

- Methadone replacement; and
- Twelve steps.

Therapeutic communities are intensive one-year (at least) programmes. They address an individual's personal, social and moral development through:

- Self-help;
- Mutual self-help; and
- Encounter groups.

Cognitive skills training has been described above.

Methadone replacement is a treatment for heroin addiction and consists of replacing heroin with methadone and gradually reducing the dose.

Twelve steps is a programme devised by Alcoholics Anonymous in the 1930s in the United States and is firmly religion-based.[13]

The evidence is that all the programmes can reduce addiction if used for the right kind of offender and are properly administered.

Community-based programmes

Community-based programmes are usually based on:

- Cognitive/behavioural training;
- Counselling;
- Drug replacement;
- Support; and
- Regular testing.

It is clear that completion of the treatment is very closely related to a greater chance of success, so improving retention rates is a very important part of the implementation process.

Evidence shows that drug programmes can be successful, even if the offender does not wish to go on the programme. The results of successful treatment are:

- Reduced demand for illicit drugs and alcohol;
- Reduced number of drug offences;
- Reduced property crime;
- Reduced violent crime.

[13]See further Volkmann, R. and D. R. Cressey (1963). "Differential Association and the Rehabilitation of Drug Addicts." *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 69, No. 2, pp. 129-142.

The positive effects of all these programmes will be:

- A higher literacy level;
- A lower unemployment rate for ex-offenders;
- Greater feeling of self-confidence;
- Greater feeling of self-worth;
- Reduced demand for alcohol and illicit drugs;
- More pro-social attitudes;
- A greater stake in society.

And hence a reduction in recidivism and victimization.

Parole and pre-release work programmes

Parole and pre-release work programmes can reduce recidivism if implemented properly with the right offenders:

- They must be tailored to an offender's needs and capabilities;
- They should logically follow from work done in prison;
- They must be intensive;
- Work programmes must be followed by employment;
- Both programmes should last at least six months.

The courts should also be encouraged, through training, to sentence a much greater proportion of offenders to community punishments. Imprisonment is costly and is a highly successful university of crime. Evidence suggests that correctional treatment can work more effectively if delivered in the community rather than in an institution.

The list is, of course, not comprehensive, but it does give an indication of what a programme designed to reduce the propensity to commit crimes might look like.

Each of the programmes proposed will impact on a number of the risk factors identified in the previous section. The table below summarizes which programmes will address which factors.

Table 1. Programmes to increase disincentives to crime and improve the ability of communities and people to prevent crime

	Cognitive skills	*Alienation*	*Relative deprivation*	*Poverty*	*Parental abuse*	*Family/peer pressure*	*Low self-esteem*	*Educational failure*	*Drugs and alcohol*
Enhancing parenting skills	✓	✓			✓		✓	✓	
Preschool literacy programmes	✓		✓	✓			✓	✓	
Improving school curriculum	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	
Restorative justice for juveniles	✓	✓					✓		
Treatment-based corrections	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	
Drug and alcohol treatment	✓			✓			✓		✓

Programmes to increase disincentives to crime and improve the ability of communities and people to prevent crime

Youth gang problems

In this section there is advice on how to deal with youth gang problems—including how to reduce inter-gang violence. A youth gang is "any durable street-oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activity is part of its group identity" (Klein and Maxon, 2006). It must be accepted that the diversity and complexity of the youth gang problem defies an easy solution or single strategy.

In a recent publication from the National Crime Prevention Centre in Canada, the writers say:

> "The response to youth gang problems … has produced three primary strategies: prevention, intervention and suppression.
>
> Gang prevention programmes typically focus on discouraging children and youth, especially those at high-risk, from joining gangs. Gang intervention programmes, on the other hand, generally target active gangs and gang members. Lastly, gang suppression programmes usually involve specialized gang units (typically led by

the police and/or criminal prosecutors) that target gang members and their illicit activities through aggressive enforcement of laws."[14]

Over the last three decades, experience has shown that certain approaches do not work. They include:

- Suppression on its own;
- Imprisonment; indeed, imprisonment normally makes a bad position worse;
- Detached worker programmes (without supervision);
- The Gang Resistance Education and Training Programme (G.R.E.A.T.)—a programme run by the police in schools to discourage young people joining gangs.

However, there are now a number of examples which have been shown to work.

Summarizing them, a programme should have five main components:

- Community mobilization—including residents, youth community groups etc. to link organizations and coordinate programmes;
- Social intervention—providing outreach and social services to gang-youth and those at risk;
- Opportunities provision—providing access to education, training and employment programmes to those at risk;
- Suppression—conducting enforcement activities and supervision and monitoring by criminal justice agencies;
- Organizational change and development —facilitating change in the community, through such ways as "problem-solving" approach and community policing.

This model has been demonstrated to reduce crime and drug offences, particularly violent crime. However, it has been shown that because of the complexity of the programme it can have a high rate of implementation failure unless backed strongly by all those involved—especially the politicians.

There are still some other good examples. For instance, the "Operation ceasefire" (the Boston Gun Project) has also proved successful in reducing youth homicide and gun violence. The lessons are:

- Involve the community in agreeing to support the approach;
- Have a head-on blitz on illicit firearms suppliers;
- Target the multi-repeat offenders in the neighbourhoods;
- Provide training and social service help to the youth.

[14]National Crime Prevention Centre, Canada (2007). *Adressing Youth Gang Problems: An Overview of Programs and Practices*.
www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cp/res/_fl/2007-YG-03-eng.pdf.

Methods to use include:

- Targeting gangs engaged in violent crime;
- Reaching out in an open manner to members of the targeted gangs both to get information and provide support and help;
- Delivering a direct message that violence will not be tolerated under any circumstance;
- Reinforcing that message by "pulling every lever" legally available (e.g. by applying the appropriate police, criminal prosecution and/or probation sanctions) when violence occurred.

In the particular area of trying to prevent gang-related gun violence there is now positive evidence on how it can be achieved:[15]

- Apply coordinated leverage to gangs through highly publicized multi-agency targeted crackdowns aimed at gangs using firearms;
- Enhance community relations to obtain neighbourhood support for the targeted crackdowns;
- Engage gang-members in eliciting information and transmitting consistent messages about targeted crackdowns;
- Develop inter-gang mediation services to head off and diffuse tensions;
- Protect victims and repeat victims;
- Provide training and support.

But if these programmes are to work, then there must be:

- Strategic planning;
- An accurate and thorough diagnosis of the problem—remember, gangs have complex social, political, educational, justice and economic layers;
- Comprehensive and integrated approaches;
- Multi-sectoral and multi-agency approaches;
- A lead agency which coordinates the programme;
- Proper targeting and different levels of intervention depending on the kind of gang you are dealing with.

A promising community effort to reduce community conflict and violence in very deprived areas of Jamaica is described below.

[15]See, for example, Braga, A., Kennedy, F.M and E.J. Waring (2001). "Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire". *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 195-225 .

The Peace Management Initiative (Kingston, Jamaica)

The Peace Management Initiative (PMI) was established in Kingston in 2002 by the Minister of National Security as a reaction to the very high levels of community conflict—much of which resulted in homicide, and to the feeling that the police could not stem the violence on their own.

The group asked to manage the PMI was made up of six "civil society" members, including members of the church, academia and the head of the Dispute Resolution Foundation and three members of each of the two main political parties, including MPs. (The inclusion of the political members was highly significant in that it recognized the political nature of many of the disputes.)

The terms of reference for the PMI were to prevent or defuse potential or actual outbreaks of community and gang violence (not domestic or conventionally criminal violence) throughout Kingston and adjoining urban areas. The PMI was to be independent—in that it could help any community it felt seriously wanted to reduce violence and in that it did not involve the police in its work.

In the first four years of its work, the PMI worked in over 50 communities in 15 different areas of Kingston.

Initially, the work of the PMI concentrated on mediation between or within communities in conflict but it quickly added welfare and development work.

If mediation was successful (often a very difficult process), then the PMI would try to:

- Assist capacity-building for social inclusion;
- Facilitate community development activities;
- Help establish ongoing relations with and between community leaders;
- Assist in the improvement of the community environment;
- Design and implement programmes for sustainable employment, health improvement and personal development; and
- Facilitate treatment and counselling of affected persons.

The great majority of participants have judged the work of the PMI as effective or very effective although it has been acknowledged that there have been organizational and financial problems. In addition, there has been a very useful exercise in identifying the achievements, strengths, weaknesses and challenges of the project.

The factors which have been identified as associated with its perceived success are:

- The direct role of the charismatic chairman;
- The composition of the PMI (members are seen as trustworthy);
- The fact that a huge majority of community members want it to be successful;
- The controlled involvement of the police; and
- The mutual respect developed between the PMI and the communities.[a]

The crucial question, though, is: Did the PMI reduce community conflict and homicide? There is, unfortunately, no hard evidence as yet although, given the activities carried out and the approach taken, it would be surprising if the PMI has not prevented some violence and murders.

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[a]The very comprehensive list of lessons learned from the project is too long to reproduce here. It was drawn from the project evaluation report.

A large percentage of youth in Latin America and the Caribbean are at high risk of engaging in dangerous behaviour such as association with gangs. In the Americas, adolescents aged 10 to 19 years old account for 28.7 per cent of all homicides. The IDB supported a project in Uruguay to train youth and integrate them into society. As a result, 24 per cent were able to enter the job market for the first time immediately after the intervention was finished.[16]

Preventing domestic violence

Domestic violence can be defined to include any level of violence, from verbal violence to murder between any members of a family (however defined). This section, however, will only deal with violence by males on their female partners or ex-partners.

Preventing such violence involves the three basic prevention methods described in this handbook.

Outlining the risk factors related to violence against women suggests a reduction and prevention strategy:

- The best predictor (or highest risk factor) of domestic violence is previous domestic violence;
- Minor violence is a predictor of escalation to major violence;
- Use of emotional abuse and controlling behaviour is a predictor of violence;
- Alcohol abuse is a risk factor;
- Women in process of separating from their partner are at higher risk than those in other statuses;
- The risk of violence goes up the greater the level of economic dependency of the woman on the man;
- Men who believe wife beating is legitimate are more likely to become perpetrators;
- Men who believe in their right to run the family are more likely to be perpetrators;
- Violence against women is more common in poor and financially insecure households;
- Unemployed women who lack economic resources find it more difficult to leave violent partners;
- It is possible that witnessing or experiencing domestic violence as a child is linked to becoming a perpetrator later;
- If there is child abuse in a family, it is more likely that there will be female abuse;

[16]Inter-American Development Bank, *Emphasizing Prevention*, op. cit.

- Women under 25 are more at risk than older women;
- It is possible that disabled women are more at risk;
- There is possibly more violence against women if the community supports strict traditional gender roles;
- There is more violence against women if community norms are supportive thereof;
- There is more violence against women if there are few supports for victims and low prosecution of offenders.

Some of the ways to reduce or prevent violence against women, then, are:

- Community education programmes designed to produce a change in community attitudes associated with violence against women;[17]
- Criminal justice programmes that strongly condemn violence against women;
- Home visitation programmes for parents of very young children to counsel on parent-child relations, child development and parenting skills;
- Removal, as soon as possible, of children from homes where partner violence is happening;
- Teaching school-aged children about cultural stereotypes and promoting attitudes favourable to non-violence;
- Engaging adolescents in discussions on the dynamics of violence against women;
- Having schools include in the curriculum programmes to promote healthy relationships and target violence, substance abuse and risky sexual behaviour;
- Offering adults advice through public awareness programmes on how to recognize abuse, about what the average person can do to help friends in violent and abusive relationships and where to go for help.

And on the more immediate level:

- The provision of shelters or refuges for abused women;
- Providing pendent alarms for vulnerable women—particularly those separated from their partner;
- Training for all police officers in a force about domestic violence and its prevention;
- A programme of incremental interventions of increasing intensity by the police and social services for repeat victims;
- A comprehensive domestic violence data base shared by police, courts and social services;

[17]For a more detailed description of such programmes, see: Smaoun, S. (ed.) (2000). *Violence Against Women in Urban Areas-An Analysis of the Problem from a Gender Perspective*. UMP Working Paper Series 17. Nairobi: United Nations Centre for Human Settlements.

- Early follow-up by the police on victims of violence giving practical and emotional support, legal advice, assurance that the victim was not at fault and referral to other agencies;
- The involvement of other family members in giving support and assistance;
- Programmes to increase the economic independence of women at risk;
- The prosecution of perpetrators;
- Treatment programmes for perpetrators based on a cognitive-behavioural approach and gender analysis which tackles the belief system that men have the right to control women in intimate relationships.

Below is an excellent example of a South African experiment which tackled economic dependency in rural South Africa and reduced partner violence.

The Image Study. Limpopo. South Africa

The project aim was to test microfinance as a tool to tackle the social determinants of vulnerability to domestic violence.

The theory was that intimate partner violence was related to poverty and gender and economic inequality.

The design was quasi-experimental in that four villages were given the intervention and four comparable villages were not until the end of the experiment. There were quantitative surveys at the baseline and 2-3 years later.

The poorest women in the selected villages were given small loans which enabled them to set up small businesses selling produce or clothes or food or providing creches.

860 women were enrolled and 1,750 loans were disbursed. 99.7 per cent of the loans were repaid.

Image phase 1 consisted of 10 compulsory training sessions which were integrated into the loan repayment meetings and which focused on gender norms, domestic violence, sexuality and HIV. Image phase 2 was aimed at community mobilization through the natural leaders discovered in phase 1.

The assets, savings and expenditure of the loan recipients all increased as did the self-confidence, willingness to challenge gender roles, communication with their partner, progressive attitudes to violence and autonomy decisions compared with the control group.

The past-year experience of partner violence was reduced by 55 per cent.

How was violence reduced?

- Shifts in attitudes to violence;
- Income earning status;
- Confidence to leave abusive relationships;
- Reduced conflicts over finances;
- Better communication;
- Speaking openly in meetings about violence;
- Confronting people who were abusive;
- Support to women who wanted to leave abusive relationships.

Broader effects:

- Intervening individually when witnessing violence;
- Providing advice to women in the community;
- Engaging young men;
- Raising community awareness;
- Organizing workshops, meetings, marches and new partnerships.[a]

[a]See, for example, Kim, J.C. et al. (2007). "Understanding the Impact of a Microfinance-Based Intervention on Women's Empowerment and the Reduction of Intimate Partner Violence in South Africa". *American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 97, No. 10, pp. 1794-1802.

Preventing homicide

Homicide is a special subset of crime because it involves the taking of something that almost all people think is their most treasured possession—their life. Homicide and its variants—patricide, matricide, fratricide, regicide, infanticide—have a special place in law, custom, literature and tradition; low rates are seen as a matter of national pride. Preventing or reducing homicide has special urgency.

However, some clarification is needed at the outset.

First, as has been shown earlier, homicide is not just violence carried to extremes—in Southern Africa, for example, there is only a small correlation between homicide rates and other violence, Barbados has a lower assault rate than most of Western Europe, but a homicide rate four times higher, and Jamaica, South Africa and Trinidad have homicide rates much higher than their level of development would lead us to expect (given that there is a high correlation between homicide rates and the Human Development Index (HDI)).

Second, homicide is not the same in all countries. For example, in England and Wales, your first year is the year you are most at risk of being murdered, and a large proportion of murders are within the family, while in Barbados babies are hardly ever victims of homicide, and intra-family murder is rare; most murders are of neighbours. In Jamaica and Trinidad, homicide is often politics, drug and gang-related while this is rare in Africa.

Indeed, in Africa, homicide is often related to the situation resulting from former civil wars. According to the World Bank, homicide rates increase by 25 per cent in the five years following a civil war (UNODC/2005 (a): p.14). Some of the factors leading to increased crime in a post-conflict period are psychological traumas, the education of young people in the skills of violence, displacement of populations and other humanitarian disasters which can result in community conflict. In addition, the general weakening of the State and its institutions can derail attempts at re-establishing order.

However, there are two overwhelming relationships with homicide in the regions of the study—the level of development and the level of inequality. Excluding the countries with abnormal homicide rates, there is a correlation of -0.72 with the HDI and 0.75 with the Gini coefficient of inequality. In other words, the lower the level of development, the higher the murder rate, and the greater the inequality, the higher the murder rate. The developed country with the highest homicide rate is the United States (5.9 per 100,000).

There seems to be little doubt, therefore, that development and reduction in inequality will reduce the homicide rate. The difficulties and implications of this have been discussed above.

The manufacture and trade in illicit drugs involves huge amounts of money and high levels of organization. The organization normally involves the formation of gangs to defend territory and move the drugs between the manufacturer and the consumer. High levels of homicide are often associated with these activities.

In the United States, drug-related homicide has dropped in the last decade probably because of some reduction in demand for drugs, but more pessimistically because a lot of the turf wars have been settled and there is not such a need to defend territory. However, reducing demand for drugs would be one way to reduce homicide. (Reducing supply, on the other hand, without reducing demand, could well have the opposite effect as gangs would fight to retain their market.)

Some alleviation of the problem has been discussed in the section on gangs (see above), but the incentives for poor young males to continue in the drugs trade are so high that relief will be temporary unless a legitimate source of income can be found for the young men. This means increasing education levels, training and providing jobs. But these only come with poverty reduction and sustained development (although there is no fixed relationship between growth and poverty reduction, it is estimated that in most developing countries GDP must grow by at least 6 to 7 per cent a year over a sustained period, while also being shared in a socially just way, for unemployment to fall).[18]

Reducing the homicide related to more general community conflict has been discussed above.

Guns and homicide

The availability of guns (particularly handguns) in a country and the homicide rate are linked. There are some exceptions to this (Switzerland is a special case), but generally it is true. Therefore, limiting gun availability will reduce homicide rates. The problem for the Caribbean is that there has been a huge increase in the number of guns available as a direct result of the drugs trade and in the incentives to have one (power, self-defence, to protect turf, command respect and demand sex).

[18]Islam, op.cit.

It is not easy to reduce the number of guns in circulation, but the effort must be made.

The United Nations/World Bank report on crime in the Caribbean[19] suggests:

1. Gun control through regulation and inspection rather than outright ban with the intention of reducing the leakage of registered guns into the illegal market, by:
   - Tight controls of vendor and purchaser;
   - Local sales with thorough background checks and close scrutiny of purchasers;
   - Importation with issuance of import licence;
   - Transfers of firearms with notification to authorities.

2. Improved interdiction of illegal guns by:
   - Intensive surveillance of the coast;
   - Searching all landing passengers by customs officers trained to search for guns and their constituent parts and methods of concealment.

3. Marking, registration and licensing to make guns traceable.

4. Ensuring guns are securely stored.

5. The creation of national or regional gun registries.

6. A criminal justice system which can gather, preserve and present evidence and provide the forensic expertise to solve gun crimes.

7. Having data that can be shared with all involved within country, region and further afield.

Higher risk situations

Homicide is very difficult to predict, but there are some situations where the risk is higher than chance. Domestic violence has been discussed above, but other relatively risky situations are:

Bars

- Alcohol can make some people much more aggressive than they normally are, so this should be taken account of in the management and design of drinking establishments;
- Bar staff should be trained to recognize behaviour that could become violent and customers who have drunk to the point of irresponsibility;

[19]UNODC and The World Bank (2007). *Crime, Violence and Development: Trends, Costs and Policy Options in the Caribbean.*

- "Glasses" should be made of plastic, and bottles should not be given to customers;
- Groups of young people should not be allowed to congregate outside the establishment after it has closed.

Long-running disputes between neighbours

A significant number of homicides in developing countries are the result of disputes between neighbours. Community police officers (where they exist) or other members of the community will be aware of these disputes. Prevention practices should include:

- Making communities and local police aware that such disputes indicate a homicide risk;
- Attempting mediation with those involved, once a judgment has been made that the quarrel is not trivial;
- Attempting to separate the disputants physically if at all practical;
- Involving the criminal justice and social service systems if violence breaks out;
- Increasing surveillance if the dispute escalates;
- Providing alarms for the families in dispute.

Very young children with step-parents

In some societies, very young children with at least one step-parent are more at risk. If such children are brought into the health system with injuries said to be from accidents, health-care professionals should seriously consider whether to alert social service providers.

People with a record of serious violence

Many murderers have no criminal record, but others do have a record of previous violence. For violent recidivists, very serious consideration should be given to ensuring that they have to attend anger management courses and cognitive skills courses.

These are some ways to reduce particular offences. The rest of this section discusses two major ways to organize the community to reduce crime more generally.

Informal social prevention

Professionals have long believed that informal social control (i.e. control of criminal behaviour by the spontaneous actions of the community) is one of the most effective crime inhibitors, but before the Chicago Project (described above) there was largely

only anecdotal evidence to support it. However, the Chicago Project has shown how effective it can be. The requirements for informal social control are social capital and collective efficacy (i.e. the willingness to use networks, norms and trust in your neighbours that facilitate co-ordination and cooperation for mutual benefit; and the ability to take effective action based on shared beliefs).

The research suggests there are three main mechanisms for this to happen:

- There must be the successful linking of adults and children in the community;
- There should be exchange of information within and between families; and
- There must be an expectation that people will intervene on behalf of the children and young people of the neighbourhood.

So, how is it possible to get these mechanisms working in neighbourhoods which are not working well?

- Neighbourhood residential stability and the introduction of successful neighbourhood associations appear to be essential.

What would a programme look like?

The hoped-for outcome would be:

- Improved neighbourhood-levels of income, education, crime, health and physical infrastructure.

Progress would be being made when there were interim outcomes such as:

- High level of contact between children and adults;
- A belief that this was a good place to bring up children;
- Residential stability;
- Good inter-group relations;
- High level of volunteerism;
- Residents feeling comfortable acting when a neighbour or a neighbour's child does something wrong;
- Residents who believe they can be successful in achieving goals;
- The vulnerable population well-cared for.

But what are the activities which might result in these longer-term outcomes? They are:

- Form a local multi-institutional project group to act as a standing advisory body;
- Ensure that a neighbourhood association exists and is supported;
- Identify current and potential neighbourhood leaders;
- Give the programme widespread publicity;

- Involve the local media in the programme;
- Involve churches in the community building exercise;
- Involve all schools in the community building exercise;
- Develop a neighbourhood newsletter to be distributed to everyone;
- Promote the active participation of all residents by door-to-door canvassing within the community;
- Launch leadership development programmes;
- Train residents in conflict resolution, community organizing and leadership skills using the appropriate range of instructional methodologies;
- Have a neighbourhood clean-up;
- Have neighbourhood parties/events;
- Form mutual support groups;
- Establish safe places where children can go if they feel threatened;
- Promote neighbourhood intergenerational sports teams;
- Encourage self-reliance through training and employment/career guidance.

Programmes to reduce opportunities for crime

This is not going to be easy to do but the rewards could be huge. It was said earlier that Barbados has a low crime rate compared with many other countries. The key probably is the high level of informal social control on the island. The crime survey showed that in Barbados there is great residential stability and that people know their neighbours well and look out for each other.

The above mentioned socially-oriented crime prevention approach constitutes the basis for success. Accordingly, the United Nations crime prevention guidelines (ECOSOC resolution 2002/13—annex) recommend the expansion of social measures in line with the objectives of social inclusion of marginalized populations into mainstream activities. Notwithstanding that the United Nations guidelines recommend also other measures to prevent crime, particular priority is accorded below to "situational" measures. Situational crime prevention encompasses approaches which prevent the occurrence of crimes by reducing opportunities, increasing risks of being apprehended and minimizing benefits, including through environmental design, and by providing assistance and information to potential and actual victims. In the implementation of these approaches, particular emphasis should be placed on community involvement, i.e. the active participation of civil society in crime prevention strategies, as well as on the formation of partnerships at different levels and among different sectors. The subsequent section is to outline the principles of situational crime prevention and to illustrate how they should be applied to the various opportunity-reduction projects.

Properly organized opportunity-reduction programmes have been shown to be the most cost-effective way to reduce crime. There is now a great deal of experience of such programmes and they have contributed significantly to the falling crime rates in the United Kingdom.

Programmes can be effective if just managed by one agency (e.g. the police), but the evidence once again is that multi-contributor partnerships are the most effective. In addition, it is now known that effectiveness can be improved by applying six key concepts. They are:

- Aims which describe overall problem-solving or crime reduction aspirations;
- Problem-specification (a more detailed and evidenced statement of an aim);
- Tactics which describe what will actually be done;
- Mechanisms, i.e. the ways tactics will bring about change;
- Context which comprises the place, time, social organization, etc. within which the tactics will activate change mechanisms;
- Replication which involves adopting and adapting approaches which have been found to work in one context so that they will work somewhere else.

Anti-burglary projects

If it has been decided by a local crime prevention group that the aim of the effort should be to reduce burglary, they can then apply the rest of the key concepts so as to maximize their impact.

The next action, then, is to decide just what the problem is. For example:

- It could be that the neighbourhood is a prime target for burglary;
- It could be that there are a number of houses where there have been successful burglaries in the past;
- It could be an area where a number of burglars live; or
- It could be that it was a place where there was a concentration of "hot products".

The tactics would be devised to deal with whichever of these which was identified as the problem.

Four main opportunity-reducing mechanisms have been found. They are:

- Increasing the perceived effort;
- Increasing the perceived risk;
- Reducing the anticipated reward; and
- Removal of excuses for crime.

The context could include the attributes of the offending population, levels of publicity, community attitudes, the physical lay-out of the area and so on.

This is a general approach to burglary reduction. In the box below, one example from the Caribbean is used to illustrate the general model above.

Burglary was seen by the police and public as a major problem in Barbados. Therefore, it was agreed to mount an anti-burglary campaign.

The instigators of the project were the police and the Department of the Attorney General.

However, as this had not been done before, it was decided to experiment in one area.

Police crime statistics were used to find a relatively self-contained area with a high recorded burglary rate.

An evaluation plan was devised and started so that base-line data could be collected by means of a crime survey in the designated area and a control area.

The local community was alerted by a leaflet drop and was invited to meet to discuss the plan and agree on a neighbourhood committee.

An international expert was engaged to advise on the tactics, given the context of the area.

It was agreed that the main effort would not be in target hardening as most of the houses in the area were relatively flimsy and made out of wood. (This meant that improving locks and window frames would not be cost-effective.)

It was decided to try a number of concurrent mechanisms even though the evaluation would not be able to distinguish at the end which mechanism had most effect.

The mechanisms chosen were:

- Property marking (75 per cent of houses had their six most valuable items marked);
- Houses with marked property had large stickers placed near the front door;
- Improving street lighting;
- Removing derelict vehicles and buildings;
- Distributing crime prevention literature that had been designed for the area;
- Offering crime prevention help through community police officers; and
- "Debushing" i.e. removing bush and scrub from open spaces to reduce hiding places.

The project was run for two years in total.

The evaluation showed that the combined activities had reduced burglary in the area significantly compared with the control area.

Depending on the circumstances, other anti-burglary projects have:

- Provided alarms;
- Improved fencing;

- Used entry system restrictions;
- Added security alarms;
- Given special protection to people who have been victims several times;
- Targeted known offenders in the community;
- Run publicity campaigns;
- Installed gates on known escape-routes;
- Introduced alternative useful activities for local youth;
- Brought in caretakers for blocks of flats;
- Introduced CCTV;
- Had damaged property repaired very quickly.

Other projects

Situational crime prevention (SCP), using the same principles, has also:

- Cut down the number of fights at football matches;
- Reduced the number of victims of sexual and partner abuse by providing shelters;
- Reduced bank robberies;
- Massively reduced car theft by better car security and car park security;
- Reduced speeding;
- Reduced drunk driving;
- Reduced violence in pubs by introducing plastic glasses;
- Reduced cell phone thefts by introducing chip technology;
- Reduced credit card fraud by having photos and sophisticated chips;
- Reduced shoplifting by having electronic tags on merchandise;
- Reduced town centre disorder through CCTV.

The great advantage of SCP is that it is inexpensive, quick to introduce and effective. Projects that many developing countries could roll out relatively quickly and which would have an effect very quickly include:

- Massively improve street lighting in higher crime areas. (This will reduce fear as well as crime);
- Increase the use of CCTV in robbery and disorder hotspots;
- Have a general debushing programme in high crime areas. (This also reduces fear);
- Have a massive clean-up, beautification and anti-litter programme. (Crime and fear both go down when the outward signs of disorder are reduced.) (This approach is based on one of the most famous theories of SCP—the broken windows theory. The theory is outlined in the box below.)

Increase in unrepaired physical deterioration

↓

Increased concern for personal safety among residents and proprietors

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Decreased participation in maintaining order on the street

↓

Increased delinquency, rowdiness, vandalism and disorderly behaviour among locals

↓

Further increases in deterioration; further withdrawal from streets by residents and other locals

↓

Potential offenders from outside the neighborhood, attracted by vulnerability, move into locals

- If cash is the item most often stolen in burglaries, ways should be explored to find out how to encourage the saving of money in bank accounts rather than under the bed. This may involve both demand and supply side activities to remove barriers to access to banking services and any campaign will have to be specifically aimed at those groups which are not traditional users of banks;
- Regulate the purchase of valuable items (gold and jewels) by jewellery retailers—thus reducing markets for stolen goods;
- Encourage behaviour in tourists which reduces the opportunity for robbery, theft and burglary;
- Subsidize the target hardening of the houses of poor people (making entry more difficult to any type of house will obviously deter crime), and encourage other parts of government to improve the quality of housing—particularly for poorer people;
- Run a campaign to encourage the use of strictly confidential phone lines to inform on people who have illegal guns or deal in illegal drugs;
- Be strict in firearm regulation: make the legal access to handguns very difficult;
- Zero tolerance campaigns for violence in general but domestic violence and child abuse in particular—including providing more shelters for battered women and education campaigns aimed at zeroing the level of tolerance for domestic violence and child abuse.

Many of the activities addressed above may well deliver in the future, but for developing countries SCP should be high on the list of priorities.

Community policing

In spite of the fact that when the first modern police force was set up in 1829, the aim was to prevent crime, policing is still traditionally based on two models. The first—mainly in developed countries—is reactive, i.e. the police wait for a crime to

be reported and then they deal with it. The second model—often found in post-colonial developing countries—is the public order model. In this model, it is the main function of the police to keep order on behalf of the government. In neither model is the police seen as needing to provide a service to the general public. In the last three decades of the last century, things began to change and a new model for policing was introduced. Some said it was just a return to old-style policing, but, whether this was true or not, the model was new for most societies.

The new model has different names and different methods, but it has become generally known as "community policing".[20] Its origins come from a realization that the police cannot prevent crime or deal with the problems that cause it on their own. It also comes out of a greater democratization of society and a realization that the job of the police is to provide a service to all members of society—not just the powerful and influential.

In the model, crime and the causes of crime are dealt with through a partnership of police, local government, organizations devoted to solving crime problems, groups of concerned citizens and individual members of neighbourhoods and communities. The driving force behind the new model can be local government or citizens, but if it does not have the backing of the police, it will fail. Indeed, in most places the driving force has been the police for the fundamental reason that they now know they can't meet the demands on them without involving the community. (A word of caution—many police forces still prefer the old system where they are basically independent and either pay only lip-service to the model or make no pretence to change.)

Sungusungu

Sungsungu is one programme within the broader UN-HABITAT Safer Cities Programme. Essentially, it is an indigenous system of community-based policing based in the United Republic of Tanzania. The backbone of the system is the existence of defence and security committees that sit at every level from the ward to the central government.

What then is needed for community policing?

- A police force that wants to adopt the model;
- A community that wants to be involved;
- A change in the aims of the police force so that prevention and problem solving become the top priorities;
- Creating a problem-solving group from all the partners and nomination of someone or some organization to ensure things happen;
- Training and re-training of the entire police force for problem solving, e.g. by using something like the Five-Step Problem-solving Process.

[20]Nuttall, C., Eversley, D. and I. Rudder (2003). *The Barbados Crime Survey 2002 – International Comparisons*. Barbados: Ministry of the Attorney General. www.barbados.gov.bb/Docs/AG-barbadoscrimesurvey2002.pdf.

The box below reproduces the one used by the Frederick Police Department, Maryland, United States (MD)[21] as an example.

Step 1. Target a neighborhood concern

The problem-solving group should create a list of issues that:

- People care about;
- Stakeholders have observed as being a quality of life, crime, or disorder problem;
- Cause harm to the community;
- Have been the subject of repeated calls for service;
- People are willing to work on; and
- The group can impact in a reasonable period of time.

The partners should vote on the problem they want to work on from the list.

Step 2. Understand the problem

The problem-solving group should put their targeted problem under a microscope. All participants should offer as much information as possible. Answer the who, what, when, where, why and how questions about the Victim, Offender and Location sides of the Crime Triangle. Each stakeholder, neighbour or police officer holds a piece of the puzzle. Together, the problem-solving group will be able to see the big picture. The more complete the picture, the more effective you will be in impacting the problem. Do not skip this important step

Step 3. Create a plan

Create a community vision. Discuss ideas to solve the problem. Set short-term goals (up to 3 months) and long-term goals (3 to 12 months). Include actions that address each side of the Crime Triangle, including assignments for the community, the police and city agencies. How will the targeted area change and how will you measure the success? Together, decide on what to accomplish, who will do the work, and by when. Ensure that other governmental agencies are included along with all relevant stakeholders in the plan.

Step 4. Take action and review programme

Plan your actions. Assign responsibilities based on the interest and skills of volunteers. Set a time line for the completion of each step of your strategies. Involve as many people as possible in planning and carrying out the action plan. Were all assigned actions completed? In a group setting with problem-solving partners, review your progress. Evaluate all of the partners' involvement and commitment; effectiveness of actions; if harm was reduced; outcomes (within time lines); and lessons learned. Who can help, businesses, neighbours, Department of Public Works, Codes and Permits, other agencies?

Step 5. Celebrate and create a lasting community presence

Acknowledge what was accomplished. Celebrate with all your active and engaged partners. Share your success through e-mails, newsletters, flyers, local media and other outlets. Agree on methods to maintain success in partnering and impacting the problem, such as expanding or creating a Neighbourhood Watch group or initiating a block club.

[21] www.cityoffrederick.com/PublicInfo/OtherInfo/NACInfo/NAC 5 step problem-solving model.doc

- A formal involvement of local government to set up a mechanism to implement agreed policies and actions;
- Involvement of all relevant local agencies;
- Police officers to become beat-based, not city-based;
- Regular (monthly) meetings, in the same place, of the police with all their partners at the beat-level;
- Beat-level meetings to discuss neighbourhood problems, including crime;
- A commitment by the police to take the discussions into account when setting strategies and plans;
- Information available to monitor activities and results;
- Civic education effort through billboards, brochures, the media, exhibitions and meetings;
- TV, radio and word-of-mouth to publicize beat meetings;
- Encouragement by community associations of citizen participation in all events.

The experience of putting these steps into action is that it is complicated and can be frustrating. But it can be done, with proper planning and genuine will, with great gains to policing and the community.

4. The information and evaluation needs for effective crime reduction

Information needs

Regrettably, there is a lack of basic information about crime and criminal justice in the Caribbean and in Southern Africa. There are huge gaps in court and police data so that there is little data about the nature of crime in the regions, crime trends, trends in sentencing or reconviction rates of ex-offenders. For example, there is information on homicide from only about half of the countries of Southern Africa and less than half of the Caribbean. Police figures on other crimes are mostly unavailable. Court data is also extremely difficult to obtain.

Accordingly, the study was based on the available crime survey data (except for the national survey of South Africa) from the United Nations and Barbados, there are very few other surveys in the Caribbean and they are not comparable with the data of the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS). And those surveys are now getting out of date. Another problem with African ICVS is that they only cover urban centres.

Therefore, it has been difficult to find evidence about crime on which to build the plans and recommendations.

Efforts should be made to improve the availability of evidence so as to satisfy the United Nations principle of evidence-based practice.

Effective monitoring and evaluation and informed policymaking can only take place if there is a step change in the understanding of the importance of having data; data collection will not improve significantly unless there is an understanding that information matters.

The quality and dependability of information will improve when the demand for evidence-based decisions and monitoring becomes the norm, not the exception. This demand can come from two main pressure sources:

- Those inside the criminal justice system who want to know how effective and efficient their administration is; and

- Those outside the criminal justice system, such as the media, the Treasury and Parliament, who want to know what happens to crime and justice and whether taxpayers are getting value for their money.

Ministries of finance could well lead these demands because the criminal justice system costs a great deal and they should require evaluations of penal programmes before they provide more resources. If this happens, then research and statistical information will be required.

The most important way of improving data collection is to move to a criminal justice system in which decisions are based on evidence and evaluation; where:

- The public, through the media and parliament, demand information;
- The Ministry of Finance requires evidence that money spent delivers value; and
- Criminal justice system professionals demand information on which to base decisions.

Even though there are major problems using police recorded crime figures in a crime reduction programme, the collection and dissemination of the best possible police crime recording must be a high priority because the police is an organization which needs the data for its own management purposes and for accountability to people and Parliament.

There need to be:

- Standard procedures for recording crime reported by the public (this should include recording every event reported as a crime and then recording which of these have been accepted as actual crimes committed);
- Standard rules for counting recorded crimes (there should basically be one crime per victim);
- Standard rules for agreeing which crimes will be counted;
- Centralized responsibility at a senior level for recording crime;
- Training for all officers on crime recording;
- Regular circulating (monthly) of recorded crime figures to all relevant organizations within the criminal justice system;
- Agreed dates for publishing crime figures (probably once a year);
- Agreed rules for deciding when a crime has been cleared up;
- An agreement that the clear-up rate should be the number of crimes cleared up in a given period divided by the number of crimes recorded in the same period;
- Computerization of crime recording;
- Regional systems of uniform crime reporting.

Once there is computerization, a geographic information system (GIS) should be introduced so that the location of all recorded crime can be identified. Such systems are extremely useful for deployment purposes and for quickly identifying crime hot spots.

A good example of the use of GIS is in Jamaica where the location of over 5,000 violence-related injuries treated in hospital has been mapped along with police recorded homicides. This "hot-spot" mapping has been used to focus police and community-based interventions.

Regular crime (victim) surveys should be carried out. They are the only way to measure crime and its trends. This cannot be stressed too much. The surveys do not have to be huge but they do have to be country-wide and random. Most developing countries carry out a census, and therefore have the necessary statistical skills for a crime survey. Using a common interview format (e.g. ICVS) has problems, but it does mean good international comparisons can be made.

The final basic requirement is for an integrated computerized criminal justice information system (ICJIS). This is an information system which covers the whole justice system from the first report of a crime to the final release of a prisoner from prison. It may seem over-ambitious for many developing countries which currently have no regular criminal justice system information at all but tested software is available and such a system will bring enormous gains in efficiency, cost reductions and improvements to the quality of justice.

The ICJIS would cover the entire justice system starting with information entered by the police when an incident is reported to them. As the process progresses information is added by those who first get it and it is used by all who need it. The final information will be entered by whichever part of the justice system decides that the case has ended.

This will mean:

- A databank on all offenders will be built up;
- Criminal records will be available to all given authority to use them;
- Data will only be entered once—all information will be passed on down the criminal justice chain. Duplication and overlap of the data will be minimized;
- For case processing purposes those with new data will enter it and records will be kept up-to-date and accurate;
- Complete statistics on the criminal justice system will be instantly available;
- Research will have an extraordinarily powerful tool;
- Offenders will be dealt with much more quickly;
- Court delays will be reduced significantly.

As long as the programme develops as proposed, there will be an information revolution. Possible problem areas are:

- The huge cultural change needed to move from a paper-based system to a fully computerized one;
- Institutional inertia;
- Agency jealousies. The idea that all criminal justice agencies share information is radical in a culture where information is power and tends to be hoarded and hidden;
- Lack of vision;
- Attempts to save time and money by going for partial solutions.

Evaluation needs

Depending on the needs of the audience for evaluation findings, the Urban Institute in the United States suggests crime reduction programmes should be evaluated:

- To find out whether they have done, what they were designed to do and, whatever they have done, how and why they did it; and/or
- To provide information on the major aspects of how a programme operates and the extent to which specified programme objectives are being attained; and/or
- To answer questions about how the programme operates and document the procedures and activities undertaken; and/or
- To find out how much the programme costs—preferably in relation to the benefits of the programme.

This process is designed to find out if one is getting value for money from the programme, whether it is worth introducing widely, whether it is worth continuing with modifications, whether it is working as it should and how it might be tailored to different surroundings.

Some programmes—those which are ambitious, innovative, costly, experimental and new—would probably need to cover all aspects; others which were not innovative or new could manage with one or two of the elements.

For example, it would be very important to know whether parenting programmes introduced into a context they have not been tried in before worked as hoped. Because implementing them on a grand scale will be very expensive and could be taking funds from programmes that could deliver more, a full impact evaluation would be justified (i.e. one which would reveal whether the hoped-for outcomes had happened and whether it was the programme which had been responsible and how it was implemented and how much it cost).

On the other hand, if the programme being introduced is tried and tested (perhaps improving street lighting), such an evaluation does not need to be carried out. In

this case, an evaluation should be geared towards revealing if the programme was carried out as it should have been and whether the results were consistent with expectation.

The general rule would be to carry out the least complex evaluation consistent with the importance of the outcome and the likely effect on expenditure.

The Urban Institute has produced an excellent guide to evaluation strategies and it is well worth consulting. Below some of its recommendations are summarized.[22]

There are three main types of impact analysis (the first element above).

The experimental design

Experiments require that individuals or groups are assigned at random into two or more groups and that the "treatment" group will receive the particular services that were designed to achieve the desired outcome. The "control" group does not receive the treatment. The outcomes for the two groups are compared.

Such designs, particularly in criminal justice, are fraught with ethical and administrative difficulties and normally should not be attempted.

Quasi-experimental design

These evaluations also compare outcomes from programme participants to outcomes for comparison groups which do not receive the programme. The critical difference is that groups are not chosen at random. Groups are made up of participants who are as similar as possible, and then statistical techniques are used to control for the remaining differences.

As in the experimental case, such designs may occasionally be problematic but they remain the most common method of outcome analysis.

Non-experimental evaluations

These evaluations examine changes in levels of risk or outcome for the programme participants but do not include a comparison group.

The design variations include:

- Before and after comparisons of the outcome measure;
- Time series designs;

[22]Harrell, A.V. et al. (1996) *Evaluation Strategies for Human Services Programs: A Guide for Policymakers and Providers*. www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=306619.

- Panel studies based on repeated measurements of outcomes for the group; and
- Post-programme comparisons among groups of participants.

This is the most common type of impact analysis—because it is the easiest to arrange and can be reliable. Unfortunately it is often done wrongly and gives rise to the greatest number of false results.

The most common reason for error is that pre-programme results are simply compared with post-programme results and if, for example, crime (the factor most people are interested in) has fallen, the programme is declared a success. What is often not done is to see whether the fall in crime was just part of a general trend, and whether crime has also fallen in places which did not have the programme.

An example:

New York City developed new policing methods in the early 1990s. They included "zero tolerance" for offending and greatly improved management methods. The methods were evaluated a few years later by comparing crime rates when the reforms were introduced with those at the end of the evaluation period. Crime had fallen and the reforms were declared a huge success.

In fact there is no evidence that the measures worked. If the evaluators had looked at crime trends in New York for a few years before the measures had started and in other cities they would have found:

- Crime in New York had started to fall several years before and that the fall just continued a trend; and
- Crime was falling just about as fast in other United States cities where new police methods had not been introduced.

The second of the four elements above is known as performance monitoring. Performance monitoring provides information on:

- Key aspects of how a programme is operating;
- Whether, and to what extent, pre-specified programme output objectives are being attained;
- Identification of failures to produce programme outputs;
- Service quality; and
- Programme efficiency, effectiveness and productivity.

This information allows programme managers to fine-tune the programme.

The third of the elements above is process evaluation. Process evaluation is a systematic, focused plan for collecting data to:

- Determine whether the programme is being implemented as specified and, if not, how it differs;

- Identify unintended consequences and unanticipated outcomes; and
- Understand the programme from the perspective of the staff, participants and the community.

Process evaluation should be carried out on all projects and programmes.

Cost studies are used to assess investments in programmes by collecting information on:

- Direct programme expenditures;
- Costs of staff and resources;
- Opportunity costs;
- Costs of purchased services;
- Value of donated time and materials.

The information can be used to estimate actual costs and compare them with the budget or with costs for other programmes, but they can also be used to work out the comparative costs of the benefits from the programme with alternate ways of spending the money. Except at the most straightforward level, these analyses need expert input, but they should be the other universal element in evaluation of crime reduction programmes.

The Home Office in the United Kingdom has some general principles for evaluation which are helpful:

- When setting up programmes be aware for the need for evaluation and build-in data collection;
- Consider the depth of the evaluation. Detailed evaluations will be needed for new, ambitious programmes. Inputs, outputs and outcomes will all have to be covered. Monitoring will be sufficient for mainstream programmes;
- Ensure there is a way to check the standard of operation;
- Consider obtaining short-term as well as long-term outcome measures. Customers like to see something for their money quickly;
- Choose outcome measures to suit the intended purposes of the project.
- Ensure the numbers being evaluated are sufficient to produce robust results.
- Aim to have a control or comparison group;
- Make sure selection effects are accounted for by looking at outcomes for those not selected for the programme;
- Ensure independent verification of the results.

Finally, programmes must be based on a "logic model". The logic model is central to evaluation. It helps groups really work out what they want to achieve and how they intend to do it. It also helps in the final evaluation and in understanding what goes on with what effect during the programme. The programme starts with a

theoretical model but finishes with data on what's going on during the programme and on its chances of replicability.

One example looks like this:

Figure I. Logic model to be used in evaluation of NACRO (crime prevention charity, UK) housing/employment programme



The model above was used for a particular evaluation but it can be used for most programmes.

It is very important to note that such a model can be used from the start of a programme (and clearly this is to be preferred), but it can also be used for an on-going programme (for example, all the 40 projects evaluated for this programme could have been analysed via such a model and some of them could have produced usable evaluations).

Filling the model out starts at the end. The realistic long-term outcomes of the particular programme have to be agreed and articulated. Then, you go to the beginning and fill in the target population, the resources that are available (human, financial etc.), the theory or rationale for the programme (this is very important), and the antecedents or context.

The context includes base-line data, the political atmosphere, the constraints there will be and so on.

Next, you fill in the box on the inputs into the programme and then the expected outputs.

Next, you fill in what you expect to be the early outputs and then the intermediate outputs.

Underneath those boxes is a box for mediating variables. This is two things; it is a list of things you think will come up during the programme, but more importantly it is filled in as you go on so that you have a record of the things which happen during the programme which could affect the outcome for this programme or other similar programmes in the future.

A theory of change approach—an alternative evaluation strategy

A theory of change is a theory of how and why an initiative works. A theory of change approach is a systematic and cumulative study of the links between activities, outcomes and the contexts of the initiative. It uses a logic model as a basic tool. It is a non-experimental method, but it does allow the evaluator to suggest causal links.

Using this approach will involve stakeholders, facilitate measurement and data collection, and, by specifying expected outcomes based on its theoretical underpinnings, reduce the problems associated with the causal attribution of impact.

The first tasks are to articulate the theories and then construct a logic model. Defining interim activities and interim outcomes and then linking them to longer-term outcomes is the hardest part. But the stakeholders must do this in advance if it is to help the causal argument.

The measurement of activities and describing the context and its effects are as important as measuring outcomes. Performance standards must be set for activities and outcomes.

There will be multiple theories. They cannot be contradictory and they cannot be unarticulated. They must be sorted out, reviewed, and some of them eventually abandoned. In the end, it should be possible to assess the validity of the theory. The more the events predicted by the theory actually occur, the more confidence there can be in the theory's validity. This could work if:

- There was a well-specified and plausible theory up-front;
- Activities carried out were in line with this;
- Changes followed predictions;
- There were not significant contextual changes or, if there were, any such changes were taken account of.

Trying to decide whether the outcome of the projects is produced by the activities of the projects is very difficult. Describing how and why the outcomes are produced is even more difficult, but this model should give us a good chance.

5. Who are the actors and what can they do?

There are large numbers of stakeholders or actors in the crime reduction realm. Here, the principal ones are described and recommendations made about what they can do to contribute to the reduction of crime and victimization.

The international community

The international community consists of organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the South African Development Community (SADC), the African Development Bank, the European Community and donors or cooperating partners, which can be non-governmental organizations.

The United Nations and its many agencies concern themselves with crime at a global level on behalf of its member States. The United Nations has a remarkable record of work on human rights, norms, standards, delivering services and publications. It brings together information on best practice and tries to advise all its members on humane crime prevention policies and strategies. This handbook is an example of the work it does to try to spread good practice.

The International Financial Institutions' (IFIs) (the World Bank, the Interamerican Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, etc.) involvement with crime prevention has been sporadic. Governments could consider approaching IFIs for the financing of crime reduction programmes.

Governmental and private aid agencies are also possible financers of crime prevention programmes. There is a need to persuade these agencies about the relationship between lowering crime and reducing poverty.

Central government

It is almost superfluous to spell out government's role. It provides the context for virtually everything of concern to this handbook. Government can either provide a productive environment or a hostile one. Crime will normally be one of government's main concerns, but it often takes a traditionalist view of crime control (cops, courts and corrections). The reforms needed for a crime reduction approach will only come with concerted political action.

Local government

The municipal level is the level of government closest to the people and where projects can be designed to target the specific needs of local community. This is also where the day-to-day delivery of services happens.

This is often the highest level of government in developed countries which actually wants to be involved in a crime reduction approach. However, many developing countries lack this level of government. Decentralization is a controversial subject but attaining more effective crime reduction could be a useful argument in its favour:

- Crime problems impinge directly on local politicians and they are often open to a reduction strategy as it gives hope of being able to make a difference—and it could save money;
- They are often responsible for housing, education, social services and planning—all services which need to be involved in crime reduction strategies;
- They are also likely to have more experience of involving the public in consultations, so working in partnerships is common practice;
- They are not usually responsible for courts and corrections, so the traditional ways of dealing with crime are not their responsibility;
- They are also more likely than central government to see the roots of crime in social problems.

This is a good level to work with if it is available.

The police

The police are a core group. They will feel that they have responsibility for anything to do with crime; very little can be done without their cooperation, or at least, acquiescence. The cultural reaction of the police is to think in terms of "law enforcement".

However, there are many officers who do see the wider context of crime and who realize they cannot do everything themselves. They are not frightened of partnerships

and information sharing. This is the group to work with. More police officers would go along with a reduction strategy if properly incentivized (see below).

In Brazil, young people are at the core of the problem of violence: they form the majority of victims of the 50,000 murders registered each year, and are often the agents of such acts. Relations between the young and the police forces are conflictive worldwide. In countries like Chile or Nigeria young people are the segment with least trust in the police and are the most frequent victims of violent police action. The CESeC together with AfroReggae developed one project with the aim to establish a dialogue between youth and the police forces. The success of this project was that the two groups realized that they shared more identities than they supposed, and by doing this a better relationship and understanding between these "antagonist" groups was possible.[a]

[a]Centro de Estudios de Segurança e ciudadania (2006). *Boletim segurança e ciudadania*, Nr.12. Rio de Janeiro, Brasil. www.ucamcesec.com.br/arquivos/publicacoes/boletim12web_eng.pdf.

The judiciary

Another core group, but they tend to see their role as one of ensuring that the rule of law is upheld and meting out punishment to the perpetrators. To the extent they see they have a crime reduction role, they see it as deterring crime through punishment and isolating offenders in prison.

Progressive members of the judiciary, however, can be very influential. They can pass cost-effective community sentences, divert offenders to positive treatment regimes and encourage restorative justice.

Influencing this group can be difficult, however, as they are normally very concerned about their independence and can even see information as an attempt to influence them improperly.

Other criminal justice professionals

This group includes prison staff, probation officers and parole officers.

A large proportion of the work outlined here is the responsibility of these corrections officers.

Probation and parole staff are normally geared towards rehabilitation, but prison officers only rarely. And prison staff are a very major influence on the atmosphere of a prison and the level of encouragement given to rehabilitation efforts. Some want to change offenders, and they have to be the core group to work with. Others have to be incentivized. But there might always be a tension in their jobs as their first responsibility is to ensure prisoners do not escape. They should be persuaded that a prison with a positive climate is a more secure prison.

Other professionals

These are the professionals who work in all those services which directly affect the ability to reduce crime—social workers, health professionals, teachers and educators, and employment officers. One difficulty is that these professionals usually have too much to do in their own areas. They have to be aware of their central role in reducing crime and be involved as much as possible. Effort must be made to ensure that at least they do not do work which would make crime reduction more difficult.

Universities

In many developing countries, the universities and other tertiary education centres play a very important role in crime reduction. In developing countries, universities can often be a principal source of information and advice and therefore have a crucial role to play.

Schools

Schools play a vital part in a long-term reduction strategy. The kinds of actions needed to turn a school into a vital part of our strategy for crime reduction have been outlined above. As can be seen, it can require major changes in school management, curriculum, approach to pupils and relationships with parents. It will not be easy to obtain these changes. And it will have to be demonstrated that the education of the children has improved—because educationalists tend to believe the core function of a school is education, not social engineering.

Any attempt at reform must be presented as both an education improvement programme and a crime reduction programme. Clearly the changes suggested earlier will have to be tried out in a small number of schools or maybe only one, with the full cooperation of the head teacher. Education ministries will have to cooperate if the experiment is ever to be turned into general practice.

The organized non-governmental sector

Organized groups in the non-governmental sector which are pushing for reforms which will lead to crime reduction have no need to be persuaded that reform is needed; that is why they have organized themselves.

These groups will provide resources, time, energy and commitment. They will pressure individuals and groups which need to be pressured; they will write letters to the paper or send emails to, or be involved with, web groups. They are the backbone of reform.

But they need to be well organized and even disciplined. Such groups and their members are almost always impatient for change and cannot see the necessity for caution or gradualism—to them it's obvious what's got to be done.

However, they must understand the context, particularly the political context. Politicians do not like to be harangued, they do not like people to think they are obtuse and they want to be re-elected—often by conservative electors who do not want them to be "soft on crime". Dedicated pressure groups and the converted can put reform back by years if they are not careful.

Well organized and realistic pressure is crucial. It must not be dissipated by impatience.

Local communities

Local community groups which want to improve their neighbourhoods are really central to crime reduction. They tend to be much more pragmatic than the pressure groups as they want to problem-solve. And it is very difficult to make changes to an area without the consent and cooperation of the community. These are the groups to nurture and develop.

Finally, all these groups can be more effective the more they work together. Building capacity in the groups can be difficult and building it by getting people and organizations to work together can be even more daunting, but it must be done. The challenge is to work together to prevent crime.

It is time to bring public policy, private sector and civil society together in order to combat the main causes of crime.[23]

[23]Kliksberg, B. (2007). *Democracias inseguras. Cinco mitos sobre la criminalidad latinoamericana*. Noticias del Sur 10/06/2007. www.noticiasdelsur.com/nota.php?nota=948.

6. Capacity-building for effective crime prevention

The crime prevention strategy outlined above is very ambitious, and not many countries (developed and developing) have the capacity to carry it all out immediately. This section, then, suggests some of the ways to build capacity but it also points out some major stumbling blocks on the way.

Capacity is the ability of organizations to carry out, effectively and efficiently, programmes of coordinated action in pursuit of their formal objectives.

Organizations depend on the skills and competencies of the individuals in them as well as their capabilities to do things such as plan, prioritize, manage, handle budgets etc.; but they also work within an institutional framework of formal and informal rules and within the State.

Thus, organizational capacity-building depends on:

- Individuals;
- Organizations;
- Institutions; and
- The State.

This crime prevention strategy, however, does not just need to build the capacity of organizations, but it also needs to build capacity within the institutions (here meaning a custom, practice, relationship, or behavioural pattern of importance in the life of a community or society e.g. parliament, the church, the media or the justice or educational systems) and the State themselves.

The strategy depends, at one extreme, on the ability of the State and major institutions to deliver reduced poverty and greater equality and, at the other, the ability to get someone out to mend a broken window in a house which has just been burgled.

In an ideal world, how would the strategy be delivered?

Individuals

What would be wanted would be a pool of people with the range of skills required by the various programmes from lawyers, criminologists, statisticians and legal drafts-people to police officers, information technology (IT) specialists, social workers, mediators, health workers, prison staff, teachers, carpenters, and so on.

To the extent that certain skills are missing, there should be the ability to buy-in consultants and experts, but part of their role would have to be to help train local people so that the skill-pool was built up.

Organizations

Organizations would have to be able to:

- Identify, plan, prioritize, monitor, and learn from specific courses of action;
- Mobilize, deploy and where necessary motivate resources (assets, people, money and information) consistently and continuously on agreed public priorities; and
- Agree to pursue agreed objectives collectively.

Institutions

Institutions would be functional—rational, i.e. open to evidence and rational argument.

The State

The State (the executive) would be accountable to its people and have systematic capacity to deliver services, maintain law and order and raise and manage resources effectively.

Technology

One needs modern IT hardware and software and the experts to run it as well as people who are computer literate.

However, the world is far from ideal, and in the poorest developing countries the State often needs considerable help to provide the right resources that will support the infrastructure needed for crime reduction—or indeed any of the desirable functions of a modern state. The cooperating partners of governments in poor countries have a special responsibility to help governments provide the basic building blocks

to support the law reform, security and the enhancement of human rights which are needed for human development.

What has been learned over the last 20 years, however, is that when basic needs have been met, creating and sustaining capacity to meet agreed objectives requires organizations, institutions and the State to agree on the objectives. And this only rarely happens.

Some examples:

Pre-school literacy training has been shown by the Perry Project to be a very successful way to reduce crime in the long-run. However, this method of improving educational attainment has not been widely introduced in the United Kingdom.

This is not because of a lack of qualified teachers or children who could gain.

It is largely because:

- The Ministry of Education does not see crime reduction as a core activity; and
- Preschool literacy programmes are not currently fashionable with the educational establishment.

Community policing and SCP are given lip-service but could be introduced in many more areas than they are and could be undertaken much more effectively than they are. If they were used more intensively, there would be fewer victims of crime and less money spent on "crime fighting".

This is not because SCP is costly or difficult to organize or because there is no demand or even that there are not enough trained police officers.

The main reason is that:

- It runs counter to traditional policing methods and is not seen as "real" policing.

The rehabilitation of prisoners is even more difficult. It is known how to reduce the likelihood of a prisoner returning to crime on release. All the methods described above will work. But they need resources and capacity. They need trained prison staff, classrooms, teachers, work experience and so on. But here there is often a reluctance to provide them.

Prisons are the bottom of the priority list in almost all societies and in some developing countries they are not on the list at all. The reasons are mainly to do with the fact that prisoners are seen as totally undeserving, which means they should not live in better conditions or have better access to education or health services, or even food, than the poorest non-offenders outside.

All programmes which need inter-agency cooperation (such as parenting courses or building informal social control) are more difficult to initiate than those which are clearly owned by the criminal justice system, and building the capacity to introduce them is not easy.

The most difficult of all are those calling for major government action on serious social problems. The reason is that they need major changes in the way societies are run and will therefore run up against the vested interests of power-holders.

Perhaps building capacity should start on simpler problems first!

So what are the lessons about institutional and state capacity-building from the last 10 years?

- Capacity has been built where modest, incremental reforms have been pursued in politically supportive environments;
- State reform is overwhelmingly a governance challenge not an organizational challenge. And the governance challenge is: to align the formal and informal incentives embedded within a country's broader institutional framework in a supportive manner so that individual and specific organizational capacity deficits can be remedied;
- The role of the State must be matched by its overall capacity;
- Incremental approaches are more likely to work than grand strategies and wholesale reform;
- Goals should be set that are politically feasible rather than technically optimum.

Some implications for building capacity:

- Understand precisely the nature and the mission of the agency whose capacity is being built;
- Choose those organizations whose activities are of greatest priority;
- Understand the structure and pattern of an organization's interests and incentives;
- The more specific, monitorable and limited the task to be performed, the easier it will be to develop organizational capacity to do so. And conversely—be very careful about organizations with many unspecified objectives;
- Be sure what capacity-building activities will be;
- If an organization has competent political and technical leadership it has more chance of success;
- Design solutions that fit the circumstances and the context;
- Understand the informal institutional structure;
- Start small;

- The greater the demand for responsive and effective organizations delivering things that people actually want, the greater the chances for sustainable change.

The Development Advisory Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has a list of principles for capacity development.

1. Don't rush. Capacity development is a long-term process.
2. Respect the value systems and foster self-esteem.
3. Scan locally and globally; reinvent locally.
4. Challenge mindsets and power differentials.
5. Think and act in terms of sustainable capacity outcomes.
6. Establish positive incentives.
7. Integrate external inputs into national priorities, processes and systems.
8. Build on existing capacities rather than creating new ones.
9. Stay engaged under difficult circumstances.
10. Remain accountable to ultimate beneficiaries.

Incentives for reform

Incentives are the key to reform and capacity-building. Regrettably, it is often the case that proper incentives for capacity-building aimed at crime and victimization reduction do not exist.

Part of the problem is that crime is often seen by the elite as affecting other people and though it can be tragic it really does not affect them or their job. It seems that appealing to the good nature of people with power is not enough. For some people—those who become the activists—human empathy is sufficient and those are the people many programmes and organizations are built round. But in order to mobilize others, more concrete incentives are needed.

Politicians

Some people are in politics because they do want to help the less privileged and unfortunate. They are incentivized. But the rest probably need the incentive of the ballot box. In developing countries, a potent force is the wish to reduce poverty. It has been shown that high crime hinders development through reduced human capital and investment, and hence it hinders poverty reduction. Thus, politicians need to understand that reducing crime will reduce poverty and therefore improve their chances of reelection.

Development agencies

Development agencies are very important in developing countries, but, as has been said above, do not seem to rate crime reduction highly in terms of development. They too need to be persuaded that reducing crime will reduce poverty.

Sentencers

Sentencers waste enormous amounts of money by sending too many offenders to prison. They need to be persuaded that severe sentences are not a unique deterrent and that people can be punished in the community. Sentencers will normally respond to changes in the law, so legislative changes would certainly help here.

The police

The police can be very difficult to change, but they too will respond to the right incentives. Legislation can also influence the police. Promotion prospects and pay are other ways to incentivize many in the police forces.

Community police officers and crime prevention are often marginalized in a police force. Therefore, officers responsible for these areas should be at the level of Deputy Chief and that no one should become Chief unless they have held that post.

The community

It has been said repeatedly that successful crime reduction requires the involvement of the community. But community involvement does not just happen (except in some areas which are so plagued with problems that it is the community which takes the initiative). Even in the cases where the community takes the initiative, building capacity for action needs skill and care. The main incentive for continued community involvement is getting results.

The recommendations outlined below assume that the initiative for community involvement comes from outside the community (often the police), but many of the recommendations also apply if the initiative comes from the community itself.

Those who want to encourage community involvement:

- Have to get community interest by leaflets, radio, television, local newspapers, other media and the web;
- Have to ask members of the community about their perceptions of local crime and disorder problems;
- Have to listen to those views;

- Have to act on the priorities identified;
- Have to give feedback to the community; and then
- Re-consult the community about the next actions to take.

Research has shown that:

- Training and capacity-building benefit from being based locally;
- Formal training is more effective for developing strategic skills, experiential training has the most impact at the community project level;
- Video training can be particularly effective in building confidence and the capacity to express local issues effectively;
- Joint training for local residents and professionals is very effective in building skills and mutual confidence;
- People in more formal bodies seem to require very focused support to maximize their effectiveness;
- Involving local people in the evaluation of projects by training and supporting them can be especially effective in developing skills and confidence;
- Training should be given in dealing with difficult situations;
- Local university staff can be particularly effective in giving support to local people.

The result of this capacity-building process should be:

- Confidence and trust in the process increases;
- Increase in involvement in consultation;
- Growth of community confidence;
- Increase in wider community involvement;
- And, at best, an increase in collective efficacy and informal social control.

Three facilitators would help the capacity-building process:

1. The first is that government should create an institution whose function is to take overall responsibility for crime reduction. It will coordinate, advise, evaluate, create a crime reduction strategy and be the government arm to maximize the success of the strategy. This will not be easy because it will be seen as encroaching on other institutions' territory (especially the police) but if attitudes and institutions are going to be turned round, this seems to be necessary.

2. Second, charismatic champions for crime reduction and victim rights are needed. People respond to such champions and they can get things done which rationality would suggest could not be done.

3. There should be excellent communications with the media, the public and the agencies.

In Kingston (Jamaica), programmes were designed to encourage local communities in some parts of the city to play a more active role in addressing the problems that were contributing to high levels of crime and violence. The success of this initiative led to its replication in other parts of the city.[a]

[a]UN-HABITAT (2007). *Enhancing Urban Safety and Security-Global Report on Human Settlements 2007*. London and Sterling (VA): Earthscan.

In addition, international data consistently shows that city dwellers face unequal crime risks according to the locations. In this respect, in those cities of sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean Basin and Latin America where crime rates are the highest in the world, most places are safe while crime is rather concentrated at certain places, namely in slums.[24]

As a corollary to the concentration of crime in marginalized areas, the growth of private urban space in the form of gated communities has been one of the most noted changes in urban space over the last two decades.[25]

[24]See the UN-HABITAT 2007 Report for successful projects to improve the situation in these areas.
[25]UN-HABITAT 2007, op. cit.

7. Sustaining momentum and activity

The next United Nations principle for crime prevention says that "crime prevention should be developed and promoted on the basis of sustainability and accountability"—hence the importance of this section.

Many crime reduction programmes fail or are not sustained because they are not implemented well and many good programmes are not developed properly or mainstreamed because the momentum behind them fails.

This section will recommend ways to overcome both problems.

Programmes must be implemented in line with the strategy agreed in the logic model. One of the most common reasons for failure is that programme implementers sometimes think they can "improve" on the original plan and introduce their own ideas. If the implementers want to change the original plan, they must agree any changes with the major stakeholders.

The National Institute of Justice in the United States suggests that there are four general conditions which need to be fulfilled to achieve successful implementation and sustainability.

Needs assessment

The problems of a community must be assessed carefully and the target clearly identified. If problems identified do not make sense to the community, the programmes will fail. For example, if the community thinks the problem is disaffected youth making their life a misery on the streets but local professionals see other problems as more pressing, there will have to be very careful discussions between the professionals and the community before deciding on the priority programmes. Imposed programmes have little chance of being sustained.

Buy-in

Building a strong basis of support early among key decision makers and individuals responsible for the programme is essential. It takes time and effort. One member of the team should have responsibility for implementation and development of the programme. Communications must be effective with staff and funders. Failure to enlist the enthusiastic support and buy-in of all stakeholders can be fatal to the programme.

Adequate resources

All the required resources, both financial and human, for planning, implementation and sustainability must be secured or a detailed strategy for obtaining them in the future must be devised. Failing to understand and budget for all the resources needed (financial and human) can result in programme failure.

Commitment

This is like buy-in, but it relates to doing a first rate job. All programmes have key elements that must be adhered to and so there must be commitment to the programme's philosophy and key components.

Early challenges to a programme that must be planned for include:

- Hiring and training staff;
- Administrative tensions (paperwork, management styles);
- Professional insecurities;
- Intra and inter-agency tensions.

Later challenges include:

- Persistent tensions over paperwork and time pressures;
- Problems related to staff turnover, personality clashes and administrative changes;
- Dramatic changes such as loss of champions, funding cuts, severed relationships with partners and confrontation with influential people who opposed the programme (these could be serious problems for the programme).

Implementation strengths include:

- Strong administrative support;
- Programme champions;
- Strong staff who bought-in to the philosophy;
- Technical assistance providers.

For long-term sustainability and development, crime reduction programmes need:

- A sound, predictable resource base, financial and human;
- Political commitment;
- A committed community;
- Strong institutional partners;
- Good inter-agency relationships;
- Police commitment;
- Community-based workers with good networks;
- Involved stakeholders;
- A supply of results (preferably encouraging!);
- Excellent media relationships;
- A reputation for sound management;
- An educated public;
- An understanding that crime reduction is not easy;
- Sensitivity to community needs; ability to have a dialogue with the community.

8. Recommendations for immediate action

1. The handbook should be distributed to key stakeholders. They will include:

- Governments;
- Donors;
- The police;
- NGOs;
- Academics; and
- The judiciary.

2. In all countries which react positively to the handbook and its programme, a project team should be put together.

3. Meetings should be organized with the key donors and NGOs within the target countries to find the level of support they will give for the programme. They could be shown that crime is not just a serious problem in its own right but that it also hinders the reduction of poverty.

4. A decision must be taken at this point in each country as to which group is going to take the lead on the crime prevention programme and who is going to be the programme champion.

5. Make sure the leaders and members of the team really want to prevent or reduce crime. If people are in it for other personal or political ends, it will not work.

6. In each country there should be an assessment of the crime situation using available local data. This could involve the World Bank and its current activities on Justice and Security Statistics which are part of the General Data Dissemination System of the IMF. Then, there should be put in place:

- A programme to examine and, if necessary, improve the collection and analysis of police recorded crime statistics;
- A programme to carry out comparable crime surveys using ICVS; and

- An examination of the possibility of introducing a coordinated computerized justice information system.

7. At the same time, stakeholders for the programme should be identified and involved in the process:

- The group would include the police, trusted community members or groups, members of traditional structures (e.g. Chiefs in many parts of Africa), people who can evaluate programmes, crime prevention experts;
- It is very important at this stage to involve the community and citizens.

8. Crime prevention needs-assessments should be produced in all participating countries by:

- Targeting community concerns; and
- Understanding the problems.

9. The infrastructure and resources needed for the prevention programme should be discussed and agreed at this point.

- A decision must be taken as to how ambitious the programme is going to be. Will the aim be to tackle major issues such as the reduction of the propensity to commit crime or will it have more limited but more immediate goals?
- It should be recognized that the more ambitious the initial programme is, the greater the chance of failure. If at all in doubt—start small. Try just to change a few things. Build on success.

10. Participating countries should very seriously consider creating a Crime Prevention Institute.

11. All these countries should exchange needs-assessments and the documents coming out of the infrastructure and resource need discussions.

12. When the goals have been agreed, it must be ensured that everyone has bought-in to them.

13. Adjustments to the Stakeholder group should be made at this point to make absolutely sure that there is the right group of stakeholders for the goals. For example, a school-based programme will need educationalists while a programme to improve parenting skills will need social workers, health workers and educationalists.

14. A strategic plan should be produced—i.e. an overall plan that you hope will get you to your goals.

15. Using the strategy detailed, plans should be drawn up, consistent with available resources, which will:

- Prioritize prevention targets;

- Describe the methods to be used; and
- Produce a logic model (see logic model example in chapter 4).

16. It would probably be useful to get the help of research and development experts at this point.

17. The level of evaluation which is needed must be agreed and arrangements made to collect the necessary data. Above all, data must be collected in order to establish a baseline against which to measure change.

18. Plans must include ways to build capacity and implement and sustain the programme effectively.

19. Make sure everyone has agreed with all stages of the planning process.

20. Programmes should begin with the knowledge that crime can be reduced or prevented if based on sound evidence and carried out with programme integrity.

21. The South-South website www.southsouthcrime.org should be used intensively throughout this process, both to see what it has to offer and as a place to relate experience. Sharing experience is very important.

22. The local media should be involved, particularly after step 5.

Annex I. The crime context*

Consistent with the United Nations crime prevention principle that evidence not ideology should drive crime prevention, the annex opens with a section on what is known about crime in the Caribbean and Southern Africa.

In order to prevent crime, it is necessary to understand the dimensions of the problem. But it is extremely difficult to measure those dimensions.[1]

The traditional way of analysing crime and crime trends has been to use the numbers of crimes recorded by the police. This is fairly easy to do (if they exist), but it has several critical disadvantages:

- Most crimes are not reported to the police;
- Some crimes reported to the police are not recorded by them;
- Police forces in different countries record and count crime in different ways;
- Reporting rates to the police for different crimes change over time (there is one exception to this—vehicle theft—because the reporting rate is extremely high everywhere);
- Recording rates by the police of crimes reported to them vary over time.

These problems mean that police recorded crime figures can never give a true record of the number of crimes, that apparent changes in crime rates may be produced by changes in reporting and recording rates, and that it is impossible to make meaningful international comparisons except, possibly, for homicide—and there are even problems in this area. In the latest book on ICVS, levels of crime were compared as recorded by the police and the ICVS. It was found that the police figures had no relationship with reality.

*Data and estimates shown in the tables of this annex are drawn respectively from the Seventh United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, International Criminal Victimization Surveys (ICVS) and other international and national crime statistics and estimate sources.

[1]Throughout the report, a crime is an act or omission prohibited and punished by national legislation—although the term is being used in this handbook to refer to those crimes which affect individuals and groups rather than the State. Crime prevention or reduction, therefore, is reducing or preventing these acts and omissions.

> "The number of crimes recorded by the police bears hardly any relationship to the ICVS-based measures of crime […]. Comparisons of European statistics on police recorded crime with survey-based estimates of the true levels of crime confirm that police figures cannot be reliably used to compare crimes across the EU countries and should not be used for that purpose."[2]

If police records of crime are unreliable in Europe—where efforts have been made to make police crime figures more comparable—how much more difficult is it in the Caribbean and Southern African regions. One example given by the United Nations to show how difficult it is to use police figures draws on police figures in Dominica which indicate a burglary rate 20 times and a theft rate 30 times that of Jamaica. This is highly unlikely. (It should, however, be noted that trends in recorded crime and crime survey crime are not quite as disparate as crime levels.)

The problems with homicide figures are that different countries have different definitions and that, particularly in the developing world, homicide figures are only published erratically. Another problem is that because dependable data on violent crime is so difficult to obtain, homicide is often used as a proxy for general levels of violence. An example will show how problematic this is. Barbados has a general violence rate (as measured by a crime survey—see below) which is lower than almost all Western European countries but a homicide rate at least four times higher.

But with all its problems the homicide data will be examined for a number of developing and developed countries as it is one of the very few offences which are roughly comparable across the world.

Some of the terms used throughout the report are explained here.

The Human Development Index (HDI) is a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education, and standards of living for countries worldwide. It is a standard means of measuring well-being and levels of development.

The Gini coefficient measures economic equality in a country. A Gini index of 0 indicates perfect economic equality (everyone has equal wealth) while 100 represents perfect inequality (one person owns everything).

A correlation is an index of the strength of the relationship between two variables. Correlation coefficients (typically denoted by "r") describe the strength of the relationship between two variables. Correlations range from -1.0 to +1.0 in value.

A correlation coefficient of + 1.0 indicates a perfect positive relationship in which high values of one variable are related perfectly to high values in the other variable, and conversely, low values on one variable are perfectly related to low values on the other variable.

[2]Van Dijk, J. M. M., Manchin, R., Van Kesteren, J., Nevala, S. and G. Hideg (2005). *The Burden of Crime in the EU.* Brussels: European Union.

A correlation coefficient of 0.0 indicates no relationship between the two variables. That is, one cannot use the scores on one variable to tell anything about the scores on the second variable. A correlation coefficient of -1.0 indicates a perfect negative relationship in which high values of one variable are related perfectly to low values in the other variables, and conversely, low values in one variable are perfectly related to high values on the other variable.

Within Europe, the Americas and Southern Africa there is a correlation of about -0.7 between HDI and Gini, i.e. richer countries tend to be more equal.

A correlation does not indicate causation—although it is often tempting to think it does!

The dates for the homicide information cover the period from 1998 (United Republic of Tanzania) to 2005 (United States), but most comes from 2003 or 2004. There is information on nine South and Central American and Caribbean countries (in pink), nine African (blue) and nine developed countries (green).

- The homicide rate per 100,000 population for the developed countries depicted in the above chart varies between 0.5 and 3, except for the United States where it is 5.9;
- Three of the six highest rates of this group are from the Caribbean; (a study by the United Nations of all regions of the world shows that the Caribbean and South and West Africa have the highest regional rates in the world.)
- There is only a relatively weak relationship between HDI and the homicide rate (r = -0.24). This means that the homicide rate in poor countries tends to be higher than in the rich but there are relatively developed countries with higher homicide rates than those in developing countries;
- In 2002, in the Americas, approximately 384,000 homicides were registered. Homicide rates per 100,000 population exceed very high or critical levels in a number of countries notably Brazil, Venezuela, Jamaica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Colombia;[3]
- If the six countries with a homicide rate of 20 or more are excluded (three of them Caribbean countries), then there is a strong relationship between HDI and homicide rate (r = -0.72);
- There is only a fairly good relationship between Gini and the homicide rate (r = 0.35);
- There is a much stronger relationship between the Gini index and the homicide rate if one excludes the same six countries from the calculation (r = 0.75).

[3]Pan American Health Organization, op. cit.

Figure A.I.I. Homicide, rate per 100,000: 2000-2005



The previous four points need some discussion.

Many prior studies have found that poor developing countries have higher homicide rates than richer developed countries. It is therefore to be expected that there will be a high correlation between the HDI (a measure of development) and the homicide rate. This has not been found. However, a more detailed examination of the results shows that the low correlation is the result of a group of countries with quite high HDIs having very high homicide rates. These countries are from the Caribbean plus Brazil, Colombia and South Africa. If these countries are excluded from the calculation, then the correlation increases very significantly suggesting they have homicide rates much higher than their development level would predict. If these countries behaved like other countries with a similar HDI, they would have homicide rates between 8 and 12.

The clear implication is that there are special problems in these countries that need to be analysed carefully. Dealing with homicide in these countries might need a different approach from that used elsewhere.

It has been suggested that the reason these countries have such high homicide rates is that they are very unequal societies and inequality drives the violence. There is no support for this hypothesis from the data from all these countries. Just a couple of examples will suffice. Jamaica has a Gini coefficient (measure of inequality) which is the same as that of the United Kingdom and Trinidad's index is the same as that of the United States of America. Their homicide rates bear no relationship. If the same six countries are taken out of the calculation, then the correlation between the Gini index and homicide rates goes up to a high 0.75. This shows that except for the outlier countries there is, in fact, a strong relationship between inequality and homicide.

For most countries, inequality and level of development do seem to be strongly related to homicide rate. The fact that in the Caribbean relatively equal societies with medium to high HDIs have such high levels of homicide is a matter for particular concern which will be addressed later.

For levels of other offences, there is only one source of usable information as police figures are fundamentally flawed. That source is the crime survey.

Crime surveys take a random sample of citizens (usually over 16 years old) to ask them about their experiences of crime over a given period (usually a year). Clearly this limits crimes that can be measured to those people can experience, but it makes it possible to get good estimates of household crime (burglary, attempted burglary, vehicle theft, theft from vehicles, vandalism of vehicles, bicycle theft and motorcycle theft) and personal crime (robbery, theft from persons, assaults and threats, sexual assaults, consumer fraud and corruption). (For simplicity's sake these are called "crime" in the section that follows.)

The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute ((UNICRI, Turin, Italy), the United Nations' crime research arm, carried out crime surveys in

the largest cities in eight Southern African countries in 2000 and 2001, 25 European cities and urban areas in 2000 (this means they will give estimates which are higher than if they had been national samples) and the Barbados government carried one out in 2002. The UNICRI surveys had samples of around 1,000. The Barbados survey had a sample of 8,000 and was countrywide. However, Barbados can be compared with the urban areas because its population density is as high as most urban areas.

There have also been two national crime surveys in South Africa (in 1998 and 2003), a household survey in the Dominican Republic and two very limited surveys in Jamaica and Haiti which were attached to the 2001 censuses. They have not been used in this section as they are not compatible with ICVS methodology.

Even though the urban ICVS cannot be used to produce national estimates they can be compared directly as they all involve urban areas.

Information on nine of the European countries has been used—five from Western Europe and four from Central and Eastern Europe.

In all countries the respondents were asked the same questions.

The surveys show, for African urban areas in particular, how serious the crime problem is.

The graph below shows the overall experience of crime in some of the surveyed countries (i.e. the percentage of people and households that experienced at least one of the crimes surveyed in the previous year). Information has been used from all the Southern African countries surveyed, Barbados because it is the only Caribbean country to have been surveyed and from nine of the 25 European urban surveys chosen at random. It is noted that France and Germany did not participate.

The chart shows just how high the chance of being a victim of crime (47.3 per cent) is in urban Southern Africa compared with the European countries (30 per cent) and with Barbados (15 per cent—a middle-income country in the Caribbean). (Comparable surveys have not been carried out in other Caribbean countries; so it is not known how representative of the region the Barbados result is.) The Barbados figure is one of the lowest in the world (similar to Japan) and possible reasons for this will be discussed later as it has enormous implications for crime prevention.

- In the sample there is a very high negative correlation (-0.75) between the proportion of victims and the level of the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI). In other words, poorer, less developed countries are likely to have higher crime rates than less poor and more developed countries. The scatter diagram below shows just what this correlation means. The relationship is clear but, for example, four countries have a victimization rate of 34 per cent while their HDIs are between 940 (Eastern and Western Europe) and 494 (Lesotho) demonstrating that HDI is only a partial explanation;

Figure A.I.II. Percentage of victims of crime



Figure A.I.III. Relationship between HDI and crime



- There is also a high correlation between HDI and crime rate within the African group (0.70) showing that within a group of developing countries the relatively better off tend to have less crime than the poorest;
- There is also a fairly strong correlation between the Gini coefficient and crime rate (0.54). Gini measures the level of inequality in a country. Inequality is often believed to be an important driver of crime, but in this study it has generally been found that the HDI is a better predictor of crime than the Gini index;
- There is only a weak relationship between Gini and crime rate within the African countries (r = 0.28).

The next chart provides information on victims of burglary:

Figure A.I.IV. Percentage of victims of burglary



- One European country (Czech Republic) has a higher burglary rate than an African one (Uganda);
- Barbados has a higher rate than most European urban areas;
- Mozambique has a very high rate—13 times that of Finland;
- There is a very high negative correlation (r = -0.85) between burglary rates and the HDI. In other words richer countries are much more likely to have lower burglary rates than poorer countries in the Caribbean and Southern Africa. (This may seem at odds with some studies which have suggested that developed countries have higher property crime rates than developing countries. The reason for this error is that police figures were used in these studies and the police grossly under-record property crime in developing countries);
- As with overall levels there is quite a strong relationship between Gini and the crime rate (r = 0.54) but it not as high as the HDI relationship. (It is because Zambia and Mozambique have much higher burglary rates than you would expect, given their moderate Gini coefficients.)

The next chart gives information on victims of robbery. Unfortunately, the European ICVS does not break down the chances of being robbed, assaulted or sexually assaulted by individual urban area but collapses the areas into Eastern Europe and Western Europe. This means that the comparators with the African countries will now be an amalgam of all Eastern and Western European countries—not just the nine used above.

Figure A.I.V. Percentage of victims of robbery



- Only one per cent of people in Barbados were victims of robbery;
- Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia and Europe also had low rates;
- Eight per cent of people in Mozambique were robbed;
- Twelve per cent of Europeans knew the robber by sight or name, so did 20 per cent in Africa. In Barbados a remarkable 42 per cent knew the robber by name or sight—it may explain why robbery is so rare in Barbados;
- There is quite a strong negative correlation (-0.55) between robbery rates and the HDI—but nowhere near as strong as between burglary and HDI.

The next chart deals with the rate of victims of assault.

The results here are very interesting as they illustrate just how difficult it is to use homicide as a proxy for violence:

- The correlation between assault rate and homicide rate within the African countries is only +0.25, in other words there is only a relatively small relationship between the assault rate and the homicide rate;
- Barbados has the lowest assault rate although it has a comparatively high homicide rate;
- Western European urban areas have an overall assault rate higher than Lesotho, Botswana and Uganda;
- Swaziland had the highest assault rates—almost 4 per cent;
- There is a moderate negative correlation (r = -0.50) between assault rates and the HDI, i.e. the more developed countries have lower assault rates.

Figure A.I.VI. Percentage of victims of assault with force



In addition:

- 26 per cent of the victims in Europe knew the offender by name, as did 39 per cent in Africa. In Barbados it was 61 per cent. Again it is hardly surprising that Barbados has such a low assault rate (it also has a very high rate of reporting the assault to the police);
- In Barbados, 70 per cent of the female victims knew the offender by name compared with 50 per cent of the males;
- In Barbados, 49 per cent of the female victims were at home at the time of the offence compared with 25 per cent of the males.

There are other sources of information on crime and violence and the box below illustrates one of these. This is information on violence-related injuries kept by hospitals in Jamaica. It cannot estimate crime levels but it does give indications of risk factors for those offenses which result in hospital treatment.

Information on sex offences is probably the most problematic. It has the lowest reporting rate to the police of all and it is also under-reported in crime surveys. The question asked (of women only) is quite general in that it seeks to find out whether the woman had been a victim of any kind of sexual offence, ranging from rape to offensive behaviour. Across all countries the results are consistent and indicate that rape only makes up a small proportion of sex offences. In the African countries, 13 per cent of the women said the offence was rape and nearly 50 per cent said it was offensive behaviour.

Violence-related injuries (VRIs) accounted for over 38,000 visits to accident and emergency units of Jamaican hospitals island wide in 2005. The estimated cost of patient care for VRIs in 2004 was 700 million Jamaican dollars. In 2006 it was J$ 2,100 million.

The Jamaica Injury Surveillance System (JISS) collects data from the nine largest hospitals and gives a profile of patients suffering violence-related injuries. Analysis of the data from JISS revealed that males were 1.4 times more likely to be injured than females. Additionally, young adults aged 10-29 accounted for 50 per cent of those injured.

Seventy-six percent (76 per cent) of violence-related injuries were as a result of an argument/ fight, 5 per cent as a result of robbery/burglary, 2 per cent were drug/gang-related, 5 per cent due to sexual assault, 1 per cent to child abuse, and 11 per cent to other factors (mob, riot, police shooting).

In terms of injury, 40 per cent were as a result of sharp objects, with males being three times more at risk than females. Blunt objects accounted for 31 per cent, bodily force 14 per cent, gunshots 7 per cent, sexual assault 5 per cent and 3 per cent other (choking, burns, strangulation).

In terms of victim/perpetrator relationships, acquaintances were the major offenders accounting for 47 per cent. Victim/stranger relationships accounted for 17 per cent, while16 per cent of offences were committed by an intimate partner. Additionally, 12 per cent of injuries were committed by a relative, 4 per cent by a friend and 6 per cent by others (legal, official).

Forty-six percent (46 per cent) of VRIs took place in the street/public areas, 40 per cent at home, 5 per cent at schools/institutions, 5 per cent in an industrial/commercial areas, 1 per cent at a farm/countryside and 6 per cent at some other place.

Finally, of all the individuals affected by VRIs, 71 per cent were seen and sent home, 17 per cent admitted to hospital, 8 per cent referred, 4 per cent left before being seen and 1 per cent died in casualty.

Figure A.I.VII. Percentage of victims of sexual offences



It was observed that:

- Lesotho and Swaziland have six times the level of Barbados or the European urban areas;
- In Europe, 25 per cent of victims knew the offender by name. In Africa it was 43 per cent and in Barbados 60 per cent;
- There is a strong relationship between HDI and sexual offences (r = -0.70). In other words once again, there are more likely to be victims in poor rather than in rich countries;
- "Approximately one in three women in Latin America and the Caribbean has been a victim of sexual, physical or psychological violence at the hands of domestic partners. In Haiti in 2000-2005, 29 per cent of women reported to have experienced physical violence and 17 per cent sexual violence."[4]

Finally two offences, or quasi-offences, are examined which rarely get reported but which are very important indeed for the health of a country. They also speak directly to the United Nations guiding principles that crime prevention should enhance the rule of law.

The first is consumer fraud. The sample was asked: "Has someone—when selling you something or delivering a service—cheated you in terms of quantity or quality of the goods or services?"

Figure A.I.VIII. Percentage of victims of consumer fraud



[4]Pan American Health Organization, *Health in the Americas 2007*, vol. 7, pp. 10, 21.

- The most developed of the countries reported low or very low rates of consumer fraud;
- Fifty per cent of Ugandans reported fraud;
- Forty-six per cent of Muscovites reported fraud;
- Over 33 per cent of people in three of the poorest countries reported consumer fraud;
- There is an extremely high correlation (+0.91) between the proportion of people living in Africa on less than $US 2 a day and the proportion who say they have been victims of consumer fraud;
- There is also a strong relationship between HDI and consumer fraud (r = -0.64). But it is noteworthy that people living in Eastern Europe are more likely to report consumer fraud than would be expected from their HDI;
- There is almost no relation between the Gini index and consumer fraud (r = 0.15), i.e. fraud is only a little more prevalent in unequal societies than in more equal societies.

The second offence is corruption. The interviewees were asked "Has any government official, for instance a customs officer, police officer, other governmental official or private sector interest asked you, or expected you, to pay a bribe for his/her service?"

The chart below illustrates the findings:

Figure A.I.IX. Percentage of victims of corruption



- All the Western European countries and Barbados had rates of less than half a percent;
- The proportions in South Africa, Botswana and Namibia were low and lower than in the Eastern European countries;
- In Uganda and Mozambique, it was at least 30 per cent;
- There is a very high correlation (+0.76) between the proportion of people living in Africa on less than $US 2 a day and the proportion of people who said they had been asked for a bribe;
- There is also a strong relationship (r = -0.65) between levels of corruption and the HDI.

This review has demonstrated a number of important variables to be considered about crime in the developing areas of the Caribbean and Southern Africa.

It has, however, been hobbled by a lack of hard evidence about crime in the Caribbean. There is no doubt at all that there is a homicide problem in parts of the Caribbean and even in places where otherwise crime is known to be low, or is thought to be low, homicide is much higher than risk assessment based on experience from other parts of the world would lead us to expect.

Apart from information on homicide, there is little dependable data on crime in the Caribbean. There is plainly a drugs problem but its extent is not clear and experts are not sure whether it is going up or down—although increasing murder rates in Jamaica and Trinidad would suggest it is getting worse.

There is also clearly a gang problem and some people's lives in some of the urban centres are miserable; in Trinidad there is currently a growing problem of kidnapping for ransom.

On general levels of violence, evidence is almost entirely lacking. In Barbados, the crime survey has shown it is low, but an attempt to use police figures for other islands leads to unbelievable conclusions. For example, a United Nations/World Bank report suggests that the Bahamas has the highest violence rate in the world by a factor of more than 2 over the next highest; that it is 8 times more violent than Jamaica and that between 1994 and 1995 there was a thousand per cent increase in serious violent crime which was then maintained. The same source that was used for the report suggests that while there were 27,000 murders in Colombia in 2000, there were only 86 cases of violence. This illustrates the difficulties encountered in using police figures for making international comparisons.

Property crime in the Caribbean could well be low. It is low in Barbados, and the high levels of informal social control in Barbados appear to exist in the other island states. But data on crime levels is mostly unavailable.

The position in Africa on information is much better. South Africa has carried out two full-scale crime surveys and UNICRI has organized urban crime surveys in many Southern African cities.

The picture, however, is not encouraging. The cities have high homicide rates, although, except for South Africa, not as high as in the Caribbean; there are high burglary, robbery, burglary and assault rates; as well as very high corruption and consumer fraud rates.

Annex II. The effects of crime in developing countries

This section will briefly examine the effects of crime on individuals, communities and development and will respond to the United Nations crime prevention principle (crime prevention should serve socio-economic development and inclusion). In particular, it has been thought necessary to include the section on the relationship between crime and development as it appears that some important policymakers—including those in development agencies—underestimate the effect of crime on development and poverty reduction. Part of the problem is that violent crime affects the poor a lot more than the better-off and its direct and daily effects are often hidden from the decision makers.

The effect on individuals

Crime affects different people in different ways. But few are indifferent to the perceived level of crime in their community or the experience of being a victim.

- Violence has a dramatic impact on poor people's well-being, in terms of both livelihood security and functioning of local social institutions;
- Between 34 per cent and 63 per cent of the people and households in the sample of African countries were victims of some crime in the year before the survey;
- In addition, victims in Africa are more likely to be victims of more serious crimes than victims in developed countries;
- Fifty-five per cent of crimes in developed countries involve vehicles compared with 24 per cent in Africa; 54 per cent of crimes in Africa involve contact or burglary compared with 33 per cent in developed countries;
- Violent crime in Africa is potentially much more serious than in developed countries because of the lack of easily available free medical services and social security;
- Loss or disablement of the breadwinner has a bigger effect in the Caribbean or Africa because more people are affected as dependency ratios are higher;

Figure A.II.I. Africa crime profile



Figure A.II.II. Developed countries crime profile



- Livestock theft can reduce a family to penury;
- One person in 2,500 in Jamaica is murdered every year and because the murders are restricted to a small area the great majority of people living in the area must be directly affected and traumatized;
- About 90 per cent of burglary victims in the sample lost property in the burglary and about a third had their property damaged (in England and Wales, the average value is over $US 2,000, in Barbados it is $US 1,250);

- The vast majority of households in the sample are not insured;
- About a third of the victims of assaults and threats are injured in the incident (in Barbados nearly two thirds of those injured visited a doctor);
- In about a third of robberies weapons were used;
- Seventy-seven per cent of victims of vehicle theft thought the crime was "very serious"; as did 67 per cent of burglary victims, 56 per cent of robbery victims, 51 per cent of sexual assault victims and 48 per cent of assault victims;
- Victims in developing countries see crimes as more serious, on average, than victims in developed countries (compare the seriousness of being burgled if you do or do not have insurance; or even if you are injured but have good medical services compared with having poor services);
- Victims of crime, particularly victims of contact crime and burglary, feel more afraid to go out alone at night than non-victims (in Barbados it was about 10 percentage points);
- Female victims of violence in Haiti are very significantly less likely than non-victims to receive antenatal care, suffer from genital ulcers and suffer from anemia.

But crime does not just affect victims. It can also affect people who may never be victimized.

- Fifty-eight per cent of all those interviewed in the African samples felt unsafe when out at night alone;
- Fifty-nine per cent of the African samples thought it likely they would be burgled in the next year;
- Twenty per cent of people in the Dominican Republic say fear of crime has stopped them going out at night;
- Forty-two per cent of Haitians said fear of crime had stopped them going to Port-au-Prince.

In an earlier study by UNICRI looking at more countries (17 developed and 17 developing) it was found that people were generally more likely to be victims of crime the lower down the HDI their country was (i.e. less developed they were). For example, in descending order of the strength of relationship:

- There are strong or very strong relationships between HDI and levels of consumer fraud, personal theft, corruption and burglary ($r = -0.81$ to -0.72);
- There are moderately strong relationships between HDI and robbery and sexual assaults ($r = -0.49$ and -0.44); and
- A weaker relationships with non-sexual assaults ($r = -0.29$).

Furthermore:

- People in developing countries feel more insecure out at night; and
- They feel they are more likely to be a victim of crime.

This is very important as it will be seen below that crime and fear of crime can have an effect on development, but in this section it has been seen that levels of development are strongly related to crime rates.

The effects on communities

Helping to build strong communities is one of the objectives of this handbook in order to meet the United Nations guiding principle of community-based action. The effects of crime on communities are particularly important because strong effective communities can be one of the most powerful crime inhibitors, as will be discussed below.

It has been shown in the huge Chicago project that informal social control (i.e. control by the community acting spontaneously) can be more powerful than formal social control (the police and criminal justice system). But to be effective there must be "social capital" (features of social organization such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit) and effective joint activity. These need the successful linking of adults and children in the community, links within and between families and the expectation that residents can and will intervene on behalf of children and young people.

The Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighbourhoods (PHDCN) is an interdisciplinary study of how families, schools, and neighbourhoods affect child and adolescent development. It was designed to advance the understanding of the developmental pathways of both positive and negative human social behaviour. In particular, the Project examined the pathways to juvenile delinquency, adult crime, substance abuse and violence. At the same time, the Project also provided a detailed look at the environments in which such social behaviour takes place by collecting substantial amounts of data about urban Chicago, including its people, institutions and resources.

The Project's design consisted of two major components. The first was an intensive study of Chicago's neighbourhoods, particularly the social, economic, organizational, political and cultural structures and the dynamic changes that take place in the structures over time. The second component was a series of coordinated longitudinal studies that followed over 6,000 randomly selected children, adolescents and young adults to examine the changing circumstances of their lives and the personal characteristics that might lead them toward or away from a variety of antisocial behaviour.

The work carried out for the South-South project in Jamaica has shown how crime within neighbourhoods can rip communities apart and destroy all such links. Indeed, it has become so extreme that some mothers even encourage their sons to get revenge for harm done to the family.

But it does not have to be so extreme. Crime and fear of crime can also:

- Keep people off the streets and reduce neighbourliness and collective action;
- Reduce social and human capital;

- Result in dereliction and disorder which encourages yet more crime;
- Result in distrust and feuds between generations;
- Increase the turnover of families in and out of the community, resulting in yet more instability; and
- Reduce investment and jobs resulting in unemployment and deprivation.

In some poor communities in Zambia, crime is seen as the second biggest problem after water supply. In other communities education has to stop when it gets dark because all the electrical fittings have been stolen.

All this can result in a feeling of hopelessness, completely undermining any informal social control and feeding yet more crime in the future.

The effect of crime on development

What is known about crime is that it results in people dying, being injured, losing their property and rights, becoming traumatized, having their quality of life reduced and becoming involved with the criminal justice system. In some places, more likely in developing countries than in developed, this can happen on a grand scale. One should, therefore, primarily be trying to prevent crime regardless of its effect on development.

However, it is commonly believed that crime and/or the perception of crime can affect the rate at which a country develops and therefore also affect the standard and quality of life. The negative effect of crime on development is another reason why much greater, targeted efforts must be made to prevent crime.

What, then, are some of the effects of crime on development?

- In 2003/4 the cost of crime in the United Kingdom was estimated at £36 billion, i.e. 1.8 per cent of GDP. In Jamaica it was over 3.7 per cent of GDP;
- It is estimated that by reducing their homicide rates to 8 per 100,000 Jamaica and Haiti could add boost economic growth per capita by 5.4 per cent a year;
- Crime imposes costs on the government (e.g. the cost of the criminal justice system, victim compensation schemes and crime prevention efforts) that could go to more productive enterprises;
- Crime costs households money that otherwise would have gone into more productive spending (e.g. school fees in most developing countries);
- Violence against women not only exacts an enormous public health tool, it impedes social and economic development by preventing its victims from contributing fully to their communities;[1]

[1]Pan American Health Organization, *Health in the Americas 2007*, vol. 1, pp. 10, 21.

- Thirty-nine per cent of managers in Jamaica said they were less likely to expand their business because of crime and 37 per cent said that crime discourages investments that would improve productivity;
- Sixty-three per cent of firms in the Dominican Republic say crime is a major obstacle to investment and 57 per cent said their access to financing had declined because of crime;
- Crime adversely affects the stock of physical capital ranging from the destruction of physical infrastructure to a reduction in investment in physical infrastructure;
- Tourism is one industry particularly affected by violence. If youth crime in Jamaica and the Bahamas were to decrease by 1 per cent it has been calculated that tourist flows would increase by more than 45,000 and 36,000 tourists per year respectively (about $US 70 million);
- Crime erodes the development of human capital. An example of this would be the lost output of workers injured or killed in criminal events—the United Kingdom estimates it as £450,000 per homicide, £4,400 per sexual assault and £1,000 per robbery, for example. This would also include the cost of not educating children who cannot get to school because of the fear of violence;
- Crime imposes costs on business, for loss by theft, fraud etc. and for the costs of security efforts, which otherwise would go into positive investment;
- Crime destroys social capital (see above) which otherwise could have been used for positive community advances—including a reduction of crime;
- The IMF has said that in parts of Malawi "insecurity makes it too risky for the poor to accumulate assets and wealth, particularly in a rural setting, as any assets or wealth are likely to be stolen".

Crime and foreign investment

Crime or the perception of crime discourages foreign investment and clearly this has an adverse effect on development.

A recent publication by the United Nations (UNODC, 2005 *(a)*)demonstrates the problems clearly:

- In the 1970s, Africa attracted a higher percentage of world foreign direct investment (FDI) than Asia or Latin America;
- Now it attracts less than a fifth of FDI as they do;
- Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest ratio of FDI to GDP of any world region even though the return on FDI is the highest of any region;
- Of 195 World Bank "rule of law" ratings, only one African country is in the top 50—African States are rated amongst the most lawless in the world;
- The Economist Intelligence Unit wrote about Kenya "Violent crime and extortion will continue to pose a risk to business ... Armed assaults on houses and

businesses are likely to remain [...] The police force, which is poorly equipped and inadequately trained, under-paid and corrupt, cannot be relied on for protection". It wrote in equal terms about Nigeria and South Africa;

- Poor, corrupt policing is seen as a, or even the, major problem.

In a recent survey 49 per cent of Zambian businesses saw crime as a major constraint on expansion—as did 70 per cent of their counterparts in Kenya, 27 per cent in Ugandan and 26 per cent in the United Republic of Tanzania.

Corruption and investment

One particular form of crime—corruption—is often seen as an even bigger impediment to investment than violent crime. The World Bank believes corruption is the single greatest obstacle to social and economic development.

- Demands for bribes on firms for doing business by corrupt officials can cost African companies between 2 and 9 per cent of their sales;
- The collapse of the Banco Intercontinental in the Dominican Republic cost the government about 15 per cent of GDP (this figure makes the losses due to violence look petty in comparison) and about 16 per cent of the population went below the poverty line as a result;
- Haiti is seen as the most corrupt country in the world, Guyana the 121st, Trinidad the 79th and Jamaica the 61st out of 163 countries judged by Transparency International;
- Corruption is a major problem in many of the African countries surveyed through the ICVS—although South Africa and Botswana are not among them.
- Fifty per cent of firms in Zambia said they had paid 4 per cent of total sales in bribes;
- Looking at economic crime more generally, 189 organizations in Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Kenya said they had lost $US 206,000,000 to corruption, extortion and embezzlement over two years.

And finally, a recent study by WHO on the effects of violence on the Millennium Development Goals has produced this extremely useful table which should be of great interest to politicians, policymakers in the governments of affected countries and development agencies.

Table A.II.1. How violence obstructs achievement of the Millennium Development Goals

Millennium Development Goals	*Relevant indicators (numbers as listed in Millennium Declaration)*	*Linkages with violence*
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	1. Proportion of population below $US 1 per day 2. Poverty gap ratio 3. Share of poorest 20 per cent in national consumption 4. Prevalence of underweight children under five years of age 5. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption	• Few events throw a family into poverty more quickly than the loss of a breadwinner due to violent death or injury, particularly in places where no formal "safety nets" exist; when this occurs through collective violence, entire societies can be affected • Both interpersonal and collective violence can reduce local and national economic performance, the impact of which falls most harshly on the poorest fifth • Collective violence often disrupts production and distribution of food, contributing to prevalence of underweight children and below-minimum diet in the general population • Poverty and hunger can be exacerbating factors in competition between social or ethnic groups, leading to collective violence ranging from rioting and repression to war and genocide (see also MDG 7)
2. Achieve universal primary education	6. Net enrolment ratio in primary education 7. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5 8. Literacy rate of 15 to 24 year-olds	• Violence in the home, both between adults and against children, is linked with reduced attendance and non-completion of studies by children • Collective violence disrupts education systems and can rob entire generations of children of their right to an education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women	9. Ratios of girls to boys in primary secondary and tertiary education 10. Ratio of literate females to males of 15 to 24 year-olds 11. Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector 12. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament	• Violence against women and girls is highly variable from culture to culture, but is linked to low status of women in society (including factors such as lower access to educational and economic activities) • Violence in and around schools appears to be a major reason why some girls are kept from entering school or from completing their education • Despair due to disempowerment (lack of own income, little control over life choices) is a contributing factor to suicide among women, particularly in some rural societies • In recent years, female leaders in certain countries have been targeted for assassination to discourage women's participation in both local and national politics

4 Reduce child mortality	13. Under-five mortality rate 14. Infant mortality rate 15. Proportion of one year-old children immunized against measles	• Women who have experienced violence as girls are at increased risk of engaging in sex at an early age; this increases their risk of early pregnancy, which is a risk factor for increased neonatal mortality • Violence against women during pregnancy increases the risk of pregnancy-related complications, damage to the foetus, and subsequent survival of the child • Under-fives are frequently (along with the elderly) the first to die when collective violence disrupts basic necessities such as food, shelter, clean water, and health care • Collective violence disrupts immunization campaigns designed to prevent common childhood diseases such as measles
5. Improve maternal health	16. Maternal mortality ratio 17. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel	• Violence against women, including sexual assault, is associated with an increased risk of unintended pregnancy, which is itself a risk factor in maternal mortality • While pregnancy is often a protective factor against violence, recent research shows that in many places women experience higher levels of domestic violence while pregnant • Disruption of health care services during collective violence, particularly access to skilled birth attendants, invariably raises maternal mortality
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, other diseases	18. HIV prevalence in 15 to 24 year-olds 19. Condom use rate 21-24. Malaria and TB prevalence and death rates, and proportion of population in high-prevalence areas receiving prevention and treatment	• In areas of high HIV prevalence, violence increases risk of HIV infection directly through rape and sexual assault and indirectly through limiting ability to negotiate use of condoms • Collective violence disrupts basic public health measures designed to prevent or treat major diseases such as TB and malaria

Millennium Development Goals	***Relevant indicators (numbers as listed in Millennium Declaration)***	***Linkages with violence***
7. Ensure environmental sustainability	25. Proportion of land area covered by forest 31. Proportion of urban population with access to improved sanitation 32. Proportion of households with access to secure tenure (owned or rented)	• Competition for resources due to environmental degradation is at least partly responsible for much violent conflict • Environmental degradation often causes population displacement, which is itself highly associated with various forms of interpersonal, self-inflicted and collective violence • In some countries, criminal violence is used by agricultural or logging interests to expel people from forest areas which are then burned or clearcut • The growth of slums lacking basic services (including reliable governance and security) is associated with a variety of forms of violence, notably raised levels of interpersonal violence related to alcohol and substance misuse, as well as violence related to criminal activities and gang violence
8. Develop a global partnership for development	33. Net Official Development Assistance, total and to Least Developed Countries, as percentage of OECD/Development Assistance Committee donors' gross national income 34. Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation)	• Violence negates the efforts of countries and their international partners to implement effective development programmes. This is particularly true in so-called "failed States" and post-conflict countries where the constant threat of violence makes it difficult for any form of intervention to be carried out, even for the most basic of services

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

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