Women and minorities as challengers to the partisan representation model:

An analysis of group representation and electoral quota design

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the relationship between a widespread electoral reform – quota policies – and the role of political parties in electoral politics. We investigate under what circumstances electoral quotas may pose a long-term challenge to the partisan representation model by increasing non-partisan involvement in electoral politics. Based on normative theories on group representation, we hypothesize that quota provisions targeting minorities will be specified in a way that excludes political parties to a greater extent than quota laws targeting women. We study the sixteen countries in the world that have adopted quotas both for women and for minorities and take a closer look at the design and wording of the quota in six of the countries that use the same quota type (reserved seats) for both groups. The study gives support to the hypothesis. Electoral quotas are not a uniform policy; to the contrary, different ideas about groups in society and their need for representation appear to be embedded in these electoral reforms.
Introduction

Grace Kyomogisha is an elected member of parliament in Uganda. Yet, she does not belong to any political party, nor was she nominated by a political party. In fact, she does not even consider herself a politician. The electoral quota system in Uganda sets aside seats for women, youth, workers, disabled people and the army. Grace Kyomogisha is an army representative. The army was responsible for nominating her to one of the reserved seats. When asked about her representative role, once in parliament, Grace says:

“I do not represent any party interest. We army-representatives keep numb when it comes to party issues. We are behind players when it comes to issues of partisan nature” (Excerpt from interview transcript with Grace Kyomogisha, December 14, 2009). 1

Is Grace Kyimogisha’s experience to be seen as something unique or is her story rather an example of a new, emerging representative model in which political parties become less and less important? Electoral quota policies represent the widest reaching electoral reforms of recent years (Krook et al. 2009). More than 100 countries have adopted quotas for women, which are either enforced by law or voluntarily adopted by political parties. In addition, quota policies for minorities are present in more than 30 countries (Krook and O’Brien 2010). Interestingly, quotas for women have rarely been analyzed in conjunction with those for minorities – despite the similarities between the reforms (see however Htun 2004; Krook and O’Brien 2010). Hitherto, most scholarly attention has been paid to the causes of these reforms

1 The interview was conducted by Malin Holm and Cecilia Josefsson, who have granted us access to the transcribed interview.
as well as to their effects on the targeted group’s numerical representation (see e.g. Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009; Tripp and Kang 2008). Significantly less attention has been paid to the more long-term impacts of these reforms (see however Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2011; Franceschet et al. Forthcoming; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Murray 2010; Zetterberg 2009).

This paper is devoted to the investigation of a possible long-term effect of quotas; the weakened role of political parties in representative politics. More specifically, it aims at examining the question of under which circumstances quotas may pose a challenge to the partisan representation model by increasing non-partisan involvement in electoral politics.\(^2\) In order for us to consider quotas as “challenging” in this respect, they have to be perceived as permanent measures and they have to be designed so as to bypass political parties in their implementation. We look more closely at two aspects that we believe affect the potential of quotas to challenge the partisan representation model: the design and wording of the quota legislation and the group of people that the quota targets. We hypothesize that quota provisions targeting minorities will be specified in a way that excludes political parties to a greater extent than quota laws targeting women.

We test the hypothesis by investigating the quota design of the sixteen countries in the world that have adopted quotas for both women and minorities. In particular, we scrutinize the six countries that have adopted so called reserved seats quotas for both women and minorities, in

\(^2\) Of course, challenges to the partisan representation model exist also without the use of quotas. Non-partisan representatives, also called independents, are already involved in many political party dominated political systems. However, the novelty with quota policies is that they might be an *active* measure to decrease the influence of political parties within representative politics.
order to determine if they are designed differently for the two groups. We find some support for the hypothesis: quotas that are used to improve representation of minorities are designed in a manner that gives them the greatest potential to challenge the partisan representation model.

In the next section, we present the theoretical underpinnings of the paper. Here, we also develop the hypothesis and present the research design. We then conduct the empirical analysis. Finally, we conclude and discuss the implications of the findings.

**Theory and hypotheses**

The theoretical aim of the paper is to put forward a plausible argument as to when electoral quotas have the potential to constitute a challenge to the partisan representation model. After all, political parties have been portrayed as being the main implementers of quota policies (see e.g. Baldez 2007). To present an argument, we draw on three bodies of literature; first, normative theories of (guarantees for) group representation and the different problem descriptions and claims about who should be represented and why that underpin the arguments for quota legislation; second, work that focuses on the design of quota policies; and third, research that examines the link between the two (i.e. studies that analyze if certain claims for group representation tend to generate specific quota designs).

Before we spell out the argument, however, let us first mention a few words about the partisan representation model. This concept simply refers to the fact that the dominant model of representation across the globe is mainly party-based: “political parties have come to be the hub around which representative politics, or at least the appearance of representative politics, revolves in most countries in the world” (Bjarnegård 2009, 40). With political party, we mean any permanent political organization that presents at elections, is capable of
recruiting aspirants and selecting candidates to political office, and that seeks to secure positions of authority within the state (see e.g. Sartori 1976; Norris 1997; Hague et al. 1998).

**Arguments for group representation**

There is an ongoing scholarly discussion about (guaranteeing) special representation of different groups in society. Although most scholars agree that it is problematic that some groups in society (poor, women, religious or ethnic minorities, etc.) are less well represented politically (see e.g. Young 2000, 141-2), there is less agreement among normative theorists that specific electoral arrangements are needed for marginalized groups (Phillips 2005). Whereas some scholars argue that group representation conflicts with liberal democratic norms, others claim that group representation is, instead, a logical extension of the practices already taking place in representative democracies, such as drawing the boundaries of constituencies so that they will correspond to ‘communities of interest’. In general, however, arguments for group representation are generally made on contextual grounds. Certain groups, under certain circumstances need guarantees for representation. There are two common and legitimate grounds: systemic discrimination and self-government (Kymlicka 1995).

The systemic discrimination argument applies to groups in society that historically have been oppressed and therefore are also disadvantaged in the political process. It becomes difficult or impossible for the views and interests of these groups to be represented (Kymlicka 1995; Young 1989, 1990). Thus, the argument for special group representation from this point of view is not that all identity characteristics need to be represented: only those characteristics that disfavor a group’s political participation need special guarantees. As Kymlicka argues, ”the historical domination of some groups by other groups has left a trail of barriers and prejudices that makes it difficult for historically disadvantaged groups to participate
effectively in the political process” (Kymlicka 1995, 141). Importantly, from a systemic discrimination point of view any guarantees of group representation should aim at reaching a society where discrimination no longer takes place and where an active measure for group representation is no longer needed (i.e. any quotas should be temporary). Society should actively seek to come to terms with the marginalization of a particular group, and include it in the polity. Giving this group special representation is both a compensation for past discrimination and an attempt to work against future discrimination (Kymlicka 1995).

The self-government argument, on the other hand, usually applies to groups in society (e.g. national minorities) who demand recognition of their different cultural identity. These groups generally wish to maintain their differences and cultural specificity alongside with integration into the larger polity. The minority groups that have a right to special representation should not just be culturally different, they should be defined as belonging to separate nations or peoples (Kymlicka 1995). Claims from these groups do not preclude claims of oppression or discrimination. The important thing here, however, is knowing which claim that is underlying the demands for increased representation, because the claims being made bring about a number of consequences for how representation is later ensured. One aspect that differs between the systemic discrimination claim and the self-government claim is that they imply different time-frames. The claim for special representation of national minorities is a claim about protection, a bid to make the group permanently politically relevant. The claim for special representation of women is, instead, based on systemic discrimination and is of a temporary character, only to be given special political attention as long as there is still discrimination against the group of women (Kymlicka 1995).
**Quota design and political parties**

Electoral quotas are the most common – but far from the only – way of ensuring group representation. Quotas can be used to improve the representation of women or other groups in society by setting a minimum level (in numbers or percentage) of either pre-election candidates or post-election members of parliament that have to belong to the targeted group (Dahlerup 2006). Importantly, quotas can be, and are, designed in very different ways. The most obvious distinguishing feature between different types of quotas is that between candidate quotas and reserved seats quotas. Candidate quotas imply that political parties are required to, whether by a legal stipulation or internal party regulations\(^3\), put a minimum number of the members of the group in question on the candidate lists to ensure their inclusion in the coming election and enhance their election possibilities. Reserved seats, on the other hand, focus on the result of the election by stipulating the minimum number of individuals from the underrepresented group in question that must occupy parliamentary seats (Baldez 2007; Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2011; Krook 2009).\(^4\) Thus, whereas the former quota type tries to ensure increased fairness of the election process, the latter focuses on the fairness of the election result.

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3 Here, we focus on quotas that are stipulated in the constitution or in national law, thus leaving voluntary party candidate quotas aside.

4 Note that concepts might differ, for instance candidate quotas are named simply "quotas" by Htun (2004) and "legislative quotas" by Krook and O’Brien (2010) (note that both these analyses exclude all voluntary party candidate quotas). Reserved seats quotas are named "reservations" by Htun (2004) and "reserved seats" by Krook and O’Brien (2010).
Not surprisingly, the involvement of political parties in quota implementation might vary across quota type. Political parties are evidently the main implementers of candidate quotas. The whole idea with this quota type is that political parties, in at least one respect, democratize their candidate selection procedures, by adding people from different groups in society to their candidate lists (Baldez 2007). For reserved seats, on the other hand, the case is not necessarily as simple. Reserved seats are usually, but not always, add-on seats, filled after the election. Political parties can be, but must not, be actively involved in filling those seats (see also Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2011). In fact, it is not evident that political parties must be part of the implementation process at all. As a consequence, we suggest that reserved seats are generally more likely to challenge the partisan representation model than candidate quotas.

However, the distinction between process-oriented candidate quotas and results-oriented reserved seats is just one first step in distinguishing between different quota designs. It can help us make a first rough sorting, but it does not get us all the way. To reiterate, all reserved seats quotas are not alike. Certain reserved seats designs give some power to the existing political parties, e.g. by basing the selection of reserved seats individuals on election results or by an internal party vote, while others bypass the political parties almost completely, e.g. by giving the power of appointment to the president or the prime minister (Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009; Matland 2006).

**Groups and quota design**

We would expect the ideas about why different groups should be represented to be mirrored in the debate about which quota design should be adopted. Interestingly enough, empirical studies on quotas for women have often been conducted in isolation from studies on quotas
for other underrepresented groups, making it difficult to compare and draw conclusions about the real world consequences of the different normative arguments for group representation (notable exceptions, on which we draw below, are Htun 2004; Krook and O’Brien 2010). As Htun (2004) and Krook and O’Brien (2010) point out, the arguments for the two groups are often compared in normative theory, but empirical studies of representation across identities have been rare.

Htun (2004) looks at country level quota adoption in electoral democracies in order to try to determine whether countries that adopt quotas for ethnic minorities adopt another type of quotas than countries that wish to improve the representation of women. Importantly, she links the quota adoption to different normative claims for representation and finds that, indeed, ”different remedies for underrepresentation are logically appropriate for each group” (439). Her argument, which finds support in her empirical material, is that reserved seats quotas are self-reinforcing and thus suitable for minorities, whereas candidate quotas are self-cancelling and, as such, more suitable for women. Reserved seats, according to Htun, create incentives for group based politics, cementing group difference as a long-term valid political claim. Candidate quotas, on the other hand, make space within already existing parties and are thus better suited to ensure representation of groups with cross-cutting partisan cleavages, where the aim is to cancel the group difference or at least make sure it is accommodated within the existing political parties, rather than to make it a permanent political cleavage. In this respect, claims for inclusion, probably channeled by candidate quotas, pose less of a challenge to political parties and existing political institutions than do claims for difference, such as the ones made by ethnic groups (Htun 2004). Htun points out that whereas ethnicity is a common mobilizing political principle, gender does not constitute an important political cleavage in most countries. She also shows that, in fact, democracies that adopt quotas for
ethnic minorities are much more likely to opt for a reserved seats design, because it "strengthens ties among group members by connecting them through channels of representation distinct from those used for everyone else" (Htun 2004, 452). Integration into existing political parties is thus not a goal. Countries who adopt quotas with the intention of securing representation for women, on the other hand, tend to adopt candidate quotas. In other words, Htun demonstrates that the different theoretical grounds for representation are reflected not only in the different demands that women and ethnic minorities make, but also in the actual quota design that (sometimes) follows from these demands. The consequence of this is that once the quota is adopted, women coalitions disintegrate and female politicians are integrated into their respective political communities and political parties. Ethnic groupings, however, continue to be a political factor even after the reserved seats quota is in place (Htun 2004).

Krook and O’Brien (2010) question the importance of groups for the quota design adopted. They demonstrate that, when not only looking at democracies, women’s representation is guaranteed by both candidate quotas and reserved seats: Out of the 50 countries in which gender quota policies have been adopted, 19 have adopted reserved seats. Minority representation, on the other hand, is almost always ensured by reserved seats (in 36 of 37 cases). The explanation for quota design is, instead, according to Krook and O’Brien,

5 Htun acknowledges that the picture looks different if authoritarian regimes are included in the analysis. In such countries, reserved seats are, by far, the most common quota type for women and ethnic minorities alike. Htun explains the pattern with the fact that authoritarian regimes "lack a commitment to substantive representation [and thus] have little incentive to promote the right remedy" (Htun 2004, 450). In addition, authoritarian states often also try to limit the influence and independence of political parties.
contextual. Historical differences and transnational influences explain why different types of quotas are common in different regions. Reserved seats are more common – for women and ethnic groups alike – in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, whereas candidate quotas are more common in Latin America (mainly legislative candidate quotas) and Europe (mainly voluntary party quotas) where, on the other hand, quotas for minority groups are less common (Dahlerup 2006; Krook and O’Brien 2010). Matland argues that countries already employing reserved seats for ethnic minorities tend to expand the use of an already existing set of rules to encompass also women (Matland 2006).

Hypothesis and Research Design

Based on the above theoretical arguments, our main hypothesis is that quotas will be designed so as to give more room for partisan involvement when targeting women than when targeting other minorities. The logic behind this hypothesis is that quotas for minorities have the ultimate goal of permanently guaranteeing and reinforcing representation of that particular group, whereas quotas for women have the goal of eventually incorporating gender considerations into political parties.

We investigate this hypothesis in two steps. First, we conduct an analysis to determine if the hypothesis holds true across quota types. We expect women to receive candidate quotas while other minorities receive reserved seats quotas. Importantly, however, we also expect this hypothesis to hold true within a quota type. Thus, secondly, we conduct an analysis to determine if reserved seats for women involve political parties more than do reserved seats for other minorities.

As we have seen, there are studies counter-hypothesizing that differences in quota design may not be due to group representation issues at all, but instead depend on contextual factors
(Krook and O'Brien 2010). The ideal way of taking these propositions into account, while focusing on the possible effect of group-belonging on quota design, is to analyze only those countries that have adopted quotas for both women and minorities. In this way, we can argue that any differences in the design of quotas that we find within one institutional setting is due to different group claims underlying the quota, rather than due to historical similarities and regional factors. If group belonging does not matter for quota design, quotas for two or more different groups should look the same in the same country.

Thus, the first, broad analysis concerns quota types. In this first step, we simply determine whether these countries adopt different quota types for women and other minorities, i.e. whether it is the case that the same country will adopt a candidate quota (that naturally involves political parties) for women and a reserved seats quota for minorities (c.f. Htun 2004). The second step involves restricting the number of cases further. The purpose here is to determine whether there is a discernable difference in the level of party involvement also within one quota type, namely reserved seats. To do this, we take a closer look at the specifics of the quota design by studying quota legislation in those countries with reserved seats quotas for both women and other minorities. If our hypothesis holds true, partisan involvement would be stipulated, envisioned or encouraged to a greater extent in reserved seats quota legislation for women and bypassed, ignored or discouraged to a greater extent in reserved seats quota legislation for other minorities.

The second step requires delving deeper into the empirical material – quota regulations formulated in constitutions and election laws. By going into the legislative texts and analyzing their content, it is possible to identify legislation that is designed and worded in a manner that increases the likelihood that non-partisan actors will be involved in the political recruitment process as well as in parliamentary activities. Here, we have two main sources: the Inter-
Parliamentarian Union’s (IPU) PARLINE database\(^6\), which contains information about the structure and working methods of national parliaments, and the International Foundation for Electoral System’s (IFES) Election Guide\(^7\). In those cases where these databases have lacked in detail we have consulted the original source – either the constitution or the election law. In one case, Jordan, we have also approached the IFES Country Director of Jordan for consultation\(^8\).

**Analysis**

In a first selection of countries, we have identified the countries that have adopted quotas for both women and minorities (Krook and O’Brien 2010). All together, this group comprises 16 countries. Table 1 shows that of these countries half of them (eight) have adopted the same quota type – reserved seats – for both women and minorities. The second and equally large group has adopted candidate quotas for women and reserved seats for minorities.

\(^6\) [www.ipu.org/parline-e](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e)

\(^7\) [www.electionguide.org](http://www.electionguide.org)

\(^8\) E-mail correspondence with Darren Nance, International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) Country Director of Jordan, June 2, 2011.
Table 1. Countries with electoral quota laws for both women and minorities, by quota type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minorities</th>
<th>Candidate Quotas</th>
<th>Reserved Seats</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Quotas</td>
<td>Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, China, France, Niger, Palestine, Portugal (8)</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Jordan, Pakistan, Rwanda, Taiwan, Tanzania, Tibet, Uganda (8)</td>
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Source: Krook and O’Brien 2010.

This finding gives some support to the suggestion that minority representation is more likely to be ensured by reserved seats than women’s representation (c.f. Htun 2004). Whereas all countries adopted reserved seats for minorities, quotas for women to a considerable extent involved the re-making of the political parties’ candidate lists. Thus, there seems to be the case that quotas for women are frequently designed to increase the gender consciousness of political parties; thereby, they might be self-cancelling and thus temporary. The reserved seats for minorities, on the other hand, appear to be self-reinforcing: they represent an explicit recognition and legitimization of the particularism of a specific minority group (c.f. Htun 2004). In this case, the role of political parties for democratic representation is less distinct. The selection of candidates to reserved seats might involve the political parties and they might not. Here, the design of the law is pivotal for the extent to which reserved seats challenge the political parties’ monopoly over candidate selection.
The remaining part of the analysis therefore concentrates its effort to the countries that have adopted reserved seats (i.e. the quota type that has the possibility to challenge the political party dominance in political representation) to both women and minorities: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Jordan, Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania (Tibet and Taiwan are excluded from the analysis, because of lack of available information). To reiterate, the idea with the analysis is to examine if reserved seats are designed differently for women than for minorities, in terms of how these representatives are to be selected. Thus, by scrutinizing the quota specifications of each of the countries, and their wording about how candidates to reserved seats are selected, we investigate whether the same tendency can be discerned also within one quota type, that is, if political parties are more involved in the selection of women than in the selection of minorities.

Analyzing the cases together, a small but distinct pattern emerges: Political parties appear to be more involved in the selection of women to reserved seats than in the selection of minorities. The pattern is not evident in all the six cases; it is indeed most evident in Uganda and Rwanda. However, importantly, in none of the cases do we find the opposite tendency: political parties are nowhere more involved in the election of representatives to minority seats than they are in the election of representatives to women’s seats. Thus, also in this second step of the analysis, the hypothesis is supported: Minority seats represent the greatest challenge to the partisan representative model: the representatives occupying minority seats have reached their position largely without support from political parties, and are thus more likely to perform their representative duties without following party programs or building partisan alliances.

To illustrate how political parties are more involved in the selection of women to reserved seats than in the selection of minorities, we look closer at the reserved seat systems of the six
countries. We group the countries in three broad groups, distinguishing between those reserved seats systems where the relationship is most obvious (Uganda and Rwanda) and the other four countries, and separating those countries where the tendencies are somewhat less evident, albeit there (Afghanistan and Jordan), from those where there is no pattern at all (Pakistan and Tanzania).

_Uganda and Rwanda: Minority seats and interest group representation_

Uganda introduced gender quotas prior to the Rwandan adoption, already in 1989. At that time, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), led by President Yoweri Museveni, had been in power for three years. Museveni adopted a “no-party system” with the argument that political parties in Uganda create ethnic conflict and sectarianism. The no-party system was in place for almost 20 years. In 2005, Ugandans voted in a referendum for a return to a multiparty system. In the following elections, in 2006, NRM still held a majority of the seats, followed by non-partisan representatives and representatives for Forum for Democratic Change (FDC). Opposition parties exist, but they are still poorly institutionalized and most of the candidates sided with the NRM or stood as non-partisan, or independent, candidates (Muriaas 2009).

The adoption of reserved seats for women was mostly a top-down initiative. Museveni went a step beyond women’s demands for political representation; women activists had asked for reserved seats at the local level, but Museveni decided to adopt reserved seats for women also in the national assembly. Scholars have argued that Museveni’s initiative was an empty gesture and a way to get a solid vote bank in the legislature, and not a way to amplify the political agenda to increasingly concern women’s issues (Goetz 2003; Tripp 2001).
In addition to women, the Constitution of 1995 gives special seats also to workers, the youth, the disabled and the army (Article 78c). The ways in which representatives are elected to these seats differ across group but also over time. Representatives for workers, the youth, disabled and the army are elected by electoral colleges populated by local leaders of these groups. Thus, there is a so-called functionalized decentralization of the candidate selection system (cf. Hazan 2002), in which leaders of popular sectors are given the power to select representatives. The reserved seats for women, on the other hand, are an exception from the functional decentralization arrangements. Before the 2006 elections, the women to reserved seats were elected primarily by “a narrow electorate of mostly male district elites” (Goetz 2003, 119). Thus the NRM controlled who was going to seat on the special seats. From 2006 and forward, women are directly elected. The political parties nominate women or women stand as non-partisan candidates, and then the citizens (both men and women) vote for who will enter the national assembly.

The Ugandan case, thus, shows that women are elected differently than the other groups. Political parties are more involved in the process of candidate selection for women’s seats than in the other cases. As a result, Uganda illustrates fairly well the argument that mainly minority quotas appear to represent a challenge to the partisan representation model.

Moving to Rwanda, this war-torn country has lately become world famous for its high level of women representatives (see e.g. Devlin and Elgie 2008). In 2008, Rwanda became the first country in the world to have more than 50 percent women (56.3 percent). The large number of women representatives date back to 2003, when Rwanda changed its constitution and introduced reserved seats to women, young people, and disabled persons. According to the constitution (Article 76), 53 of the 80 seats in the Chamber of Deputies are open for any
contestant who meets the eligibility requirements, 24 seats are reserved for women, two seats are reserved for young people, and one seat is reserved for disabled persons.

Also the Rwandan case illustrates the argument rather well. As in Uganda, the constitution commands specific selection procedures for seats reserved to women in relation to the special seats designated to other groups. Whereas seats reserved to young people as well as disabled persons are elected via functional decentralization (through the national organization of each of the groups), the election of women’s seats also involves the political parties. More specifically, the two women from each province as well as the capital (Kigali) are elected by a joint assembly composed of members of the local (district, town, municipality, etc.) councils as well as by members of the executive committee of locally based women’s organizations (Article 76). Thus, in practice, the assembly is of a hybrid character, with members of the local councils being party activists, mainly representing the dominant party – the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) – and with actors from civil society and the women’s movement. As a consequence, also in Rwanda the partisan aspect is more evident in the election mechanisms for women’s reserved seats than for other targeted groups.

There is a slight dissonance, however, between the theories on group representation for minorities and the empirical results emanating from these two countries. Theories on group representation stipulate that minorities’ claim to representation is grounded in arguments of protection and self-government. That these two aims go together is evident when ethnic or religious minorities are to be represented, but less evident when young or disabled people gain special representation. Clearly, the claim underlying their representation has nothing to do with them wanting to be seen as a nation, claiming self-government. Nor, however, does it belong with the step-by-step integration into the system that is envisioned in the quotas for women. Our suggestion is that these reserved seats quotas do belong with other quotas for
minorities, because they are still about permanent protection of groups. In order to protect the rights of disabled people, of young people, of workers, of people fighting for the country, the argument is that they need to be guaranteed inclusion in the highest political body of the country. Take the group of disabled people, for instance – it is not a group large enough to make it possible for political parties to clearly integrate them in their candidate nomination process. Instead, they need to be given guaranteed representation. It is, however, important to note that quotas for these types of groups seem to be a black spot in theories on group representation.

_Afghanistan and Jordan: Separate constituencies for minorities, women are “lucky losers”_

The argument presented here, that minority seats represent the greatest challenge to the partisan representative model, is most evidently illustrated by the Ugandan and Rwandan cases. Being aware of this rather obvious pattern, however, makes it possible to unveil similar tendencies in other types of reserved seats legislation. The reserved seat systems in Afghanistan and Jordan thus lend some support to the argument. Quotas are designed somewhat differently for women and other minorities. It is, however, important to note that political parties play a very limited role in both Afghan and Jordanian elections. The answer to the question of whether a particular quota design challenges the partisan representation model is thus therefore not as straightforward here, as the partisan representation model is already questioned or challenged in these countries. Despite this, however, differences can be discerned in how reserved seats quotas for women are more integrated into ordinary elections whereas reserved seats quotas for other minorities are often filled by assigning these minorities their own constituencies, thus separating their vote-base from that of other political actors.
Afghanistan’s reserved seat system dates back to 2004, after the fall of the Taliban regime. The 2004 constitution stipulates that 68 of 249 seats (27 percent) should be reserved to women. If this quota is not filled in the ordinary election, the women who received the most votes, without being elected, are appointed until all 68 seats are filled. Another 10 seats are reserved to a nomad population: the Kuchis (Article 83). Being a nomad population, the Kuchis do not occupy a particular territory. Instead, a nation-wide Kuchi-constituency has been created. All Kuchis are granted special “Kuchi-cards” and can vote in designated Kuchi polling-stations, and thus only for the ten Kuchi seats. The political system in Afghanistan is quite exceptional, as the partisan involvement in elections is generally very low. There are no stipulations requiring candidates to be associated with political parties, and there are certain incentives in Afghanistan not to be connected to a political party: publically labeling oneself might incur a potential security risk. As a consequence, candidates for elections stand as non-partisans, or independents, although they might informally be linked to a political party (Larson Forthcoming). However, there is still a discernable difference between the reserved seats for women and the reserved seats for the Nomads. The reserved seats for women are incorporated into the ordinary election, and the women who fill these seats have competed with other candidates, whether partisan or not. The underlying objective clearly seems to be to give women candidates a “boost”, to compensate for the disadvantages they might have in an ordinary electoral race, and, in the long run, level out the electoral playing field so that women can compete on the same terms as other candidates. The Kuchis, however, are not at all competing with non-Kuchi candidates. They have ten seats, separated from the rest of the seats, and Kuchi interests are seen as so particular that they do not need to concern themselves with any political struggles going on outside the Kuchi constituency.
Quotas for women in Jordan were first introduced in the 2003 amendment of the Election Law from 2001. The quota policy required that six seats (5.45 percent) in parliament were reserved for women. In the temporary Election Law in May 2010, the number of seats reserved for women increased to 12, which equals 10 percent of all the seats (the total number of parliamentarians increased from 110 to 120). In addition, the law also specified that nine seats should be reserved for Christians and three seats should be reserved for Circassians or Checheans. Within the 96 remaining seats, which are distributed among Muslim candidates, nine are reserved for Bedouins. Thus, the Jordan system for distributing seats to parliament is entirely quota-based.

As in Afghanistan, the party system in Jordan is not well developed. Parties do exist, but the most institutionalized party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), boycotted the last election in November 2010. Rather, tribes are influential in Jordan politics, and the number of non-partisan representatives is large (89 percent in the 2007 elections). The quota provision for women specifies that the seats should be distributed according to a system of “lucky losers”, i.e. to those 12 women who did not become elected in the open race for the Muslim seats but obtained the largest number of votes (in percentage). Unlike the Afghani version, however, 12 quota seats are reserved for women regardless of how many “ordinary” seats that are filled by women. As for the remaining seats, these are distributed through specific constituencies in which only constituents from the specific group (Checheans/Circassians, Bedouins, and Muslims) have the right to vote. That is, Bedouin representatives are elected by Bedouin voters, etc. Thus, the pattern in Jordan is similar to the Afghani pattern. Women are involved in the electoral race for the 96 Muslim seats, and their participation is encouraged by giving additional seats to women who clearly stood a chance but did not manage to win a seat. When given a parliamentary seat, they are also given the chance to build up confidence among
constituents and to forge alliances within parliament (whether partisan or not), and they thus stand a better chance of winning an “ordinary” Muslim seat in the next election. The other minorities are clearly granted separate constituencies in order to protect and ensure the political participation of members of that particular group. They are not seen as politically disadvantaged in the electoral race, rather, they need to be ensured representation for the very reason that they are seen as permanently different from the majority Muslim population.

The fact that these two countries both have weak party systems is, of course, a bit problematic when the purpose is to determine to what extent the partisan representation model is challenged. Also, however, none of these countries are considered democracies, and strengthening political parties is often seen as a way of strengthening democracy. The introduction of quotas can be seen as one way of reinforcing a non-institutionalized party democracy. It all depends on, of course, how the quota is designed. It is interesting to note that there are differences in the design of quotas for different groups even in undemocratic countries where parties are not officially strong. This is certainly an indication that different groups are viewed in different ways, and that this affects the type of quota they get.

Tanzania and Pakistan: No discernable differences

In two of the countries – Pakistan and Tanzania – we have found no significant difference in selection procedure between the different groups. In Pakistan, the special seats allocated to women and minorities (Hindus, Christians, Ahmadis/Parsees, and Other religious minorities), respectively, are selected by the political parties, in relation to the number of seats they receive in the election (The National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies. Allocation of reserved seats for women and non-Muslims (procedure) rules, 2002. Article 3). Thus, all reserved seats in Pakistan, regardless of which group they are targeting, do involve political
parties and in the same manner and there is thus no discernible difference in to what degree they involve political parties. In fact, political parties are central actors in filling the reserved seats for both women and other minorities, and thus, the reserved seats quota in Pakistan does not constitute a strong challenge to the partisan representation model at all.

Political parties are central in Tanzanian politics too, and all candidates must be proposed by a political party (Tanzania Constitution, Article 67, 1b). Specific seats are reserved for two groups: women and inhabitants of the island of Zanzibar. The reserved seats allocated to women are 30 percent of all the seats in the parliament. These seats are filled by the political parties after the general election, in accordance with their proportion of the votes. The Zanzibari seats are five. These are elected by the Zanzibari House of Representatives (Article 66, 1b-c). Thus, the election to the reserved seats in Tanzania includes political parties, both the seats designated to women and to minorities. In the first case, the parties are directly involved, as the seats are proportionally distributed after the election result has been presented. Most political parties have had no institutionalized process, with clear candidacy requirements, for electing their representatives to women’s seats; thus, political leaders have tended to choose those women who are personally loyal to them (Meena 2003). As for the Zanzibari seats, political parties have been indirectly involved, through the Zanzibari legislature. The semi-autonomous status of the island of Zanzibar in the Republic of Tanzania is fairly unique. Inhabitants of Zanzibar vote for both the Zanzibari House of Representatives for state-issues as well as for the Tanzanian parliament for national issues - and in addition the Zanzibar House of Parliament gets to represent Zanzibar interests by appointing five of its elected members to the national parliament. Certainly, this arrangement is about protecting the Zanzibari community by granting them guaranteed influence over national politics as well as a certain amount of self-government. The case of Tanzania shows that this can be
accomplished while still involving political parties. Thus, while not showing tendencies in line with our hypothesis, the Tanzanian and Pakistani examples provide “negative” support – not even in these countries, where the pattern is least evident, does it go in the opposite direction. Political parties are equally involved in quotas for women and for minorities – but there are no indications that they would, in any way, be more involved in quotas for minorities.

**Conclusion**

This paper has analyzed the relationship between a widespread electoral reform – quota policies – and the role of political parties in electoral politics. A distinct feature of gender quotas and quotas for minority groups is that these regulations to some extent change the rules of the game of party-dominated representative democracy, either by requiring the political parties to put a number of persons of the targeted group on the electoral slots, or by earmarking a number of seats in the legislature to persons of a specific group in society. The specific research question we have addressed is under what circumstances electoral quotas may pose a long-term challenge to the partisan representation model by increasing non-partisan involvement in electoral politics. By looking closer at the design and wording of the quota as well as at the group of people the quota targets, we have hypothesized that quota provisions targeting minorities will be specified in a way that excludes political parties to a greater extent than quota laws targeting women. Analyzing the quota design of the sixteen countries in the world that have adopted quotas both for women and for minorities, the study gives support to the hypothesis.

The analysis indicates that electoral quotas are not a uniform policy; to the contrary, different ideas about groups in society and their need for representation appear to be embedded in these
electoral reforms. To put it simply, a general idea seems to be that the interests of minority groups should be permanently protected whereas women should be gradually included in the polity until they are no longer marginalized. These thoughts are reflected in the quota policies, not only in the choice of quota type but also in the more detailed wording within a specific quota type. Roughly speaking, women should become included in the political parties, whereas minority groups should be protected from party-dominated politics by letting people from their own group (organizations, citizens, etc.) elect a number of legislators. Interestingly, this pattern is most obvious in Rwanda and Uganda, that is, in countries that are not democratically developed. This finding shows that also in authoritarian states, ideas about group representation have implications for the ways in which electoral reforms are designed (c.f. Htun 2004).

The implications of the findings are several: Empirically, the results indicate that, based on which group we pay attention to, the partisan representation model is unequally challenged. Hitherto, empirical research on quota policies has had a bias towards gender quotas. If we look solely at this electoral quota, the conclusion would be that political parties appear not to be challenged by a non-partisan involvement in politics. However, if we focus exclusively at quotas for minorities, we may instead overestimate the degree to which these electoral reforms challenge party dominance in electoral politics: quotas might to some extent represent a new avenue for representation that excludes political parties. A point we want to make here is that an exclusive focus on one social group probably generates a biased conclusion: a focus on women would under-estimate the challenge, whereas a focus on minorities would over-estimate it. By comparing the two groups, we get a more nuanced picture. As a consequence, research on quota policies would benefit from comparing electoral quotas targeting different
groups in society. To reiterate, this analysis has shown that quotas for different groups to some extent rests on specific assumptions about the groups and their need for representation.

As for the normative implications of the findings, they differ of course, depending on one’s position about the partisan representation model. On the one hand, political parties are, to reiterate, the hub around which representativ politics revolves in most countries in the world. For those who support the dominance of political parties in electoral politics, the increase of quotas for minorities might potentially be a problem, as they might decrease the role of political parties in electoral affairs. On the other hand, the legitimacy of political parties is fairly, or very, low in a large number of countries. For those who question the dominant role of political parties, and welcome new players to the electoral arena, quotas for minorities might be a way to vitalize electoral politics and make representative politics more genuinely representative.

Finally, the policy implications of the findings should not be under-estimated: wording matters, also within a specific quota system. It is unlikely that a party-dominated legislature deliberately introduces a law that on a long-term basis potentially challenges the dominant position of political parties – or at least reinforces a non-institutionalized party system. However, we have attempted to show in this paper that quotas, under certain circumstances, might potentially generate such effects. Thus, the way the law is formulated might have long-term, and not necessarily intended, consequences on representative democracy.
References


