The Role of Resource and Relational Concerns for Procedural Justice

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Two studies test the hypothesis that trust, neutrality, and standing influence procedural justice because of their relation to resource motives as well as the relational motive posited by the Group Value Theory. In Study 1, El Salvadorons were asked to evaluate a procedure for seeking redress for a rights violation and the current national government. Both the rights procedure and the government were evaluated on the dimensions of trust, neutrality, standing, absolute outcome, outcome fairness, and procedural fairness. In separate models of procedural fairness, the relational variables exerted both resource and relational effects. The same model was examined among U.S. residents questioned about a recent encounter with another individual. The resource hypothesis was supported again, despite changes in the cultural and political context and the operationalization of key constructs. These studies suggest a broader interpretation of the meaning of the relational variables than is typically emphasized in current theoretical conceptualizations.

Imagine you are driving through congested city streets late one evening and in a moment of confusion you cruise through an intersection without noticing the stop sign at the corner. Unfortunately, the police officer parked across the street does notice and the flashing red lights signal you to pull your car to the curb. Alternatively, imagine that you are a junior faculty member whose department is due to consider your candidacy for tenure and you have been summoned to the Chair’s office to meet with two senior faculty members about “a matter of substantial importance.” In the next few minutes of either of these scenarios, you will be engaged in an encounter of a sort that has been the focus of considerable attention from procedural justice theorists. Among the questions that have generated, the greatest attention is one concerning the social and psychological factors shaping your belief that an authority has treated you fairly. Most justice theorists would likely agree that one crucial factor is whether these authorities treat you politely and respectfully. Most would probably also agree that respect matters in these situations because of what it signals about the authorities’ views about your standing in some important social group. Below, we challenge the evidence supporting this claim.

Although we are persuaded that the group standing message is likely to be an important (perhaps even the predominant) concern in both of these settings, we suspect that motives other than just group standing are also likely to be of considerable importance. So, for example, respectful (or disrespectful) treatment in either setting might be as likely to communicate about such matters as the likelihood of obtaining desired outcomes (Am I going to be ticketed and fined? Will these faculty members recommend me for tenure?). Our argument below

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can be seen as a criticism of the assumption that trust, neutrality, and standing are indicators of just within-group standing. We suspect that these variables are indicators of other motives as well, including the motive to obtain fair or beneficial outcomes.

A Brief Historical Overview

Based on their observations of individuals in conflict, Thibaut and Walker (1975) proposed a theory of procedural justice. This theory shared with equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965; Homans, 1961; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973) the assumption that individuals are selfishly motivated but that in exchange for membership in social groups they evaluate outcomes according to fairness standards. Thibaut and Walker’s revolutionary contribution was to propose that individuals would define fairness not only according to the outcomes they received but also according to the allocation procedures employed. Based on their assumption of selfishly motivated individuals striving for fair distributions, they proposed that procedures would be judged as fair according to whether they provided disputants an opportunity for process control (an opportunity to tell one’s side of the story) and decision control (an opportunity to influence the final decision).

Consistent with Thibaut and Walker’s theory, process control or “voice” enhancements of procedural fairness have been reliably demonstrated (e.g., Folger, 1977; Kanfer, Sawyer, Earley, & Lind, 1987; LaTour, 1978; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Lind, Kurtz, Musante, Walker, & Thibaut, 1980; Lind, Lissak, & Conlon, 1983; Tyler, 1987; Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985). According to Thibaut and Walker, voice is important to disputants for instrumental reasons—it is expected to influence decisions. Because of this underlying assumption in Thibaut and Walker’s theory, Lind and Tyler (1988) have referred to it as a self-interest model.

A Group Value Theory of procedural justice. Numerous studies have reported findings inconsistent with an exclusively instrumental view of voice (e.g., Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Lind et al., 1983; Tyler, 1987; Tyler et al., 1985). In each of these studies, voice effects have been found to enhance procedural fairness beyond their effect on shaping the outcomes of social conflict. Motivated in part to explain these noninstrumental benefits of voice, Lind and Tyler (1988; Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Lind, 1992) proposed a Group Value Theory of procedural justice. The Group Value model emphasizes individuals’ concern about their relationship with social groups and the authorities representing those groups; it assumes that group identification and group membership is psychologically rewarding and that individuals are motivated to establish and maintain group bonds. According to this theory, when individuals are focused on their long-term relationship with groups, they evaluate the fairness of procedures according to a different set of criteria than the control variables proposed by Thibaut and Walker. Lind and Tyler proposed that under such circumstances, procedures are evaluated according to three noninstrumental criteria: (a) the trustworthiness of the authorities enacting the procedures, (b) the neutrality of those authorities, and (c) information emanating from the procedure about the individual’s standing in the group.

Numerous studies are supportive of Lind and Tyler’s suggestion that individuals are sensitive to issues such as polite or respectful treatment (e.g., Bies & Moag, 1986; Bies & Shapiro, 1987; Tyler & Bies, 1990; Tyler & Folger, 1980). Other studies have shown that the variables of trust, neutrality, and standing account for variance in procedural justice beyond what can be explained by the variables of process and decision control (e.g., Lind et al., 1990; Tyler, 1989). So, for example, Tyler (1989) surveyed Chicago residents about an encounter with a legal authority and found that the relational variables added substantially to the prediction of procedural justice when entered in a regression equation subsequent to the control variables, whereas the control variables added very little explanatory power beyond that provided by the relational variables.

Perhaps the boldest claim for the role of relational concerns in shaping procedural justice comes from two studies that tested competing models that pitted the relational motive against the “resource motive” postulated by procedural justice (e.g., Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978) and distributive justice theorists (e.g., Reis, 1986; Walster, Earley, & Berscheid, 1978). In these studies, Tyler (1994) characterized the “resource motive” as the motive to maximize one’s outcomes or win the dispute. This motive was operationalized in a path model as the direct effects of decision control, absolute outcome favorability, and relative outcome favorability on distributive justice and procedural justice. In both an organizational and a legal setting, Tyler found the best-fitting model to be one in which relational concerns affected procedural justice but resource concerns did not. Based on these findings, Tyler concluded that procedural justice has a relational, but not a resource, base. Although this exclusivity claim is tempered in other theorizing and research by Tyler and his colleagues (in fact, Tyler acknowledges a resource contribution to procedural justice at other points in the 1994 article), the general claim is clearly that procedural justice is at least predominantly relationally based.

A resource motive component of trust, neutrality, and standing. Although the best-fitting model in both settings examined by Tyler (1994) was one with no paths from the exogenous resource variables to the endogenous
variable of procedural fairness, this model does not preclude a resource interpretation of procedural justice because it is possible that the variables of trust, neutrality, and standing might reflect resource concerns as well as relational ones. So, for example, just as in our imaginary examples above, the participants in Tyler’s (1989, 1994) studies might have interpreted polite treatment as fair not only because it signified group standing but also because is signaled that the respondent was going to receive a fair or favorable outcome.

Our argument, and the studies we present below, poses a challenge to the construct validity of the measures of trust, neutrality, and standing as indicators of intragroup standing. Although the Group Value Theory makes a compelling argument that these variables communicate information about group standing, we suspect that trust, neutrality, and standing are informationally richer than is acknowledged by the Group Value Theory and that it is premature to conclude that these measures are tapping exclusively relational concerns.

A considerable part of our argument is that people are using procedural information such as trust, neutrality, and standing to inform them about the fairness of their outcomes as well as to inform them about purely relational concerns. If we are correct, this suggests that resource concerns are more important for people’s reactions to social conflict than is readily apparent from their concern with procedural variables. This argument comports well with recent views advanced by numerous fairness theorists, all of which point to circumstances under which resource concerns are important for fairness judgments. Brockner and Weisenfeld (1996), for example, showed that reactions to the outcomes of social exchanges (including procedural justice) are often determined by an interactive relationship between outcome factors and procedural ones, such that procedures matter less when outcomes are favorable. A similar procedure by outcome interaction is predicted by Referent Cognitions Theory (Folger, 1987, 1993). More recently, Folger and Cropanzano’s (1998) Fairness Theory postulates a considerably broader notion of outcomes than that proposed in Folger’s (1987, 1993) Referent Cognitions Theory. According to Fairness Theory, fairness judgments result from a combination of an event (defined broadly as including both physical or material outcomes as well as relational events such as rude or inconsiderate conduct) and whether someone is held accountable for that event.

Although each of these lines of work point to an influence of resource concerns on fairness judgments, others are more explicit about proposing an influence of resource concerns on procedural fairness. Therefore, for example, Brett and Shapiro (Brett, 1986; Shapiro & Brett, 1993) proposed that voice matters primarily for its instrumental value. More recently, Fairness Heuristic Theory (Lind, 2001; van den Bos & Lind, 2001; van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997) also suggests that information about outcomes can shape reactions to procedures. Work by van den Bos and colleagues, for example (van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997; van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997), demonstrates convincingly that under certain conditions outcome information is important for judging procedural fairness. Similarly, Skitka (in press; Skitka & Mullen, 2002) has argued that in some situations, people’s satisfaction with the resolution of social conflicts is considerably more influenced by outcomes than is apparent in much of the procedural justice literature. Skitka’s research found that among people who had moral mandates concerning a particular outcome in a social conflict (viz., a belief that the outcome at stake taps a moral ideal), procedural fairness was strongly influenced by whether the outcome of the conflict was consistent with their moral mandate. Such findings are consistent with our argument that procedural information (similar to trust, neutrality, and standing) might be perceived to communicate information about outcomes, which in turn influence procedural fairness.

Although our attention to the importance of the resource motive for procedural justice is not new, we are unfamiliar with any research testing the magnitude of the resource implications of trust, neutrality, and standing in addition to the relational implications specified by the Group Value Theory. However, our suggestion that motives other than group standing might underlie people’s concern with trust, neutrality, and standing is not without empirical and theoretical support. For example, Lind and Tyler (1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992) have suggested that justice is important for people’s feelings of self-worth. On numerous occasions, Tyler and colleagues (Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Degoe, 1995; Tyler, DeGoe, & Smith, 1996) have noted that polite and dignified treatment also affirms people’s self-esteem. In addition, Lind, Tyler, and Huo (1997) proposed that status recognition is important for dyadic esteem and can signal the viability of the dyadic relationship, suggesting that concerns with politeness and dignity have implications for interpersonal attachments as well as group relations. Thus, although most of the theorizing and empirical work on the variables of trust, neutrality, and standing has focused on their consequences for our relationships with groups, justice theorists also have noted that these variables can inform individuals about the degree to which other social psychological motives, such as self-esteem maintenance and interpersonal attachments, are being satisfied. We are suggesting that trust, neutrality, and standing also might carry important information about resource concerns.
Two studies are described below that permit three tests of the hypothesized resource component of the group value variables. The first study surveyed residents of El Salvador shortly after the peace accord that marked the end of that country’s 12-year civil war and shortly before the first post-war national election. These residents were asked a series of questions about their satisfaction with their current government as well as their preferences for a procedure to resolve complaints about rights violations committed against them or their family. The El Salvador data permit the resource hypothesis to be tested in two models: one in which respondents are thinking prospectively about the fairness of procedures they might employ for seeking redress for rights violations and a second in which they are thinking retrospectively about the fairness of their current government. We will test a model of fairness from both vantage points that includes resource concerns (absolute outcomes and fair outcomes) as a mediator of the effect of trust, neutrality, and standing on procedural fairness.

Because we are unaware of other studies examining the resource and relational effects of trust, neutrality, and standing, it seems particularly important that we consider whether contextual or methodological factors might contribute to their resource value in these studies. Several methodological considerations, including ones that might be referred to as culture, chronological perspective, and conflict, merit consideration in this regard. Study 1 differs from much of the published research by virtue of relying on a sample of residents of a collectivist Latin American country rather than the more commonly studied individualistic Western European and North American populations (Hofstede, 1980). Study 1 also asked respondents to think about the fairness of dispute resolution procedures employed in two different settings to tap two different chronological perspectives: one was considered prospectively and one was considered retrospectively (the typical approach in the justice literature) (for exceptions, see Heuer & Penrod, 1986; Houlden, LaTour, Walker, & Thibaut, 1978; Kurtz & Houlden, 1981). It is possible that resource concerns loom larger as disputants are preparing to make their case, rather than afterward, when they might be more concerned with rationalizing their settlements. Finally, the nature of the conflict varies considerably across our two studies. The conflict examined in Study 1 (rights violations in the context of a long-standing civil war) is more serious than that examined in Study 2 and is arguably a considerably more serious one than has typically been examined in the justice literature (although it is not unique in this regard; see studies by Casper, Tyler, & Fisher, 1988; Lind, MacCoun, et al., 1990).

Study 2 is a survey of New Yorkers who were asked to think of a recent encounter with another individual. The questions in this survey permit an additional test of a model of resource effects on procedural fairness. Across the three model tests in the two studies, concerns about resource effects being a function of any particular contextual or methodological factor should be reduced. Thus, whereas one model in Study 1 examines prospective fairness perceptions, the other model in Study 1, as well as the model tested in Study 2, examines retrospective ratings. Furthermore, the New York data differ in a variety of ways from the Salvador data, including the physical, cultural, and political context as well as the nature of the procedures being considered, the magnitude of the outcomes at stake, and the operationalization of key constructs. Evidence of the generalizability of a resource component of trust, neutrality, and standing across these two settings would provide particularly strong support for our resource argument.

**Hypothesis.** The hypothesis to be tested in both studies concerns the relationship between the group value variables (trust, neutrality, and standing) and procedural fairness. According to Lind and Tyler (1988; Tyler, 1989, 1994), these variables influence fairness primarily for relational reasons—their presence indicates that the authority enacting the procedure values the individual’s membership in their social group. Although we do not disagree with the assertion that relational motives are implicated in the effects of trust, neutrality, and standing on procedural fairness, we expect that each of these variables also might serve to inform people that their resource concerns will be satisfied as well and that this resource motive will mediate the effect of trust, neutrality, and standing on procedural fairness. Therefore, our hypothesis is that the variables of trust, neutrality, and standing will affect procedural fairness because of their implications for resource motives as well as relational ones.

Our test of the importance of resource concerns for justice will employ the same definition and essentially the same operationalization of resource concerns as that employed by Tyler (1994), who conceptualized the effects of both absolute outcome and distributive fairness on procedural justice as resource concerns. Our hypothesis is tested by looking for evidence that the effect of trust, neutrality, and standing on procedural fairness is mediated by absolute outcome and distributive fairness.

**STUDY 1**

**Method**

**SURVEY INSTRUMENT**

Several months prior to administering the survey, a draft version was presented to 10 focus groups (with 5-15
Salvadorans per group) selected from various socioeconomic, geographical, and ideological sectors of the country. Based on these group discussions, the survey was revised to ensure that the questions asked about key concepts in the most comprehensible fashion. Revisions were made in Spanish, after which the survey was translated to English and back-translated to Spanish (Brislin, 1980). The survey was then piloted to ensure that respondents understood the questions. After piloting and modest revisions, the survey was again translated to English and back to Spanish to assure maximum consensus on the meaning of each of the items included.

The final survey consisted of 80 questions covering three general topics and took about 30 to 45 mins to answer. The first section of the survey consisted primarily of demographic questions. Next, the respondents were asked a series of questions about the treatment and outcomes they and their family received from the current government and their attitudes toward the government and government leaders. The last section of the survey began by asking the respondents to think of some right or rights of theirs or their children’s that had been violated by the government and were asked to describe up to three of them. Next, they were asked to focus on the rights violation they mentioned first and to think about a governmental or a nongovernmental procedure they might employ for seeking redress from the government for that violation. The instructions explicitly stated that they were to think of a rights violation that was unresolved, because subsequent questions asked about procedures that might be employed for seeking redress for the rights violation. Pilot testing had produced a list of the governmental and nongovernmental procedures that were likely to be among those mentioned by respondents as the ones they would be likely to employ (among the popular governmental procedures were the judicial system, the governmental ministries, and the governmental human rights commission; among the popular nongovernmental procedures listed were the United Nations Observer Mission and the Nongovernmental Human Rights Commission). After identifying the procedure most likely to be employed, respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement to a series of statements about that procedure. All answers were provided on 7-point bipolar adjective scales.

Both sections of the survey included similarly worded questions about each of the key constructs discussed above. The following questions were employed about procedures for seeking redress from a rights violation: (a) the opportunities for process and decision control (Taking your complaint to . . . will enable you to explain your complaint as you see it and in your own words; Going to . . . will have an influence on the government’s decision about your complaint); (b) the extent to which the respondent would be treated with trust, neutrality, and standing (Going to . . . ensures that your complaint will be heard by people who have an interest in your welfare; Going to . . . will ensure that your complaint will be heard by people that are neutral in their evaluation of your case; The people at . . . will hear your complaint and treat you with respect and dignity); (c) absolute outcomes (Taking your complaint to . . . will get you the result you want); (d) outcome fairness (Going to . . . will get you the fairest possible outcome to your complaint); and (e) procedural fairness (If you go to . . . you will be treated fairly by those who hear your complaint).

The following questions were employed about government procedures and satisfaction with the government: (a) process and decision control (You and your family can freely express your points of view to the government concerning government decisions; You and your family can influence decisions made by the government); (b) trust, neutrality, and standing (The government has an interest in your family and is devoted to serving your best interests; In general, the government favors some groups over others; When you and your family have had an interaction with government officials, they have treated you with respect and dignity); (c) absolute outcomes (The present policies of the government benefit you and your family); (d) outcome fairness (the number of benefits my family receives from the government is fair); and (e) procedural fairness (The government employs fair procedures to decide how to distribute benefits to people and groups in this country). The means and standard deviations of these variables are reported in Table 1.

PROCEDURE

The polling was conducted by trained pollsters from the Survey Research Center at the University of Central America (UCA). Residents of El Salvador were sampled during a 2-day period in January 1994, nearly 2 years after a peace accord ended that country’s 12-year civil war and about 4 months prior to the first national elections since that accord.

Respondents were sampled in approximately equal numbers from four geographic regions of the country: Western (Santa Ana, Sonsonate, Ahuachapan), Central (Chalatenango, La Libertad, San Salvador), Para-Central (San Vicente, Cabañas, La Paz, Cuscatlan), and Eastern (San Miguel, Usulutan, La Union, Morazan). Within each region, a deliberate effort was made to sample from both rural and urban communities and to sample from across the ideological and socioeconomic spectrums.

Pollsters contacted people by knocking on the doors to their homes and requesting the cooperation of an adult in completing a survey about the current situation of the country. The pollster assured respondents of con-
Ratings of Governmental and Nongovernmental Procedures on Independent and Dependent Measures, Study 1 (N = 287)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Governmental Rating</th>
<th>Nongovernmental Rating</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M (SD)</td>
<td>M (SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process control</td>
<td>5.24 (1.67)</td>
<td>5.70 (1.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision control</td>
<td>4.59 (1.90)</td>
<td>5.02 (1.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>4.83 (1.84)</td>
<td>5.60 (1.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality</td>
<td>4.81 (1.84)</td>
<td>5.59 (1.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standing</td>
<td>5.30 (1.60)</td>
<td>5.89 (1.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable outcome</td>
<td>4.76 (1.80)</td>
<td>5.31 (1.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome fairness</td>
<td>4.85 (1.82)</td>
<td>5.54 (1.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural fairness</td>
<td>5.11 (1.68)</td>
<td>5.74 (1.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: When necessary, scales were reversed so that for all ratings a higher score on the 7-point scale indicates a better, more desirable, or more favorable rating.

participant

Each respondent was asked to think about an unresolved violation of their rights. The El Salvadoran context is especially well suited for identifying individuals who are able to consider such an unresolved problem. During their 12-year civil war (which officially ended December 31, 1991), El Salvadorans lived in an environment of violence, terror, and intimidation. For example: (a) In the early years of the conflict (1980-1982), the nongovernmental Salvadoran Human Rights Commission (CDHES—Comision de Derechos Humanos de El Salvador) reported civilian deaths from government security forces and right-wing death squads numbered more than 14,000 per year. As recently as 1990, according to the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission, Salvadoran armed forces were responsible for 899 assassinations, 571 arbitrary arrests, and 105 disappearances during the first 8 months of the year. All told, approximately 75,000 El Salvadorans were killed in the war; (b) More than 1 million people (20% of the population) left the country during the war to escape the violence, whereas another 500,000 were internally displaced; and (c) Children under the age of 18 were recruited or volunteered to fight in the war. In 1992, 1,557 children younger than age 18 were demobilized from the ranks of the Frente Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). After the war, 8,506 FMLN ex-combatants and 32,000 government troops returned home to children traumatized by war and separation from their parents. It is expected that most individuals would have little difficulty thinking about violations of their own or their family’s rights in this social and political environment.

When the respondents had completed answering the questions about their first choice of a procedure, they were asked to think of their next choice, with the condition that the two procedures included a governmental and a nongovernmental one. Once they had identified a second procedure, they answered the same set of questions about it.

PARTICIPANTS

Completed interviews were obtained from 287 of the 308 persons who were asked, yielding a response rate of 93.2%. The respondents were slightly more likely to be men (57%), they ranged in age from 18 to 79 years (Mdn = 36 years), politically they were most likely to identify themselves as centrist, and 23% of them reported being a refugee or displaced by their country’s civil war.

Results

MODEL 1: PROSPECTIVE FAIRNESS RATINGS

A summary of the initial rights violations named by respondents is provided in Table 2.

Ratings of governmental and nongovernmental procedures. Overall, the respondents were about twice as likely to name a governmental procedure as a nongovernmental one as the first place they would turn to when seeking redress (listed first by 69% of the respondents). Overall, the combined popularity of human rights agencies (listed as a first choice by 25% of the respondents) and the United Nations Observer Mission (listed as a first choice by 14% of the respondents) is suggestive of a different social and political landscape than typically investigated in the United States. On average, the respondents rated both the governmental and nongovernmental procedures high in process and decision control, trust, neutrality, and standing. Overall, they expected both governmental and nongovernmental procedures they identified to produce favorable and fair outcomes and to be fairly enacted; they rated them as quite desirable.

Hypothesis tests. As a first step in testing the hypotheses, a path model of procedural fairness using the items listed above was tested using LISREL with covariance matrices1 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1988). The tested model is shown in Figure 1. In this model, all paths were free from the exogenous variables of process control, decision control, trust, neutrality, and standing to the endogenous mediating variables of absolute outcome, fair outcome, and fair procedure. In the endogenous portion of the model, paths were free from absolute outcome to fair outcome and fair procedure and from fair outcome to fair procedure. Because of the repeated measures design, in which respondents rated both a governmental and a nongovernmental dispute resolution procedure, a first question concerns whether the same model is supported across the two sets of ratings. To test the
invariance of the model across the two procedures, we
imposed an equality constraint on the Beta and Gamma
matrices for the governmental and nongovernmental
models (all paths from the exogenous variables to the
endogenous ones and among the endogenous variables
were constrained to equality across the two models). The
estimated coefficients for this equality constrained
model also are shown in Figure 1. This model had an
acceptable fit to the data: χ²(57) = 120.55, p < .001, comparative fit index = .98, nonnormed fit index = .96.
Because the equality constrained model provided an
acceptable fit to the data, all subsequent model tests will
be conducted on it. Therefore, only one set of ratings is
shown in Figure 1. Our hypothesis predicted that the
variables of trust, neutrality, and standing would influ-
ence procedural fairness judgments for resource as well
as relational reasons. By several measures, this hypothe-
sis received strong support. First, all three of these
variables have significant and substantial direct paths to
both of the mediating variables of absolute outcome and
fair outcome, as well as to procedural fairness. In fact, for
both trust and neutrality, the direct paths to these
resource concerns are comparable in magnitude to their
direct (relational) paths to procedural fairness. This
observation is supportive of our expectation that these
variables carry information about resource motives as
well as relational ones.

Second, the indirect, resource-based effects (those
passing through either absolute outcome or distributive
fairness) of these variables on procedural fairness are sig-
nificant for all three variables: trust, standardized indi-
rect effect = .06, t = 4.32, p < .001; neutrality, standardized
indirect effect = .07, t = 4.66, p < .001; and standing, stan-
dardized indirect effect = .08, t = 5.25, p < .001. It is note-
worthy that each of these indirect (resource) effects are
of greater magnitude than the resource-based effects of
the control variables on procedural fairness (process
control, standardized indirect effect = .03, t = 2.56, p < .01;
decision control, standardized indirect effect = 2.75, t =
4.66, p < .01). It is also noteworthy that a comparison of
the indirect and total effects of each of the group value
variables on procedural fairness reveals that a substantial
portion of their effects on procedural fairness are indi-
rect resource concerns (27% for trust, 29% for neutrality,
and 28% for standing).

Finally, two nested model tests were conducted to
examine the importance of the resource versus rela-
tional role of these variables for an overall model of pro-
cedural fairness. The first nested model test constrains
the direct paths from trust, neutrality, and standing to
procedural fairness (paths i, l, and o in Figure 1). This
constraint produces a substantial decrement in the fit of
the model, χ² difference(3) = 186.31, p < .001, comparative fit index = .92, nonnormed fit index = .85. This finding is
supportive of the relational claim of the Group Value
model. The second nested model test constrains the
paths from trust, neutrality, and standing to the resource
variables of absolute outcome and fair outcome (paths g,
h, j, k, m, and n in Figure 1). The result of this test is an
even greater decrement in the fit of the model than that
resulting from the previous test, χ² difference(6) = 254.09, p <
.001, comparative fit index = .90, nonnormed fit index = .81,
and is strongly supportive of our expectation that these
variables play an important resource role in disputant
fairness judgments.

Model 2: Retrospective fairness ratings. The resource
hypothesis was submitted to a second test using the
respondents’ evaluations of their ruling government. To
test the hypothesis, a path model of procedural fairness using the items listed above was conducted using LISREL with covariance matrices (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1988). The tested model is shown in Figure 2. Except for being limited to a single procedure, this model is identical to the one shown in Figure 1. All paths were free from the exogenous variables of process control, decision control, trust, neutrality, and standing to the endogenous mediating variables of absolute outcome, fair outcome, and fair procedure. In the endogenous portion of the model, paths were free from absolute outcome to fair outcome and fair procedure and from fair outcome to fair procedure. Because this is a fully saturated model, its fit is perfect. However, the model was modified once to eliminate nonsignificant paths and the revised model had an acceptable fit to the data: data, $\chi^2(7) = 8.34, p > .10$, comparative fit index = 1.00, nonnormed fit index = .99.

**Hypothesis tests.** Our hypothesis predicted that the variables of trust, neutrality, and standing would influence procedural fairness judgments for resource as well as relational reasons. As was true of the procedural fairness model of dispute resolution procedures tested above, this hypothesis was strongly supported in this model of government satisfaction. First, all three group value variables again have significant and substantial direct paths to the mediating variables of absolute and fair outcomes. It is again the case that the magnitude of the paths from the group value variables to these resource concerns is generally comparable to or greater than their direct (relational) path to procedural fairness (the current model differs from the one above in that the effects of trust are completely resource-driven by virtue of its nonsignificant path to procedural fairness and in that the effect of respect is somewhat greater on procedural fairness than on either absolute or fair outcomes). This observation supports our prediction that these variables carry information about resource motives as well as relational ones.

Second, the indirect, resource-based effects (those passing through resource concerns) of each of the relational variables on procedural fairness is significant: trust, standardized indirect effect = .19, $t = 5.43, p < .001$; neutrality, standardized indirect effect = .09, $t = 3.15, p < .001$; standing, standardized indirect effect = .12, $t = 3.95$. It is noteworthy that a comparison of the indirect and total effects of each of these variables on procedural fairness again reveals that a substantial portion of their effects on procedural fairness are indirect resource concerns (100% for trust, 38% for neutrality, and 25% for standing).

Finally, two nested model tests were conducted to examine the importance of the resource versus relational role of these variables for an overall model of procedural fairness. The first nested model test constrained the direct paths from neutrality and standing to procedural fairness (the path from trust was not constrained as its nonsignificant path was eliminated in the model revision reported above). This constraint produced a substantial decrement in the fit of the model, $\chi^2_{\text{difference}}(2) = 60.27, p < .001$; comparative fit index decreases from 1.00 to .90; nonnormed fit index decreases from .99 to .69, and is again strongly supportive of the relational claim of the Group Value model. The second nested model test constrains the paths from the relational variables to resource concerns. The result of this test is an even greater decrement in the fit of the model than that resulting from the previous test, $\chi^2_{\text{difference}}(6) = 128.97, p < .001$; comparative fit index = .84; nonnormed fit index = .65, and is again strongly supportive of our expectation that these variables play an important resource role in disputant fairness judgments.

**Discussion**

Each of the tests of the resource hypothesis in both of the models reported above is strongly supportive of our prediction that the variables of trust, neutrality, and standing carry substantial information about resources and influence procedural justice because of their effect on resource concerns as well as relational ones. One implication of this finding is that future research on justice cannot reasonably assume that the influence of trust, neutrality, and standing are linked exclusively with concerns about relational issues. However, because the
Salvador data differ from the data employed for most procedural justice studies in several ways enumerated above, an additional test of the resource model would enhance our confidence about the generalizability of our findings. Therefore, Study 2 examines procedural fairness ratings of New Yorkers reflecting on a recent encounter with another individual.

STUDY 2

This study looks for a resource interpretation of trust, neutrality, and standing in a survey of U.S. residents’ impressions of a recent social encounter with another individual.

**Method**

**PROCEDURE**

Participants were approached in various public areas near a university in New York City and were asked to complete a questionnaire about an encounter with another individual. The instructions about the encounter participants were asked to recall varied according to the experimental conditions described below. After they had identified the encounter and provided a brief description of it, they were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with a series of statement about it.

**PARTICIPANTS**

Completed surveys were obtained from 98 male and 194 female respondents. Of the 293 participants, 182 were students. Respondents’ ages ranged from 16 to 75 years (M = 24.2 years).

**MEASURES**

All answers were provided on 9-point Likert-type response scales. The statements included multiple measures of the key constructs so that unit-weighted composites of the following constructs are employed in the analyses that follow: process control (three items, e.g., I was able to influence the outcome of this meeting; I was able to control what happened during this meeting; α = .74); decision control (three items, e.g., I was able to influence the outcome of this meeting; I was influential during this encounter; I was able to control the outcome of this encounter; α = .79); trust (four items, e.g., The other person was honest; The other person had my best interests in mind; The other person tried to be fair; The other person thoroughly considered my views during this encounter; α = .85); neutrality (two items, e.g., The other person was biased in their behavior toward me; The other person demonstrated favoritism toward someone else during our encounter; r = .30); standing (four items, e.g., The other person treated me politely; The other person treated me with dignity; The other person respected my rights during this encounter; The other person treated me disrespectfully; α = .94); absolute outcome (two items, e.g., The outcome of this encounter favored me; I was able to obtain the outcome that I preferred; α = .83); fair outcome (three items, e.g., The outcome of this encounter was fair; This encounter produced a fair result; The outcome of this encounter was not fair; α = .87); and fair procedure (three items, The other person treated me unfairly during this encounter; The other person behaved fairly toward me during this encounter; I was treated the way I deserved to be treated; α = .89). The means and standard deviations of these composite measures are reported in Table 3.

**DESIGN**

This study utilizes data from two nearly identical studies of the role of group membership on fairness perceptions that were conducted at similar points in time. The studies employed the same procedure and an identical manipulation of whether the target encounter involved a dispute. Both studies also included a manipulation of whether the target encounter was with someone who was in the same or a different social group than the respondent, although the nature of that manipulation varied slightly across the studies (the ingroup condition was the same across studies, whereas the outgroup condition varied, so that in one respondents were instructed to think of an encounter with someone who was not a member of a liked social group and in the other they were instructed to think of an encounter with a member of a disliked social group). The first study included a manipulation of whether respondents were to think about an encounter in which they were satisfied or dissatisfied with the manner of treatment they had received from another individual. The first study employed a 2 (encounter with someone who was a member of a liked group vs. someone who did not share a membership in any of the respondent’s valued groups) × 2 (conflict present vs. absent) × 2 (satisfied vs. dissatisfied with treatment) randomized between-subjects design. The second study employed a 2 (encounter with someone who was a member of a liked group vs. encounter with someone who was a member of a disliked group) × 2 (conflict present vs. absent) randomized between-subjects design. The LISREL model presented below employed dummy variables to capture a 3 (encounter with liked group member vs. nonoverlapping group member vs. disliked group member) × 2 (conflict present vs. absent) × 2 (satisfaction manipulation present vs. absent) randomized between-subjects design. These dummies were entered as exogenous variables with paths to each of the endogenous variables in the model reported below. However, because none of these variables had any significant effects in the
model, and because their theoretical significance is not central to this inquiry, they are excluded from subsequent analyses and will not be discussed further below.

Results

To test the hypotheses, the same path model of fairness as in Study 1 was tested using the composite measures of each construct described above. This model included paths from all of the exogenous variables to each of the endogenous variables and from absolute outcome to fair outcome and fair procedure and from fair outcome to fair procedure. Because this is a fully saturated model, its fit is perfect. However, the model was modified once to eliminate nonsignificant paths, and the revised model had an acceptable fit to the data: $\chi^2(15) = 9.12$, $p > .10$; comparative fit index = 1.00, nonnormed fit index = 1.01. The final model is shown in Figure 3.

HYPOTHESIS TESTS

Our hypothesis predicted that the variables of trust, neutrality, and standing would influence procedural fairness due to their implications for resource concerns as well as their implications for relational concerns. By several measures, this hypothesis received strong support. First, whereas standing is the only relational variable with a significant direct path to absolute outcomes, all three group value variables have significant and substantial direct paths to the resource concern of fair outcomes. Furthermore, the pattern of these effects is similar to that in the models examined in Study 1 in that the magnitude of the paths from trust and neutrality to fair outcomes are of approximately the same magnitude as their paths to fair procedure. This finding is again supportive of our prediction that the group value variables carry resource information.

Second, the indirect, resource-based effects (those passing through resource concerns) of all three group value variables are significant: trust, standardized indirect effect = .04, $t = 2.95$, $p < .01$; neutrality, standardized indirect effect = .01, $t = 2.06$, $p < .05$; standing, standardized indirect effect = .06, $t = 3.39$, $p < .001$. As a proportion of total effects, the indirect effects of the group value variables are somewhat smaller in this study than in Study 1 (17% for trust, 10% for neutrality, and 11% for standing).

Finally, two nested model tests were conducted to examine the importance of the resource versus relational role of these variables for an overall model of procedural fairness. The first nested model test constrained the direct paths from trust, neutrality, and standing to procedural fairness. This constraint produced a substantial decrement in the fit of the model, $\chi^2_{\text{difference}}(3) = 169.80$, $p < .001$; comparative fit index decreases to .89, nonnormed fit index decreases to .66. This finding is supportive of the relational claim of the Group Value model. The second nested model test constrains the paths from the relational variables to resource concerns. The result of this test is again a significant decrement in the fit of the model, $\chi^2_{\text{difference}}(4) = 147.40$, $p < .001$; comparative fit index decreases to .89, nonnormed fit index decreases to .66, and is again strongly supportive of our expectation that these variables play an important resource role in disputant fairness judgments (the chi-square for this nested model test has fewer degrees of freedom than in the comparable nested model tests in Study 1 due to the elimination of the nonsignificant paths from trust and neutrality to absolute outcome in the single model revision described above).
GENERAL DISCUSSION

One of the most important developments in procedural justice research in the past decade has been the observation that procedural justice is affected by more than just the instrumental motive identified by Thibaut and Walker (1975). So, for example, interactional justice theorists (Bies, 1987; Bies & Moag, 1986; Bies & Shapiro, 1987, 1988; Bies, Shapiro, & Cummings, 1988; Cropanzano & Folger, 1989; Folger & Bies, 1989; Tyler & Folger, 1980) have pointed to interpersonal concerns such as polite and caring communication as central to procedural justice. Similarly, Lind and Tyler (1988; Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Lind, 1992) proposed a relational theory of procedural justice that emphasizes individuals’ concern about their relationship with social groups and the authorities representing those groups. Their theory has been well supported by studies showing a substantial contribution of the relational variables of trust, neutrality, and standing to procedural fairness (e.g., Tyler, 1989). Furthermore, research on the relational theory has been supportive of the claim that the variables of trust, neutrality, and standing are affected by the level of one’s attachment to a social group (e.g., Huo, Smith, & Tyler; Lind, 1996; Huo & Tyler, 1998), as should be the case if these variables reflect concern with one’s standing in social groups as postulated by the Group Value Theory.

However, to our knowledge, no research has satisfactorily examined the degree to which the variables of trust, neutrality, and standing matter exclusively or even primarily because of their relational significance. Thus, for example, it is fairly common to point to evidence that the group value variables enhance the explanatory power of justice models as support for the Group Value Theory. Although such claims are surely correct to a degree, it is not well established that the influence of the group value variables on procedural justice reflects uniquely relational concerns. In others words, the construct validity of these measures of group value concerns is not well established. As a result, evidence that trust, neutrality, and standing affect procedural justice, even after controlling for the influence of such instrumental variables as process and decision control, does not unequivocally establish their unique link to relational concerns. Instead, each of them might simultaneously carry information related to resource concerns.

Each of the model tests reported in the studies above strongly support the view that justice theorists cannot reasonably assume that trust, neutrality, and standing are linked exclusively with concerns about relational issues. Thus, in each of our studies, these three variables significantly affected perceptions of whether fair outcomes were expected (Model 1) or obtained (Models 2 and 3). Furthermore, in both of the El Salvador models, all three variables had significant direct effects on absolute outcomes, as was true for the variable of standing in the U.S. study. Equally impressive is the fact that across the three models, these variables’ influence on resource concerns was generally of comparable or even greater magnitude than the effect of process and decision control (variables typically construed as reflecting resource concerns) on resource concerns.

Our dual-motive hypothesis is further supported by the consistent finding that the direct effects of trust and neutrality on resource concerns are of a comparable magnitude to their direct (and presumably relational) effects on procedural fairness. It is noteworthy that in all three studies, the direct effects of standing are consistently greater on procedural fairness than on either of the resource variables. This pattern is consistent with theoretical depictions of the group value variables and is another instance in which the data are supportive of our dual-motive hypothesis as well as supportive of the Group Value Theory. So, for example, although Tyler (1989, 1994) suggests that respect communicates information about within-group standing, he describes trust and neutrality as important because they provide information about the likelihood that fair outcomes will be forthcoming in one’s long-term relationship with one’s social group.

Additional support for our hypothesis is provided by the fact that in all three models, the indirect, resource-based effect (those passing through resource concerns) of the group value variables was significant and by the fact that in all three models, nested model tests revealed a significant decrement in the fit of the resource-constrained model (one in which the paths from the variables of trust, neutrality, and standing to absolute and fair outcomes were constrained to 0). In fact, in both of the El Salvador models, this nested model test produced a greater decrement in the fit of the model than the relationally constrained model (in which the direct, relational paths, from trust, neutrality, and standing to procedural fairness, were constrained to 0).

Several more general observations are also in order. First, despite our showing that the relational variables have resource value, the data in all three models also are supportive of the Group Value Theory. Even though a significant portion of the effect of the group value variables on procedural fairness was indirect (and resource based), it is still the case that the largest share of their influence is direct (and, apparently although not necessarily, symbolic). Second, of the variables in the model that could influence procedural fairness, none had total effects that exceeded those of the group value variables.

Third, several lines of reasoning suggest that the political environment in El Salvador at the time that these data were collected posed an especially strong challenge to
the relational theory. For example, one might expect that surveying individuals in a setting where the nature of their dispute with government officials or even rebel guerrillas poses severe challenges to their physical, economic, and social needs, procedural justice would be overwhelmingly driven by resource concerns. Similarly, El Salvador's civil unrest in the 12 years preceding our survey might have produced an alienation from the government similar to the decreased supraordinate identification that Tyler and colleagues (Huo et al., 1996; Tyler & Smith, 1998) found to increase resource concerns and to decrease relational concerns. In addition, the focus on rights violations also might have increased the role of outcome concerns as the conflict tapped moral mandates (Skitka & Mullen, 2002). In fact, our findings do show somewhat larger resource effects among the El Salvadoran than the U.S. respondents. Still, it remains the case that in both El Salvador models, the majority of the variance in procedural justice is explained by the nonresource (and presumably relational) paths. In that way, these data offer some of the strongest support for the relational theory with which we are familiar.

Finally, it is important to point out that whereas these model tests are among the first we know of to demonstrate resource effects of the group value variables on procedural fairness, this resource role was not overlooked by Group Value theorists. In fact, according to Tyler (1994),

> Although identity issues are central to the relational model, the model does not ignore questions of resources. People are viewed as taking a long-term perspective on the value of group membership, believing that if group authorities are fair, act in neutral ways, have benevolent motives, and recognize people's rights and standing in society, then, over time, people will receive reasonable levels of resources from the group and group authorities. (p. 852)

Although Tyler's (1994) conclusion, based on data from both legal and organizational settings, was one that strongly emphasized the relational underpinnings of procedural justice, the data from our studies clearly implicate both resource and relational concerns. The evidence for a substantial effect of resource concerns in these data invites a broader approach to the nature of people's justice motives than is clearly articulated by either the Group Value Theory (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989) or Thibaut and Walker's (1975, 1978) self-interest theory, which emphasizes a social-exchange-based resource motive.

At least one caveat about this research is in order. Our models posit causal relationships (e.g., that trust, neutrality, and standing influence expectations about outcome fairness, which in turn affects procedural fairness) that are tested here with correlational data. Although our theorizing about causality is consistent with other justice theories (both the Group Value Theory and Fairness Heuristic theory make similar assumptions), and our model tests consistently demonstrate a good fit with our data, alternative models might be proposed that cannot be ruled out short of experimental research.

To this point, we have relied exclusively on relational and resource motives to explain the effects of trust, neutrality, and standing on procedural justice. However, our introductory examples and recent research point to additional motives as mediators of these variables’ influence on justice. So, for example, whereas group value theorists have emphasized the importance of peoples’ concern with their intragroup standing, an experiment by Heuer, Stroessler, and Vale (1998) showed that the effect of respectful treatment on fairness was mediated by concerns with intergroup standing as well as by concerns with intragroup standing and self-interest. A similar demonstration of the influence of intergroup concerns on the meaning of respect was revealed in a survey of New Yorkers about their recent encounters with the police (Sunshine & Heuer, 2002). In another set of laboratory studies, Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas, and Weinblatt (1999) showed that people care about respect because of what it conveys about other’s valuation of their worth as individuals rather than its group-based connotations.

This concern with the meaning of respect for intergroup standing and one’s self-esteem is consistent with the claim advanced here that the variables of trust, neutrality, and standing are important for justice because of their implications for more motives than just within-group standing. In fact, they are among a litany of additional motives that can be expected to mediate the relationship between treatment and procedural justice. Future research might consider other motives as well. So, for example, in a recent review, Baumeister and Leary (1995) assert that “the desire for interpersonal attachment may well be one of the most far-reaching and integrative constructs currently available to understand human nature” (p. 522). Based on their extensive review of the relevant literature, Baumeister and Leary suggest that the need to belong appears to entail both the need for frequent, affectively pleasant interactions with the same individuals and the need for these interactions to occur in a setting of long-term, stable caring and concern. Clearly, this is different than the group affiliation motive posited by Lind and Tyler (1988). Yet, it is as easy to imagine an interpersonal motive as an intragroup one causing people to focus on trust, neutrality, and standing. Being treated with respect can as easily signal that someone values us interpersonally as that they value our membership in a common group. Similarly, just as trust
signals the long-term intentions of group authorities from the group value perspective, so might it signal the long-term viability of our relationship from an interpersonal attachment perspective.

Why should justice researchers be interested in the role of these additional motives? We expect that a richer appreciation of the motives underlying procedural justice will benefit procedural justice theory and its applications. Theoretically, a showing that trust, neutrality, and standing are mediated by any concerns other than group standing poses a challenge to researchers to explore the contribution of other motivational mediators than the relational one postulated by the Group Value Theory. If our interpretation of these variables is correct, procedural justice might not be primarily relationally based—a model that incorporates a fuller set of psychological mediators might reveal that each is important and that each matters more or less in different conflict settings. It is entirely possible that a model incorporating a broader set of motivational mediators than just the relational and resource concerns considered here would reveal that procedural justice is not primarily driven by concern with one’s standing in valued groups.

For most of the time from Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) procedural justice theory until Lind and Tyler’s Group Value Theory, the reigning assumption was that the psychological mediator was an instrumental one. Lind and Tyler (1988; Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Lind, 1992) and interactional justice theorists (e.g., Bies, 1987; Bies et al., 1988; Cropanzano & Folger, 1989; Folger & Bies, 1989) altered this assumption, which led to an interest in such variables as trust, neutrality, and standing. If other motives can be shown to mediate between treatment and procedural fairness, other procedural concerns might be suggested as well. Furthermore, whereas the variables of trust, neutrality, and standing seem likely to remain important even under different motivational circumstances, it is not difficult to imagine that the presence of other motives would change the relative significance of each of these variables. So, for example, although much recent work has focused on the importance of trust as a group value concern (Brockner, Siegel, Daly, Tyler, & Martin, 1997; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind, 2001), it is conceivable that respect is much more important in settings where intergroup tensions are high (e.g., ethnic conflicts). Similarly, if interpersonal considerations are of particular importance, neutrality might take a backseat to trust and respect.

Conclusion

Lind and Tyler (1988; Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Lind 1992) proposed a relational theory of procedural justice that emphasizes individuals’ concern with trust, neutrality, and standing because of what these variables say about intragroup standing. We have argued that whereas the research testing the Group Value Theory has clearly demonstrated an important role for relational concerns in procedural justice, the relational influence of these variables might be overstated. Our argument rests on the claim that the construct validity of the variables of trust, neutrality, and standing is not well established; that is, these variables might plausibly connotate information about other social motives, such as whether fair or beneficial outcomes will be obtained. If so, what is often presented as a relational influence on justice could be partitioned further as the joint influence of relational and resource concerns. The data from three studies are consistent with our dual-motive hypothesis. Such findings suggest that future justice researchers incorporate appropriate measures of the psychological mediators of these procedural variables to gain a richer appreciation of the motives underlying procedural justice.

At a more practical level, the assumption that trust, neutrality, and standing matter primarily, or exclusively, for reasons pertaining to within-group standing has profound implications for the significance of these variables in other settings. According to Tyler and Smith (1998), “If the group is not important to one’s sense of identity, the relational implications of treatment should not matter” (p. 229). On the other hand, a showing that trust, neutrality, and standing also matter because of what they signify about a decision maker’s view about our (out) group, or our interpersonal relationships, or our self-esteem, or our outcomes leads to the competing hypothesis that these variables would be equally important for enhancing, or undermining, procedural justice in a variety of other types of encounters in which within-group standing is not involved.

NOTES

1. The means and variance-covariance matrix for all variables reported in this article are available from the first author.

2. Although the $\chi^2$ is significant, this test is sensitive to sample size. Numerous strategies have been suggested for judging goodness of fit when N’s high. Wheaton, Muthen, Alwin, and Summers (1977) suggest that a $\chi^2$ less than 5 times the degrees of freedom is acceptable, and Carmines and McIver (1981) suggest that 2 to 3 times the degrees of freedom is more appropriate. By the most conservative of these standards, this model provides an acceptable fit to the data.

3. Our thanks to an anonymous reviewer for assisting us with this argument.

REFERENCES


