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# FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING

An Assessment of How Well the  
Federal Criminal Justice System is  
Achieving the Goals of Sentencing Reform

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UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION  

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November 2004



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# Executive Summary

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 [hereinafter the SRA] ushered in a new era of sentencing in federal courts. Prior to implementation of the SRA, federal crimes carried very broad ranges of penalties, and federal judges had the discretion to choose the sentence they felt would be most appropriate. They were not required to explain their reasons for the sentence imposed, and the sentences were largely immune from appeal. The time actually served by most offenders was determined by the Parole Commission, and offenders, on average, served just 58 percent of the sentences that had been imposed. The sentencing process, a critical element of the criminal justice process, was opaque, undocumented, and largely discretionary. Because of its impenetrability to outside observers, there was a sense that the process was unfair, disparate, and ineffective for controlling crime.

In order to inject transparency, consistency, and fairness into the sentencing process, Congress passed the SRA, which established the United States Sentencing Commission [hereinafter the Commission] and charged it with establishing guidelines for federal sentencing. The guidelines were promulgated in 1987, but district and circuit court rulings prevented their full implementation until the Supreme Court, in *Mistretta v. United States*, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), affirmed the constitutionality of the Commission and its work in crafting guidelines. As a result, in 1991, when the Commission issued its report, *The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Report on the Operation of the Guidelines System and Short-term Impacts on Disparity in Sentencing, Use of Incarceration, and Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining* [hereinafter called the Four-Year Evaluation], there was relatively little data from which the Commission could evaluate the effects of the guidelines. Today the Commission is in a better position to evaluate the success of the guidelines system and identify areas for further refinement. This report focuses on three specific assessments: 1) the guidelines' impact on the transparency, certainty, and severity of punishment, 2) the impact of the guidelines on inter-judge and regional disparity, and 3) research on racial, ethnic, and gender disparities in sentencing today.

## *Introduction to the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines*

**Goals and evaluation criteria.** The SRA was the result of nine years of bipartisan deliberation and compromise and, as such, reflects the varied and, at times, competing sentencing philosophies of its many sponsors and supporters. It set forward the following goals for sentencing reform:

1. elimination of unwarranted disparity;
2. transparency, certainty, and fairness;
3. proportionate punishment; and
4. crime control through deterrence, incapacitation, and the rehabilitation of offenders.

The goals of the new system identified in the SRA provide the best criteria for judging whether sentencing reform has been successful. These goals can be divided into two groups. The first group, the goals of sentencing reform, include certainty and fairness in punishment and the elimination of unwarranted disparity. Research on the effectiveness of the system at achieving these goals is the subject of this report. The second group, establishment of policies that will best accomplish the purposes of sentencing—which are usually summarized as just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—is the subject of previous Commission-sponsored research as well as ongoing research at the Commission.

***Development of the guidelines.*** The guidelines promulgated by the Commission were based on the directives in the SRA and other statutory provisions, as well as on a study of past sentencing practices. The Commission analyzed detailed data from 10,000 presentence reports and additional data on over 100,000 federal sentences imposed in the immediate preguidelines era. The Commission determined the average prison term likely to be served for each generic type of crime. These averages helped establish “base offense levels” for each crime, which were directly linked to a recommended imprisonment range. Aggravating and mitigating factors that significantly correlated with increases or decreases in sentences were also determined statistically, along with each factor’s magnitude. These formed the bases for “specific offense characteristics” for each type of crime, which adjusted the offense level upward or downward. The Commission deviated from past practice when it determined there was a compelling reason, such as past under-punishment of white collar offenses, and when Congress dictated increased severity for an offense category. The Commission also factored offenders’ criminal history into the guidelines as a way to identify offenders most likely to recidivate.

***Real offense guidelines.*** The statute-defined elements of many federal crimes fail to provide sufficient detail about the *manner* in which the crime was committed to permit individualized sentences that reflect the varying seriousness of different violations. In addition, the many, sometimes overlapping provisions in the federal criminal code create the potential that similar offenses will be charged in many different ways. To better reflect the seriousness of each offender’s actual criminal conduct, and to prevent disparate charging practices from leading to sentencing disparity, the original Commission developed guidelines that are based to great extent on offenders’ real offense behavior rather than the charges of conviction alone. Some of the mechanisms to help ameliorate the effects of uneven charging include: 1) the multiple count rules, 2) cross-references among guidelines, and 3) the relevant conduct rule. In a real offense system, the offender’s actual conduct proved at the sentencing hearing—not only the elements of the counts of conviction—factor into the sentence imposed within the statutory penalty range established by the legislature for the offenses of conviction.

## ***Certainty and Severity of Punishment***

***Truth-in-sentencing, mandatory minimums, and sentencing guidelines.*** In some sense, the success of the guidelines at achieving certainty of punishment has never been at issue, because

the establishment of “truth-in-sentencing” with the elimination of parole accomplished it at a stroke. Under the guidelines, punishment became not only more certain but also more severe. The proportion of probation sentences declined, use of restrictive alternatives such as home confinement increased, and the rate of imprisonment for longer lengths of time climbed dramatically compared to the preguidelines era. While mandatory minimum penalties had some direct and indirect effects on these trends, careful analysis of sentencing trends for different types of crimes demonstrates that the sentencing guidelines themselves made a substantial and independent contribution.

***Overall trends in the use of imprisonment and probation.*** Between 1987 and 1991, as the full impact of the sentencing guidelines gradually emerged in federal courts, the use of simple probation was cut almost in half. It continued to decline throughout the guidelines era. By 2002, the percentage of offenders receiving simple probation was just a third what it had been in 1987. The use of imprisonment spiked in the early years of guidelines implementation and then resumed a long gradual climb, reaching 86 percent of all offenders by 2002, about 20 percent higher than it had been in the preguidelines era. Some of the decrease in the use of simple probation following implementation of the guidelines is explained by increased use of intermediate sanctions, especially for “white collar” crimes. These offenders historically were more likely to receive simple probation, but under the guidelines they increasingly are subject to intermediate sanctions, such as home or community confinement or weekends in prison, and imprisonment.

In addition to an increase in use of imprisonment, the guidelines era is marked by longer prison terms actually served. Longer prison terms result both from the abolition of parole, which requires offenders to serve at least 85 percent of the sentence imposed, and also by increases in the sentences that are imposed for many types of crimes. Between November 1987 and 1992, the average prison term served by federal felons more than doubled. Since fiscal year 1992, there has been a slight and gradual decline in average prison time served, but federal offenders sentenced in 2002 will still spend almost twice as long in prison as did offenders sentenced in 1984, increasing from just under 25 to almost 50 months in prison for the typical federal felon.

The abolition of parole, the enactment of mandatory minimum penalty provisions, and changes in the types of offenders sentenced in federal court, along with implementation of the guidelines, all contributed to increased sentence lengths. The influence of each of these factors varies among different offenses.

***Drug Trafficking.*** Drug trafficking offenses have comprised the largest portion of the federal criminal docket for over three decades. With the overall growth in the federal criminal caseload, the number of offenders convicted of drug trafficking or use of a communication facility to commit a drug offense has grown every year, reaching 25,835 offenders in 2002, or 40.4 percent of the total criminal docket. Only 592 additional drug offenders, less than 1 percent, were convicted of simple drug *possession*, as opposed to trafficking. As a result of the large number of drug offenders, overall trends in the use of incarceration and in average prison terms are dominated by drug sentencing.



In developing sentences for drug trafficking offenders, the Commission was heavily influenced by passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 [hereinafter ADAA] which created five- and ten-year mandatory minimum penalties based on the weight of the “mixture or substance containing a detectable amount” of various types of drugs. Finding the correct quantity ratios among different drugs and the correct thresholds for each penalty level has proven problematic. The Commission previously reported that the ratios among certain types of drugs contained in the ADAA, and incorporated into the guidelines’ Drug Quantity Table, fail in some cases to reflect the relative harmfulness of different drugs. This is particularly true for the 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio between powder and crack cocaine. The quantity thresholds linked to five- and ten-year sentences for crack cocaine have been shown to result in penalties that are disproportionately long given the relative harmfulness of crack and powder cocaine, and results in lengthy incarceration for many street-level sellers and other low culpability offenders. As a result, the Commission has recommended to Congress revision of the mandatory minimum penalty statutes and the guidelines. Congress has not yet acted on this recommendation.

There has been a dramatic increase in time served by federal drug offenders following implementation of the ADAA and the guidelines. The time served by federal drug traffickers was over two and a half times longer in 1991 than it had been in 1985, hovering just below an average of 80 months. In the latter half of the 1990s, the average prison term decreased by about 20 percent but remained far above the historic average. The decrease in time served during the late 1990s is a result of a trend toward less serious offenses and a greater incidence of mitigating factors in cases sentenced. The overall pattern is repeated for each drug type, although the severity levels are highest for crack cocaine, followed by powder cocaine, heroin, and other scheduled narcotics. Marijuana offenses received the shortest prison terms.

***Economic Offenses.*** Economic offenses—which include larceny, fraud, and non-fraud white collar offenses—constitute the second largest part of the federal criminal docket. A wide variety of economic crimes are prosecuted and sentenced in the federal courts, ranging from large-scale corporate malfeasance to small-scale embezzlement to simple theft. The Commission’s study of past sentencing practices revealed that in the preguidelines era, sentences for fraud, embezzlement, and tax evasion generally received less severe sentences than did crimes such as larceny or theft, even when the crimes involved similar monetary loss. A large proportion of fraud, embezzlement, and tax evasion offenders received simple probation. In response, the guidelines were written to reduce the availability of probation and to ensure a short but definite period of confinement for a larger percentage of these “white collar” cases, both to ensure proportionate punishment and to achieve adequate deterrence.

The most striking trend in economic offenses is a shift away from simple probation and toward intermediate sentences that include some type of confinement. The use of imprisonment for economic offenders also has increased steadily throughout the guidelines era. These data demonstrate some success in achieving the Commission’s goal of assuring a “short but definite period of confinement” for white collar offenders. The guidelines ensure that offenses involving the

greatest monetary loss, the use of more sophisticated methods, and other aggravating factors are given imprisonment.

***Immigration Offenses.*** Prior to fiscal year 1994 there were relatively few immigration cases sentenced in the federal courts. In the first three years of the 1990s the number of cases ranged between 1,000 and 2,000 annually. Beginning in 1995, however, the number of cases began to climb, and after the implementation of Operation Gatekeeper—the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s southwest border enforcement strategy—the number began to soar, reaching a peak of just under 10,000 cases in 2000. Along with the phenomenal growth in the size of the immigration offense docket, a series of policy decisions by Congress and by the Commission have steadily increased the severity of punishment for the two most common classes of immigration offenses: alien smuggling and illegal entry.

Use of imprisonment has increased substantially for these offenses and is affected by the fact that many immigration offenders are non-resident aliens. Lacking a legal home in the United States, many are detained prior to sentencing. Immediate deportation has also become a frequent response to those individuals arrested for illegal entry. Legislative and Commission changes to these penalties have focused on increasing the guidelines offense levels. This has pushed more offenders into the zones of the Sentencing Tables in which probation and alternative sentences are unavailable. In addition to the increased use of incarceration, the average length of time served for both alien smuggling and illegal entry have increased considerably. Illegal entry offenders experienced the first wave of sentence increases in the early 1990s as the guideline amendments enacted in those years became effective. Alien smuggling experienced a steep increase in 1998, as the amendment promulgated pursuant to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 took effect.

***Firearm trafficking and possession.*** The federal criminal code contains a variety of provisions proscribing the possession, use, and trafficking of firearms. In the last two decades, congressional attention has focused on 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which provides for a mandatory minimum penalty for offenders who use, carry, or possess a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking or violent crime. In 1984, the statute was amended to require at least five years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutive to the sentence for the underlying offense. In 1986, the statute’s scope was expanded to include drug trafficking offenses, and additional penalties were added. In 1998, in response to *Bailey v. U. S.*, 516 U.S. 137 (1995)—a U. S. Supreme Court decision that narrowly construed the “use” criteria—the statute’s scope was again expanded to include “possession in furtherance” of the underlying offense. Penalties were also increased for brandishing or discharging a firearm during a crime.

Federal statutes also define two other broad types of firearm offenses. Federal law regulates transactions in firearms and imposes record-keeping and other requirements designed to facilitate control of firearm commerce by the various states. In addition, possession of a firearm by certain classes of persons, such as felons, fugitives, or addicts, is prohibited, as is “knowing transfer” of

weapons to these persons. Under the guidelines, the certainty and severity of punishment for all these offenses have greatly increased.

For firearm traffickers, the use of probation has been steadily reduced to about one-quarter of its preguidelines level, replaced by imprisonment and, to a lesser extent, intermediate sanctions. After a period of volatility and decline in trafficking sentences in the first years of guidelines implementation, time served began a steady climb in fiscal year 1992, after the Commission enacted a major revision to the firearms guideline. The subsequent amendments to the guideline have continued to increase sentence severity. By 2000, prison terms were about double what they had been in the preguidelines era. For illegal possessors, probation has been replaced almost completely by imprisonment. The penalty increases for possession offenses were equally dramatic, doubling average time served between 1988 and 1995.

Some of the changes observed for firearm offenses may have been a consequence of more serious cases generated by Department of Justice [hereinafter the Department] initiatives. But the most significant factor driving the penalty increases appears to have been the guideline amendments. These revisions have dramatically increased offense levels, particularly for offenders with prior convictions and for those who used more dangerous types of weapons. These changes in sentences for illegal firearm transactions and possession represent one of the most substantial policy changes initiated largely by the Commission.

***Violent Crimes.*** Unlike the state courts, the federal courts sentence relatively few offenders convicted of violent crimes. In 2002, murder, manslaughter, assault, kidnaping, robbery, and arson constituted less than four percent of the total federal criminal docket. Due to the unique nature of federal jurisdiction over these types of crime, a sizeable proportion of murder, assault, and especially manslaughter cases involve Native American defendants. The most common federal violent crime is bank robbery, which has long been of special concern to federal law enforcement.

For most violent offenses, rates of imprisonment have always been high and have remained so under the guidelines. Only manslaughter, the violent offense for which Native Americans are most highly represented, contained room for significant growth in incarceration rates. The use of alternatives to imprisonment for manslaughter cases has been steadily reduced under the guidelines, and now occurs in less than ten percent of cases. Kidnaping and murder have incarceration rates between 90 and 100 percent, with arson and assault somewhat lower. The imprisonment rate for bank robbers climbed from the mid to the high 90s under the guidelines.

Average prison sentences *imposed* on violent offenders decreased at the time of guidelines implementation, but due to the abolition of parole, the time served increased significantly. The greatest increases have been for murder, kidnaping, bank robbery, and arson. The more stable prison term lengths for manslaughter partly reflect the large number of these offenders who receive relatively short prison terms rather than an alternative sanction.

***Sex offenses.*** Although sex offenses account for a very small percentage of cases in the federal docket, just 1.3 percent in 2002, Congress has legislated frequently on this issue during the guidelines era, particularly regarding offenses against minors. Much like policymaking in the area of drug trafficking, Congress has used a mix of mandatory minimum penalty increases and directives to the Commission to change sentencing policy for sex offenses. In the PROTECT Act of 2003, Congress, for the first time since the inception of the guidelines, directly amended the *Guidelines Manual* and developed unique limitations on downward departures from the guidelines in sex cases.

The guidelines treat separately three types of sexual offenses. Criminal sexual abuse involves offenses such as aggravated rape, statutory rape, or molestation. Sexual exploitation involves the production, distribution, or possession of child pornography. Promotion offenses involve inducing, enticing, or persuading commission of an illegal sex act, or traveling or transporting persons to commit such acts, or otherwise promoting illegal commercial sex acts.

The percentage of offenders receiving imprisonment increased for both sexual abuse and sexual exploitation offenders in the guidelines era, and dramatically so for sexual exploitation offenders. Fewer than ten percent of either type of offender receives probation or intermediate sanctions. The average length of time served for sexual exploitation has increased by 20 months from its preguidelines level. Sentences imposed on sexual abuse offenders show the same decreases observed for violent offenders, but time actually served has remained fairly constant throughout the period of study.

### ***Inter-judge and Regional Disparity***

***Evidence of disparity in preguidelines sentencing.*** In the debates leading to passage of the SRA, Congress identified differences among judges and, to a lesser extent, differences among geographic regions in sentencing practices as particularly common sources of unwarranted disparity. Research demonstrated that philosophical differences among judges affected the sentences they imposed. The data showed that some judges were consistently more severe or more lenient than their colleagues, and that judges varied in their approaches to particular crime types. Several studies found geographical variations in sentencing patterns, suggesting that different political climates or court cultures can affect sentences. Regional differences arise not just from the exercise of judicial discretion, but also from differences in policies among U. S. attorneys.

***Increased transparency and predictability of sentences under the guidelines.*** The guidelines have made sentencing more transparent and predictable. The SRA requires judges to document in open court the facts and reasons underlying the sentences they impose, which are then reviewable on appeal. Defendants and prosecutors are better able to predict sentences based on the facts of the case than in the discretionary, preguidelines era. By making sentencing policies more transparent, the guidelines make it easier to debate and evaluate the merits of particular policies. The effects of changes in sentencing policy can also be anticipated more precisely. The prison impact

model developed by the Sentencing Commission, and further elaborated by the Bureau of Prisons [BOP], has proven very accurate at projecting the need for prison beds and supervision resources, making management of correctional resources easier.

Statistics provide a method for quantifying the increased understanding of sentencing made possible by guidelines. Most of the “variance”—the deviation of sentences around the average—among sentences in the preguidelines era was unaccounted for in statistical studies. Only 30 to 40 percent of the variance could be explained by characteristics of the offense or offender, leaving open the possibility of considerable arbitrary variation. Today, approximately 80 percent of the variance in sentences can be explained by the guidelines rules themselves. This greater transparency makes it easier to dispel concerns that sentences vary arbitrarily among judges, or that irrelevant factors, such as race or ethnicity, significantly affect sentences.

Evaluation research has been made easier by another benefit of sentencing reform—the creation of a specialized expert agency with a substantial research mission. The Commission has developed and maintains huge databases on the sentences imposed in each fiscal year, as well as specialized data sets focused on particular issues. These represent the richest sources of information that have ever been assembled on federal crimes, federal offenders, and sentences imposed. As a result, we are in a better position to evaluate whether unwarranted inter-judge, regional, or racial discrimination affects sentences today.

***The effect of guidelines implementation.*** The effect of the guidelines on unwarranted disparity is best evaluated by comparing, among judges who receive similar types of cases, the amount of variation in sentences *before* and *after* guidelines implementation. Researchers both inside and outside the Commission have made this comparison using the “natural experiment” created by the random assignment of cases to judges in many courthouses. The most recent and best of these studies found significant reductions in the unwarranted influence of judges on sentencing under the guidelines compared to the preguidelines era.

Studies of disparity divide judges’ influence into “primary judge effects” (greater severity or leniency among judges in all types of cases, represented by differences in their average sentence) and “interaction effects” (greater severity or leniency in particular types of cases). Two judges with similar average sentences may greatly differ in their treatment of particular offenses. Interaction effects can reduce or even cancel the primary judge effect, with one judge sentencing drug offenses more severely than “white collar” offenses and another doing the opposite.

In the Commission’s study, the influence of several different factors were compared, including the primary judge effect, interaction effects, city effects, as well as the general type of offense involved and whether an offender had any prior criminal conviction. General offense type accounted for the most variation in sentences both before and after guidelines implementation (between 15% & 20%) followed by interaction effects, city effects, and judge effects. The primary judge effect was relatively small in both the preguidelines and guidelines era, but was reduced by

between a third and half under the guidelines (*e.g.*, from 2.32 to 1.24 percent among judges who sentenced in both time periods). Interaction effects were about three to five times larger than primary judge effects. Interaction effects were reduced for most judges under the guidelines, although not among judges who sentenced in both time periods. The influence of judges was reduced by the guidelines for drug, fraud, firearm, and larceny offenses, though immigration or robbery offenses did not show a reduction. Notably, regional differences in drug trafficking cases were increased from the pre-guidelines to the guidelines era.

***Disparity Arising at Presentencing Stages.*** The SRA focused primarily on sentencing, but Congress, the Commission, and other observers recognized that sentencing could not be considered in isolation. Decisions regarding what charges to bring, decline, or dismiss, or what plea agreements to reach can all affect the fairness and uniformity of sentencing. Congress directed the Commission to develop mechanisms to monitor and, if necessary, control some of the negative effects of plea bargaining, particularly through policy statements establishing standards for judicial review and rejection of plea agreements that undermine the guidelines. In addition, the Commission developed the real offense system of relevant conduct and multiple count rules to reduce the effects of charging variations on the sentencing of offenders who engage in similar conduct. The Judicial Conference of the United States developed procedures for presentencing investigations designed to inform judges of the effects of charging and plea bargaining decisions. The Department also took steps to help ensure that sentencing uniformity was not thwarted at the presentencing stages. The Department's efforts were recently renewed, demonstrating continuing recognition that presentencing decisions can undermine sentencing uniformity.

Congress has previously directed the Commission to study plea bargaining and its effects on disparity. Because fewer statistical data are available to investigate decisions made at presentencing stages, their effects are difficult for the Commission to monitor and precisely quantify. However, a variety of evidence developed throughout the guidelines era suggest that the mechanisms and procedures designed to control disparity arising at presentencing stages are not all working as intended and have not been adequate to fully achieve uniformity of sentencing.

The Commission, as well as outside observers, have reported that plea bargaining is re-introducing disparity into the system. The Commission in 1989, 1995, and again in 2000 compared descriptions of the offense conduct contained in samples of presentence reports with the conduct for which the offenders were charged and sentenced. Each time a large proportion of qualifying offenders (in some cases large majorities) were not charged with potentially applicable penalty statutes. While some offenders are charged in a manner that results in sentences above the guideline range that would otherwise apply to the case, in other cases the charges selected cap the statutory range below the guideline range that would properly apply to the offender's real offense conduct. Charging decisions that limit the normal operation of the guidelines result in sentences that are disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense and disparate among offenders who engage in similar conduct.

Surveys of judges and probation officers have suggested other forms of plea bargaining, such as fact bargaining, that can result in disparity. A majority of chief probation officers reported in a survey sponsored by the Commission’s Probation Officer’s Advisory Group that the facts included in plea agreements were complete and accurate in the majority of cases. However, 43 percent reported this was true just half the time or less. Probation officers in some districts reported that prosecutors tried to limit information used in applying the guidelines in some cases. The Federal Judicial Center found in a nationwide survey that more than a quarter of responding judges reported that plea stipulations understated the offense conduct somewhat or very frequently, while another 12 percent said they did so about half the time. Judges reported that they did sometimes "go behind" the plea agreements to examine underlying conduct, but they reported doing so “infrequently.”

Field studies in several districts have demonstrated other ways that plea bargaining can result in sentencing disparity. An early study sponsored by the Commission estimated that plea agreements circumvented the guidelines in 20 to 35 percent of cases through charge, fact, or date bargaining. Some commentators have called circumvention of the guidelines through plea agreements a form of “hidden departure,” in which prosecutors and courts create incentives for guilty pleas and defendant cooperation beyond the incentives contained in the guidelines themselves. In some cases, the sentence recommended in plea agreement appears to the parties and to the court more fair and effective at achieving the purposes of sentencing than the sentence required by strict pursuit of every potentially applicable charge or sentence enhancement.

***Other Sources of Disparity Under the Guidelines.*** Several mechanisms within the guidelines system have been identified by commentators as continuing sources of disparity. These include variation in the rates of departure, including departures for substantial assistance to the government, or the extent of such departures. In addition, the guidelines give judges discretion over placement of the sentence within the guideline range, including, in some cases, whether to use a sentencing option such as probation.

The Commission analyzed the influence of each of these mechanisms on sentencing variations. Among these mechanisms, substantial assistance departures accounted for the greatest amount of variation in sentence lengths—4.4 percent. Other downward departures contributed 2.2 percent, while upward departures contributed just 0.29 percent. Only 0.07 percent of the variation was explained by use of the guideline range above the guideline minimum. Because data is unavailable on the types of assistance offered by defendants, or the nature of the mitigating circumstances present in cases, it is not possible to determine how much of these sentencing variations represent unwarranted disparity.

Even though the *rate* of substantial assistance and other downward departures is similar—17.1 percent and 18.3 percent, respectively—substantial assistance departures account for more variability in sentence length because the *extent* of departure for substantial assistance is on average greater. Commission research found varying policies and practices in different U. S. attorney’s offices regarding when motions for departures based on substantial assistance were made, and in the extent of departure recommended for different forms of assistance.

## ***Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparity***

***Growing caseload of minority offenders and a gap in sentencing.*** The proportion of the federal offender population consisting of minorities has grown over the past fifteen years. While the majority of federal offenders in the preguidelines era were White, minorities dominate the federal criminal docket today. Most of this shift is due to dramatic growth in the Hispanic proportion of the caseload, which has approximately doubled since 1984. Most notably, while the gap in average sentences between White and minority offenders was relatively small in the preguidelines era, the gap between African-Americans and other groups began to widen at the time of guidelines implementation, which was also the period during which large groups of offenders became subject to mandatory minimum drug sentences. The gap was greatest in the mid-1990s and has narrowed only slightly since then. The Commission had conducted a great deal of research to investigate possible reasons for this gap, including the possible influence of discrimination or of changes to the sentencing laws themselves.

***Discrimination.*** The SRA sought to eliminate all forms of unwarranted disparity, including disparity based on irrelevant differences among offenders. Different treatment based on such characteristics is generally called *discrimination*. Discrimination may reflect intentional bias toward a group, or may result from unconscious stereotypes or fears about a group, or greater empathy with persons more similar to oneself. Discrimination is generally considered the most onerous type of unwarranted disparity and sentencing reform was clearly designed to eliminate it. Concern over possible discrimination in federal sentencing remains strong today. No sentencing issue has received more attention from investigative journalists or scholarly researchers.

The studies agree on a general point: racial and ethnic discrimination by judges, if it exists at all, is not a major determinant of federal sentences compared to the seriousness of offenders' crimes and their criminal records. But the studies disagree over whether discrimination continues to affect sentencing at all. Many of the earlier studies were plagued by methodological problems, including a lack of good data on legally relevant considerations that might help explain differences in sentences and a failure to take account of statutory minimum penalties. Many of these problems can be overcome by using a "presumptive sentence" model.

The Commission studied whether race, ethnicity, or gender affects federal sentences after controlling for the influence of legally relevant considerations, including the guidelines rules and mandatory statutory penalties. Across five recent years, a typical Black male or Hispanic male drug trafficker had somewhat greater odds of being imprisoned when compared to a typical White male drug trafficker. No differences were found in non-drug cases. The odds of a typical Black drug offender being sentenced to imprisonment are about 20 percent higher than the odds of a typical White offender, while the odds of a Hispanic drug offender are about 40 percent higher. Differences in odds are difficult to translate into plain language, but further analysis examining the proportional reduction in error achieved by using race and ethnicity suggest that in only a handful of cases in any given year does being Black or Hispanic influence the decision whether to incarcerate. Some of these differences might be explained by legally relevant considerations for which we have no data.



For offenders whom judges choose to incarcerate, the question becomes: do similar offenders receive similar prison terms? For Black offenders, the results are once again limited to drug trafficking offenses and to male offenders. The typical Black drug trafficker receives a sentence about ten percent longer than a similar White drug trafficker. This translates into a sentence about seven months longer. A similar effect is found for Hispanic drug offenders, with somewhat lesser effects also found for non-drug and female Hispanic offenders. These findings indicate that all types of Hispanic offenders are placed above the minimum required sentence more frequently than similar White offenders, or receive somewhat lesser reductions when receiving a downward departure. The same is true of Black drug trafficking offenders and Black males.

While any unexplained differences in the likelihood of incarceration or in the lengths of prison terms imposed on minority and majority offenders is cause for concern, there is reason to doubt that these racial and ethnic effects reflect deep-seated prejudices or stereotypes among judges. Most noteworthy is that the effects, which are found only for some offense types and for males, are also unstable over time. Separate year-by-year analyses reveals that significant differences in the likelihood of imprisonment are found in only two of the last five years for Black offenders, and four of the last five for Hispanic offenders. The effects for sentence length disappear for both Black and Hispanic offenders in the most recent year for which data are available. Offense-to-offense and year-to-year fluctuations in racial and ethnic effects are difficult to reconcile with theories of enduring stereotypes, powerlessness, or overt discrimination affecting sentencing of minorities under the guidelines. In addition, the effects that we observe may be due in part to differences among groups on factors that judges legitimately may consider when deciding where to sentence within the guideline range or how far to depart, but on which we have no data.

Unlike race and ethnic discrimination, the evidence is more consistent that similar offenders are sometimes treated differently based on their gender. Gender effects are found in both drug and non-drug offenses and greatly exceed the race and ethnic effects discussed above. The typical male drug offender has twice the odds of going to prison as a similar female offender. Sentence lengths for men are typically 25 to 30 percent longer for all types of cases. Additional analyses show that the effects are present every year.

***Rules Having Questionable Adverse Impacts.*** Discrimination by sentencing judges cannot explain the growing gap between African-American and other offenders observed during the guidelines era. Another possibility is sentencing rules that have a disproportionate impact on a particular demographic group. Research has shown that differences in the types of crimes committed by members of different groups and in their criminal histories explains much of the gap in average sentences among them. Rules that are needed to achieve the purposes of sentencing are considered fair, even if they adversely affect some groups more than others. But if a sentencing rule has a significant adverse impact and there is insufficient evidence that the rule is needed to achieve a statutory purpose of sentencing, then the rule might be considered unfair toward the affected group.

In its cocaine reports, the Commission addressed crack cocaine defendants—over eighty percent of whom are Black—who are given identical sentences under the statutes and the guidelines

as powder cocaine offenders who traffic 100 times as much drug (the so-called 1-to-100 quantity ratio). The average length of imprisonment for crack cocaine was 115 months, compared to 77 months for the powder form of the drug. The Commission reported that the harms associated with crack cocaine do not justify its substantially harsher treatment compared to powder cocaine. For these reasons, the Commission recommended that cocaine sentencing be reconsidered. If the Commission's recommendations were adopted, the gap between African-American and other offenders would narrow significantly. Other rules in the statutes and guidelines have adverse impacts on particular groups. The efficacy of these rules for advancing the purposes of sentencing should be carefully assessed.

## ***Summary and Conclusions***

***Significant achievement of the goals of sentencing reform.*** In general, the guidelines have fostered progress in achieving the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act. Sentencing is more transparent, based on articulated reasons stated in open court and reviewable on appeal. Punishment is more certain and predictable, allowing the parties to better anticipate the sentencing consequences of case facts, and allowing the system to better predict the impact of changes in policy on prison populations and correctional resources. Sentence severity has been increased for many types of crime, in some cases substantially. Most important, the guidelines do not admit consideration of factors, such as race or ethnicity, that are irrelevant to the purposes of sentencing. There is less inter-judge disparity for similar offenders committing similar offenses.

Sentencing reform has had its greatest impact controlling disparity arising from the source at which the guidelines themselves were targeted—judicial discretion. Disparity arising from the decisions of other participants in the sentencing system, or from the process of sentencing policymaking itself, has been less successfully controlled. Statutory minimum penalties are invoked unevenly and introduce disproportionality and disparity when they prevent the guidelines from individualizing sentences. Presentencing stages, such as charging and plea negotiation, lack the transparency of the sentencing decision, making research more difficult. But significant evidence suggests that presentencing stages introduce disparity in sentencing. There is still work to be done to achieve the ambitious goals of sentencing reform in all respects.

***Partial implementation of the components of sentencing reform.*** Part of the reason not all the goals of sentencing reform have been fully achieved is that not all of the components of guidelines implementation put in place at the dawn of the guidelines era have been fully implemented or have worked as intended. Probation officers conduct presentencing investigations to the best of their abilities given limited resources. Judges conscientiously apply the guidelines to the facts as they know them. Appellate review corrects guideline misapplications and alerts the Commission to areas of ambiguity where clarification of the guidelines is needed. But neither appellate review nor guidelines amendments have prevented, at least through the 2002 data currently available, significant variations in departure rates. Neither Department policy nor judicial review of plea agreements has prevented plea bargaining from sometimes circumventing proper application of the guidelines needed to ensure similar treatment of offenders who commit similar crimes.

The SRA also outlined three major components of sentencing policy development: 1) utilization of research and criminological expertise developed by the Commission, 2) collaboration among policymakers and front-line implementers in the courts, and 3) political accountability through legislative directives and review. The Commission has worked to be responsive to the concerns of Congress, and its priorities and policymaking agenda have been greatly influenced by congressional directives and other crime legislation. In some cases, the results of research and collaboration have been overridden or ignored in policymaking during the guidelines era through enactment of mandatory minimums or specific directives to the Commission.

The Commission is uniquely qualified to conduct studies using its vast database, obtain the views and comments of various segments of the federal criminal justice community, review the academic literature, and report back to Congress in a timely manner. These are the processes set out in the SRA, which established the Commission as the clearinghouse for information on federal sentencing practices and the forum for collaboration among policymakers, implementers, and other stakeholders. As an independent agency in the Judiciary, but with frequent interaction with the three branches of government, the Commission is well-positioned to develop fair and effective sentencing policy as long as it continues to receive the resources and support it needs to carry out its vital mission.

# Preface

Prior to November 1, 1987, the implementation of federal sentencing guidelines, sentencing in the federal courts was very different. Crimes typically carried broad statute-defined ranges of possible penalties and sentencing judges had discretion to choose the penalty within the statutory range they felt would best achieve the purposes of sentencing. Judges were not required to explain the reasons for their sentences, and the sentences themselves were largely immune from appeal. If prison time was ordered, the time defendants actually served depended only partly on the sentence imposed by the judge. Release dates generally were determined by the United States Parole Commission and defendants typically served just 58 percent of the sentence that had been imposed (BJS, 1987).

These factors contributed to a widespread perception that sentences imposed and sentences and prison terms served under the old “indeterminate” sentencing system were unfair, disparate, and ineffective for controlling crime. Respect for law enforcement and the entire criminal justice process was undermined when offenders served only a fraction of the sentence imposed by the judge. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 [SRA] sought to establish sentencing practices that would eliminate unwarranted disparity, assure certainty and fairness, reflect advances in criminological knowledge, achieve proportionate punishment, and control crime through the deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation of offenders.

The SRA established the U.S. Sentencing Commission, composed of federal judges and other experts in the field of sentencing, and charged it with the task of promulgating sentencing guidelines for federal courts. After eighteen months of deliberations, the Commission issued the initial set of guidelines, which took effect on November 1, 1987. Four years later, in December 1991, the Commission submitted its report to Congress, *The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Report on the Operation of the Guidelines System and Short-term Impacts on Disparity in Sentencing, Use of Incarceration, and Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining* to Congress. The gradual implementation of the guidelines, which applied only to offenses committed after their enactment, and numerous court challenges delayed full implementation until the early 1990s. Furthermore, the guidelines were accompanied by changes of policy and practice that took time to be fully established. Thus, when the Commission released its Four-year Evaluation, it noted the report was a “preliminary assessment of some short-term effects” (USSC, 1991a) rather than a comprehensive examination of the effects of the guidelines on federal sentencing practices.

Twenty years after the SRA was passed and with fifteen years of data on sentences imposed under the guidelines, the Commission is in a better position to evaluate how well the changes brought by the SRA have achieved the ambitious goals Congress set for federal sentencing. This report will update the Four-year Evaluation and outline areas for further research in the continuing evolution of sentence reform.

## ***Overview of the Fifteen-Year Evaluation***

*Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing* is one of a series of publications describing the results of the Commission's fifteen-year anniversary evaluation of the guidelines. In addition to this report, the Commission has published three other monographs: *Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy* (May 2002), the third in a series of Commission reports on cocaine sentencing; *A Survey of Article III Judges on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Final Report* (February 2003), which provides all the findings of the Commission's survey conducted as part of the Fifteen-Year Evaluation; and *Downward Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines* (October 2003). These reports are available at the Commission website, [www.ussc.gov](http://www.ussc.gov). In addition, the Commission is releasing on its website a research series on the recidivism of federal offenders. Two reports, *Recidivism and the First Offender and Measuring Recidivism: The Criminal History Computation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines* are currently available.

*Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing* undertakes a survey of the federal sentencing system in light of the goals for sentencing reform established by Congress in the SRA. It draws upon a diverse pool of research, including work from both inside and outside the Commission. A bibliography of the published research bearing on the effectiveness of the guidelines is included in this report as Appendix A. The report picks up where the Four-Year Evaluation left off. The Commission targeted three primary areas for special consideration in this report: 1) the guidelines' impact on the transparency and rationality of sentencing, and the certainty and severity of punishment, 2) the impact of presentencing stages and inter-judge and regional disparity, and 3) research on racial, ethnic, and gender disparities in sentencing today. In all three areas, evidence indicates that in the fifteen years under sentencing guidelines, we have made progress toward meeting the goals of sentencing reform.

As policymakers reconsider the federal sentencing system's purposes and effectiveness, the Commission believes improvements in the system can best be achieved by careful consideration of the best available evidence concerning what works in sentencing policy, what doesn't work, and what we still do not know. The Fifteen-Year Evaluation was designed to inform this debate by summarizing the current state of "knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process." 28 U.S.C § 991(b)(1)(C).

# Chapter One:

## Introduction to the Sentencing Reform Act

### A. The History of the Sentencing Reform Act

The history of the Sentencing Reform Act [SRA] has been described in the Commission's Four-Year Evaluation (USSC, 1991a), as well as in numerous articles and books listed in the bibliography in Appendix A (*see, e.g.*, Stith & Cabranes, 1998; Miller & Wright, 1999). This history will not be recounted in detail here. Instead, this section briefly sketches the historical context of sentencing reform, the legislative history of the SRA, and the initial development of the sentencing guidelines for those who are unfamiliar with other sources, with an emphasis on aspects that are valuable for understanding the workings of the guidelines system today.

#### 1. *The Roots of Reform*

Federal sentencing reform has been described as another in a line of twentieth century legal reform movements that reflect two sometimes-competing American themes of Progressivism and Populism (Brooks, 2002). In the realm of government, the Progressive spirit has generally favored formation of public policy by expert agencies empowered to conduct research. By contrast, the Populist spirit has generally favored formation of public policy based on common sense and public sentiment.

The heritage of Progressivism can be seen in the SRA's emphasis on creation of an expert and independent agency, the United States Sentencing Commission. The SRA created a bipartisan commission in the judicial branch of government, and directed it to establish a "research and development program" (28 U.S.C. § 995 (a)(12)) that can "develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing." 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(2). The Commission is to establish sentencing policies that "reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C). These sections all reflect the Progressive impulse, articulated by such early twentieth century reformers as John Dewey, to develop a scientific approach to social problems. Creation of independent commissions was a favorite tool of Progressive reformers intent on bringing expertise to public policymaking insulated from the passions of politics.

Early in the twentieth century, the Progressive impulse in criminal justice was expressed through the growth of indeterminate sentencing and the rise of the rehabilitative ideal (Rothman, 1983). Prisons were re-conceptualized from places of penance and punishment to institutions for the transformation of offenders into law-abiding citizens. Parole release and probation supervision were invented as central components of the new approach. Medical and social-psychological experts were called upon to design treatment and supervision programs, and indeterminate sentences allowed the

length of incarceration to be tailored to each offender’s progress toward rehabilitation, as judged by expert evaluators.

By the 1970s, faith in the rehabilitative ideal had declined (Allen, 1981), but faith in expert commissions remained. Progressive-minded reformers were led to a search for alternatives to indeterminate sentencing by growing mistrust of a “therapeutic state” and the dangers to liberty and fairness it potentially posed (Kittrie, 1971; Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing, 1976), and by the lack of strong evidence for the effectiveness of correctional treatment programs (Martinson, 1974). Several proposals to rationalize the federal criminal code (ALI, 1962; ABA, 1968, 1979; Nat’l Comm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Law, 1971) included proposals for sentencing reform. Judge Marvin Frankel’s influential book, *Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order* (1972), called for creation of an independent sentencing commission that could replace judicial and parole board discretion with sentencing guidelines. In this new Progressive vision, the medical model of rehabilitation was replaced with legal and technocratic expertise, which could fashion penalties that were calibrated to the seriousness of the crime (Von Hirsch, 1976) or that were optimal for maximizing the control of crime while minimizing the costs of criminal justice (Becker, 1968).

Alongside the sections of the SRA that reflect a Progressive spirit, however, are sections that reflect a Populist distrust of both elite “experts” and politically unaccountable judges. The sentencing guidelines were intended most importantly to curtail judicial and Parole Commission discretion, which was viewed as “arbitrary and capricious” and an ineffective deterrent to crime.<sup>1</sup> The Sentencing Commission was also ordered to eliminate sentences that, in the view of Congress, “in many cases . . . do not accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(m). The SRA contains dozens of other detailed instructions to the Commission, including directives to consider “the community view of the gravity of the offense;” and “the public concern generated by the offense . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 994(c). Most importantly, while the Commission is charged with developing and amending the guidelines, the SRA ensures that the people’s elected representatives in Congress have an opportunity to review the Commission’s work before it becomes law. Congress reserved to itself the power, each year, to “modify or disapprove” any of the Commission’s amendments to the guidelines. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p).

Distrust of judges is a recurring theme of Populism, voiced early in the twentieth century by Nebraska Senator George Norris (1922), who declared that “Federal judges are not responsive to the pulsations of humanity” (Brooks, 2002). On two major occasions in the second half of the twentieth century, this distrust led to a very different type of determinate sentencing reform—a proliferation of mandatory minimum penalty statutes. Fixed mandatory penalties had been common in Colonial times but grew increasingly rare during the nineteenth century (Lowenthal, 1993). In 1956, however, Congress enacted the Narcotic Control Act, also known as the “Boggs Act,” which established minimum terms of imprisonment without parole for certain drug trafficking offenses. Finding that

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<sup>1</sup> S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1984), at 65 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].

increases in sentence length “had not shown the expected overall reduction in drug law violations”<sup>2</sup> Congress pulled back from statutory minimum penalties with passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, which repealed virtually all of the mandatory sentencing provisions. But beginning again in 1984, with expansions in 1986 and 1988, Congress enacted a series of mandatory penalties targeted at firearm, drug, and sex offenses, and at repeat offenders. Over one hundred such statutory penalties exist today alongside the sentencing guidelines, and more mandatory penalty provisions continue to be proposed in almost every session.

The tension between Commission developed guidelines and Congress enacted mandatory minimum penalty statutes greatly complicates the task of sentencing reform, as discussed in the Commission’s *Special Report to Congress: Mandatory Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System* (USSC, 1991b). The root tension between Progressive and Populist reform—between delegation to experts and popular oversight—also contributed to a lengthy process of public debate and legislative development before final passage of the SRA in 1984. These tensions resulted in legislation that reflects aspects of both movements, and thus, compromises and contradictions in both the goals to be achieved by sentencing reform and in the mechanisms created to achieve them.

## **2. *Legislative Development of the SRA***

The legislative history of the SRA has been subject to widely varying interpretations. Some scholars view the legislation as a thoughtful blueprint for rationalizing the sentencing process, with significant liberal elements meant to reduce over-reliance on imprisonment and preserve significant judicial discretion, albeit with some compromise of these principles as the legislation took final shape (Miller & Wright, 1999). Others believe the SRA was subtly transformed from the liberal blueprint originally introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy in 1975 into a law-and-order measure designed to increase the severity of punishment and virtually eliminate judges’ discretion to consider individual offender characteristics (Stith & Koh, 1993). Most agree, however, that the legislation that emerged from nearly a decade of deliberation and compromise contained important ambiguities, which left the original Sentencing Commission with significant administrative discretion to shape the guidelines system it was directed to create (Feinberg, 1993; Miller & Wright, 1999; Hofer & Allenbaugh, 2003).

The legislation that ultimately became the SRA survived the introduction of competing proposals in both the House and Senate. It was repeatedly amended over a decade of development before enactment, somewhat surprisingly, on October 12, 1984, as part of an omnibus continuing appropriations measure. The final version differed from the bill that was originally introduced and from competing proposals in many important respects.

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<sup>2</sup> S. REP. NO. 613, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969).



## Sentencing Reform Act Time Line

- Jan. 1971** National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (the “Brown Commission”) issues report. The commission recommends classification and grading of offenses, concise listing of authorized sentences, limits on the cumulation of punishment for multiple offenses, parole following longer periods of imprisonment, and limited appellate review.
- Nov. 1971** U.S. District Judge Marvin E. Frankel (S.D.N.Y.) delivers lectures at the University of Cincinnati Law School, calling for a national commission to study sentencing, corrections, and parole; formulate laws and rules on the basis of the research; and enact rules subject to congressional veto.
- 1971-1974** Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures considers Brown Commission proposals. The subcommittee holds hearings during the 92nd Congress and in the 93rd focuses on two legislative proposals: (1) S. 1, the Criminal Justice Codification, Revision, and Reform Act of 1973 and S. 1400, the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1973. The bills include large-scale criminal code re-codification. No mention is made of a sentencing commission or sentencing guidelines.
- 1975** Yale Law School professors (with support of the Guggenheim Foundation) advocate creation of a sentencing commission to issue sentencing guidelines, appellate review of sentences, and the abolition of parole.
- Nov. 1975** Sen. Edward Kennedy introduces bill during the 94th Congress (S. 2699) to form United States Commission on Sentencing to issue sentencing guidelines and to reduce numerous statutory maximum sentences.
- May 1976** The Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976 (Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219 (May 14, 1976)) is enacted. The act codifies the Parole Commission’s program that applied guidelines to all parole decisions beginning in 1974.
- 1977-78** In the 95th Congress, Senator McClellan and Sen. Kennedy sponsor S. 1437 to re-codify federal criminal laws, restrict parole, and to establish a sentencing commission to draft sentencing guidelines. An amended S. 1437 passes the Senate. The Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Committee subsequently conducts hearings on the bill and an alternative proposal, but reports a number of problems and takes no further action.

## Sentencing Reform Act Time Line (Continued)

**1979-1980** During the 96th Congress, S. 1722, the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979 is introduced, which is similar to S. 1437 and creates a sentencing commission, but abolishes parole and adds the concept of supervised release. The House Judiciary Committee approves a sentencing bill (H.R. 6915) that proposes promulgation of guidelines by a seven-member, part-time, Judicial Conference Committee on Sentencing; authorizes greater flexibility to depart from those guidelines; and retains parole. Neither chamber acts on its version of the legislation.

**1982** During the 97th Congress, Senate Judiciary Committee, reports a comprehensive criminal code revision bill, S. 1630, but no Senate action occurs on the proposal. A nearly identical sentencing reform package, S. 2572, passes the Senate, but gets deleted from the House version of the bill.

**1983-1984** Senators Strom Thurmond and Paul Laxalt, during the 98th Congress, introduce S. 829, comprehensive crime control legislation that contains sentencing reform as Title II. Senate Judiciary Committee holds hearings and breaks S. 829 into several bills, including S. 1762, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, which contained a major section on sentencing reform, and S. 668, a bill by Sen. Kennedy virtually identical to Title II. Both bills pass the Senate in 1984.

The House Judiciary Committee reports out H.R. 6012 that calls for determinate parole terms and the creation of a part-time commission within the Judicial Conference to draft advisory sentencing guidelines. The bill is not considered by the full House.

An amended Comprehensive Crime Control Act is made part of a continuing appropriations bill, is passed by both chambers of Congress, and is signed into law by President Reagan on October 12, 1984. The portion of the act creating the United States Sentencing Commission and instructing it to create sentencing guidelines for the federal courts is termed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

*Away from judicial control of guidelines development.* The bill originally introduced by Sen. Kennedy<sup>3</sup> and subsequent competing proposals in the House<sup>4</sup> called for development of sentencing guidelines within the existing administrative structure of the judiciary. Some proposals called for guidelines to be developed by a committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Sen. Kennedy's bill called for a commission whose members would be chosen entirely by the Judicial Conference. But over its years of development, the idea of the Sentencing Commission was transformed from a judge-dominated agency to an agency whose membership is more closely connected to the Executive and Legislative branches. Under the terms of the SRA, as finally enacted, all commissioners are to be chosen by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). The role of the Judicial Conference was reduced from choosing the commissioners, to recommending a list of judges from which the President would be required to choose, to recommending a list of six judges which the President is required only to "consider." The SRA required just three of seven voting commissioners to be active federal judges. The PROTECT Act recently further changed the Commission structure to eliminate the requirement of a minimum judicial presence on the Commission and set the maximum number of judge-members at three.

Proponents of judicial involvement had argued that the judiciary already had the capacity for guidelines development, which was similar to their existing responsibility for developing rules of practice and procedure for the courts. Some members of the House believed that "[j]udges who have had a strong

## The U.S. Sentencing Commissioners

The seven voting members on the Commission are appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and serve staggered six-year terms. The Commission has always included federal judges, which are selected after considering a list of six judges recommended to the President by the Judicial Conference of the United States. The Commission has a chair and three vice chairs.

No more than four commissioners, or two vice chairs, may belong to the same political party. The Attorney General or his/her designee is a non-voting, *ex-officio* member of the Commission, as is the chair of the U.S. Parole Commission. No commissioner may serve more than two full terms. When an appointment expires, the commissioner may continue to serve until Congress adjourns sine die or a new commissioner is appointed. Four affirmative votes are necessary for the Commission to pass sentencing policy.

Since its inception there have been four Commission chairs: Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr., U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit; Judge Richard P. Conaboy, U.S. District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania; Judge Diana E. Murphy, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit; and the present chair, Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas.

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<sup>3</sup> S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).

<sup>4</sup> H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980).

voice in developing the guidelines will be more likely to consistently and fairly apply them.”<sup>5</sup> But the prevailing opinion was “a reluctance to have the people in the middle of the problem try to solve it.”<sup>6</sup> Rather than retain even tighter control over sentencing—as some states such as California had with legislatively drafted determinate sentences, and as Congress itself did when enacting mandatory minimum penalties—Congress instead opted for an independent Commission within the Judiciary with close connections to the Legislative and Executive Branches.

***Away from voluntary guidelines.*** As it developed, sentencing reform legislation shifted from a model that continued significant discretion for sentencing judges toward a model of sharply limited discretion. Sentencing guidelines systems in the states range along a continuum from “voluntary” or “advisory,” to “presumptive,” to “mandatory” (BJA, 1998). The differences among them are marked by the standards governing when a judge may depart from the recommended guideline range, and the extent of appellate review of those departures. The original federal legislation called for advisory guidelines with limited appellate review. During Senate debates in 1978 however a standard was added requiring that judges sentence within the prescribed guideline range unless “the court finds that an aggravating or mitigating circumstance exists that was not adequately taken into consideration by the Commission in formulating the guidelines and that should result in a different sentence.”<sup>7</sup> This was intended to ensure that the guidelines were treated as “presumptive” rather than “voluntary” (Miller & Wright, 1999). Subsequent attempts to loosen the departure standard in the Senate and the House were defeated (Stith & Koh, 1993).

The final SRA also provided for an automatic right-of-appeal if a judge sentences outside the prescribed guideline range. 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Defendants have an automatic right-of-appeal if a judge departs upward (imposes a sentence that is longer than the top of the guideline range). The government has an automatic right-of-appeal if the judge departs downward. Sentences may also be appealed by either party based on a misapplication of the guidelines.

As the guidelines were taking effect in 1987, the departure standard was again revisited and revised slightly:

The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range [required by the guidelines] unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance *of a kind, or to a degree*, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described” (new language italicized). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).

The author of this amendment, Rep. John Conyers, apparently intended it to expand the discretion of the sentencing judge to depart from the guidelines. However, a “joint explanation” inserted into the Congressional Record by several senators contradicted this analysis (Miller & Wright, 1999).

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<sup>5</sup> H.R. REP. NO. 1017, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, at 93-94 (1984).

<sup>6</sup> CONG. Q., 1983, at 339.

<sup>7</sup> 124 CONG. REC. 382-83 (1978) (unprinted amend. No. 1100, adopted Jan. 23, 1978).

Thus, the legislative history and final text of the SRA are somewhat ambiguous as to just how restrictive the departure standard was intended to be, particularly in combination with other provisions of the Act. Ultimately, actions of the Commission, the appellate courts, and Congress shaped where the federal guidelines fall on the continuum between presumptive and mandatory. Prior to the

## ***Blakely v. Washington: A New Challenge for Federal Sentencing Reform***

On June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court decided *Blakely v. Washington*, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), a case with potentially profound consequences for the federal sentencing guidelines and for the sentencing reform movement. The court invalidated a sentence imposed under the Washington State sentencing guidelines because it violated the defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The judge in the case had departed from the standard sentencing range, set out by the legislature in the state's sentencing statutes, based on an aggravating factor that had not been admitted by the defendant as part of his guilty plea nor proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Although the majority opinion made clear that the court was not passing judgment on the constitutionality of the federal sentencing guidelines, which were not before the court, some of the dissenting justices and numerous commentators argued that the decision raised questions about the constitutionality of the federal guidelines or the procedures used to enhance sentences under them. District judges and circuit courts have reached varying opinions on the implications of the decision for federal sentencing. The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in two cases in order to clarify the implications of *Blakely*, if any, for the federal sentencing guidelines. Oral arguments were given in *United States v. Booker* (375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004)) and *United States v. Fanfan* (2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18593 (D.Me. June 28, 2004)) on October 4, 2004, the first day of the court's 2004-2005 term, with a decision in the case expected later in the year.

Until these questions are resolved, the ultimate status of the federal sentencing guidelines will remain uncertain. In the meantime, numerous observers have hoped that the *Blakely* decision will inaugurate a renewed national conversation about the state of federal sentencing and the sentencing guidelines. (Testimony of witnesses at a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, "*Blakely v. Washington* and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines," July 13, 2004.) The Commission will be part of this conversation and believes that the results of the Fifteen-Year Evaluation of the guidelines can make an important contribution to understanding and improving federal sentencing.

Supreme Court's decision in June, 2004, in the case of *Blakely v. Washington*,<sup>8</sup> which again raised questions about the constitutionality of the federal guidelines, all observers agreed that the federal guidelines were far from voluntary. Judges were legally bound to apply them unless a departure could be justified to the appellate court if the case were appealed. But whether the guidelines were sufficiently mandatory was a source of continuing debate.

In 2003, Congress concluded that the governing standards for appellate review of departures had resulted in an unacceptably high downward departure rate, particularly in the area of sex offenses against children. For these latter offenses, the PROTECT Act of 2003 eliminated judicial departures for all reasons except those specifically authorized in Chapter Five, Part K, of the *Guidelines Manual*. For other downward departures, the PROTECT Act established *de novo* review upon appeal. The Act also directed the Sentencing Commission to amend the guidelines and policy statements in order to substantially reduce the incidence of downward departures. The Commission implemented this directive in amendment 651, which narrowed the circumstances in which departure is authorized. Results of a Commission study of downward departures was published simultaneously with the amendment (USSC, 2003b).

The PROTECT Act made other changes to sentencing policies and practices that will be discussed further where appropriate in the remainder of this report. It also established requirements for reporting sentencing and departure information to the Commission and, upon their request, to the Department and Congress. Data from these new reporting requirements are not available at the time this report is being written, but departures will continue to be closely monitored by the Commission.

***Toward greater sentencing severity.*** Changes in the legislation through its decade of development also encouraged the Commission, and in some cases required it, to increase sentence severity. Provisions designed to control or reduce the use of imprisonment were weakened. For example, the bill as originally introduced directed the Commission to assure that the capacity of the federal prisons “will not be exceeded.”<sup>9</sup> But, in the final SRA the Commission is required only to “minimize the likelihood” that prison capacity will be exceeded. 28 U.S.C. § 994(g). Similarly, while the original legislation encouraged the Commission to be guided by the prison terms then typically served for various types of crime, the final Act specifically directed the Commission to use then-current practice only as a “starting point.” The Commission was to “insure that the guidelines reflect the fact that, in many cases, current sentences do not accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(m).

As described above, the SRA contains other provisions reflecting a Populist belief that judges tend toward leniency and should be constrained by “guidelines and policy statements that have teeth in them.”<sup>10</sup> The final SRA also contained an early type of “Three-Strikes-You’re-Out” provision that requires a term “at or near the maximum term authorized” for repeat drug and violent offenders.

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<sup>8</sup> 124 S.Ct. 2531 (June 24, 2004).

<sup>9</sup> S. 1437, *supra* note 3, at § 124.

<sup>10</sup> 130 CONG. REC. 1644, 838 (1984)(statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond).

28 U.S.C. § 994(h). As will be shown in Chapter Two, the SRA ultimately resulted in guidelines that have contributed to a doubling of the average prison time served by federal felony offenders.

*Toward regulation of plea bargaining.* Finally, concern that charge selection and plea bargaining could limit or thwart the goals of sentencing reform surfaced early in scholarly writings (Twentieth Century Fund, 1976; Zimring, 1976) and in congressional debates (*see* Schulhofer & Nagel, 1989). Reform skeptics pointed out that prosecutors had considerable discretion to select charges and structure plea agreements, but that in the preguidelines era judges and the Parole Commission, in setting sentences and release dates, could temper the effects of prior prosecutorial decisions. Binding sentencing guidelines, without parole, could eliminate these checks, and prosecutors could conceivably exercise considerable control over sentences through the charges they bring and the facts they prove at sentencing. The result would be a shift of discretion toward prosecutors, which could perpetuate disparity and reduce the certainty of punishment.

In 1978, in response to these concerns, the Federal Judicial Center [hereinafter FJC] undertook a study of the interaction of prosecutorial discretion and sentencing (FJC, 1979). It concluded that in the preguidelines era, judges could control the impact of plea bargaining in various ways. Under sentencing guidelines, however, discretion could be transferred to prosecutors. Further, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion would be relatively invisible; unless some judicial mechanism were found to control it, plea bargaining would be subject to supervision only within the Department of Justice and each U. S. attorney's office. The report recommended that the sentencing reform bills then pending before Congress should be amended by adding a directive to the Sentencing Commission to issue guidelines for judges to use when deciding whether to accept a guilty plea.

The FJC report heightened congressional concern that sentencing reform might actually increase disparities in federal sentencing by shifting discretion to prosecutors (*see* Schulhofer & Nagel, 1989). To address this possibility, Congress adopted a slightly weakened version of the mechanism recommended in the report. The Senate amended the pending bill to direct the Sentencing Commission to issue *policy statements*, instead of binding *guidelines*, governing the acceptance of plea agreements. This provision was included in the SRA as 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(E), which ordered the Commission to promulgate policy statements to all courts regarding the appropriate use of “the authority granted under Rule 11(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to accept or reject a plea agreement . . . .” The *Senate Report* accompanying the SRA confidently asserted that “this guidance will assure that judges can examine plea agreements to make certain that prosecutors have not used plea bargaining to undermine the sentencing guidelines.”<sup>11</sup>

By the time the SRA was signed into law by President Reagan in 1984, it had undergone nearly ten years of development. It was designed to revamp a federal sentencing system Congress described as “ripe for reform.”<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> SENATE REPORT, *supra* note 1, at 63.

<sup>12</sup> *Id.*

## B. Goals and Purposes of the SRA

The goals identified in the SRA for the new system provide the best criteria for judging whether sentencing reform has been successful. These goals can be divided into two groups. The first group, the goals of sentencing reform itself, include certainty and transparency in punishment and the elimination of unwarranted disparity. Research on the effectiveness of the system at achieving these goals is the subject of the remaining chapters of this report. The second group, establishment of policies that will best accomplish the purposes of sentencing—which are usually summarized as just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—is the subject of previous Commission-sponsored research (*see* Rossi & Berk, 1996) as well as ongoing research at the Commission. Results of this work will be addressed in future installments of the research series on the recidivism of federal offenders and other commission reports.

### 1. *The Goals of Sentencing Reform*

***Reducing unwarranted disparity.*** The “first and foremost” goal of sentencing reform is avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparity (Feinberg, 1993). Much has been written defining unwarranted disparity (Blumstein, 1983). Obviously, not all different treatment of offenders is unfair, so long as it reflects differences in the seriousness of their crimes or in other relevant case or offender characteristics. But sentencing reform aimed to:

(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities *among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct* while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices; 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).

Section 994(f) reiterates this goal of “providing certainty and fairness in sentencing and reducing unwarranted sentence disparities.”

The possibility that different racial or ethnic groups might receive unfair treatment was part of the motivation for the SRA, and it remains the subject of much public and scholarly interest. Research investigating the role of race, ethnicity, and gender in federal sentencing is presented and discussed in Chapter Four of this report. The legislative history of the Act clearly shows, however, that different treatment by different judges was the chief problem the Act was designed to address, as well as regional differences in sentencing.<sup>13</sup> The success of the guidelines at reducing inter-judge and regional sentencing disparities will be discussed in Chapter Three of this report.

***Assuring certainty and severity of punishment.*** In a narrow sense, the success of the guidelines at achieving certainty of punishment has never been an issue, because the establishment of truth-in-sentencing through the elimination of parole accomplished it at a stroke. In a broader

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<sup>13</sup> SENATE REPORT, *supra* note 1, at 41-46.



sense, however, certainty of punishment is weakened when defendants are not held accountable for all of the criminal acts they actually committed. Charging or plea bargaining practices that allow defendants to avoid punishment for some acts, can undermine the certainty of punishment in this sense. Existing evidence regarding the effects of charging decisions, plea bargaining, and guideline avoidance on the certainty of punishment and on sentencing disparity will be reviewed in Chapter Three of this report.

The SRA also called for increased sentence severity for many types of offenses. The effect of the guidelines on the use of probation and the length of time served for various types of crime will be discussed in Chapter Two of this report.

***Increased rationality and transparency of punishment.*** Finally, the SRA aimed to increase the rationality and transparency of sentences. By replacing the unguided discretion of the preguidelines era with a system of binding legal rules that specify in advance the effect of most offense circumstances the predictability of sentences was increased. Rationality was further advanced by requiring the Commission to develop policies and practices that “reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process” (28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C)) and to “develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing.” 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(2). Transparency was advanced by requiring each judge to “state in open court the reason for its imposition of the particular sentence” and to provide a written record of these reasons. 18 U.S.C. 3553(c). Disclosure of the presentence report, with its preliminary application of the guidelines to each case, at least ten days before the sentencing hearing, further reduces the possibility of surprise and confusion regarding the reasons for the sentence ultimately imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3552(d). The increased rationality, transparency, and predictability of the guidelines system will be discussed in Chapter Five of this report.

## ***2. The Purposes of Punishment***

In addition to these goals of sentencing reform, the SRA directed the Commission to: “(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system that—(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of Title 18, United States Code.” 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1). That section lists the purposes as:

- (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
- (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
- (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
- (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner[.]

***Proportionality: Making the Punishment Fit the Crime.*** The vast majority of the sentencing guidelines, particularly in Chapters Two and Three of the *Guidelines Manual*, are aimed at assuring that the severity of punishment is proportional to the seriousness of the crime. Each crime is assigned a “base offense level” as a starting point in grading the seriousness of the offense. Guideline

adjustments then increase or decrease this score to account for aggravating or mitigating factors that differentiate degrees of harm of different offenses and the varying culpability in each case. The Commission has used a wide variety of information to assess crime seriousness, including survey data on public perceptions of the gravity of different offenses, analysis of various crimes' economic impacts, and medical and psychological data on the harm caused by drug trafficking, sexual assaults, pollution, and other offenses.

***Crime control through incapacitation and deterrence.*** The original Commission recognized crime control as the ultimate objective of the criminal law and of sentencing policy (*Guidelines Manual*, Historical Introduction, at 2). It also recognized that proportionate punishment can control crime through a deterrent effect. It followed the practice of most state guideline systems (Kauder, et al., 1997) and the federal Parole Commission—which had developed a “Salient Factor Score” to help predict the recidivism risk of various offenders—by increasing the term of imprisonment for offenders who were at a greater risk of recidivism (Hoffman & Beck, 1997). To minimize conflict with the other purposes of punishment, the Commission chose to predict risk using only the offender's criminal history (Hofer & Allenbaugh, 2003). Chapter Four of the *Guidelines Manual* provides rules for assigning each offender to a “criminal history category” which, along with the offense level, determines the range of imprisonment and sentencing options available to the judge.

As part of the Fifteen-Year Evaluation, the Commission has undertaken a major empirical study of the recidivism of federal offenders. The results of this study, published as Release 1 in the Research Series on the Recidivism of Federal Guideline Offenders, have reconfirmed the validity of the criminal history score as a measure of recidivism risk (USSC, 2004). Further analysis of these data will allow the Commission to refine the criminal history category to make it an even more accurate predictor of risk. Additional research is also underway to assess the deterrent effect of various terms of imprisonment and other aspects of the guidelines' efforts at crime control.

***Rehabilitation.*** The SRA directs judges to consider each defendant's need for educational and treatment services when imposing sentence. However, the SRA and the guidelines make rehabilitation a lower priority than other sentencing goals (*see* Hofer & Allenbaugh, 2003). For example, the Commission was directed to ensure that “the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(k). Despite the relatively low priority given rehabilitation, judges are still required to assess a defendant's need for treatment or training when they decide whether to impose any special conditions of probation or supervised release. *See* USSG §5D1.3(d). (Supervised release has replaced parole as the means to provide offenders with post-imprisonment supervision.) Because prison rehabilitation programs are administered by the Bureau of Prisons and post-imprisonment programs are administered by the probation service of the Administrative Office of the United States Court, these agencies have conducted the most extensive research on the effectiveness of treatment and training programs (BOP, 1997).

## C. The Commission's Implementation of the SRA

A number of articles by original commissioners have described in detail how they set about implementing the directives in the SRA (Breyer, 1988; Nagel, 1990; Wilkins, 1992a; Corrothers, 1992). The details of these efforts will not be repeated here, but a brief summary of the guideline development process is provided for readers unfamiliar with the history of the Commission. An introduction to how the guidelines determine the sentence is also provided for those unacquainted with the guidelines' operation.

### 1. *Guidelines Drafting Procedures*

***Sentencing Philosophy.*** The SRA directed the Commission to develop guidelines that would advance all of the goals of sentencing reform and all the purposes of sentencing reviewed above. Sentencing philosophy was a source of much discussion among the original Commissioners. For the first 18 months of its existence, competing versions of the Guidelines were developed and debated, each built on different theoretical principles, such as just desert theory or the economics-based theory of optimal penalties (Nagel, 1990). None of these proposals gained sufficient support to win acceptance, so the Commission decided to use an empirical approach instead (*see* Breyer, 1988, for a fuller discussion of these developments).

Although the Commission has never explicitly articulated a philosophy of sentencing, the guidelines rules themselves reflect a fairly clear ordering (Bowman, 1996; Hofer & Allenbaugh, 2003). Like guideline systems in the states, the federal guidelines reflect the current "consensus model of criminal punishment" (Frase, 2003), a form of "limiting retributivism" (Morris, 1977). This approach places primary emphasis on punishment proportionate to the seriousness of the crime and, within the broad parameters of this retributivism, lengthier incarceration for offenders who are most likely to recidivate. Some scholars call this approach "modified just desert" (Monahan, 1982). The Commission approvingly cited scholars working within this model in the *Supplementary Report* that accompanied promulgation of the guidelines (USSC, 1987, p. 16).

***The use of data on past practices and recidivism.*** The original Commission based the guidelines on many considerations, including distinctions made in the substantive criminal statutes, the United States Parole Commission's guidelines, and public commentary. However, an important starting point in the deliberations was a statistical analysis of pre-guidelines sentencing practices. The Commission analyzed detailed data drawn from more than 10,000 reports of offenders sentenced in 1985 and additional data from approximately 100,000 more federal convictions. The Commission determined the average prison term likely to be served for each generic type of crime. These averages established offense levels for each crime, which were directly linked to a recommended imprisonment range. Aggravating and mitigating factors that significantly correlated with increases or decreases in sentences were also determined statistically, along with each factor's magnitude (USSC, 1987). These formed the bases for "specific offense characteristics" for each type of crime, which adjusted the base offense level upward or downward.

The Commission used the statistical results as a starting point for deliberations, departing from past practice when a majority of the Commissioners agreed there was a reason to do so. Guidelines for most crimes were based on past practices, but important considerations led the Commission to depart from past practices for certain crimes such as fraud and drug trafficking. Some of these considerations were driven by statute. The SRA required that the Commission provide “a substantial term of imprisonment” for certain categories of offender,<sup>14</sup> and statutory minimum penalties, enacted as the guidelines were being drafted, dictated many terms of the drug trafficking guidelines. The Commission also sought to correct past under-punishment of crimes, such as “white collar” crimes.

In addition to the offense level, the guidelines take into account each offender’s criminal history. The offender’s “criminal history score,” designed to predict recidivism, is based on the frequency, seriousness, and recency of prior criminal convictions, and whether the offender was under criminal justice supervision at the time of the present offense. The rules the Commission developed were based on factors that prior research had found to be empirically related to the likelihood of future criminal behavior (Hoffman & Beck, 1997). The criminal history score was designed to predict recidivism, but uses only criminal history to do so (as opposed to also using employment or drug use history, as had the Parole Commission’s salient factor score). In this way, the Commission sought to reduce the tension between preventing future crime and just punishment for the current crime. Offenders with prior convictions were shown to be more likely to recidivate, and also were viewed as more culpable and therefore more deserving of punishment.

***The necessary level of detail.*** One important question in developing the guidelines was how much detail to build into the system, that is, how many different offense level adjustments and criminal history categories were needed to adequately differentiate among crimes and offenders. A very simple system could produce sentence uniformity, but at the expense of proportionality. A few general categories might make the guidelines easy to administer, but at the cost of lumping together offenders who are very different in important respects. This problem arises in statutory minimum penalties that require the same penalty for very different offenders—for example, at least ten years imprisonment for all offenders who traffic in a certain quantity of drug, regardless of the mitigating factors that may be present in some of the cases (USSC, 1991(b)).

On the other hand, a sentencing system that attempts to account for every conceivable offense and offender characteristic relevant to sentencing could quickly become unworkable. As the number and complexity of decisions needed to apply the guidelines increase, so do the resources required for investigations and sentencing hearings, as well as the risk that different judges will apply the guidelines differently (Ruback & Wroblewski, 2001). In the end, the original Commission balanced these concerns and devised a Sentencing Table with 43 offense levels and 6 criminal history categories with overlapping ranges of imprisonment. In creating this table the Commission was guided by the provision in the SRA, sometimes called the “25 percent rule,” which requires that the maximum of each recommended sentencing range exceed the minimum of the range by no more than six months or 25 percent of the minimum range, whichever is greater.<sup>15</sup> This rule requires guidelines of sufficient detail to assign offenders to relatively narrow ranges of recommended prison terms.

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<sup>14</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 994(i).

<sup>15</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2).

## 2. *How the Guidelines Determine the Presumptive Sentence*

The federal sentencing *Guidelines Manual* sets out the rules that determine the presumptive guideline range in every case and contains additional policy statements, background commentary, and application notes to assist courts in applying the guidelines as intended. The manual is revised annually, and all versions can be found at the Commission’s website [www.ussc.gov](http://www.ussc.gov). The basic structure of the guidelines, has remained constant throughout the guidelines era.

**General application principles.** Chapter One of the manual lays out the steps to be followed in determining each offender’s guideline range. The process begins with deciding which guideline from Chapter Two best applies to each count of conviction or group of closely related counts. (Counts that are closely related—for example, fraud and conspiracy to commit the fraud, or multiple drug sales that are part of an ongoing common scheme—are treated as single offenses and sentenced under the same Chapter Two guideline according to the “Multiple Count” rules in Chapter Three, Part D.) If a plea agreement stipulates a more serious offense than the offense of conviction, the Chapter Two guideline for the more serious offense is used. USSG §1B1.2.

A preliminary offense level is then determined under Chapters Two and Three for each count or group of counts. In determining which base offense level, specific offense characteristics, cross-references among guidelines, or other special instructions apply, the court considers all “relevant conduct.” The relevant conduct rule has been called the “cornerstone” of the guidelines system (Wilkins & Steer, 1990) and it is described in greater detail later in this chapter. After the offense levels for all counts or groups have been determined, a “combined offense level” is determined according to the multiple count rules found in Chapter Three, Part D. This offense level may be reduced by two or three levels if the offender qualifies for a reduction under the “acceptance of responsibility” guideline found in Chapter Three, Part E. The court then determines the offender’s criminal history score and placement in a Criminal History Category. Together, the offense level and criminal history category determine where the defendant’s case falls in the Sentencing Table.

**The offense level.** Each guideline contains a base offense level, which is the starting point for ranking the seriousness of each particular offense. More serious types of crime have higher base offense levels; for example, trespass has a base offense level of 4, while kidnaping has a base offense level of 32. Most guidelines include a number of specific offense characteristics, which can increase or decrease the offense level. For example, the guideline for theft increases the offense level based on the amount of loss involved in the offense. The guideline for robbery increases the offense level by five if a firearm was brandished or possessed, and by seven if a firearm was discharged.

Chapter Three contains additional offense level adjustments that pertain to all kinds of offenses. Categories of adjustments include: victim-related adjustments, the offender’s role in the offense, and obstruction of justice. For example, if the offender knew that the victim was unusually vulnerable due to age or physical or mental condition, the offense level is increased by two levels. If the offender was a minimal participant in the offense, the offense level is decreased by four levels. If the offender obstructed justice, the offense level is increased by two levels. Chapter Three also includes the multiple counts rules and the adjustment for the offender’s acceptance of responsibility.

## The Sentencing Table

The Sentencing Table is found in Chapter Five, Part A, of the *Guidelines Manual*. The range of recommended sentences for every offender is given in the cell of the table at which the offender’s final offense level and the criminal history category intersect. The table provides 43 levels of offense seriousness and six criminal history categories, making a total of 258 cells.

In the following excerpt from the table, an offender with a criminal history category of I and a final offense level of 20 would have a guideline range of 33 to 41 months.

### Sentencing Table (excerpt)

(in months of imprisonment)

Offense Level	Criminal History Category					
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
...	...	...	...	...	...	...
19	30-37	33-41	37-46	46-57	57-71	63-78
20	33-41	37-46	41-51	51-63	63-78	70-87
21	37-46	41-51	46-57	57-71	70-87	77-96
...	...	...	...	...	...	...

The lowest level of the table is divided into four zones, which define the alternatives to imprisonment that are available to the judge. In Zone A, involving ranges of 0-6 months, judges may impose any sentencing option from probation to imprisonment. In Zones B and C, certain more restrictive alternatives to imprisonment are available (*see* accompanying text). In Zone D, which includes 206 of the cells, only sentences of imprisonment are available. At offense level 43, life imprisonment is required.

**Criminal History.** Chapter Four contains the rules that assign offenders to one of the six criminal history categories. Criminal History Category I is for offenders with the least serious criminal record and includes many first-time offenders. Criminal History Category VI is for offenders with the most extensive criminal records. The chapter also contains a special provision for “Career Offenders,” USSG §4B1.1, which implements the directive in the SRA that requires the Commission to provide a sentence “at or near the maximum term authorized” for certain categories of violent and drug trafficking offenders with two or more prior offenses. (28 U.S.C. § 994(h). Other provisions apply to “Armed Career Criminals” USSG §4B1.4, who are subject to a statutorily enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and to “Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offender Against Minors” USSG §4B1.5.

#### *Determining the final sentence.*

Judges must impose a sentence within the guideline range unless a reason for departure can be identified and stated on the record. For offenders convicted of less serious offenses with relatively little criminal history, Chapter Five, Part F provides sentencing options other than imprisonment. The Sentencing Table is divided into four zones, A through D. Offenders in all zones *may* receive a sentence of imprisonment, but offenders in Zone D, which is the great majority of the Sentencing Table, *must* receive a term of imprisonment equal to at least the minimum of the guideline range. In Zones A through C judges have the option of imposing alternative sentences, depending on the particular zone in which the defendant falls.

*Zone A (offenders with sentencing ranges of 0-6 months):*

- probation;
- probation with confinement conditions (*i.e.*, intermittent confinement, community confinement, or home detention).

        *Zone B (offenders with sentencing ranges of 1-12 months):*

- probation with a condition that substitutes intermittent confinement, community confinement, or home detention for at least the minimum of the guideline range;
- imprisonment of at least one month plus supervised release with a condition that requires community confinement or home detention to be served for the remainder of the minimum term specified in the guideline range.

*Zone C (offenders with minimum terms of 8-16 months):*

- imprisonment of at least one-half of the minimum term plus supervised release with a condition requiring community confinement or home detention to be served for the remainder of the minimum term specified in the guideline range.

Chapter Five, Part D, contains provisions governing the use of “supervised release,” which is a period of supervision following release from prison. Supervised release provides the opportunity for the managed re-entry of an offender back into the community, as was once provided by parole release. (Chapter Seven of the *Guidelines Manual* contains policy statements for the revocation of probation or supervised release if an offender fails to abide by the conditions of his or her supervision.) Chapter Five, Part E, establishes guidelines for the imposition of fines, restitution, assessments, and forfeitures. Other provisions of Chapter Five provide rules for the use of consecutive or concurrent sentences and other sentencing matters. Parts K and H establish policies regarding departure from the guidelines for various reasons, as discussed further below.

## **D. Components of the Reformed Sentencing System**

The SRA contained a long list of specific goals for sentencing reform. Inherent in these goals is the preservation of American values, such as fundamental fairness, due process of law, and the efficient administration of criminal justice. Congress recognized that to achieve all of this, more than just the promulgation of sentencing guidelines would be needed. A new and coordinated federal sentencing *system* involving all three branches of government was required. The components of this new system can be divided into two stages: *policy development* and *policy implementation*. In this section, we explore the components of these stages and illustrate how they were intended to work together to realize Congress’s goals for federal sentencing.

## 1. *Components of Guidelines Development*

- *Collaboration among policymakers, implementers, and other stakeholders*
- *Utilization of specialized criminological and sentencing expertise*
- *Political accountability through Executive participation and Legislative directives and review*

***Collaboration among policymakers, implementers, and other stakeholders.*** The SRA contemplates the development of sentencing policy and practices through a process of collaboration between the Commission and all major “stakeholders” in the federal criminal justice system, as well as input from interested observers and the general public.

The Commission periodically shall review and revise, in consideration of comments and data coming to its attention, the guidelines. . . . In fulfilling its duties and in exercising its powers, the Commission shall consult with authorities on, and individual and institutional representatives of, various aspects of the Federal criminal justice system. The United States Probation System, the federal Bureau of Prisons, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Criminal Division of the U. S. Department of Justice, and a representative of the Federal Public Defenders shall submit to the Commission any observations, comments, or questions pertinent to the work of the Commission whenever they believe such communication would be useful, and shall, at least annually, submit to the Commission a written report commenting on the operation of the Commission’s guidelines suggesting changes in the guidelines that appear to be warranted, and otherwise assessing the Commission’s work.  
28 U.S.C. § 994(o).

Clearly, the SRA envisions a highly collaborative process of guideline development and revision.

The Commission heeded these instructions and “decided early in its deliberations that the only way to develop practical sentencing guidelines was through an open process that involved as many interested individuals and groups as possible. By tapping the expertise and experience of those who work in the system, the Commission ensured that its guidelines would be grounded in reason and practicality” (USSC, 1987). The Commission conducted nationwide hearings and met with representatives of a wide range of federal agencies, even beyond the list contained in the SRA.

Through the years, the Commission has been advised by Standing Advisory Groups of Probation Officers and Attorney Practitioners, as well as by Special Advisory Groups on research, organizational crimes, environmental crimes, Native Americans, and a variety of other topics. The Department of Justice, through its *ex-officio* member of the Commission, and with the help of the Sentencing Subcommittee of the Attorney General’s United States Attorneys Advisory Committee, provides important feedback on Commission priorities and proposed amendments. The Commission



collaborates with the Judicial Conference of the United States through meetings with the Conference and its Committee on Criminal Law, which has a Subcommittee on Sentencing.

The SRA directs the Commission to comply with the “notice and comment” provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act. 28 U.S.C. § 994(x). In addition, the Commission adopted its own Rules of Practice and Procedure, which were revised in 2001 (USSC, 2001c). These rules provide for the annual publication of a Notice of Priorities, the timely publication of Issues for Comment and Proposed Amendments in the Federal Register and through the Commission’s own website. The rules also provide for a period of public comment, all of which is reviewed prior to any Commission action. The Commission conducts almost-monthly public meetings and annual public hearings where it receives testimony from concerned interest groups and citizens.

These extensive mechanisms for obtaining input from interested parties are both required by law and recommended by experience. Research on program change and evaluation has consistently demonstrated that for sentencing reform to succeed, it must enjoy the confidence of those charged with implementing the new policy (Von Hirsch, et al., 1987). Open collaboration with key stakeholders is intended to obtain “buy in” from the essential participants in the federal sentencing system to help ensure that the guidelines are perceived as legitimate and credible.

***Utilization of specialized criminological and sentencing expertise.*** The SRA envisions policymaking informed by a research program that can “develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing.” 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(2). This ongoing research helps ensure that the guidelines “reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C). The Commission serves as a “clearinghouse and information center for the collection, preparation, and dissemination of information on federal sentencing practices” (28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(12)(A)), and to “collect systematically the data obtained from studies, research, and the empirical experience of public and private agencies concerning the sentencing process. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(15).

The Commission responded to these mandates by developing a large data collection and policy analysis facility. Documents, including presentence reports, written plea agreements, and Judgment and Conviction orders, are received from courts throughout the country on virtually every federal defendant sentenced under the guidelines. Data from these documents are extracted and entered into the Commission’s Monitoring Database, the most extensive collection of information on federal crimes, offenders, and sentences collected by any agency. The Commission’s annual *Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics* (USSC, 2002) is based on these data, and contains descriptions of the types of crimes and sentences imposed for each federal judicial district. The Commission also houses a library containing an extensive collection of books and articles relevant to federal sentencing and sentencing guidelines. This material is available to the public through Commission publications and the release of datasets through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (USSC, 2003). Additional information is gathered through the Commission’s Helpline, training sessions, and through specialized research projects.

All of these sources of data inform guidelines development and revision through the use of multi-disciplinary Policy Development Teams, whose work is described in the Commission's *Annual Reports* (USSC, 2002b). These teams engage in a wide variety of research projects relevant to their assigned topics, including, for example, consultation with psychologists on the recidivism of sex offenders or with economists on the financial impact of copyright infringement or corporate crime. In addition, as required by statute 18 U.S.C. § 4047, the Commission uses a statistical Prison Impact Model to estimate the effects of any proposed change in the guidelines on the types and lengths of sentences imposed under the revised guidelines, and the fiscal impact of such changes on the Bureau of Prisons.

***Political accountability through Executive participation and Legislative directives and review.*** The final component of policy development provides political accountability for the Commission's actions. The Commission's authority is derived from Congress. For this delegation of legislative power to be Constitutional, Congress must provide minimum "intelligible principles" to guide the Commission's work.<sup>16</sup> Congress did so in the SRA which provides the foundational principles governing the Commission's guideline development process. In addition, the SRA provides mechanisms for Congressional direction and oversight.

The most important mechanism for political accountability of the Commission, however, is the SRA's provision for a period of review for guideline amendments prior to an amendment's effective date. Under the normal amendment procedures outlined in the SRA, the Commission must submit proposed amendments to Congress no later than the first day of May, together with a statement of the reasons for the amendment. The Commission must specify an effective date for the change that is not earlier than 180 days after submission to Congress and no later than the first day of November. Congress can modify or disapprove the amendment during this period of review. Two amendments (regarding guidelines for trafficking in crack cocaine and money laundering) out of 674 were disapproved in this manner in the first fifteen years of the guidelines.

The advent of the guidelines system has provided new opportunities and mechanisms for Congress to work with and through the Commission to influence sentencing policy. The advantages and disadvantages of many of these mechanisms was first discussed in the Commission's 1991 report *Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System*. In addition to formal oversight hearings, informal communication with individual commissioners or with the Commission's Office of Legislative Affairs is possible. Congress has also shaped policy by changing the statutory maximums applicable to a particular crime, at times in conjunction with Sense of Congress resolutions indicating its intention that the Commission amend the relevant guidelines.

Most commonly, Congress has influenced and controlled sentencing policy through formal statutory directives to the Commission, supplementing the directives contained in the SRA itself. Appendix B describes these directives—which by 2004 numbered over eighty-five separate enactments, many containing multiple directives—and indicates the dates they were enacted and the types of crime with which they were concerned. The most common area for directives has been drug

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<sup>16</sup> *Mistretta v. United States*, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).

trafficking crimes, which have been the subject of 22 directives, followed by economic crimes with 16 directives, and sex offenses with 15 directives. The directives have varied along a continuum from general to specific, leaving more or less discretion to the Commission to finalize the details of the policy change. General directives obviously permit a greater role for collaboration and research in policy development than do specific directives. The most general directives instruct the Commission to study a problem and report back to Congress with any recommendations or guideline amendments the Commission views as appropriate.<sup>17</sup> More specific are directives to increase the offense level applicable to a particular crime. At other times, Congress has directed that a certain offense level be increased by a specific number of levels, or that specific offense adjustments be added to a guideline.<sup>18</sup> In the PROTECT Act of 2003, Congress for the first time directly amended the *Guidelines Manual* itself.

Congress, of course, retains authority to control sentencing policy directly through a mechanism completely outside the framework established by the SRA—enactment of new statutory minimum penalty statutes or amendment of existing ones. Some commentators view mandatory minimum penalties as inconsistent with the guidelines system (Lowenthal, 1993; Wallace, 1994). Others view mandatory penalties as superfluous given the tough, binding, sentencing guidelines (Cassell, 2004). The legislative history of the SRA lends some support to the view that the guidelines system and mandatory minimum penalty provisions are “sentencing policies in conflict” (USSC, 1991b). Yet, Congress enacted mandatory minimum penalties for firearm and drug offenses the very same year it enacted the SRA, and more mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses were added in 1986 while the guidelines were being developed. Additional mandatory minimums for drugs and other types of offenses have been added or increased several times since guidelines implementation.

The SRA envisions multiple mechanisms for Legislative and Executive influence over sentencing policy within a framework that also assures input from the front-line actors charged with implementing the policies in the courts, and in light of the best in criminological research. Mechanisms for direct control over the guidelines bypass these other components of sentencing policy development envisioned by the SRA.

## **2. *Components of Guidelines Implementation***

- ***Uniform charging of readily provable offenses***
- ***Transparent plea agreements consistent with the goals of the SRA***

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<sup>17</sup> See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 250003, 108 Stat. 1796 (Sept. 13, 1994). This statute directed the Commission to review and, if necessary, amend the guidelines to ensure that sentence enhancements for frauds committed against the elderly were adequate, and to report to Congress on the reasons for the Commission’s actions. *Id.*

<sup>18</sup> See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 106-310, § 3663, 114 Stat. 1101 (Oct. 17, 2000). This Act directed the Commission to provide enhanced punishment for traffickers in MDMA, otherwise known as the club drug “ecstasy.” *Id.*

- *Reliable fact-finding regarding real offense conduct and criminal history*
- *Conscientious application of the guidelines to the facts*
- *Departure when needed to achieve the purposes of sentencing*
- *Appellate review*

***Uniform charging of readily provable offenses.*** Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike recognize that the advent of the guidelines has made the *sentencing consequences* of their *presentencing* decisions a central focus of the entire federal criminal justice process. In the words of one defense attorney: “In federal criminal practice, almost all strategic decisions of the defense attorney should initially flow from federal sentencing guidelines analysis” (Wisenberg, 2003). Because the guidelines are designed to bind judges to particular sentencing consequences for particular proven facts, even law enforcement officers have been trained to anticipate the sentencing impact of their criminal investigations (Berlin, 1993). Observers have recognized that uniform charging of offenders’ criminal conduct will be needed if unwarranted sentencing disparity is to be eliminated (Schulhofer & Nagel, 1989; Edmunds, 1996).

From the beginning of guidelines implementation, Department policies have recognized that prosecutors’ charging and plea agreement practices could have a major impact on the success of sentencing reform.<sup>19</sup>

Under the new system, the nature of the charge to which a defendant pleads is particularly important because it will more precisely than ever determine the defendant’s actual sentence. . . . [I]f prosecutors consult the guidelines at the charging stage in an effort to achieve the most appropriate sentence for the conduct committed, the purpose of the SRA of eliminating unwarranted disparity in sentencing will be served since similar conduct should result in the bringing of similar charges, which will form the bases for similar sentencing.<sup>20</sup>

The Department clearly recognized that charging decisions would have a significant impact on sentencing, and on the success of sentencing reform.

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<sup>19</sup> William F. Weld, Assistant Attorney General, U. S. Department of Justice [DOJ], “Prosecutors Handbook on Sentencing Guidelines” [hereinafter Redbook], Nov. 1, 1987. *Excerpts reprinted in* 6 FED. SENT. REP. 333 [hereinafter FSR] (1994).

<sup>20</sup> Memorandum from Stephen Trott, Associate Attorney General, DOJ, to All United States Attorneys, regarding “Interim Sentencing Advocacy and Case Settlement Policy Under New Sentencing Guidelines” [hereinafter Trott Memo], Nov. 3, 1987. *Reprinted in* 6 FSR 342 (1994).

To advance the goal of similar charging of similar conduct, the Department directed prosecutors to “initially charge the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses consistent with the defendant’s conduct.”<sup>21</sup> Limited exceptions to this rule were permitted, for example, if there was a need to protect the identity of a witness. But the long-standing principle that prosecutors should select “the most serious offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant’s criminal conduct, that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction,”<sup>22</sup> was recognized in Department policies as important to the success of sentencing reform. These national policies set by the Department were met with skepticism by some district offices, who argued that varying local conditions required that they retain discretion and flexibility (Braniff, 1993). Clarification of the policy in 1993 was perceived by some as granting local prosecutors more flexibility, in that it authorized prosecutors to consider the proportionality of sentences resulting from their charging decisions (Beale, 1994).<sup>23</sup>

The PROTECT Act of 2003 again highlighted the importance of sentencing consistency and the need for Department guidance to prosecutors in the field. Subsequent to its passage, the Attorney General issued further guidance to federal prosecutors concerning Department charging and plea agreement policies.

The fairness Congress sought to achieve by the Sentencing Reform Act and the PROTECT Act can be attained only if there are fair and reasonably consistent policies with respect to the Department’s decisions concerning what charges to bring and how cases should be disposed. Just as the sentence a defendant receives should not depend upon which particular judge presides over the case, so too the charges a defendant faces should not depend upon the particular prosecutor assigned to handle the case.<sup>24</sup>

This latest guidance reiterates that prosecutors “must charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of the case” except in limited, enumerated, circumstances.

***A first look at real offense sentencing.*** Because sentencing uniformity is crucially dependent on charging uniformity, the original Commission was concerned that continuing unevenness in

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<sup>21</sup> Memorandum from Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General, DOJ, to All United States Attorneys, regarding “Plea Policy for Federal Prosecutors, Plea Bargaining Under the Sentencing Reform Act” [hereinafter Thornburgh Blue Sheet], March 13, 1989. *Reprinted in* 6 FSR 347 (1994).

<sup>22</sup> DOJ, “Principles of Federal Prosecution,” 9-27.310, July 1980. *Excerpts reprinted in* 6 FSR 317-329 (1994).

<sup>23</sup> Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General, DOJ, to All Holders of U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, Title 9, regarding “Principles of Federal Prosecution” [hereinafter Reno Bluesheet], Oct. 12, 1993. *Reprinted in* 6 FSR 350 (1994).

<sup>24</sup> Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, DOJ, to All Federal Prosecutors, regarding “Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing” [hereinafter Ashcroft Charging Memo], Sept. 22, 2003.

charging could undermine sentencing reform despite the Department’s efforts to control it. The Commission sought to build mechanisms into the guidelines themselves that would help to ameliorate some of the effects of uneven charging. These mechanisms include: 1) the multiple count rule, found in Part D, Chapter Three of the *Guidelines Manual*, 2) cross-references among guidelines, and 3) the relevant conduct rule found at USSG §1B1.3. Together, these mechanisms make the federal guidelines a significantly *real offense*, as opposed to *charge offense*, sentencing system. (The relevant conduct rule and real offense sentencing is discussed further in a text box later in this section.)

The original Commission explained the need to consider aspects of the real offense committed by defendants instead of only the charges of conviction. First, the statute-defined elements of many federal crimes fail to provide sufficient detail about the *manner* in which the crime was committed to permit individualized sentences that reflect the varying seriousness of different violations. “[T]he hundreds of overlapping and duplicative statutory provisions that make up the federal criminal law forced the Commission to write guidelines that are descriptive of generic conduct rather than guidelines that track purely statutory language.”<sup>25</sup> The Commission recognized that in the preguidelines system judges and the Parole Commission took into account many details of offenders’ actual conduct. “A pure charge system would overlook some of the harms that did not constitute statutory elements of the offenses of which the defendant was convicted.” *Id.*

Furthermore, the Commission remained concerned that the charges to which defendants were subject would continue to depend to some extent on which prosecutors were assigned to each case or in which district the offense was prosecuted, leading to unwarranted sentencing disparity. “The Commission recognized that a charge offense system has drawbacks. . . . One of the most important is the potential it affords prosecutors to influence sentences by increasing or decreasing the number of counts in the indictment.” The Commission created rules for grouping multiple counts to help control excessive severity that could arise from charging what was essentially a single criminal act as multiple counts. And the Commission created the relevant conduct rule and cross-references among guidelines to prevent excessive leniency that could arise from prosecutors failing to charge all of the offender’s conduct, or failing to charge the most serious of the conduct.

The Commission’s approach to multiple count convictions was discussed in the original introduction to the *Guidelines Manual* in Chapter One, Part A4(e), which is reproduced for historical reference in the current edition of the manual. (*See also* Breyer, 1988.) The rules are designed to reduce some of the sentencing disparity that can result from charging variations. For example, charging *both* a criminal act and conspiracy to commit that act results in the same sentence as charging *only* the act or the conspiracy. Similarly, a kidnapping involving an assault is sentenced the same if charged and convicted only as a kidnapping or as one count of kidnapping and one count of assault. For offenses involving fungible quantities, such as drugs or money, sentences are based on the total amount involved in the ongoing offense, not on how many counts involving various transactions or acts are charged or convicted. Indeed, for these offenses sentences are based on all relevant conduct, whether or not all of the conduct is charged or conviction is obtained.

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<sup>25</sup> USSG, Ch. 1, Pt. A, sec. 4(a).

## Real Offense Sentencing and the Relevant Conduct Rule, USSG §1B1.3

The relevant conduct rule is the guideline that defines the scope of a defendant's criminal behavior that is used by the court in applying the Chapters Two and Three guidelines. The rule allows the court to consider facts beyond those specified in the indictment or in the elements of the offense of conviction. Relevant conduct includes details about the manner in which the offense was committed. It can also include other criminal conduct that was not charged, that was described in counts that were dismissed prior to sentencing, conduct of accomplices, and even conduct for which the defendant was acquitted at trial.

In determining an offense level, judges generally use Appendix A of the *Guidelines Manual* to identify the guideline applicable to the offense of conviction (unless a plea agreement stipulates a more serious offense—*see* section 1B1.2). The court then uses all relevant conduct to determine the base offense level, the specific offense adjustments, and whether any cross-references to other guidelines should be applied. Relevant conduct includes acts the defendant personally committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused if the acts occurred during the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in avoiding detection or responsibility for the offense. It also includes acts within the same time context that were committed by the defendant's accomplices, if those acts took place within the scope of a joint undertaking with the defendant and were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Any harms resulting from the relevant acts of the defendant and accomplices are also relevant.

In certain offenses, primarily those where the guidelines determine the offense level based on fungible items, such as quantities of drugs or amounts of money involved in the offense, the acts of the defendant and accomplices as analyzed above are expanded to include those acts and resulting harms within the context of the "same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction." This means, for example, that a defendant convicted of selling drugs to an undercover officer on one occasion is sentenced under USSG §1D1.1 for the amount of drugs involved in *all* the drug trafficking known to the court that was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as that one sale. Because the standard of proof used in the determination of relevant conduct, as with any sentencing factor, has been the preponderance of evidence, "a jury's verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence." *United States v. Watts*, 117 S. Ct. 633, 638 (1997).

Cross-references among guidelines, which are applied based on all relevant conduct, also serve to reduce the impact of charging variations. An offender convicted of criminal sexual abuse of a minor under the age of sixteen (statutory rape), but whose conduct actually involved the more serious offense of forcible rape, will be sentenced under the more severe guideline for the more serious offense pursuant to the cross-reference from the statutory rape guideline, section 2A3.2 to the sexual abuse guideline, section 2A3.1. The *Guidelines Manual* contains many cross-references, many of which were added after promulgation of the initial guidelines in light of evidence that undercharging of offenses was resulting in significant sentencing disparity and disproportionately lenient sentences.<sup>26</sup>

These mechanisms were designed to reduce sentencing disparity resulting from uneven charging decisions, but they were never intended to eliminate it altogether. The guidelines retain some characteristics of a charge offense system, particularly for offenses that do not involve fungible goods like drugs or money. For example, the guideline rules take into account only those robberies for which a conviction is obtained, and not other robberies committed by the defendant that may come to the attention of the court at sentencing. Policy statement USSG §5K2.21 permits judges to take uncharged or dismissed conduct, such as additional bank robberies, into account through upward departure, but the relevant conduct rule itself does not require consideration of such conduct as it does uncharged conduct involving fungible harms. In addition, statutory minimum penalties and sentencing enhancements continue to give prosecutors considerable control over final sentences in many cases, because prosecutors determine whether the statutory minimum penalties are invoked. Chapter Three presents data on the effects of these charging decisions on unwarranted sentencing disparity.

***Transparent plea agreements consistent with the goals of the SRA.*** The need for efficient administration of justice has led to a recognition of plea agreements as a common method for securing convictions in American courts. In the forty years prior to the guidelines, between 85 and 90 percent of all convictions in the federal courts annually involved pleas of guilty or nolo contendere (BJS, *Sourcebook*, 1987; AO, *Annual Report*, 1987). If the guidelines system is to be workable, it must accommodate plea bargaining and provide incentives for defendants to plead guilty. In the preguidelines era, these incentives were provided when prosecutors agreed not to bring charges, or to dismiss charges, or to make various sentencing recommendations to the judge. But, as a general rule, these agreements only loosely bound the court (FJC, 1979).

In the guidelines era, both the goals and the dynamics of the system have changed. Congress has now defined reduction of unwarranted sentencing disparity as an important goal of the system. The guidelines bind judges more tightly to the sentencing consequences of the charges of conviction and the guideline-relevant facts proven at sentencing. Given all this, the first component of guidelines implementation—uniform charging—cannot ensure uniform sentencing if plea bargaining results in the dismissal of provable charges that would affect the applicable guideline range, or stipulations to misleading facts, or other agreements that result in sentences different from those required by complete and proper application of the guidelines to offenders' criminal conduct.

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<sup>26</sup> See, e.g., USSG, App. C, Amends. 313, 323 (Nov. 1, 1990); Amend. 444 (Nov. 1, 1992).



Congress directed the Commission to develop policy statements governing judges' acceptance and rejection of plea agreements in the hope that "judicial review of plea bargaining under such policy statements should alleviate any potential problem in the area."<sup>27</sup> These policy statements are found in Chapter Six, part B of the *Guidelines Manual*. The Commission believed that if judicial power to reject plea agreements "were properly exercised, undue shifting of authority [from judges to prosecutors] will not occur." (USSC, 1987, p. 49). Some commentators believed the Commission's initial policy statements sent mixed signals regarding how strictly judges should monitor agreements. Accordingly, the *Guidelines Manual* was amended in 1992 to make clear "the Commission's policy that plea agreements should not undermine the sentencing guidelines."<sup>28</sup>

The policy statements address the various types of plea agreements that are contemplated by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e), which include agreements to dismiss or not bring charges, and various types of binding and non-binding sentencing recommendations. (This rule has itself been recently amended to reflect new types of agreements made possible by implementation of the guidelines, such as agreements that a particular provision of the guidelines does or does not apply. It is now denoted as Rule 11(c).) Despite variations in the types of agreements, the policy statements all adopt a simple principle: plea agreements should be accepted by the judge only if the resulting sentence is within the applicable guideline range or departs from the range for a reason that can be justified according to the normal departure standard at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).<sup>29</sup> The fact of an agreement itself should not be used to impose a sentence outside the range otherwise required by the guidelines. This principle has recently been reinforced by an amendment to the policy statements reiterating that "the court may not depart below the applicable guideline range merely because of the defendant's decision to plead guilty to the offense or to enter a plea agreement with respect to the offense."<sup>30</sup> Other policy statements in Chapter Six require that plea agreements be disclosed to the court (USSG §1B1.1; *see also* F. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(2)), and that any factual stipulations accompanying the agreement shall set forth the "circumstances of the actual offense conduct and offender characteristics" and "shall not contain misleading facts."<sup>31</sup>

To implement judicial review of plea agreements, some mechanism for judges to compare the agreement with the offender's actual conduct was needed. This was provided through changes to the presentence investigation and report, which are discussed in the following section Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(c)(3) allows judges to defer acceptance or rejection of a plea agreement "until the court has reviewed the presentence report." USSG §6B1.1, p.s., goes further, stating that the court "shall defer" its decision "until there has been an opportunity to consider the report."

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<sup>27</sup> SENATE REPORT, *supra* note 1, at 63; *see sec.* A.2 (discussing move toward regulation of plea bargaining during the legislative development of the SRA).

<sup>28</sup> USSG, App. C, Amend. 467 (Nov. 1, 1992).

<sup>29</sup> *See* USSG §6B1.2.

<sup>30</sup> USSG, App. C, Amend. 651 (final provision) (Oct. 27, 2003).

<sup>31</sup> USSG §6B1.4.

Even with the help of the probation officer's investigation and report, it was recognized that the judiciary and the Commission would have limited power and resources with which to police plea bargaining. "It will be up to the government to insure that inconsistencies in the treatment of plea agreements do not frustrate the purpose of the Guidelines" (Trott Memo, Nov. 3, 1987). To that end, the Department adopted strict policies regarding plea agreements. "The overriding principle governing the conduct of plea negotiations is that plea agreements should not be used to circumvent the guidelines" (Redbook, Nov. 1, 1987). The Department recognized that, as a practical matter, judges would be tempted to accept plea agreements outside the guideline range, since appeals of bargained-for sentences would be unlikely. But the Department instructed prosecutors to ensure that plea bargains result in imposition of a sentence within the guideline range unless a departure could be justified. The policies made clear that the existence of a plea agreement alone was not enough to justify a departure. Further, the Department reinforced the Commission's policy statement on factual stipulations: "The Department's policy is only to stipulate to facts that accurately represent the defendant's conduct" (Thornburgh Bluesheet, 1989).

In 2003, following passage of the PROTECT Act, the Department again reiterated the importance of consistency in the manner charges are disposed of and the importance of adherence to the sentencing guidelines when entering into plea agreements. To achieve "honesty in sentencing"

[a]ny sentencing recommendation made by the United States in a particular case must honestly reflect the totality and seriousness of the defendant's conduct and must be fully consistent with the Guidelines and applicable statutes and with the readily provable facts about the defendant's history and conduct.<sup>32</sup>

"This policy applies fully to sentencing recommendations that are contained in plea agreements."<sup>33</sup> Thus, these new policies reinforce the Department's commitment to the goals of sentencing reform.

The Commission recognized that defendants would need *some* incentive to plead guilty if trial rates were to be kept within manageable limits. Research on sentencing practices in the preguidelines era had demonstrated that offenders typically received a sentence discount for sparing the government the time and expense of a trial. The original Commission sought to maintain this benefit so that defendants retained sufficient incentive to plead guilty and "the number of trials facing an already overburdened federal court system" would not be increased.<sup>34</sup> At the same time, the Commission sought to regularize the guilty plea benefit in order to reduce disparity. "The Commission considered, but rejected, a proposal to give the sentencing judge considerable latitude to give a sizeable sentence reduction because of the entry of a guilty plea. Doing so would have risked the introduction of

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<sup>32</sup> Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, DOJ, to All Federal Prosecutors, regarding "Department Policies and Procedures Concerning Sentencing Recommendations and Sentencing Appeals," July 28, 2003.

<sup>33</sup> Ashcroft Charging Memo, *supra* note 24, September 22, 2003, at 5.

<sup>34</sup> USSC, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, at 49 (1987).

considerable unwarranted disparity and unpredictability into the system.”<sup>35</sup> The Commission decided to balance competing concerns regarding plea bargaining by relying on judges to police bargains that could undermine the guidelines and by allowing various types of prosecutors’ recommendations—for example, that the judge sentence at the bottom of the guideline range or depart for a justifiable reason.

The Commission provided an explicit incentive to plead guilty in USSG §3E1.1, the “Acceptance of Responsibility” guideline. This guideline was designed both as a reward for offenders who plead guilty and also as a recognition of the reduced culpability of offenders who acknowledge guilt and take steps to mitigate the harm caused by their offense. The guideline provides a reduction in the offender’s offense level “[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates “acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” The first factor judges are directed to consider when deciding whether to grant this reduction is the defendant’s “[t]ruthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction.”<sup>36</sup> Data show that 94 percent of offenders who plead guilty receive the acceptance of responsibility reduction. Later amendments to this guideline increased its utility as an incentive for defendants to provide helpful information to prosecutors and to enter pleas in a timely manner so that the government may avoid wasting resources in trial preparation.<sup>37</sup>

It is clear from the data that plea bargaining has continued, and even expanded, in the guidelines era. Guilty plea rates steadily increased from 87 percent in the years preceding the guidelines to 96.6 percent in 2001. However, the system of regularized incentives for guilty pleas that was put in place by the original Commission has never operated in isolation from statutory minimum penalties. Department policies allow prosecutors to invoke statutory minimum penalties and statutory enhancements as further incentives for guilty pleas, even barring their declination or dismissal except as part of a plea agreement (DOJ, 2003).

***Reliable fact-finding regarding real offense conduct and criminal history.*** It was apparent from the beginning of the guidelines era that the reformed sentencing system would require new procedures to establish facts relevant to application of the guidelines. Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which concerns sentencing procedures, was amended by the SRA itself. Additional procedures needed to make guideline sentencing fair and efficient were the subject of much thought by the Sentencing Commission and by various committees of the Judicial Conference of the United States. The procedures ultimately put in place emphasized the role of the probation officer in investigating the relevant facts, recommending the guidelines applicable to the case, and identifying any remaining disputes for resolution by the judge at a sentencing hearing. Each district also retained discretion to fashion local rules and informal procedures that were tuned to local conditions.

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<sup>35</sup> *Id.*

<sup>36</sup> USSG §3E1.1, comment. n.1(a).

<sup>37</sup> USSG, App. C, Amends. 459 (Nov. 1, 1992) & 649 (Sept. 30, 2003). The latter amendment was pursuant to a directive to the Commission contained in the PROTECT Act.

Amended Rule 32 requires a presentence report in virtually all guidelines cases and establishes a timeline for its completion, its disclosure to the parties, and for any party to the file objections to its contents. The rule also specifies matters to be included in the report, including the probation officer's determination of how the guidelines apply in the case. The Judicial Conference provides more detailed instructions and training to probation officers about how to conduct the presentence investigation and write the report. These policies are contained in Publication 107 (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, last revision 2001), which was extensively revised at the time of guidelines implementation. Procedures for the presentence report have recently again become a topic of concern to the judiciary as growing caseloads and budgetary constraints make detailed presentence investigations in every case increasingly difficult.

At the dawn of the guidelines era, the presentence report was redesigned to make it effective in assisting judges in application of the guidelines, and to support judicial review of plea agreements. Probation officers were instructed to provide a "concise but complete description" of all information relevant to application of the guidelines, including the "offense(s) of conviction and all relevant conduct" and all verifiable criminal history. An "Impact of the Plea Agreement" section was developed to assist the court in evaluating the effects of "counts to be dismissed, stipulations, or any other factors in the plea agreement that may affect the guideline range or the sentence to be imposed" (AO, Publication 107, II-79). Inclusion of an "Impact of the Plea Agreement" section in the presentence report demonstrates that courts, like Congress, anticipated plea agreements that would sometimes understate the offender's real offense conduct. As described above, the relevant conduct rule instructs courts to look beyond the counts of conviction to the offender's actual criminal conduct, including conduct that was never charged or was specified in counts that were subsequently dismissed. The aim was to ensure that a judge's fact finding—and not just the prosecutor's charging and bargaining decisions—would determine the sentence (Breyer, 1988; Wilkins & Steer, 1990).

While offering fewer procedural protections than fact finding at trial, fact finding at sentencing under the guidelines is subject to more formal procedures than was fact finding in the preguidelines era. "The court's resolution of disputed sentencing factors usually has a measurable effect on the applicable punishment. More formality is therefore unavoidable if the sentencing process is to be accurate and fair." USSG §6A1.3 p.s., comment. In addition to disclosure of the presentence report and taking of objections, amended Rule 32(I) gives counsel an opportunity to comment on the probation officer's findings. The court may permit the parties to introduce testimony and other evidence at an evidentiary hearing. The court must rule on any disputed fact that affects the sentence and append a record of its rulings to the presentence report, which is then made available to the Bureau of Prisons and the Sentencing Commission. However, Commission policy statements permit courts to "consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy." USSG §6A1.3(a) p.s. Courts have held that, in most circumstances, sentencing facts must be proven to the judge only by a preponderance of the evidence (FJC, 2002, p. 484).

***Conscientious application of the guidelines to the facts.*** The core of the new system is the judge's imposition of a sentence "of a kind, and within the range" established by the guidelines for the circumstances of the offense and the offender's criminal history. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). In most situations, guideline application is straightforward, but it could break down in several ways.

Probation officers and judges could make mistakes due to confusing or complex guidelines (Ruback & Wroblewski, 2002). The guidelines could be circumvented, explicitly or covertly, through manipulation of the facts found to be present in the case, through strained guidelines interpretations, or through the granting of departures for unjustifiable reasons. Pressure to find a way around the guidelines can be acute if a judge finds the guidelines-required sentence unjust (Weinstein, 1992, p. 365; Stith & Cabranes, 1998, p. 90) and the parties agree that a sentence outside the guideline range is acceptable. Enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) relies on each judge's duty to follow the law in good faith, and on the provisions for appellate review created by the SRA, discussed below.

To improve comprehension of the guidelines and help avoid mistakes, the Commission, on its own and in conjunction with the Federal Judicial Center, the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, the Federal Bar Association, and other groups, participates in extensive training of probation officers, judges, defense attorneys, and prosecutors. The Commission also maintains a "HelpLine" available to court personnel who have specific questions about guidelines applications. To reduce pressure to circumvent the guidelines, the Commission communicates with judges through conferences, seminars, and newsletters, and seeks to improve "buy in" among those charged with implementing the guidelines through collaborative guidelines development.

***Departure when needed to achieve the purposes of sentencing.*** Congress recognized that the Commission could not anticipate and describe in general guidelines every possible circumstance relevant to sentencing in every case. It included a provision in the SRA permitting departure from the guideline range if "the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). In implementing this provision the original Commission instructed judges to

treat each guideline as carving out a "heartland," a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes. When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted.<sup>38</sup>

The Commission also encourages, discourages, or flatly prohibits departures in various circumstances in commentary throughout the *Guidelines Manual* and in policy statements in Chapter Five, Parts H and K. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of the Commission's role in regulating departures in *United States v. Koon*, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). In the PROTECT Act of 2003, Congress directed the Commission to review these provisions and amend them "to ensure that the incidence of downward departures are substantially reduced."<sup>39</sup> The results of the Commission's

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<sup>38</sup> USSG, Ch. 1, Pt. A.4(b). (This provision was transferred to an Editorial Note at the end of sec. 1A1.1 as part of the Commission's implementation of the PROTECT Act of 2003.)

<sup>39</sup> PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401(m)(2)(a), 117 Stat. 650 (April 30, 2003).

review were published in *Downward Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines* (USSC, 2003) and the amendments to the *Guidelines Manual* became effective on October 27, 2003.<sup>40</sup>

Departures serve several functions in the sentencing system established by the SRA. They help maintain “sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). They allow fine-tuning of sentences when literal application of a guideline would fail to achieve the guideline’s intended purpose (Hofer & Allenbaugh, 2003). And they provide a feedback mechanism to the Commission. “By monitoring when courts depart from the guidelines and analyzing their stated reasons for doing so, the Commission, over time, will be able to refine the guidelines to specify more precisely when departures should and should not be permitted.”<sup>41</sup>

**Sections 5K1.1 and 5K3.1 departures.** The guidelines also provide for additional types of departure to reward defendants who assist the government in various ways. The first of these—often called 5K1.1 departures, after the policy statement that governs them—was not part of the SRA itself but was added in response to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA),<sup>42</sup> which also established mandatory minimum penalties for a wide variety of drug trafficking crimes. The ADAA permits waiver of statutory minimum penalties for persons who assist the government in the “investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). It also directs the Commission to “assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed . . . to take into account a defendant’s substantial assistance.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(n). The Commission implemented this provision by issuing a policy statement encouraging judges to depart in such cases “upon motion of the government.” USSG §5K1.1 p.s.

The Department of Justice recognized that “[t]his departure provides federal prosecutors with an enormous range of options in the course of plea negotiations” (Thornburgh Bluesheet, 1989). Later concern that charging and plea bargaining might be undermining sentencing reform led to changes in Department procedures involving section 5K1.1 motions.<sup>43</sup> Authority to approve the filing of such motions was limited to top management in each U. S. Attorney’s office, and documentation of the facts justifying a motion to depart from the guidelines on these grounds was required.

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<sup>40</sup> USSG, App. C, Amend. 651 (Oct. 27, 2003).

<sup>41</sup> USSG, §1A1.1, Ed. Note, Ch. 1, Pt. A.4(b).

<sup>42</sup> Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1007, 1008, 100 Stat. 3207 (Oct. 27, 1986).

<sup>43</sup> Memorandum from George J. Terwilliger, III, Acting Deputy Attorney General, DOJ, to Holders of United States Attorneys’ Manual Title 9, regarding “Indictment and Plea Procedure Under Guideline Sentencing” [hereinafter Terwilliger Bluesheet], Feb. 7, 1992. *Reprinted in* 6 FSR 350 (1994).

In the PROTECT Act, Congress directed the Commission to promulgate a policy statement authorizing a new ground for downward departure. The Commission's response was to add USSG, §5K3.1 p.s., which became effective October 27, 2003.<sup>44</sup> If the Government files a motion, an offender may receive a departure of no more than four offense levels for participating in an early disposition program authorized by the Attorney General and the United States Attorney.<sup>45</sup> This provision was created to help regularize so-called "fast-track" departures that had developed in a number of districts in recent years to accommodate overwhelming caseloads that outstrip both prosecutorial and judicial resources. The new departure provision rewards offenders for pleading guilty early in the process and waiving certain procedural rights, such as the right of appeal, most rights to challenge a conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (the federal habeas corpus provision), and any of the motions described in the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3), such as motions for discovery or to suppress evidence.

The Department issued a memorandum outlining its criteria for authorization of early disposition programs on September 22, 2003. The memorandum stressed that the programs were "properly reserved for exceptional circumstances . . . [and] are not to be used simply to avoid the ordinary application of the guidelines to a particular class of cases."<sup>46</sup> In addition to downward departures, the Department's policies contemplate that some districts may reward offenders for participation in early disposition programs by agreeing not to charge or pursue all readily provable criminal conduct. Results of the Commission's review of early disposition programs, and implications of the new departure provision, were discussed further in the Commission's report *Downward Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines* (2003).

**Appellate review.** Appellate review of sentences, which the SRA codified for the first time at 18 U.S.C. § 3742, was intended by Congress to "reduce materially any remaining unwarranted disparities by granting the right to appeal a sentence outside the guidelines and by providing a mechanism to assure that sentences inside the guidelines are based on correct application."<sup>47</sup> Any party may appeal a sentence that they allege "was imposed in violation of law" or "as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines."<sup>48</sup> The government may appeal any sentence resulting from a departure below the guideline range, and the defense may appeal an upward departure. The SRA directed appellate courts to accept the district court's findings of fact unless they were clearly erroneous, and to give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines

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<sup>44</sup> USSG, App. C, Amend. 651 (Oct. 27, 2003).

<sup>45</sup> PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650 (April 30, 2003).

<sup>46</sup> Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft, DOJ, to All United States Attorneys, regarding "Department Principles for Implementing an Expedited Disposition or 'Fast-Track' Prosecution Program in a District" [hereinafter Ashcroft Fast-Track Memo], Sept. 22, 2003, at 5.

<sup>47</sup> SENATE REPORT, *supra* note 1, at 86.

<sup>48</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 3742

to the facts. In the case of an appeal of a departure, the appellate court determines if the sentencing judge's stated reasons for departure were reasonable, and met the standards set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, described above. The U.S. Supreme Court further clarified the standards for judicial review of departures in *Koon v. United States*.<sup>49</sup>

In early 2003, the Department of Justice cited with alarm the increasing rate of downward departures. The Department's representatives testified before Congress that "[m]uch of the damage is traceable to the Supreme Court's decision in *Koon v. United States*."<sup>50</sup> That decision had established "abuse of discretion" as the proper standard for review of departures and had also cautioned appellate courts against categorically prohibiting departures on grounds not specifically prohibited by the Sentencing Commission. In the view of the Department, these holdings had made it difficult to appeal unjustified downward departures, thereby contributing to their increasing rate. The Department called for *Koon* to be effectively overruled by statute. It encouraged legislation that would both 1) establish *de novo* review as the proper standard for review of departures, and 2) prohibit departures on any grounds not affirmatively encouraged by the Commission. As ultimately enacted, the PROTECT Act prohibited departures on grounds not affirmatively encouraged by the Commission only for offenders convicted of sex crimes against children. However, the Act did change the standard of review for all departures to *de novo*.

Some early advocates of sentencing reform (Morris, 1977), and some recent commentators (Berman, 1999), have envisioned appellate review as making substantial contributions to the development of a principled "common law of sentencing." Others have noted the inherent weaknesses in such a vision, however, and have argued that the "enforcement function" of appellate review—ensuring that sentencing courts faithfully implement the guidelines system—has emerged as more important than any "lawmaking function" (Reitz, 1997).

In any event, the legislative history of the SRA makes clear that Congress's primary purpose in establishing appellate review was to ensure that unwarranted disparity did not re-emerge through misapplication of the guidelines or through unjustified departure. Appellate review has also helped alert the Commission to important ambiguities in the guidelines and other problems of guidelines application. It has identified areas in need of guideline amendments to resolve circuit conflicts and help control sentencing disparity (Wilkins & Steer, 1993).

The appellate courts cannot perform their assigned functions without the cooperation of other participants in the system. Appellate review depends on clear fact findings and statements of reasons by the sentencing courts to provide a sufficient record for review. And, of course, correction of

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<sup>49</sup> 518 U.S. 81 (1996).

<sup>50</sup> *The Child Abduction Prevention Act and The Child Obscenity & Pornography Prevention Act of 2003; Hearing on H. R. 1004 and H.R. 1161 Before the House Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (March 11, 2003) (statement of Daniel P. Collins, Associate Deputy Attorney General, DOJ).*



guidelines errors or improper departures depends on appeal of the sentence by at least one of the parties to the case.

## E. From Theory to Practice

This detailed description of the components of the reformed sentencing system shows how much was changed by enactment of the SRA. The Sentencing Commission, the Department of Justice, and the Judicial Conference of the United States all responded by establishing new policies and procedures to support the SRA's objectives. This systemic perspective shows how implementation of each component is needed for Congress's goals for sentencing reform to be fully realized. Changes to the system and departure from the original vision of the SRA—including enactment of statutory mandatory minimum penalties, the PROTECT Act, and application of *Blakely v. Washington* to the federal guidelines—could change the dynamics of federal sentencing and upset the interaction of components needed to achieve Congress's goals for sentencing reform. A quick contrast between the system as envisioned and the ways it might function in practice reveals what is at stake.

**Guidelines development.** If the Commission develops policy informed by its research and by “advancement in knowledge of human behavior” (28 U.S.C. §991(b)(c)), we would expect the guidelines to achieve the purposes of sentencing as effectively as current criminological knowledge will allow. If collaborative guidelines development obtains “buy in” from the courts and practitioners, then those charged with implementing the system would have a stake in its success. Practices that could undermine or circumvent the guidelines would be avoided, and implementers would undertake their new duties and responsibilities conscientiously. If collaborative guidelines development and political accountability were harmonized, then direct congressional intervention in sentencing outside the guidelines framework, through mandatory minimum legislation or other specific directives, could be avoided.

If, however, there were a breakdown in any of these components, we could expect negative consequences for the system. If research weren't utilized, correctional resources could be squandered on ineffective sentences. If guidelines were imposed from above rather than developed through collaboration, implementers might shirk their new responsibilities, leading to circumvention and disparity. If the Commission failed to be accountable to Congress, legislative micro-management through specific directives or statutory minimum penalties would be more likely.

**Guidelines implementation.** If prosecutors charge uniformly and obtain plea agreements that fully account for each offender's criminal conduct, then sentencing uniformity will be advanced. But if prosecutors charge statutory penalties that trump the guideline range and don't permit consideration of the guidelines' mitigating adjustments, then different offenders will be treated similarly. On the other hand, if prosecutors don't pursue all relevant conduct, then independent probation officer investigations into offense conduct is needed to inform judicial review of plea agreements. But if judges accept plea agreements that undermine the guidelines, or depart for unwarranted reasons, or misapply the guideline provisions, then unfair and disparate sentences can result. If appellate courts

correct mistaken guideline applications or unjustified departures, uniformity would be restored. But if neither party appeals the sentence, then the corrective and enforcement functions of appellate review cannot operate.

***The role of empirical research.*** There are many ways the system could fail to reach its ambitious goals. Reforms this comprehensive, requiring coordinated actions among all three branches of government, present a formidable challenge. It may be unreasonable to expect this new system to be fully implemented at a stroke. The original commissioners recognized that sentencing reform would have to be incremental. They wrote that “[t]he Commission decided not to make major changes in plea agreement practices in the initial guidelines, but rather to provide guidance by issuing general policy statements. . . . The Commission will collect data on . . . whether plea agreement practices are undermining the intent of the [SRA]” in order to seek corrective actions as needed.<sup>51</sup> The Commission also contemplated “monitoring when the courts depart from the guidelines and . . . analyzing their stated reasons for doing so” in order to “refine the guidelines to specify more precisely when departures should and should not be permitted.”<sup>52</sup> And guideline amendments, informed by research and appellate review, was expected to help reduce ambiguities, circuit conflicts, and problematic guidelines provisions (Wilkins & Steer, 1993).

Further research and guideline revisions were anticipated in many other areas. Data collection was planned to evaluate the validity and “crime-control benefits” of the criminal history score (*Supplementary Report*, 1987, at 44). The Four-Year Evaluation called for additional research on the effects of the guidelines on sentence length and the use of incarceration, and on sentencing disparity, especially “in the area of departures and the interaction of the guidelines with mandatory minimum penalties” (USSC, 1991a, at 54).

Because the guidelines had been fully implemented for only a short time, the statutorily mandated Four-Year Evaluation was recognized as “a preliminary examination of the short-term effects of the guidelines during the first few years of implementation” (USSC, 1991a, at 1). Much more data is available today. While the guidelines have been the subject of a large critical literature, and anecdotal reports from the field suggest breakdowns in some of the key components of the system, objective evaluation must be based on empirical evidence. This report seeks to use all the available research from both inside and outside the Commission to answer two sets of questions:

- *Evaluative questions: Are the goals of the SRA being met? Have certainty, severity, rationality and transparency increased, and unwarranted disparity decreased?*
- *Diagnostic questions: Are the components being implemented? And if not, how has this affected the system’s ability to reach its goals?*

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<sup>51</sup> USSG §1A1.1, Ed. Note, Ch. 1, Pt. A.4(c).

<sup>52</sup> *Id.* at Pt. A.4(b).

# Chapter Two: Impact of the Sentencing Guidelines on the Certainty and Severity of Punishment

## A. Introduction to the Chapter and the Data

### 1. *Sentencing Policy and the Scale of Imprisonment*

The text and legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act [SRA], reviewed in Chapter One, make clear that the SRA aimed to increase the certainty and severity of punishment by eliminating parole and increasing sentencing severity for some crimes. Congress instructed the Commission to ensure that “the guidelines reflect the fact that, in many cases, current sentences do not accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense.”<sup>53</sup> The SRA specifically required “a substantial term of imprisonment” for some types of offenses and offenders.<sup>54</sup> The Commission also determined from its own analyses that penalties for some types of crime, such as “white collar” offenses, were disproportionately low compared to other types of theft involving similar economic losses. Thus, both Congress and the Commission endeavored to change historic sentencing practices by using the new instrument of policy control created by the SRA—the federal sentencing guidelines. In this chapter we evaluate the effects of these efforts.


Some criminologists have been skeptical that explicit policy changes imposed by centralized authorities, such as adoption of sentencing guidelines, can significantly alter historic sentencing practices. The “going rates” of punishment for various types of crime and the overall “scale of imprisonment”—the proportion of a jurisdiction’s population that is imprisoned at any given time—seem subject to local, cultural, and institutional forces that are hard to explain and even harder to control (Zimring & Hawkins, 1991). Experience with sentencing reform in the states has convinced some observers that guidelines can successfully change sentencing practices, despite evidence of circumvention through plea bargaining and other practices (Tonry, 1996). But room for skepticism remains. It has been shown, for example, that neither variation in crime rates among different jurisdictions, nor the adoption of determinate sentencing policies, have consistent effects on rates of prison admissions or on prison populations (Marvel & Moody, 1996). Explicit policymaking through law appears to be just one factor among many that determine incarceration rates at a given time in a given jurisdiction. The analyses in the remainder of this chapter demonstrate, however, that the federal sentencing guidelines have had a significant, independent effect on federal sentencing practices, along with other legal and policy changes occurring during the last fifteen years.

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
<sup>53</sup> Pub. L. No. 98–473 (1984). *See generally* 28 U.S.C. § 994(m).

<sup>54</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 994(i).

**Figure 2.1:  
Sentenced Prisoners in Federal Institutions**



**Sentenced Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions**



Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (2001); BJS, Historical Statistics on Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions (1988).

Whatever the causes, there is no dispute that in recent decades the scale of imprisonment has climbed dramatically over historic levels in the federal and in most state criminal justice systems. Figure 2.1 shows that both federal and national imprisonment rates—the number of prisoners per 100,000 adult residents—remained fairly steady for fifty years before climbing to over four times their historic levels by 2002. The growth of the federal system began a decade after the states but has continued even as growth in the states has flattened. In 2002, the Federal Bureau of Prisons became the largest prison system in the country, surpassing California, and is now responsible for over 174,000 inmates (BJS, 2003; BOP, 2004).

This chapter explores the contribution of the sentencing guidelines to these trends. Specifically, longitudinal data on federal sentencing practices is reviewed, beginning with changes in the percentage of offenders who receive prison time instead of simple probation, or instead of one of the new “intermediate sanctions,” such as home confinement with electronic monitoring. The chapter discusses how the abolition of parole has changed the relationship between sentences imposed and time actually served and tracks the expected length of imprisonment for various types of crime over the period of guidelines implementation. After examining overall trends for the major crime groups, the chapter focuses on specific crime types and notes that sentences have increased dramatically for some types of crime while remaining largely unchanged for others. Finally, the extent to which the observed changes can be attributed to the guidelines themselves, as opposed to other legal and social changes that occurred over the same time period, is discussed.

## 2. *Assembling the Data*

Longitudinal data on the effects of the guidelines on federal sentences are hard to assemble. One early study covered the beginning of guidelines implementation, but could not continue past 1991 because its data source—the Federal Probation Sentencing and Supervision Information System [FPSSIS]—was dismantled as the Sentencing Commission’s database became operational (McDonald & Carlson, 1993). Data from the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts [AO] cover a long time period but contain limited information on intermediate sanctions and offender characteristics. Periodic reports from the Federal Justice Statistics Program provide trends from data compiled from various agencies, including the AO, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, the U.S. Sentencing Commission [USSC], and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (*see, e.g.*, BJS, 2002a). Different agencies collect data for different purposes, however, so it is not surprising that the information collected, and the definitions and categories used, vary somewhat from agency to agency (BJS, 1998). To identify the effects of a particular policy intervention, such as implementation of the guidelines, different datasets must be combined making every effort to ensure comparability across the years.

Technical Appendix D gives more detailed explanations of the data and methods used in this chapter. Trends in the use of imprisonment were determined using FPSSIS for the years in which it is available and USSC monitoring data for subsequent years. Changes in average imprisonment length were determined controlling for the effects of parole for preguidelines cases, and credit for good time for guidelines cases, using an estimation procedure developed by the Commission. Trends are reported for offenders *sentenced*, rather than *released*, in each year to assess the immediate impact of changes in sentencing policy.

## B. The Increased Certainty of Imprisonment

### 1. *Historical Development of the Use of Imprisonment in the Federal System*

To put the changes of the last fifteen years into context, it is useful to review briefly the history of imprisonment in the United States. Today, the punishment for almost all serious crimes is a term of imprisonment, but prisons were not always the dominant form of punishment. In colonial times, whipping, fines, banishment, and public humiliations, such as time in the stocks, were common punishments for the least serious crimes. Following English practice, repeat offenders and those guilty of more serious offenses were sentenced to capital punishment. After independence, reform-minded legislators sought forms of punishment that were more effective (jurors were reluctant to convict simple thieves knowing that they faced execution) and that were more suitable to the new popular republic. Imprisonment quickly emerged as an enlightened alternative to “barbarous usages,” such as corporal punishment or the gallows, for all but the most serious crimes (Rothman, 1995, quoting New York sentencing reformer Thomas Eddy).

During the Jacksonian period, prisons became “penitentiaries,” and moral reform of the convict became the goal. Every state—federal criminal courts did not yet generate enough convicts to require separate federal prisons—spent considerable sums on construction of penitentiaries. These were such a noteworthy American experiment that many European visitors, including Alexis de Tocqueville, came to the new republic specifically to study them. As the mix of offenders changed and the number of incarcerated offenders increased, prisons became crowded and unruly, and prison discipline came to include corporal punishment as a way of enforcing strict prison rules (Rotman, 1995). By the end of the Civil War, the reformatory ideals of the penitentiary had largely given way to the practical realities of modern imprisonment, with overcrowding and brutality among prisoners and staff a grim reality.

The increasingly obvious failure of prisons to achieve the moral reform of inmates led to repeated calls for change and a search for sentencing alternatives (Rotman, 1995). The invention of probation and parole release and the conversion to indeterminate sentences during the

***Prison was not the only method of punishment historically, and is not the only method available today.***

Progressive Era early in the twentieth century, as discussed in Chapter One, were responses to these failures. The federal government began to develop separate prisons during this era, with construction of penitentiaries at Leavenworth in 1897 and Atlanta in 1902. The federal system was among the first to adopt innovations, such as merit selection of prison wardens and eight-hour workdays for prison guards, and to humanize conditions in the cell blocks through the introduction of basic amenities, such as round dining tables to replace the long wooden benches of the state “big houses.” Most importantly, from its inception, the federal system operated largely as an indeterminate sentencing system. The Federal Bureau of Prisons, created in 1929, set a new standard for classification and assignment of prisoners based on criminological studies, with lower-risk offenders sent to new lower-security prison camps (Rotman, 1995). The Parole Board, later the Parole

Commission, determined release dates based on an assessment of the inmates' progress toward rehabilitation.

As faith in rehabilitation faltered in the 1970s, indeterminate sentences fell into disfavor (Allen, 1981). Many criminologists turned to developing a theory of punishment focused on the seriousness of the offender's current offense and the offender's danger to the community, rather than the offender's potential for rehabilitation (Von Hirsch, 1976; Singer, 1979). Faced with criticism about arbitrary decisions and limited procedures, the federal Parole Commission began the process of developing guidelines for release decisions. These were based on empirical analyses and emphasized the seriousness of the offense and the offender's risk of recidivism, rather than an assessment of their progress toward rehabilitation (Gottfredson, et al., 1975).

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, making punishments uniform and proportionate became the dominant concern of sentencing reformers. To satisfy the principle of proportionality, the *severity* of punishment had to be fitted to the *seriousness* of the crime, and the *length* of imprisonment came to be seen as the primary measure of punishment severity. To avoid the need for imprisonment in all cases, however, interest in "intermediate sanctions," such as home confinement (FJC, 1987) or community service (Feeley, et al., 1992), also grew in the 1980s. To ensure that these intermediate sanctions were sufficiently punitive to punish proportionately, "exchange rates" were invented to equate alternative sanctions with various lengths of imprisonment (Morris & Tonry, 1990).<sup>55</sup> Studies confirmed that offenders found some alternative sanctions equally or more punitive than some types of incarceration (Crouch, 1993; Wood & Grasmick, 1995; Spelman, 1995; Wood & Grasmick, 1999). The perception remained widespread, however, that only imprisonment—the "clanging of the steel doors"—was sufficiently punitive to punish and deter (Sigler & Lamb, 1995).

## 2. *Overall Trends in the Use of Imprisonment*

Figure 2.2 displays trends in the percentage of all federal felony and major misdemeanor offenders given either prison, simple probation, or intermediate sanctions from 1984 through 2002. The solid line indicates a term of imprisonment, the dotted line indicates sentences of probation only,

***The percentage of offenders receiving simple probation has been cut in half under the guidelines.***

and the dashed line indicates an intermediate sanction. In all the figures that follow, split sentences—which involve a period of imprisonment followed by a period of confinement in one's home or a community-based treatment facility—are considered sentences of imprisonment. Sentences to confinement at home or in a community-based facility for the *entire*

period of confinement are considered intermediate sanctions, as is intermittent confinement in a local jail or community-based facility on weekends. Sentences involving no confinement of any type,


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<sup>55</sup> USSG §5C1.1(e) represents a simple schedule of this type.

including sentences involving fines and restitution, community service orders, court-mandated drug or mental health treatment, or other restrictive conditions, are all considered simple probation only.

The shift to guidelines sentencing was gradual over several years. Since the guidelines applied only to offenses that were *committed* after their effective date, November 1, 1987 (fiscal year 1988), many of the defendants sentenced during the early guidelines period, in fact, were not sentenced under the guidelines. [All years reported are fiscal years, which end on September 30 of the named year and begin on October 1 of the previous year.] In addition, many courts held the SRA unconstitutional until the United States Supreme Court’s decision in *Mistretta v. United States*<sup>56</sup> in fiscal year 1989, indicated by the vertical right line. Thus, no single point marks the beginning of the guidelines era, but the years from 1988 to 1991 are critical transition years. Important mandatory minimum legislation concerning drug trafficking and the use of a firearm during a crime was also enacted in 1986 and 1988. Isolating the effects of these different policy changes is difficult, as discussed at the end of this chapter, but together they established trends toward greater certainty and severity that would become hallmarks of the guidelines era.

***Away from the use of simple probation.*** As shown in Figure 2.2, between fiscal year 1988 and 1991, the first four fiscal years of guidelines implementation, the use of simple probation was cut by half. In 1987, 29 percent of offenders received sentences of probation, while only 14 percent did in 1991. The use of imprisonment spiked in the first few years of guidelines implementation and then declined slightly before resuming a long gradual climb to 86 percent of all offenders sentenced in 2002, over 20 percent higher than during the immediate preguidelines era.



<sup>56</sup> 488 U.S. 361 (1989).



Examining the seventeen-year trend shows that the percentage of felony and major misdemeanor offenders receiving some time in prison was increasing even prior to implementation of the guidelines, and has continued its gradual long-term increase during the guidelines era. The percentage of serious federal offenders receiving sentences of simple probation declined gradually over the same time period, with the sharpest “step” decrease at the time of guidelines implementation. The decrease in the use of probation is consistent with projections of the effects of the guidelines made by the Commission when the guidelines were promulgated (Block & Rhodes, 1987). The overall pattern suggests that numerous factors—including changes in the composition of the federal caseload, in social attitudes toward crime, and in federal penalty statutes—were toughening sentences throughout the period of study, with implementation of the guidelines having a substantial additional effect.

***Widening the net.*** As described in the section on economic offenses below, much of the decrease in the use of simple probation following implementation of the guidelines is explained by increased use of intermediate sanctions for “white collar” crimes involving lesser economic losses. These offenders historically were likely to receive simple probation, but under the guidelines they increasingly are subject to intermediate sanctions and imprisonment. This development runs counter to the recommendations of some advocates for intermediate sanctions. Many had hoped that alternative sanctions would be used to divert offenders from prison and avoid “net widening”—use of intermediate sanctions for offenders who would historically have received simple probation (Tonry, 1995). Intermediate sanctions have been recommended as cost savers, since they can punish low-risk offenders for somewhat less money than imprisonment (GAO, 1994). But in the federal system, home, community, and intermittent confinement have been used almost exclusively to increase the severity of punishment for offenses that historically received simple probation. The only exception to this general finding is among larceny offenders, as described below.

The increased use of intermediate sanctions during the guidelines era was influenced by both legal and practical factors. Under the guidelines’ zone system, discussed in Chapter One, prison is available as a sentence for all offenders, but simple probation is available only for the least serious offenders who fall in Zone A. Offenders in Zone B of the Sentencing Table *must* receive some period of alternative confinement if they are not imprisoned. Offenders in Zone C must receive imprisonment, but may serve up to half of the minimum term in some form of alternative confinement. The Commission amended the Sentencing Table in 1992 to expand modestly the number of offenders who were eligible for alternative confinement, in order to take advantage of the increasing availability of a new technology.<sup>57</sup> Electronic monitoring, considered an important enforcement tool for home confinement, became available nationwide in the early years of guidelines implementation, through the joint endeavors of the Federal Probation Service and the Bureau of Prisons. This made an intermediate sanction available in locations without access to community confinement facilities.

Judges responding to the 2002 Commission survey were very positive about the availability of these alternatives to incarceration. The majority of district judges urged greater availability of

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<sup>57</sup> USSG, App. C, Amend. 462 (Nov. 1, 1992).

probation with confinement conditions, particularly for drug trafficking offenders (64 percent), and the majority of circuit judges requested that such sentencing options be made either more available or not reduced from their current availability (USSG, 2003d, III-18). Across all types of offenses, only a small minority of judges (approximately 15 percent) urged reduced availability of these options.

## C. The Increased Severity of Prison Sentences

### 1. *The Elimination of Parole and the Importance of Time Served*

To appreciate long-term changes in the severity of federal prison sentences, it is important to distinguish between the *sentences imposed* by the courts and the *time actually served* by offenders. In the preguidelines system, the division of authority between the Parole Commission and sentencing judges gave rise to a large gap between sentences imposed and the time offenders actually served in prison. On average, preguidelines offenders served just 58 percent of their imposed sentences (Sabol & McGready, 1999). In the SRA, Congress mandated that all offenders would serve at least 85 percent of the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge, with a maximum reduction of about 15 percent as a reward for good behavior while in prison.<sup>58</sup> Time served today can be affected by other sentence reductions of various kinds. For example, offenders may qualify for early release for successful completion of drug treatment while in prison,<sup>59</sup> or upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, for extraordinary and compelling reasons, such as terminal illness.<sup>60</sup> The Commission has occasionally made reductions in the guideline range applicable to certain categories of offenders retroactive under USSG §1B1.10, p.s.


Figure 2.3 illustrates the importance of accounting for the abolition of parole. The solid line shows average sentences imposed on offenders, while the dashed line shows an estimate of the prison time likely to be served. (The sentence severity charts in the remainder of this chapter all follow this standard format.) Examination of the solid line gives no hint of any substantial change at the time of guidelines implementation. Time imposed actually decreased slightly before resuming its gradual upward trend, which continued until 1992. The dashed line, however, shows that prison time likely to be served increased dramatically over the period of guidelines implementation.

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<sup>58</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b).

<sup>59</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e).

<sup>60</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).



Offenders sentenced to simple probation or intermediate sanctions are excluded from these trends, so readers are cautioned to interpret changes in average sentences in conjunction with changes in the rates of imprisonment. The interaction of these trends can be potentially misleading. For example, imposing short prison terms on offenders who historically received simple probation could cause the average prison term to *decrease*, even while the sentences of other imprisoned offenders remained the same. These interactions will be discussed in greater detail in the sections on variations among different offense types later in this chapter.

## 2. Overall Trends in Sentencing Severity

The data clearly demonstrate that, on average, federal offenders receive substantially more severe sentences under the guidelines than they did in the pre-guidelines era. Between 1987 and 1989, the first year in which the majority of federal offenders were sentenced under the guidelines, the average prison time expected to be served almost doubled. By 1992, the average time in prison had more than doubled, from 26 months in 1986 to 59 months in 1992. Since fiscal year 1992 there has been a slight and gradual decline in average prison time, but federal offenders sentenced in 2002 will still spend about twice as long in prison as did offenders sentenced prior to passage of the SRA.

***Average prison time for federal offenders more than doubled after implementation of the guidelines.***

The abolition of parole, the enactment of mandatory minimum penalty provisions, and changes in the types of offenders sentenced in federal court all contributed to increased sentence

severity along with implementation of the guidelines. The influence of each of these factors varies among different offenses, which is the subject of the next section.


## D. Variations Among Different Offense Types

During congressional debates on sentencing reform and in the early discussions of the Commission, considerable attention was paid to the adequacy of existing sentences for various types of crime. For most offenses, the Commission decided to base guideline ranges on the existing average time served, as revealed in the past practice study discussed in Chapter One. One would expect average prison time for these crimes to remain relatively constant under the guidelines. For several other offenses, however, the Commission, either on its own initiative or in response to congressional actions, established guideline ranges that were significantly more severe than past practice. Drug trafficking and “white collar” offenses are the two most notable examples, but guideline ranges were also set above historical levels for robbery of an individual, murder, aggravated assault, immigration, and rape (USSC, 1987). Fifteen years later, it can be confirmed that the policy changes initiated by Congress and the Commission substantially increased sentence severity for virtually all of the targeted offenses. And because these guidelines apply to the most frequently sentenced offenses in the federal courts, they account for the overall severity increases seen in Figure 2.3.

A major advantage of the guidelines approach to sentencing is that offenses and offenders can be categorized along dozens of dimensions relevant to the purposes of sentencing, rather than only a few dimensions. This section, however, must necessarily over-simplify and lump together offenses that are dissimilar in many ways. To obtain comparable groups across the pre-guidelines and guidelines eras, we categorize offenses only in terms of the most serious count of conviction. When relevant, changes to statutory elements or other factors affecting the characteristics of offenses in each category are noted. Technical Appendix D gives more complete information on the statutes included in each group.

### 1. Drug Trafficking Offenses

Drug trafficking offenses have comprised the largest proportion of the federal criminal docket for over three decades (AO, Annual Reports, 1971-2001). At the beginning of the guidelines era, approximately half of the persons sentenced under the new laws were drug offenders (USSC, Annual Report, 1989, Fig. VI). As shown in Figure 2.4, that proportion has decreased to about 40 percent in recent years, largely due to a substantial increase in immigration



offenses (USSC, *Sourcebook*, 2001, Tbl. 33). But with growth in the overall size of the federal criminal docket, the sheer number of drug trafficking offenders sentenced in federal court has continued to increase every year, reaching 25,376 in 2002.

The large number of drug offenders means that overall trends in the use of imprisonment and in average prison terms, reviewed above, are dominated by drug sentencing. Analysis using the Federal Bureau of Prison's population simulation model demonstrated that three-quarters of the growth in the federal prison population in the early years of guidelines implementation could be attributed to changes in drug sentencing policies (Simon, 1993). Changes in drug sentencing policies are also a primary cause of a widening gap between the average sentences of Black, White, and Hispanic offenders, which will be discussed in Chapter Four. Understanding these trends, and the influences of the policy choices made by Congress and the Commission, is thus especially important.

***Increases in sentence lengths for drug trafficking offenders are the major cause of federal prison population growth over the past fifteen years.***

***Development of the drug trafficking guideline.*** The Commission's work developing sentences for drug trafficking offenders was heavily influenced by passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 [ADAA]. The Commission had begun its work prior to passage of the ADAA by examining the Parole Commission's guidelines, which set release dates for drug traffickers based, in part, on the quantity of pure drug with which an offender was involved (USSC, 1987; Scotkin, 1990). The ADAA codified this quantity-based approach by triggering five- and ten-year mandatory minimum penalties based on the weight of the "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" of various types of drugs.<sup>61</sup> The ADAA was expedited through Congress in the summer of 1986 in the wake of a number of well-publicized tragic incidents, including the overdose death of a first-round NBA draft pick, Len Bias (USSC, 2002a). The legislative history of the statute is limited primarily to statements made on the House and Senate floors. It presents only a partial picture of why Congress made quantity a dominant consideration for sentencing drug offenders (USSC, 1991b). There are several indications, however, that Congress intended to establish a two-tiered penalty structure for most drugs. Relying on information supplied by law enforcement, Congress apparently linked five-year penalties to amounts that were indicative of "managers of the retail traffic," while amounts linked to ten-year penalties were believed generally indicative of "manufacturers or the heads of organizations" (USSC, 2002a).<sup>62</sup>

Enactment of the ADAA created dilemmas for the Commission. For example, if the Sentencing Commission had followed the Parole Commission and made drug trafficking sentences dependent on the amount of pure drug, instead of the amount of any "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount," courts would be required to consider two different quantities at

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<sup>61</sup> 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).

<sup>62</sup> H. REP. NO. 845, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. Pt. 1, at 16-17 (1986).

sentencing, one for purposes of the statutes and another for the guidelines. If the Commission had given more weight to other potentially relevant factors, such as an offender's role within the drug trafficking organization, then sentences under the guidelines might conflict with sentences required by the statutes in a large number of cases. The statutes would "trump" the guidelines and consideration of the other factors effectively would be voided.

The Commission drafted a drug trafficking guideline that 1) generally measures the applicable amount based on the weight of the mixture or substance, and 2) linked the quantity levels in the ADAA to guideline ranges corresponding to the five- and ten-year mandatory minimum sentences. USSG §2D1.1 assigns base offense levels according to a Drug Quantity Table. The Table requires imprisonment of 63-78 months for offenses involving drug amounts at the five-year

***USSG §2D1.1 adopts and extends the drug quantity-based approach to sentencing drug traffickers found in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.***

mandatory minimum penalty level, and imprisonment of 121-151 months for drug amounts at the ten-year statutory level. Adjustments lengthen the sentence for any prior offenses, for an offender's leadership role, for the possession of any weapon, for any death or injury resulting from use of the distributed drug, and for a variety of other aggravating factors. Downward

adjustments for accepting responsibility or for a mitigating role in the offense can reduce the guideline range below the statutory minimum in some cases, in which case Part G of the *Guidelines Manual*, "Implementing the Total Sentence of Imprisonment," requires a guideline sentence at the mandatory minimum level. This "trumping" of the otherwise applicable guideline range creates disparity by treating less culpable offenders the same as more culpable ones (USSG, 1991b), but is necessitated by the need to make the guidelines consistent with the quantity thresholds found in the mandatory minimum penalty statutes.

In addition to linking the drug amounts in the statutes to guideline ranges at the five- and ten-year levels, the Drug Quantity Table extends the quantity-based approach across 17 different levels falling below, between, and above the two amounts specified in the statutes. The current table ranges from offense level six, which allows probation for some first-time marijuana offenders, to level 38, which requires prison terms of 235-293 months for first time offenders accountable for large quantities of drugs. Offenders receiving adjustments for criminal history, a leadership role, or other aggravating factors can receive higher guideline ranges up to life in prison. The *Guidelines Manual, Supplementary Report* (USSC, 1987) and other documents published at the time of guideline promulgation do not discuss why the Commission extended the ADAA's quantity-based approach in this way. This is unfortunate for historians, because no other decision of the Commission has had such a profound impact on the federal prison population. The drug trafficking guideline that ultimately was promulgated, in combination with the relevant conduct rule discussed below, had the effect of increasing prison terms far above what had been typical in past practice, and in many cases above the level required by the literal terms of the mandatory minimum statutes.

One explanation for the Commission's approach is the need to provide a full range of quantities and penalties to achieve proportionality in drug sentencing. Under this view, drug type and quantity are reasonable first measures of the *harm* for which a drug trafficker should be held

accountable. Another possible reason for the Commission’s approach was to avoid sentencing “cliffs” (USSC, 1991b). A cliff arises where a trivial change in quantity has a substantial effect on sentences. For example, if the Drug Quantity Table contained only the two thresholds found in the ADAA, an increase from 499 to 501 grams of powder cocaine could result in a dramatic increase in punishment, just as it does under the mandatory minimum statutes. The drug trafficking guideline provides more finely tuned distinctions among offenses and, therefore, more incremental increases in punishment.

***Finding the proper measure of drug offense seriousness.*** Whatever the reasons for the emphasis on quantity in the drug trafficking guideline, commentators soon raised potential problems with its operation (Judicial Conference of the United States, 1995; Reuter & Caulkins, 1995). By providing a wide range of punishments for different drug amounts, the importance of quantity was greatly elevated compared to other offense characteristics. Some observers doubted that drug quantity was a reliable measure of offense seriousness, or could be determined with sufficient precision to justify seventeen meaningful distinctions among offenders (Schulhofer, 1992). Specific types of cases in which quantity served as a poor proxy for offense seriousness were identified by the Commission and by other observers (USSC, Working Group Report, 1992; FJC, 1994). For example, the weight of different inactive ingredients mixed with the drug—dilutants, carrier media, and even humidity—can result in disparate sentences for offenders who sell similar numbers of doses of a drug (Alschuler, 1991). Subsequently, the Commission developed a standardized weighing method for LSD doses and added other application notes designed to control for these problems,<sup>63</sup> but arbitrary variations due to the weight of inactive ingredients remain (Meier, 1993; Stockel, 1995).

More generally, the amount of drugs for which an offender is held accountable is determined by the relevant conduct rules and research suggested significant disparities in how these rules were applied (Hofer & Lawrence, 1992). The Commission repeatedly amended the relevant conduct commentary to clarify its operation in drug trafficking cases,<sup>64</sup> but questions remain about how consistently it can be applied (Marks, 2003). Drug quantity often is highly contested, and disputes must be resolved based on potentially untrustworthy factors, such as the testimony of co-conspirators. Drug quantity has been called a particularly poor proxy for the culpability of low-level offenders, who may have contact with significant amounts of drugs, but who do not share in the profits or decision-making (Goodwin, 1992; Wasserman, 1995). The Commission also identified ways that drug quantity can *underestimate* offense seriousness, and promulgated commentary encouraging upward departure in these situations.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> See USSG, App. C, Amends. 484, 485, 488 (Nov. 1, 1993), & 503 (Nov. 1, 1994). See also *Chapman v. U.S.*, 500 U.S. 453 (1991) (holding that the Commission’s LSD weighing method could not be used to determine the applicability of mandatory minimum penalties).

<sup>64</sup> USSG, App. C, Amends. 78 (Nov. 1, 1989) & 439 (Nov. 1, 1992).

<sup>65</sup> See USSG §2D1.1, comment., n. 1, 9, 12, 15, 16 and comment., backgr’d. (citing examples of circumstances where the Commission recognizes that quantity may underestimate offense seriousness).

Finding the correct ratios among different drugs and the correct quantity thresholds for each penalty level has also proven problematic. The Commission previously reported that the 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio between crack and powder cocaine fails to reflect the relative harmfulness of different drugs (USSC, 1995, 1997, 2002). In addition, the quantity thresholds linked to five- and ten-year sentences for crack cocaine have been shown to result in severe penalties for many street-level sellers and other low culpability offenders. As a result, the Commission recommended revision of the mandatory minimum penalty statutes and the guidelines. In 1995, the Commission recommended that the quantity levels for crack cocaine should be set at the same level applicable to powder cocaine. This recommendation, and a guideline amendment promulgated to implement it, were rejected by Congress.<sup>66</sup> In 1997, the Commission suggested a range of quantity thresholds for both powder and crack cocaine that would have reduced the ratio between them by both raising the threshold for crack and reducing the threshold for powder (USSC, 1997). This recommendation was not acted upon. Most recently, the Commission recommended that the ratio between powder and crack be reduced to 20-to-1 by raising the threshold quantity amounts for crack cocaine. Certain enhancements to the drug trafficking guideline generally were also recommended to better target the most dangerous and culpable offenders (USSC, 2002a). To date, Congress has not acted on this recommendation.

Evidence that the mandatory minimum statutes were resulting in lengthy imprisonment for many low-level, non-violent, first-time drug offenders (DOJ, 1994)<sup>67</sup> led Congress in 1994 to enact a so-called “safety valve,” which waived the mandatory penalties for certain categories of less serious offenders.<sup>68</sup> In the same legislation, Congress directed the Commission to revise the guidelines to better account for the mitigating factors that qualify offenders for the safety valve, and thus reduce the importance of drug quantity in those cases. In 1995, a two-level reduction was added for some offenders who met the safety valve criteria,<sup>69</sup> and in 2001 this was expanded to all qualified drug offenders.<sup>70</sup> Most recently, the Commission again attempted to ameliorate the influence of large drug quantities on sentences for the least culpable offenders by capping the quantity-based offense level for defendants who receive a mitigating role adjustment under USSG §3B1.2.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334 (Oct. 30, 1995).

<sup>67</sup> See also *Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Hearing on H. R. 2199 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary*, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1993).

<sup>68</sup> See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and USSG §5C1.2.


<sup>69</sup> USSG, App. C, Amend. 515 (Nov. 1, 1995).

<sup>70</sup> *Id.* at 624 (Nov. 1, 2001).

<sup>71</sup> See *id.* at 640 (Nov. 1, 2002) and 668 (Nov. 1, 2004).




Given the problems with relying on drug type and quantity to measure the seriousness of drug trafficking offenses, some observers have called for a fundamental re-examination of the role of quantity under the guidelines (Bowman, 1996; RAND, 1997; ABA, 2002). Thirty-one percent of district court judges responding to the Commission’s 2002 survey listed drug sentencing as the greatest or second greatest challenge for the guidelines in achieving the purposes of sentencing (USSC, 2003d), with 73.7 percent of district court judges and 82.7 percent of circuit court judges rating drug punishments as greater than appropriate to reflect the seriousness of drug trafficking offenses (USSC, 2003d). The Commission has been asked to identify ways to amend current drug penalties to better target the most culpable and dangerous offenders.<sup>72</sup>



**Use of imprisonment.** Figure 2.5 shows that a large proportion of drug traffickers received sentences of imprisonment in the preguidelines era, and this proportion was increasing at the time of guidelines implementation, perhaps as a result of the ADAA enacted in 1986. Upon full implementation of the guidelines, the percentage rose and has held steady at about 95 percent. The use of simple probation and intermediate sanctions has dropped to less than five percent each. Separate analyses of heroin and other schedule I narcotics, cocaine and other schedule II narcotics, and marijuana (the only breakdowns possible with the data available across the entire time period) show only minor variations in this general pattern.

<sup>72</sup> Letter from Senator Jeff Sessions, United States Congress, to Judge Diana E. Murphy, Chair, United States Sentencing Commission, regarding “Targeting Sentences on the Degree of Culpability and the Likelihood of Recidivism,” July 13, 2000.

**Length of time served.** The graph in Figure 2.6 shows the dramatic increase in time served by federal drug offenders following implementation of the ADAA and the guidelines. The time served by federal drug traffickers was over two and a half times longer in 1991 than it had been in 1985, hovering just below an average of 80 months. In the latter half of the 1990s, the average prison term decreased by about 20 percent but remained far above the historic average. Analysis of three separate drug groups showed that this overall pattern is repeated for each drug type, although the severity levels are highest for crack cocaine, followed by powder cocaine and heroin and other scheduled narcotics. Marijuana offenses received the shortest prison terms.




**What caused the trends?** While sentences for drug trafficking were changing prior to enactment of statutory minimum penalties and implementation of the guidelines, and have continued to change since, there can be no doubt that the policy choices of Congress and the Commission in 1986, 1987, and 1988 each had a dramatic impact on federal sentencing policy for drug offenders. Attempting to precisely allocate responsibility for these changes between the statutes and the guidelines may be impossible (Schwarzer, 1992). As described above, the Commission accommodated the mandatory minimum penalty levels when it developed the drug trafficking guideline, so the influence of the ADAA is both *direct* when it controls the sentence in an individual case by trumping the guidelines, and *indirect* through its influence on the design of the drug guideline itself.

It is important to note, however, that the Commission's choices when drafting the guidelines contributed significantly to these trends. In the *Supplementary Report* that accompanied promulgation of the guidelines, the Commission projected the estimated impact of 1) the ADAA, 2) the career offender provisions of the SRA (implemented at USSG §4B1.1) and 3) the guidelines themselves (USSC, 1987, Table 3, at 69). This analysis suggested that the ADAA would increase average sentences from 23 months to 48 months, and the career offender provision would add another nine months. The guidelines themselves were projected to increase sentences by only an additional month. Later analyses raised questions about this result, however, by reporting that the sentences required by the guidelines above the minimums required by the ADAA significantly increase the average prison term, at least for crack cocaine offenders (McDonald & Carlson, 1993). Analyses conducted for the present report confirm the later findings for all drug offenders: the guidelines have significantly increased average sentence length above the levels required by statute. About 25 percent, or eighteen months, of the average expected prison time of 73 months for drug offenders sentenced in 2001 can be attributed to guideline increases above the mandatory minimum penalty levels. (Appendix D gives details of the analysis supporting this conclusion.)

***Over 25 percent of the average prison time for drug offenders sentenced in 2001 can be attributed to guideline increases above the mandatory minimum penalty levels.***

***The recent downturn.*** In recent years, attention has focused on the decrease in prison terms that began in the 1990s. There are many possible explanations for the trend, including changes in the characteristics of drug crimes being committed or being sentenced in federal courts, changes in the charges being brought or plea bargains being offered, or changes in the way the guidelines are being applied. In addition, as noted above, Congress and the Commission adopted several measures during this time period that would decrease sentence lengths for some offenders, including the "safety valve" and additional reductions for first-time, low-level offenders. Congress and the Commission also increased penalties for several types of drugs over this time period, however, including methamphetamine, amphetamine, "ecstasy," and various "date rape" drugs.

The available data suggest a general trend toward less serious offenses and a greater incidence of mitigating factors in cases sentenced in the late 1990s. The median drug amount for powder and crack cocaine and for marijuana decreased from 1996 to 2001 (the only years for which data are available). The percentage of defendants pleading guilty and receiving the acceptance of responsibility adjustment has increased steadily over the past decade. The application of mitigating guideline adjustments associated with the safety valve and a defendant's minor role in the offense also have increased. And the percentage of offenders benefitting from downward departures became increasingly frequent, with the use of USSG §5K1.1 departures growing in the early part of the 1990s and other downward departures increasing in later years. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 2.7, the percentage of first offenders sentenced under the drug guideline, while still over 50 percent, has declined slightly since the early 1990s.



The trend toward somewhat lower sentences in the late 1990s has led observers to conclude that those charged with implementing drug sentences have searched for ways to mitigate the severe prison terms mandated by the ADAA and the guidelines (Schulhofer & Nagel, 1997; Saris, 1997; Bowman & Heise, 2001, 2002). This conclusion is reinforced by surveys that have consistently shown that the “harshness and inflexibility” of the drug trafficking guideline is seen as the most significant problem with the sentencing guidelines system (GAO, 1992; *see also* FJC, 1997; USSC, 1991c, 2003).

## 2. *Economic Offenses*

***Similar punishment for similar loss.*** As shown in Figure 2.4, economic offenses—which include larceny, fraud, and non-fraud white collar offenses—constitute the second largest portion of the federal criminal docket. A wide variety of economic crimes are prosecuted and sentenced in the federal courts, ranging from large-scale corporate malfeasance, to small-scale embezzlements, to simple thefts. The federal criminal code contains a plethora of provisions covering economic offenses, many of which are not easily placed into simple categories such as fraud or larceny (Bowman, 2001). Particular scholarly and media attention has occasionally focused on “white collar” crimes, although there is no general agreement on what is meant by that term (Schlegel & Weisburd, 1992).

In establishing sentences for economic offenses, the Commission grouped the many statutory provisions into a small number of guidelines and made the pecuniary loss resulting from the crime a primary consideration in determining sentences. The Commission’s empirical study of past sentencing practices revealed that in the pre-guidelines era, sentences for fraud, embezzlement, and

tax evasion generally received shorter sentences than did crimes such as larceny or theft, even when the crimes involved similar monetary losses (USSC, 1987). A large proportion of fraud, embezzlement, and tax evasion offenders received simple probation. In response, the guidelines were written to reduce the availability of probation and to ensure “a short but definite period of confinement”<sup>73</sup> for a larger proportion of these “white collar” cases, both to ensure proportionate punishment and to achieve adequate deterrence (Steer, 2003).

Over the years, additional aggravating adjustments were added to the theft and fraud guidelines, often in response to congressional directives (*see* Appendix B.) The appearance early in the guidelines era of these mandated sentence increases for economic crimes, and the perceived absence of empirical research establishing the need for them, led one former Commissioner to warn that the SRA’s promise of policy development through expert research was being supplanted by symbolic “signal sending” by Congress (Parker & Block, 1989).

In 2001, following a six-year process of deliberation, collaboration with the Judicial Conference and DOJ, and field testing, the guidelines governing economic crimes were comprehensively amended as part of an “Economic Crime Package” (*see* Bowman, 2001, for a history of the efforts leading to this package).<sup>74</sup> This amendment sought to further refine and simplify the guidelines, focus the most severe sentences on the most serious offenders, and clarify the definition of pecuniary loss. In the wake of the corporate scandals of 2002, the guidelines again were amended at the direction of Congress to further increase sentence severity (Steer, 2003).<sup>75</sup> The data reported in this section reflect only the initial effects of the Economic Crime Package and none of the effects of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley amendments because these changes had not taken effect for cases sentenced by fiscal year 2002.

***Use of imprisonment.*** Figure 2.8 displays trends in the use of imprisonment, intermediate sanctions, and probation for offenders convicted of all economic crimes. The most striking trend is a shift away from simple probation and toward intermediate sentences that occurred as more economic offenders became subject to the guidelines in the early 1990s. These trends among economic offenders drive the overall trends for all felons portrayed in Figure 2.2, because economic offenders comprise the largest share of offenders receiving intermediate sanctions in the federal system. The use of imprisonment for economic offenders also has increased steadily throughout the guidelines era.


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<sup>73</sup> *Sentencing Commission Guidelines: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary*, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 55 (1987)(statement of Stephen Breyer, Commissioner, USSC).

<sup>74</sup> USSG, App. C, Amend. 617 (Nov. 1, 2001).


<sup>75</sup> Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, §§ 805, 905, 1104, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002).

**Figure 2.8: Type of Sentence Imposed for Economic Crimes**  
All Economic Crimes



Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1984-1990 AO FPSSIS Datafiles, 1991-2002 USSC Monitoring Datafiles.

**Figure 2.9: Economic Crime Caseload**



Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1984-1990 AO FPSSIS Datafiles, 1991-2002 USSC Monitoring Datafiles.

As shown in Figure 2.9, fraud offenses constitute the largest proportion of economic offenses, and their proportion has grown. Thus, the trends for economic offenses are dominated by fraud

***The rate of imprisonment for fraud offenders, the most common economic crime, rose from about 50 percent in the preguidelines era to almost 70 percent by 2001.***

offenders. The thumbnail graphs show that the shift to intermediate sanctions is pronounced for fraud, forgery/counterfeiting, and tax offenders. Embezzlement showed the same shift in the early 1990s, but beginning in 1992, larger numbers of embezzlers were imprisoned. The use of simple probation has been reduced by about two-thirds for fraud offenders and by about half for embezzlers and tax evaders. The rate of imprisonment for fraud offenders rose


from about 50 percent in the preguidelines era to almost 70 percent by 2001. For embezzlers, the increase over the same time period was from about 35 to 60 percent. The one unexpected finding is that while use of intermediate sanctions for tax offenders increased from virtually nothing to nearly 30 percent of all cases, the use of imprisonment for tax evaders actually fell slightly after guidelines implementation until returning to historic levels in 2000.

Interestingly, among larceny offenders, intermediate sanctions have been used to divert from prison about 20 percent of the offenders who once were incarcerated. While this pattern is commonplace in state systems, it is something of an anomaly in the federal system where intermediate sanctions have generally “widened the net,” as discussed above. The reduced use of imprisonment for larceny offenders appears to reflect the Commission’s concerted effort to equalize penalties between “white collar” and “blue collar” offenders.

These data raise the question of whether the Commission’s goal of assuring a “short but definite period of confinement” for white collar offenders has been achieved. The answer depends both on whether intermediate sanctions satisfy the goal and which offenses count as “white collar.” The guidelines ensure that offenses involving the greatest monetary losses, the use of more sophisticated methods, and other aggravating factors are given imprisonment. Certainly the use of simple probation has been slashed—by about two-thirds for fraud offenders and by about half for embezzlers and tax evaders. For most types of economic crime, the rate of imprisonment has also been substantially increased. Despite these increases, in 2002 many district (63%) and circuit (64%) court judges still felt the guideline sentences were less than appropriate to reflect the seriousness of fraud offenses, with smaller majorities believing the same regarding theft/embezzlement/larceny (USSC, 2002). These findings were obtained prior to the full impact of the Commission’s 2001 Economic Crime Package and the 2002 amendments made pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

***Length of time served.*** As shown in Figure 2.10, the amount of prison time imposed on economic offenders declined significantly upon implementation of the guidelines, but with the abolition of parole the length of time actually served remained fairly constant at about 15 months. Fraud offenders again dominate the trends, with their average sentence hovering close to 15 months. (The one-year peak in 1988, seen across all economic offense types except tax offenses, may reflect










differential implementation of the guidelines in the first year of their application. But it may be a statistical artifact. As a general rule, statisticians look with suspicion on one-year fluctuations in otherwise stable trends, especially if they occur at a time of great tumult in the system. Remember that many courts held the guidelines unconstitutional for this year, potentially affecting the selection of cases for sentencing.)



The relatively stable time served by economic offenders, as well as the decreases for some types of offenses, was noted early in the guidelines era (Block, 1989). These trends were caused by the Commission's decision to increase the use of imprisonment. As one Commissioner stated, “[T]he flip side of the Commission's dramatic increase in the likelihood of confinement is an equally dramatic *decrease* in the projected time served by defendants who serve time” (Block, 1989, emphasis supplied). For example, average time served for embezzlement has decreased from pre-guidelines levels, but nearly twice the proportion of embezzlers are going to prison. As more embezzlers were given short periods of imprisonment, the average length of imprisonment among all embezzlers declined as the new offenders were included in the average. In the case of larceny, however, the reduction in the percentage going to prison is matched by a reduction in time served, again reflecting the Commission’s design to reduce sentence severity for simple theft, while increasing it for fraud, embezzlement, and tax offenses (USSC, 1987).




## Economic Crime Thumbnails



### 3. *Immigration Offenses*

Prior to fiscal year 1994 there were relatively few immigration cases sentenced in the federal courts. Figure 2.11 shows that in the first three years of the 1990s the number of cases ranged between 1,000 and 2,000 annually (BJS, 2002c). Beginning in 1995, however, the number of cases for alien smuggling and illegal entry began to climb, and after the implementation of Operation Gatekeeper—the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s southwest border enforcement strategy—the number began to soar, reaching a peak of just under 10,000 cases in 2000. Along with the phenomenal growth in the size of the immigration offense docket, a series of policy decisions by Congress and the Commission have steadily increased the severity of punishment for the two most common classes of immigration offenses: alien smuggling and illegal entry, sentenced under USSG §§2L1.1 and 2L1.2, respectively.



When the Commission constructed the original guidelines for alien smuggling and illegal entry, they were based largely on past practice, with a slight reduction in the availability of straight probation and the amount of time served (Block & Rhodes, 1989). Beginning in 1988, one year after the original guidelines were enacted, the Commission began a series of amendments which significantly increased the penalties for these offenses.

***Smuggling, Transporting, or Harboring an Unlawful Alien—§2L1.1.*** In early 1988, the Commission amended §2L1.1 to better reflect the typical case sentenced under the guideline, which involved for-profit alien smuggling. The base offense level was increased by three levels, and a three-level reduction was provided if the offense was *not* committed for profit or involved only the

defendant's family members.<sup>76</sup> A second amendment to section 2L1.1 occurred less than a year later, when the Commission increased the base offense level for defendants with prior deportations.<sup>77</sup> In 1991, the Commission increased the base offense level to 20 if the defendant had been previously deported after conviction for an aggravated felony.<sup>78</sup> And again in 1992, the Commission revised the specific offense characteristics to enhance penalties based upon the number of aliens, documents, or passports involved in the offense.<sup>79</sup> Finally, responding to a congressional directive in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, the Commission increased the alien smuggling base offense level by three levels and made various other changes to the alien smuggling guideline.<sup>80</sup>

***Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States—§2L1.2.*** The first amendment to §2L1.2, effective on January 15, 1988, limited the guideline to felony cases only and increased the base offense level from six to eight.<sup>81</sup> In 1989, the Commission added a specific offense characteristic to section 2L1.2, increasing the offense level by four levels for defendants previously deported after conviction for a non-immigration related offense.<sup>82</sup> Two years later, the Commission made the most significant change to the guideline by creating a 16-level enhancement for re-entry by offenders with prior convictions for aggravated felonies.<sup>83</sup> In 1997, acting upon a congressional directive in the 1996 Immigration Reform legislation, the Commission expanded the eligibility criteria for the “aggravated felony” enhancement to include numerous other offenses.<sup>84</sup> Finally, in 2001, responding to complaints from sentencing practitioners along the southwest border, the Commission altered the aggravated felony enhancement to provide graduated enhancements of eight, twelve, or sixteen levels for prior aggravated felonies,<sup>85</sup> depending on the seriousness of the prior offense.

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<sup>76</sup> USSG, App. C, Amend. 35 (Jan. 15, 1988).

<sup>77</sup> *Id.* at 192 (Nov. 1, 1989).

<sup>78</sup> *Id.* at 375 (Nov. 1, 1991).

<sup>79</sup> *Id.* at 450 (Nov. 1, 1992).

<sup>80</sup> *Id.* at 543 (May 1, 1997) & 561 (Nov. 1, 1997).

<sup>81</sup> *Id.* at 38 (Jan. 15, 1988).

<sup>82</sup> *Id.* at 193 (Nov. 1, 1989).


<sup>83</sup> *Id.* at 375 (Nov. 1, 1991).

<sup>84</sup> *Id.* at 562 (Nov. 1, 1997).


<sup>85</sup> *Id.* at 632 (Nov. 1, 2001).

These amendments, especially the enhancement for prior aggravated felonies, and when coupled with the elimination of petty immigration offenses from the guidelines, explain why the original impact projections for the immigration guidelines underestimated the percentage of offenders who would be sentenced to prison and the length of time they would serve (Gaes, et al., 1992; Gaes, et al., 1993). They also explain the trends visible in Figures 2.12 and 2.13, which show the percentage of offenders receiving each type of sentence and the length of prison time likely to be served for all types of immigration offenders combined.

**Use of imprisonment.** The use of imprisonment in immigration cases is affected by the fact that many offenders are non-resident aliens. Lacking a legal home in the United States, many are incarcerated even prior to sentencing. Immediate deportation has also become a frequent response for those individuals arrested for illegal entry (BJS, 2002c). Figure 2.12 shows that there has been a gradual increase in the use of imprisonment throughout the period of study, reflecting a gradual decrease in the use of simple probation. Legislative and Commission changes to these penalties have focused on increasing offense levels. This has pushed greater numbers of offenders into the zones of the Sentencing Tables in which probation and alternative sentences are unavailable. Even when these alternatives are available, non-resident aliens are generally unable to participate in alternative confinements such as home confinement due to their lack of a home in the United States and their high risk of flight from community detention.




**Figure 2.13: Mean Prison Sentence Length for Immigration Offenses**



Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1994-1999 AD FPSSIS Datafiles, 1991-2002 USSC Monitoring Datafiles.

**Figure 2.14: Immigration Time Served**



Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1994-1999 AD FPSSIS Datafiles, 1991-2002 USSC Monitoring Datafiles.

***Length of Time Served.*** As discussed above, the original immigration guidelines did not deviate substantially from past practice. The amount of time served actually decreased slightly with guidelines implementation. However, subsequent revisions to the guidelines significantly increased penalty levels. As shown in Figure 2.13, the average length of time served by immigration offenders nearly tripled between 1990 and 2001.

Figure 2.14 displays trends in the average length of time served for alien smuggling and illegal entry separately. Both guidelines have experienced considerable increases in the amount of time served. Illegal entry offenders experienced the first wave of sentence increases in the early 1990s as the guideline amendments enacted in those years became effective. Alien smuggling experienced a steep increase in 1998, as the amendment promulgated pursuant to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 took effect.

***The average length of time served by immigration offenders nearly tripled between 1990 and 2001.***

#### ***4. Firearm trafficking and possession***

***Guns in violent and drug trafficking offenses.*** The federal criminal code contains a variety of provisions proscribing the possession, use, and trafficking of firearms. In the last two decades, congressional attention has focused on 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which provides for a mandatory minimum penalty for offenders who use, carry, or possess a firearm “during and in relation to” a drug trafficking or violent crime. The predecessor to this provision was enacted by Congress in 1968 and originally required a one- to ten-year mandatory prison term for using or carrying a firearm during the commission of a violent felony. In 1984, the statute was amended to require at least five years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutive to the sentence for the underlying offense. In 1986, the statute’s scope was expanded to include drug trafficking offenses, and additional penalties were added. Further amendments in 1988, 1990, and 1994 required sentences of twenty years to life imprisonment for offenders with prior convictions.

In 1998, in response to a U. S. Supreme Court decision that had narrowly construed the “use” criteria,<sup>86</sup> the statute’s scope was again expanded to include “possession in furtherance” of the underlying offense. Penalties were again increased for brandishing or discharging a firearm during a crime, among other things.<sup>87</sup> These sentencing enhancements have been incorporated into the guidelines (Hofer, 2000). In this chapter, the effects of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) are included in the data for drug trafficking and violent crimes presented in other sections of this chapter.

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<sup>86</sup> Bailey v. U. S., 516 U.S. 137 (1995).

<sup>87</sup> Pub. L. No. 105–386, 112 Stat. 3469 (Nov. 13, 1998).

***Firearm trafficking and possession or transfer to prohibited persons.*** Federal statutes also define two other broad types of firearm offenses. Federal law regulates transactions in firearms and imposes record-keeping and other requirements designed to facilitate control of firearm commerce by the various states. Failure to abide by these federal regulations is a federal crime. In addition, possession of a firearm by certain classes of persons, such as felons, fugitives, or addicts, is prohibited.<sup>88</sup> Knowingly transferring weapons to these persons is also prohibited. Congress has been somewhat less active in sentencing for these offenses over the last two decades than it has for drug trafficking, economic, or sex offenses. But the Commission has chartered several staff working groups concerning sentencing policy for these issues. The Department of Justice and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms have also been active, both in collaborating with the Commission on the development of sentencing policies, and in organizing Task Forces, such as Project Triggerlock, Project Weed and Seed, and Project Exile, which utilize the federal firearm statutes to target dangerous offenders.

The Commission originally based the guidelines for these firearm offenses on its study of past practices (USSC, 1987). Soon thereafter, however, the Commission undertook several major revisions of firearms guidelines, which resulted in significant severity increases over historic levels. In 1990, the Commission increased the base offense level applicable to some offenses.<sup>89</sup> In 1991, the Commission again increased penalties and reorganized the guidelines by consolidating them into a single provision, USSG §2K2.1, which was created to handle most firearm trafficking and possession offenses.<sup>90</sup> The base offense level was linked to the statute of conviction, and enhancements were provided based on the number of firearms trafficked and other aggravating factors. Several later amendments clarified this basic structure.

In the Violent Crime Control Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Congress created several new offenses involving the possession or transfer of firearms to juveniles and expanded the list of persons prohibited from possessing firearms. It also directed the Commission to increase penalties for offenses involving semiautomatic weapons. The Commission amended USSG §2K2.1 in response to these directives.<sup>91</sup> The most recent amendments track statutory changes expanding the class of persons prohibited from possessing firearms and further increasing penalties.<sup>92</sup> In 2001, at the suggestion of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, penalties were increased for trafficking offenses involving more than 100 weapons.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

<sup>89</sup> USSG, App. C, Amend. 333 (Nov. 1, 1990).

<sup>90</sup> *Id.* at 374 (Nov. 1, 1991).

<sup>91</sup> *Id.* at 522 (Nov. 1, 1995).


<sup>92</sup> *Id.* at 578 (Nov. 1, 1998).

<sup>93</sup> *Id.* at 631 (Nov. 1, 2001).

**Use of imprisonment and length of time served.** Figure 2.15 shows changes in the percentage of firearm trafficking and possession offenders who receive sentences of imprisonment, probation, and intermediate sanctions. For traffickers, the use of probation has been steadily reduced to about one-quarter of its preguidelines level, replaced by imprisonment and, to a lesser extent, intermediate sanctions. For illegal possessors, probation has been replaced almost completely by imprisonment.

Figure 2.16 shows changes in the length of time served. After a period of volatility and decline in trafficking sentences in the first years of guideline implementation, when the guideline was being reconsidered and redesigned by the Commission, time served began a steady climb in fiscal year 1992, the year the Commission's major revision to USSG §2K2.1 became effective. The subsequent amendments to the guideline have continued to increase sentence severity. By 2000, prison terms were about double what they had been in the preguidelines era. The severity increases for possession offenses were equally dramatic, doubling between 1988 and 1995.

***By 2000, prison terms for firearm offenders were about double what they had been in the preguidelines era.***






## 5. *Violent Crimes*

Unlike the state courts, the federal courts sentence relatively few offenders convicted of violent crimes. In 2001, murder, manslaughter, assault, kidnaping, robbery, and arson constituted less than four percent of the total federal criminal docket. Due to the unique nature of federal jurisdiction over these types of crime, a sizeable proportion of murder, assault, and especially manslaughter cases involve Native American defendants. The most common federal violent crime is bank robbery, which has long been of special concern to federal law enforcement.


While not expressly directing a change in federal sentencing practices for violent offenses, the SRA and numerous other penalty statutes display a special concern with violent crimes.<sup>94</sup> In addition, “the Commission was careful to ensure that average sentences for such [violent] crimes at least remained at current levels, and it raised them where the Commission was convinced that they were inadequate” (USSC, 1987, 18-19). For robbery, the Commission found from its study of past practices that bank robbers and muggers were treated differently. Lacking a principled reason why this should be, it increased the sentences for personal robbery to make them more proportional to those for bank robbery while still recognizing the greater seriousness of offenses against financial institutions (USSC, 1987, 18). For murder and aggravated assault, the Commission felt that past sentences were inadequate since these crimes generally involved actual, as opposed to threatened, violence (USSC, 1987, 19).




<sup>94</sup> See e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)(1)(A) and § 994(j); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

**Use of imprisonment.** Figure 2.17 and the accompanying thumbnails in the following pages show that, for most violent offenses, rates of imprisonment have always been high and they have remained so under the guidelines. Only manslaughter, the violent offense for which Native Americans are most highly represented, contained room for significant growth in incarceration rates. The use of alternatives to imprisonment for manslaughter cases has been steadily reduced under the guidelines, and now occurs in less than ten percent of cases. Kidnaping and murder have imprisonment rates between 90 and 100 percent, with arson and assault somewhat lower. The imprisonment rate for bank robbers climbed from the mid- to the high-90s under the guidelines.

**Length of time served.** Figure 2.18 provides a striking example of the importance of examining time served rather than sentences imposed. Average prison sentences imposed on violent offenders actually decreased at the time of guideline implementation, but, due to the abolition of parole, the time served actually increased significantly. The greatest increases are seen for murder, kidnaping, bank robbery, and arson. The more stable prison term lengths for manslaughter partly reflect the larger proportion of these offenders who are receiving relatively short prison terms rather than an alternative sanction.




## Type of Sentence Imposed for Violent Crimes



Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1984-1990 AD FPSSIS Datafiles, 1991-2002 USSC Monitoring Datafiles.

## Mean Sentence Length for Violent Crimes



Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1984-1990 AD FPSIS Databases, 1991-2002 USSC Monitoring Database.

## 6. *Sexual Abuse, Exploitation, and Transportation for Illegal Sexual Activities*

***Frequent congressional involvement.*** Sexual offenses were among the first crimes to test the limits of federal criminal jurisdiction early in the twentieth century (*see* the “White Slave Traffic Act” of 1910, popularly known as “the Mann Act”), and Congress has shown a continuing interest in the federal prosecution of sex crimes. In recent decades, concern has focused on sex offenses involving minors. As shown in Appendix B, Congress has legislated frequently on this issue and at times in rapid succession during the guidelines era. Much like policymaking in the area of drug trafficking, Congress has used a mix of mandatory minimum penalty increases and directives to the Commission to change sentencing policy for sex offenses. In the PROTECT Act of 2003, Congress, for the first time since the inception of the guidelines, directly amended the *Guidelines Manual* and developed unique limitations on downward departures from the guidelines in sex cases.

A brief history of just the major sex offense sentencing legislation from the past ten years gives a sense of the frequency and complexity of congressional actions. The Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act of 1995 directed the Commission to increase guideline offense levels for crimes involving child pornography, prostitution, and the use of a computer.<sup>95</sup> The Commission amended the guidelines effective November 1, 1996, and also recommended several statutory changes for congressional consideration designed to improve guidelines operation.<sup>96</sup> That same year, however, the Amber Hagerman Child Protection Act and the Child Pornography Act of 1996, while adopting some Commission recommendations, also added new mandatory minimum penalties, including “two-strikes-you’re-out” life imprisonment for a second conviction of coercive sexual abuse of a child under the age of 16 years.<sup>97</sup>

***Direct congressional control over sentencing policy for sex offenses has increased throughout the guidelines era.***

In 1998, Congress again directed the Commission to raise penalties for a wide variety of sex offenses, including those involving travel or transportation, the use of a computer, or misrepresentation of the perpetrator’s identity.<sup>98</sup> Penalties were directed to be increased for offenders who engaged in a “pattern of activity involving sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor.” The Commission responded with a comprehensive revision of the sex offense guidelines, effective November 1, 2000,<sup>99</sup> including significant across-the-board penalty increases and creation of a new, severe guideline, section 4B1.5,

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<sup>95</sup> Pub. L. No. 104–71, 109 Stat. 774 (Dec. 23, 1995).

<sup>96</sup> USSG, App. C, Amends. 537 & 538 (Nov. 1, 1996).

<sup>97</sup> Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996). *See generally* 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c).

<sup>98</sup> Pub. L. No. 105–314, Title V., §§ 501 to 507, 112 Stat. 2974 (Oct. 30, 1998).

<sup>99</sup> USSG, App. C, Amend. 592 (Nov. 1, 2000).

for “Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offenders.”<sup>100</sup> Offenders convicted of serious sex offenses with previous convictions for sex offenses were made subject to severe penalties, typically requiring twenty or more years in prison. Offenders who engaged in a “pattern of activity” were also subject to severe penalties, regardless of whether the previous activity had resulted in a conviction. “Pattern of activity” was defined as two separate occasions of sexual activity with at least two separate minors. This definition was crafted to target pedophiles who seek out multiple minor victims, rather than “opportunistic” offenders who engage in sexual activity with the same minor on more than one occasion. These “opportunistic” offenses were found to be typical, in the federal system, of offenses involving Native Americans.

In the PROTECT Act of 2003 more mandatory minimum penalties were added and existing statutory minimums and maximums were again increased. The “two-strikes-you’re-out” provisions were expanded to include most federal sex offenses against any person under 18 years of age. The definition of “pattern of activity” was revised to include engaging in sexual activity with multiple minors or with any single minor on more than one occasion. In addition, Congress dramatically restricted the permitted grounds for departure below the guideline range for sex offenses.<sup>101</sup> The Commission implemented provisions of this Act in 2003.<sup>102</sup>

The frequent mandatory minimum legislation and specific directives to the Commission to amend the guidelines make it difficult to gauge the effectiveness of any particular policy change, or to disentangle the influences of the Commission from those of Congress. The guideline amendments effective on November 1, 2000, will have affected only some cases in the final year of data in the following graphs. None of the changes in the PROTECT Act will be apparent in these data.

***Growth of the Internet.*** Part of the explanation for the flurry of sex offense legislation in the last fifteen years has been the rapid growth of the Internet, which occurred almost simultaneously with implementation of the guidelines. The Internet has been used to facilitate distribution of illegal pornography and for communication among sex offenders and their potential victims. Congress passed the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act in 1988 to help control misuse of the new technology, and subsequent legislation has focused on strengthening law enforcement and increasing penalties for computer-distributed and computer-generated images.

A special Task Force of the FBI, “Innocent Images,” was developed to target pedophiles by using computer-based investigations. Prosecutions resulting from these investigations are often brought under the provisions of Chapter 117 of Title 18, United States Code (the modern revision of the Mann Act), which prohibit transporting persons or traveling interstate to engage in prohibited sexual activities. Recently amended provisions of Chapter 117 prohibit use of the mails or any facility of interstate

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<sup>100</sup> *Id.* at 615 (Nov. 1, 2001).

<sup>101</sup> Pub. L. No. 108–21, 117 Stat. 650 (April 30, 2003).

<sup>102</sup> USSG, App. C, Amend. 651 (Oct. 27, 2003).

commerce to persuade or entice a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct, or to transmit information about a minor that might encourage any person to engage the minor in prohibited sexual activity.


***Sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.*** Other *sexual exploitation* offenses are prosecuted under Chapter 110 of Title 18, United States Code. Sexual exploitation offenses involve the production of child pornography or the exploitation of children for the purposes of prostitution or pornography production, as opposed to *sexual assault* offenses, which involve sexual contact between the offender and victim. Trafficking and possession of child pornography by any means, including but not limited to the Internet, also are prosecuted under these provisions.

A significant number of additional offenses come to the federal courts through federal jurisdiction over Native American lands, military bases, and federal parks. These are usually *sexual abuse* cases, involving what are commonly called rape, statutory rape, and molestation. These are prosecuted under Chapter 109A of Title 18 United States Code. As a result of this special federal jurisdiction, the majority of defendants sentenced for these crimes in the federal courts are Native Americans, with the vast majority in the districts of New Mexico, Arizona, and South Dakota. In 2001, 63 percent of the offenders subject to these sentences were Native Americans.

In practice, some cases might be prosecuted under a number of alternative statutory provisions. The guidelines contain cross-references so that, for example, a conviction for traveling to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with a minor will be sentenced under the guideline for sexual abuse, or attempted sexual abuse, if that guideline better captures the defendant's real offense behavior. When describing historic trends extending to preguidelines practice, however, cases must be grouped according to their statutes of conviction.

***Use of imprisonment and prison time served.*** The thumbnail graphs, Figures 2.19 and 2.20, show the percentage of sexual abuse offenders and sexual exploitation offenders who receive each type of sentence as well as changes in the sentences imposed and time actually served. The percentage of offenders receiving imprisonment increased for both types of offenders, and dramatically so for sexual exploitation offenders who are subject to the recent crackdowns on child pornography. Fewer than ten percent of either type of offender receives probation or intermediate sanctions.

Sentences imposed on sexual abuse offenders show the same decreases observed for violent offenders, but time actually served has remained fairly constant throughout the period of study. The average length of time served for sexual exploitation, however, has increased by twenty months from its preguidelines level.



## E. Certainty, Severity, and the Scale of Imprisonment

### 1. Policymaking in the Guidelines Era

*A mix of independent and joint actions.* The preceding survey of sentencing trends for different offenses reveals a mixed pattern of policymaking by both Congress and the Sentencing Commission. Continuity with past practices, or changes from them, often can be traced to particular decisions by the Commission when it drafted or amended the guidelines. The Commission chose to keep prison terms for many types of crimes consistent with historic levels, as revealed by its study of past practices. But for several offenses, notably firearm and certain violent offenses, the Commission chose to increase penalties. Among economic crimes, the Commission reduced the use of simple probation for “white



collar” offenses while lowering sentences for some other property crimes in order to eliminate disparity that it detected in past practice. For still other offenses, particularly alien smuggling and illegal entry, separate actions by both the Commission and Congress resulted in significant increases in sentence severity at repeated points over the past fifteen years.

For several important offenses, however, it is impossible to disentangle the effects of Commission actions from those of Congress. Mandatory minimum penalties directly control the sentence in many cases, but their greatest influence is indirect. Mandatory minimum statutes highlight certain case characteristics, such as drug quantity, and establish offense severity levels that the Commission incorporates within the guidelines structure. In addition, as shown by congressional directives to the Commission listed in Appendix B, Congress has influenced policymaking through a variety of other methods, including changes to statutory maximums accompanied by instructions to the Commission to amend the guidelines, general “sense of the Congress” resolutions, and specific directives to amend the guidelines in particular ways. The Commission has invariably followed congressional directives and has taken care to ensure that all its actions conform to law.

***Sentencing and prison populations.*** The changes in sentencing policy occurring since the mid-1980s—both the increasing proportion of offenders receiving prison time and the average length of time served—have been a dominant factor contributing to the growth in the federal prison populations depicted in Figure 2.1. Given that drug trafficking constitutes the largest offense group sentenced in the federal courts, the two-and-a-half time increase in their average prison term has been the single sentencing policy change having the greatest impact on prison populations. Increases for other crimes, such as firearms, also have been significant (Blumstein & Beck, 1999).

Sentencing policy is not the only factor contributing to prison population increases, however. Sheer growth in the federal criminal docket has also been a major influence. The number of cases referred to United States Attorneys for prosecution has grown considerably during the guidelines era, reflecting increased resources appropriated for federal law enforcement (BJS, 2001). No decrease in federal prosecution rate or increase in declination rate, while varying somewhat from crime-to-crime and year-to-year, has offset the growth in the number of cases referred for prosecution. The result is dramatic growth in the number of offenders convicted and sentenced in federal court. For example, the number of drug trafficking offenders sentenced in federal court increased from just under 5,000 cases in 1984 to nearly 25,000 cases in fiscal year 2001.

This growth in the federal criminal docket is *not* a reflection of rising crime rates; indeed, throughout the 1990s, the national crime rate decreased, as measured both by the Uniform Crime Reports and the National Victimization Survey. Similarly, the number of daily and monthly users of most types of drugs, and by inference the number of drug dealers, has declined throughout the guidelines era (BJS, 2001). The federal criminal justice system simply is handling an increasing proportion of a decreasing number of criminals in the United States and imposing increasingly severe penalties upon them.

## 2. *Sentencing Guidelines: A New Instrument of Policy Control*

As described at the beginning of this chapter, studies of the “scale of imprisonment” have questioned whether imprisonment rates vary as a result of conscious policymaking or from cultural and historical forces beyond human control (Zimring & Hawkins, 1991). The different trends for different offense types reviewed in the previous section certainly suggest that federal prison population growth in the guidelines era has resulted in significant part from deliberate policy choices made by Congress and the Sentencing Commission. The growth could have been less, or more, but the choices that were made substantially increased the certainty and severity of punishment for many types of crimes, and for some crimes quite substantially.

While it is often impossible to disentangle the influences of Congress and the Commission on sentencing practices, it is important to note that the data demonstrate that the guidelines can control and change sentencing practices even in areas where there are no mandatory minimum penalty statutes. Because they take into account many more factors than the statutes, the guidelines create the potential for more precisely targeted policymaking than is possible through mandatory minimum penalty statutes.

Sentencing with explicit and detailed rules, instead of the largely unguided discretion of the preguidelines era, has created something that did not exist before: a precise legal instrument for policy control. One may agree or disagree with the policies the rules represent, but the creation of rules itself brings greater *transparency* to sentencing. This allows all interested parties—whether attorneys negotiating a plea agreement in a particular case, or officials managing the prison population—to better understand and predict federal sentencing practices (Goldsmith & Gibson, 1998).

To date, the guidelines have been used, often pursuant to explicit congressional directives, to increase the certainty and severity of punishment for most types of crime. They could, however, be used to advance different goals, that also are mentioned in the SRA: “For example, the guidelines could be structured and managed “to minimize the likelihood that the federal prison population will exceed the capacity of the federal prisons, as determined by the Commission.”<sup>103</sup> Some commentators have argued that the Commission neglected this goal (Parent, 1992), while others argue that this “capacity limitation” was given a low priority in the SRA as finally enacted (Stith & Koh, 1993). To date, Congress has proven willing to appropriate the funds needed to expand the capacity of the federal prisons to the levels needed to accommodate expanded federal prosecution and increased sentence severity.

If policymakers choose to limit prison growth in the future, however, the guidelines provide a precise instrument for controlling federal sentencing policy. Controlling prison populations and correctional budgets, while protecting the public by reserving prison space for the most dangerous offenders, has been one of the noteworthy successes of sentencing reform and sentencing guidelines

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<sup>103</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 994(g).

in the states (Wright, 2002). If controlling the scale of federal imprisonment becomes a priority in the future, the guidelines are in place to shape sentencing practices to the evolving needs of the system.

# Chapter Three: Presentencing, Inter-Judge, and Regional Disparity

## A. Introduction

Eliminating unwarranted sentencing disparity was the primary goal of the Sentencing Reform Act [SRA]. The legislative history of the SRA, reviewed in Chapter One, devotes more space documenting the “shameful disparity” constituting a “major flaw in the existing criminal justice system” than on any other aspect of pre-guidelines sentencing practices.<sup>104</sup> The SRA directs the United States Sentencing Commission to establish policies and practices that will “provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices.”<sup>105</sup> The Commission is also directed to “assure that the guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders.”<sup>106</sup>

The following two chapters review the empirical evidence concerning whether these central goals of sentencing reform have been achieved. This chapter focuses on inter-judge and regional differences and the impact of presentencing stages on sentencing uniformity. The next chapter investigates potential sources of racial, ethnic, and gender disparity.

### 1. *Definitions of Disparity*

***Form and substance.*** While there is widespread agreement that unwarranted disparity should be eliminated, there is less agreement on how to define it. Similar treatment for similar offenders and different treatment for different offenders is the hallmark of fair sentencing. But this formal definition is incomplete because it does not tell us how to classify offenders as similar or different (Cole, 1997). We need to identify which characteristics of offenses and offenders are relevant to our sentencing goals to know how to classify offenders.

In the federal system, sentencing goals are supplied by the statutory purposes of sentencing found at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), which were prioritized by the federal sentencing guidelines (Hofer

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<sup>104</sup> SENATE REPORT, *supra* note 1.

<sup>105</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).

<sup>106</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 994(d).

& Allenbaugh, 2003). The guidelines place primary importance on proportionate punishment—fitting the severity of punishment to the seriousness of the offense. Offense characteristics bearing on the *harms* caused by the offense and the offender’s *culpability* for those harms are especially relevant to assessing offense seriousness. The need to protect the public from additional crimes by the offender makes the offender’s *risk of recidivism*, as measured by their criminal history, also highly relevant. Unwarranted disparity is eliminated when sentencing decisions are based only on offense and offender characteristics related to the seriousness of the offense, the offender’s risk of recidivism, or some other legitimate purpose of sentencing.

***Common sources of unwarranted disparity.*** In the debates leading to passage of the SRA Congress identified differences among judges in sentencing philosophy and, to a lesser extent, differences among regions in sentencing practices as common sources of unwarranted disparity. Research evidence demonstrated that philosophical differences among judges affected the sentences they imposed, and that sentences varied significantly depending on the judge to whom an offender was assigned. The Federal Judicial Center’s Second Circuit Study—cited in the legislative history of the SRA—found dramatic differences among judges in the sentences they imposed on an identical set of hypothetical offenders (Eldridge & Partridge, 1974). Judges were sent presentence reports based largely on 20 actual federal cases representing a range of typical offenses and were asked what sentences they would impose. Differences of several years were common; in one case more than 17 years separated the most severe from the least severe sentence. The data showed that handfuls of judges were consistently more severe or more lenient than their colleagues. More important, judges varied in their approaches to particular crime types. Some judges treated drug traffickers relatively leniently while sentencing white collar offenders more harshly; other judges displayed the reverse pattern. Forst and Wellford (1981) also found significant inter-judge disparity and analyzed the role played by each judges’ sentencing philosophy in greater detail. Using a sample of 264 federal judges sentencing a different series of hypothetical cases, they found that judges who were oriented towards utilitarian goals (incapacitation and deterrence) gave sentences at least ten months longer on average than judges who emphasized other goals.

In addition to differences in philosophy among individual judges, several studies of preguidelines sentencing found geographical variations in sentencing patterns, suggesting that different political climates or court cultures can affect sentences. Research sponsored by the Department of Justice in the 1970s showed that judges placed differing importance on various factors depending on the region in which they sat (Sutton, 1978; Rhodes & Conly, 1981). Regional differences arise not just from the exercise of judicial discretion, but also from differences in policies among U. S. attorneys and in the practices of individual prosecutors.

## ***2. Increased Transparency of the Sentencing Decision***

Sentencing may now be the most transparent part of the criminal justice system. Not only is sentencing done publically in open court, with factual findings and determinations of law made on the record, but a detailed database of offense and offender characteristics and the judge’s decisions are compiled by the Sentencing Commission. With the exception of confidential

information contained in the presentence report (such as an offender’s medical history) most of this information has been made available to researchers and to the public.

We know more about the federal sentencing process today than ever before. One measure of this growth in understanding is what researchers call the “percentage of variance accounted for” by statistical models of the sentencing decision. Variance is a statistical term for the total of all variations in a group of sentences from the average sentence. Prior to the guidelines, researchers typically could account for 30 to 40 percent of the variance in sentences. Today that percentage has risen to over 80 percent, primarily because the factors that determine sentences are in large part identified in the guidelines themselves and in the data the Commission collects. Sentencing is the most-studied stage of the criminal justice process, and investigations of sentencing disparity are the most common subject of empirical inquiry in part because of this transparency.

## **B. Disparity Arising at Presentencing Stages**

The SRA focused primarily on sentencing, but Congress and the Commission recognized from the beginning that sentencing could not be considered in isolation. Decisions regarding how investigations should be conducted, what charges to decline or dismiss, what plea agreements to reach, and other decisions made prior to conviction and sentencing can all affect the fairness and uniformity of sentencing.

As described in Chapter One, the SRA directed the Commission to develop several mechanisms to monitor, and if necessary, control some of the effects of presentencing stages. The Department of Justice and the Judicial Conference of the United States also developed policies and procedures designed to ensure that the guidelines were not undermined by charging or plea bargaining variations. In 2003, the Department reaffirmed its belief that “[j]ust as the sentence a defendant receives should not depend upon which judge presides over the case, so too the charges a defendant faces should not depend upon the particular prosecutor assigned to handle the case.”<sup>107</sup>

The detailed federal sentencing guidelines take into account a large number of aggravating and mitigating factors in order to precisely tailor the severity of punishment to the seriousness of the crime and the dangerousness of the offender. Presentencing decisions can result in punishment that is either more severe or more lenient than the guideline sentence that would otherwise apply to the case. Uneven charging or plea agreements that fail to fully account for offenders’ criminal conduct can result in sentences that are both disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime and disparate among offenders who engaged in similar conduct. As reviewed below, several mechanisms leading to this type of disproportionality and disparity have been identified by researchers and by participants in the sentencing process.

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<sup>107</sup> Ashcroft Charging Memo, *supra* note 24, September 22, 2003, at 2.

Disparity arising at presentencing stages has been described as often occurring “below the radar screen” (Saris, 1997). Plea and sentencing procedures require that plea agreements be disclosed to the court, but not all the reasons for presentencing decisions are necessarily stated on the record, and fewer public documents and statistical data exist to investigate the reasons for, and effects on sentences of, decisions to decline or bring charges, or to stipulate to particular sentencing facts or guideline provisions. Some commentators have called circumvention of the guidelines that would properly apply to a case a form of “hidden departure” (Wolf & Broderick, 1991; Schulhofer & Nagel, 1997; Hofer et al., 1999; Berman, 2000). Avoiding potentially applicable penalty statutes or circumventing applicable guidelines may result in sentences, in some cases, that are better suited to achieve the purposes of sentencing than the sentence that would result from strict adherence to every applicable law. But unlike judicial departures—which require reasons stated on the record and reviewable on appeal—presentencing decisions may open a gulf between sentencing “by the book” and sentencing “by the bargain,” which can undo the transparency and uniformity intended by the SRA (Freed, 1992).

The extent to which concerns about the effects of presentencing decisions have proven valid is an important issue for federal sentencing today and in the years ahead. The data available to assess these effects are not as detailed and complete as data on the sentencing decision itself. The data that are available, however, suggest that presentencing stages remain important in achieving sentence uniformity, and that some of the components of guidelines implementation that were designed to ensure uniformity have proven inadequate to the task or have not worked as intended.

### ***1. Presentencing Stages That Can Affect Sentencing Uniformity***

Commentators have identified several stages and decision points prior to sentencing that can affect the uniformity of sentencing decisions.

***Investigation techniques.*** Under the guidelines, sentences are based on detailed facts concerning offenders’ criminal conduct. The links between sentences and, for example, the quantity of drugs or money involved in the offense, the presence of a gun, or the location of the crime, are widely known to prosecutors and police. This enables them to predict the likely sentence based on the facts developed and brought forward at sentencing. Berlin (1993) argues that manipulation of defendant’s sentencing exposure during the investigation phase is a significant source of continuing disparity in the federal system. For example, rather than arrest a drug seller when his crime first becomes known, police could choose to make additional purchases until the quantity of drugs involved reaches the amount needed to trigger the sentence the police believe appropriate (Zlotnick, 2004). Judges have recognized a ground for departure from the guidelines for some types of police conduct—“sentencing entrapment”—when, for example, police induce a defendant to cook powder cocaine into crack cocaine in order to qualify the defendant for a harsher penalty (Fisher, 1996).

***Charging decisions.*** Decisions about which charges to decline or bring against a defendant have binding consequences for the final sentence. The guidelines were designed to minimize the effects of uneven charging decisions in many circumstances, as described in Chapter One. But in

some cases the statutory minimum and maximum penalties provided for the counts of conviction constrain the judge's discretion and trump guideline range that would otherwise apply to the offenders' conduct (Nagel & Schulhofer, 1989, 1992).

Mandatory minimum statutory penalties sometimes require a sentence *above* the otherwise applicable guideline range. For example, many offenders who are convicted of trafficking drug amounts just above the five- and ten-year thresholds cannot receive the full benefit of the guidelines' adjustments for acceptance of responsibility or mitigating role in the offense, because they do not qualify for a waiver of the mandatory minimum penalty under USSG §5K1.1 or the "safety valve." Charging an offender with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) usually, although not always, results in a sentence above the guideline range that would apply if the drug trafficking guideline's enhancement for possession of a firearm were applied instead (Hofer, 2000). Charging several counts of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in the same indictment—so-called "count stacking"—can result in sentences dramatically higher than the otherwise applicable guideline range, because mandatory prison terms are increased from at least five to at least twenty-five years for each subsequent conviction, even if sentenced at the same time, and must be imposed to run consecutively (Etienne, 2003). Including a money laundering count in an indictment once substantially increased the guideline range for conduct that might otherwise have been appropriately sentenced under a different guideline (USSC, 1997). (A 2001 amendment to the guidelines reduced, but did not eliminate, this effect of charging decisions.)<sup>108</sup>

In other cases, use of charges that understate the true offense conduct—for example, charging drug possession or use of a communications facility instead of drug trafficking—caps the statutory sentencing range *below* the level required by the guidelines for offenders' real offense conduct (USSC, 1995). The Commission has more than quintupled the number of cross-references to the guidelines through the years based on research findings that some offenders guilty of serious crimes, such as aggravated sexual abuse, were being charged and sentenced for less serious crimes like statutory rape or abusive sexual contact (USSC, 1992). Despite these attempts to undo the effects of undercharging, some evidence suggests that cross references are viewed as optional by some prosecutors and courts and are not always used as intended (USSC, 1996, 1997).

***Plea bargaining.*** Agreements not to charge or to dismiss charges are often made as part of plea negotiations between the parties. Plea agreements can be reached before indictment or between the time of indictment and sentencing. Plea agreements also may contain stipulations that a particular sentencing factor or provision of the sentencing guidelines does or does not apply to the case, or recommendations that a specific sentence is appropriate.<sup>109</sup> These stipulations and recommendations may be either non-binding or binding. Courts may reject plea agreements, but once an agreement with a binding recommendation is accepted, the court is obligated to sentence in accordance with the agreement. If an agreement is rejected, the court must personally advise the

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<sup>108</sup> USSG, App. C, Amend. 634 (Nov. 1, 2001).

<sup>109</sup> Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(B) and (C).



defendant that the sentence may be less favorable than the agreed-upon sentence and give the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his or her guilty plea.<sup>110</sup>

Early in the guidelines era, Commission-sponsored research suggested that plea bargaining was leading to circumvention of the guidelines in a significant number of cases (Schulhofer & Nagel, 1989, 1992, 1997). In addition to charge bargaining, researchers reported that new types of plea agreements had developed under the guidelines, including fact bargaining and date bargaining (Alschuler & Schulhofer, 1989). Fact bargains include agreements on sentence-relevant considerations, such as the amount of drugs involved in an offense or the presence of a firearm. Date bargaining occurs when the parties negotiate over when an offense occurred, in order to use a particular edition of the *Guidelines Manual* that is more favorable to a defendant than a later edition.

While charging and plea bargaining are officially regulated by nationwide DOJ policies, researchers reported that in practice these policies were less determinative of prosecutorial conduct than internal U.S. Attorney's office policies. Judicial scrutiny of plea agreements, supported by probation officers' independent presentence investigations, were often inadequate to control plea bargaining because both judges and probation officers were heavily dependent on the information provided by the prosecutor in a given case. In addition, resource limitations and a reluctance to reject agreements, for a variety of reasons discussed further below, made judicial rejection of plea agreements that undermined the guidelines relatively rare.

***The presentence investigation.*** Probation officers are responsible for conducting the presentence investigation and informing the court in the presentence report of all the facts relevant to guidelines application. The probation officers' review of the offense conduct and explicit analysis of the impact of the plea agreement on the sentence helps inform judges' review of plea agreements. This investigative function that helps ensure that the guidelines are faithfully applied has led probation officers to be called the "guardians of the guidelines" (Bunzel, 1995).

Surveys of probation officers have consistently found variations in how offense conduct is investigated (FJC, 1990; USSC, 1991; Bowman, 1996). In some districts, probation officers conduct independent investigations, even interviewing prosecution witnesses and examining taped conversations or laboratory reports. In other districts, probation officers rely on the prosecution's version of the offense, even incorporating the government's written version of the offense directly into the "Offense Conduct" section of the presentence report. The amount of relevant conduct outside the counts of conviction, or potential grounds for upward or downward departure, uncovered by the probation officer depends on the intensity of the presentence investigation (Zlotnick, 2004). If these investigations are waived or abbreviated, relevant differences among offenders may go undiscovered and dissimilar offenders may be treated similarly.

***Filings of motions and notices.*** Statutory provisions give prosecutors sole discretion to seek certain increases or reductions of sentences. For example, 21 U.S.C. § 841 provides lengthier

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<sup>110</sup> Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(5).

mandatory minimum prison terms for offenders who commit certain drug trafficking offenses subsequent to a prior conviction for a drug felony in either state or federal court. To obtain the increased penalties, 21 U.S.C. § 851 provides that prosecutors must file notice of their intention to seek the enhancement prior to the sentencing hearing. Similarly, departures from the guidelines for a defendant's substantial assistance in the prosecution of other persons under USSG §5K1.1, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 35(b) may be granted only upon motion of the government. (These motions are the only means by which a mandatory minimum penalty can be waived, other than the "safety-valve" exception at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) for certain first-time nonviolent drug offenders.) More recently, the PROTECT Act gave prosecutors sole authority to move for an additional reduction of one offense level for offenders who accept responsibility for their crime in a timely manner, thereby saving the government the cost of preparing for trial—a decision that had previously been left to the court. In addition, the departure of up to four levels below the otherwise applicable offense level authorized by the PROTECT Act for offenders who participate in an authorized early disposition program may be granted only upon motion of the prosecutor.<sup>111</sup>

## ***2. Surveys Suggest Sentencing Disparity Results from Presentencing Stages***

Preliminary evidence suggesting that sentencing disparity results from presentencing decisions comes from surveys of court practitioners. Several times in the life of the guidelines, researchers have asked practitioners to complete detailed questionnaires on the practical operation of the sentencing guidelines. While the results of these surveys are not strictly comparable due to differences in the wording of questions, the surveys reveal the perceptions and concerns of court practitioners and how those concerns have evolved over the guidelines era.

The earliest warning that charge and sentence bargaining were persisting into the guidelines era came from a survey of judges in one circuit (Alschuler & Schulhofer, 1989). Judges reported that the frequency of charge and sentence bargaining was roughly the same during the guidelines era as before, and that new forms of plea bargains were being developed. Just over two years later, as part of its Four-Year Evaluation, the Commission conducted its own survey in which judges were asked the effects of presentencing bargaining on sentencing disparity (USSC, 1991). However, the majority of judges reported that pre-indictment or post-indictment plea agreements were a source of unwarranted disparity in only some or a few cases. Only a minority of judges supported additional regulation of plea agreements beyond the policy statements contained in Chapter Six of the *Guidelines Manual*. Many other members of the court community, however, including probation officers and defense attorneys, identified presentencing decisions as a source of unwarranted sentencing disparity.

Two more surveys of court practitioners were conducted in the mid-1990s. The Commission's Probation Officers Advisory Group conducted a nationwide survey of federal

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<sup>111</sup> USSG App. C, Amends. 649 (April 30, 2003) and 651 (October 27, 2003); Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 401(g), 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650 (April 30, 2003).

probation offices and received responses from eighty-five districts (Bowman, 1996). Although not without methodological limitations (Berman, 1996), the survey reported some troubling findings. Just over half of the districts reported that “when guideline calculations are set forth in a plea agreement, they are supported by offense facts that accurately and completely reflect all aspects of the case.” But 43 percent of the districts reported that this was true just half the time or less. Probation officers reported preparing presentence reports that described the real offense conduct in almost all cases, but officers relied to a great extent on information supplied by prosecutors. In some districts and cases, respondents indicated that prosecutors tried to limit or manipulate information used in applying the guidelines. In a significant number of districts, probation officers reported that the court would usually or nearly always defer to the plea agreement when it conflicted with information in the presentence report.

The Federal Judicial Center conducted a survey of chief probation officers as well as Article III judges in 1996. The findings showed that “respondents believe much of the discretion that resided with judges before the guidelines has been shifted to prosecutors” (FJC, 1997, p. 6). About three-quarters of district judges and over half of chief probation officers reported that prosecutors had more influence on the final sentence than did judges. The vast majority of respondents reported that plea agreements in their district contained stipulated facts. More than a quarter of the judges reported that plea stipulations understated the offense conduct somewhat frequently or very frequently, while another 12 percent said they did so about half the time. Judges reported that they did sometimes “go behind” the plea agreements to examine underlying conduct, but they reported doing so “infrequently.” In contrast to the 1991 survey, 73 percent of judges felt that plea agreements were a hidden source of unwarranted disparity.

### ***3. Field Studies Suggest Sentencing Disparity Results from Presentencing Stages***

More evidence that disparity arises at presentencing stages comes from field studies conducted in several federal districts. This research suggests that different districts have evolved different “adaptations” to the guidelines system and to caseload pressures and other local conditions (Braniff, 1993; Bersin & Feigin, 1998). These various adaptations may be more or less formalized and regularized within a given district, and may be developed by U.S. Attorneys in each district with or without coordination with local judges and probation officers. The various types of “fast-track” programs that were developed in several districts beginning in the late 1990s are an example of a relatively formalized adaptation. The provisions of the PROTECT Act and recent initiatives of the Department dealing with early disposition programs are an attempt to centralize and regulate these mechanisms (DOJ, 2003).

Some districts control their workload with strict intake and charge declination policies, declining to prosecute, for example, marijuana cases that involve less than a ton of drugs—an amount that would be a major federal case in another district (Gleeson, 2003). Still other districts utilize post-indictment charge bargaining, fact bargaining, or other plea agreements to move their cases and obtain defendant cooperation, either as part of a systematic program or on a more ad hoc

basis. One district may employ liberal use of section 5K1.1 motions and departures, while a neighboring district achieves a similar overall departure rate through use of departures for mitigating circumstances other than substantial assistance (Farabee, 1998). Comparing data from four different federal courts, Storto (2002) suggested that different paths—for example, systematic charge bargaining in immigration cases in one district and departure bargaining in another—can sometimes lead to similar results.

One of the earliest and most comprehensive series of field studies was the work of Nagel and Schulhofer mentioned above (Schulhofer & Nagel, 1989, 1992, 1997). They concluded that circumvention of the guideline sentence was common, but that such circumvention was not necessarily “wrong” but “a covert vehicle for downward departure.” These hidden departures were motivated by a variety of reasons, including efforts to save time and resources and to provide incentives for defendant cooperation in addition to the incentives already included within the guidelines. In addition, several areas where the guidelines lacked flexibility were identified, which caused prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges to search for ways to circumvent the guidelines’ strict requirements. These areas included an overemphasis on harm- and quantity-driven offense characteristics, a relative neglect of offender characteristics, and overall severity levels required by statutory minimum penalties and the guidelines pegged to them that were regarded by a significant number of judges and prosecutors as unnecessarily harsh in some cases, particularly for drug trafficking offenses. The authors concluded that prosecutorial discretion “if unchecked, has the potential to recreate the very disparities that the Sentencing Reform Act was intended to alleviate” and they warned that the system for regulating plea bargaining—relying on 1) probation officers’ investigations, 2) judicial review of plea agreements, and 3) Department of Justice charging and plea policies—might prove ineffectual.

More recently, Marks (2002) studied the effects of prosecutorial decisions in one district court, focusing on these same three mechanisms designed to help control disparity, as well as the relevant conduct rule. Interviews revealed that key participants in the sentencing process were generally unfamiliar with the contents of the policy statements in Chapter Six governing judicial review of plea agreements. “Informational asymmetry” between the government and the court made it unrealistic for probation officer investigation to fully inform the court about offenders’ real offense conduct. Implementation of the relevant conduct provision was further hindered by ambiguity in the language of the rule, discomfort with the role of law enforcement in establishing relevant conduct, and discomfort with the severity of sentences that often result from inclusion of all relevant conduct in guidelines determinations. Department of Justice policies then in place were also viewed as ineffective at achieving charging and plea bargaining uniformity.

A former prosecutor and current federal judge has argued that regional disparities in prosecutorial conduct are endemic and may be impossible to eliminate (Gleeson, 2003). Using drug couriers as an example, the judge demonstrated how two similar couriers arriving into the country in two different districts are subject to penalties over fifty percent higher in one than the other, due to the existence in one district of an agreed-upon program of maximum reductions for role in the offense for drug couriers.

The successful effort to restrain judicial discretion...has not produced a system in which similarly situated offenders are treated alike. Prosecutors have always been vested with ample discretion, and the Guidelines' diminution of the power of judges further enhanced the power of federal prosecutors. Differences in the exercise of that discretion among U.S. Attorneys, and by individual U.S. Attorneys in specific cases, have resulted in the differential treatment of similar cases, and account for the lion's share of the remaining disparities in federal sentencing (*id.* at 1701).

Judge Gleeson advised the Commission not to concern itself with presentencing disparity, however, since regional differences in public attitudes toward different types of crime and other local conditions make disparate practices inevitable. He concluded this does "not mean that the Guidelines have failed to achieve their essential goal" of controlling judicial discretion (*id.* at 1711).

#### **4. *Quantifying the Extent of Disparity Arising at Presentencing Stages***

**Limited data.** While surveys and field research suggest that unwarranted disparity arises at presentencing stages, such evidence can be challenged as anecdotal and impressionistic. Quantifying the effects of presentencing decisions is hampered by a lack of systematic data on police and prosecutorial practices. Only a few numerical estimates have been attempted. Based on their field studies in ten federal districts early in the guidelines era, Schulhofer and Nagel (1997, p. 1284) estimated that circumvention of the guidelines occurred in 20 to 35 percent of cases. The only other attempt to quantify the exact impact of plea bargaining through statistical analysis was conducted by the Commission in its Four-Year Evaluation. The Commission reported that in 14 percent of all guilty plea cases sentenced in 1989, the plea agreement resulted in a sentence below the minimum of the original guideline range.

These early estimates are unreliable bases for quantifying the precise impact of presentencing stages on sentencing today and more research is sorely needed. Recent revisions to Department of Justice policies, which reiterate that plea agreements are to be placed on the record<sup>112</sup> and forwarded to the Commission,<sup>113</sup> may help facilitate additional research in the coming years. Yet the existence of pre-indictment bargaining, limitations in the ability of probation officers to investigate and report offenders' real offense conduct, and judicial inability or unwillingness to review and reject plea agreements that understate the real offense will continue to hamper research.

**Research based on case documentation submitted to the Commission.** The Commission has periodically used the case documentation it receives on the vast majority of cases sentenced under the guideline to shed light on the sentencing effects of charging and plea bargaining decisions. Original and superceding indictments, plea agreements, and information provided by probation

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<sup>112</sup> Ashcroft Charging Memo, *supra* note 24, September 22, 2003, at 5.

<sup>113</sup> The PROTECT Act amended 28 U.S.C. § 994(w) to require the Chief Judge of each district to submit a report of each sentence to the Commission, including any plea agreement.

officers in presentence reports are studied to reconstruct, as best as possible, offenders' real offense conduct and to compare it with the conduct for which they were ultimately held accountable. This has proven some of the most difficult research undertaken at the Commission. First in 1990, as part of the Four-Year Evaluation, and again in 1995 and 2000, the Commission collected an Intensive Study Sample (ISS)—a representative, random sample of cases sentenced in each year. The ISS is discussed in greater detail in Technical Appendix D.

Research based on information provided in presentence reports has been challenged as not accurately reflecting, for example, evidentiary problems that may attend proof of criminal conduct in some cases. Thus, estimates of undercharging or fact bargaining may be overstated if they are based on criminal conduct described by probation officers for use at the sentencing hearing, where the rules of evidence and standard of proof are more lax, which could not have been readily proven at trial. On the other hand, probation officers report that information on potentially applicable charges is sometimes not provided to them or to the court, or is excised from the presentence report if it is not used to determine the final sentence. This would cause comparisons of the conduct described in the presentence report with the conduct used for sentencing to *understate* the extent of undercharging or fact bargaining. On balance, although imperfect, data on undercharging or fact bargaining derived from presentence reports are the most reasonable and best available to quantify how presentencing stages affect the uniformity of sentencing.

***Uneven use of statutory penalty enhancements based on prior record.*** Research over the past fifteen years has consistently found that mandatory penalty statutes are used inconsistently in cases in which they appear to apply. Early in the guidelines era, the Commission reported that, among all offenders who engaged in conduct that qualified them for a mandatory minimum sentence, only 74 percent were initially charged with a count carrying the highest mandatory penalty applicable to their conduct (USSC, 1991b, pp. 56-58). Only sixty percent were ultimately convicted and sentenced at this penalty level or above.

Perhaps the firmest evidence of uneven use of statutory penalties concerns 21 U.S.C. § 841, which doubles the minimum statutory penalty for drug trafficking offenders who have a previous conviction for a felony drug offense, as long as the government files notice of its intention to seek the enhancement. Because criminal records are relatively straightforward compared to evidence concerning drug amounts or other factors, evidentiary problems are unlikely to prevent prosecutors from seeking this enhancement in a large number of cases. Yet the enhancement is more often avoided than sought. In 1991, the Commission reported that the enhancement was applied in a minority of qualified cases (USSC, 1991(b), p. 57). Analysis of data from both the 1995 and 2000 ISS samples found that the proportion of offenders with prior felony drug convictions who received the enhancement was under seven percent (6.5% and 6.9%, respectively).

Department of Justice policies explicitly permit prosecutors to forego the enhancement “after giving particular consideration to the nature, dates, and circumstances of the prior convictions, and

the extent to which they are probative of criminal propensity.”<sup>114</sup> This policy, however sound in theory, vests in prosecutors discretion to make sentencing judgments that were traditionally vested in judges, and that the Commission was designed to make with the benefit of research and study. There is reason to believe that the criminal history guidelines, which were developed based on empirical evidence on the links between prior convictions and the likelihood of recidivism, are better able to identify high-risk offenders than prosecutors deciding whether to pursue mandatory penalty enhancements available in the statutes (Krauss, 2003; USSC, 2004).

***Uneven use of firearms enhancements.*** Research on sentencing for possession or use of a firearm during a drug trafficking or violent offense has also consistently found uneven use of the statutory enhancement found at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), as well as the firearm offense level adjustments contained in the guidelines. In 1991, the Commission reported that among drug offenders, only about 45 percent who qualified for a mandatory penalty enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) were initially charged under the statute. This firearms count was later dismissed for 26 percent of the offenders initially charged. Analysis of 1995 ISS data found that only 34 percent of offenders who qualified for the statutory enhancement based on use of a firearm received the enhancement. Thirty percent received the guideline SOC instead, while 35 percent received no weapon increase of any kind (Hofer, 2000). Offenders who had merely carried or possessed a firearm, as opposed to using it, were even less likely to receive the statutory enhancement. Notably, Blacks accounted for 48 percent of the offenders who appeared to qualify for a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) but represented 56 percent of those who were charged under the statute and 64 percent of those convicted under it.

Analyses conducted for this report found that in 2000, just 20 percent of offenders who used a firearm received the statutory enhancement, 35 percent received the SOC, while 49 percent received neither. (Percentages add to more than 100 because a small number of offenders received both the statutory enhancement and the SOC. These estimates have a margin of error of about plus or minus ten percent because they are based on a random sample of cases.) As in 1995, offenders who merely carried or possessed a firearm were even less likely to receive the statutory enhancement than those who used it. Data from 2000 also showed the same pattern of disproportionate overrepresentation of Blacks among qualified offenders who actually received the statutory enhancement.

There is little empirical research exploring why enhanced penalties are sought in some cases and not in others, or whether their use reflects legally relevant factors, extra-legal factors, or arbitrary variation. A re-analysis of the Commission’s 1991 data found that racial disparity in use of mandatory penalties disappeared after controlling for additional factors, including whether the offender had pled guilty (Langan, 1992). Field research has reported that defense counsel believe the existence of penalty enhancements that are applicable at the sole discretion of the government gives prosecutors tremendous bargaining power to encourage defendant cooperation and discourage zealous defense advocacy (Etienne, 2003). Without more complete data on the legitimate

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<sup>114</sup> Ashcroft Charging Memo, *supra* note 24, September 22, 2003, at sec. I.B.5.

considerations that affect charging decisions, it is not possible to evaluate the reasons for relatively rare use of these enhancements or the disparities observed.

Department policy was recently clarified to give prosecutors additional direction regarding use of the statutory firearm enhancement. The policy directs charging one count of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in every case in which it is applicable. If an offender has three or more possible counts and the predicate offenses are crimes of violence, prosecutors are directed to charge and pursue the first two such counts. The policy is silent on what should happen to offenders with two possible counts, or where the predicate offenses are drug convictions. It also permits exceptions to these rules if an office is “particularly overburdened” and in other circumstances.<sup>115</sup>

***Statutory floors and statutory caps.*** *Not* seeking statutory minimum penalties can lead to *more* proportionate sentencing, because statutory penalties would often trump the otherwise applicable guideline range and prevent mitigating adjustments contained in the guidelines from being taken into account. From this perspective, high rates of circumvention of potentially applicable mandatory penalties may be desirable. Many offenders do not benefit from avoidance of the penalties in these circumstances, however. In 2002, ten percent of federal offenders (over 6,000) received sentences above the top of the guideline range that would otherwise have applied to their case because of a trumping statutory minimum penalty. For another five percent, a statutory penalty restricted the judge’s discretion above the minimum of the guideline range that would otherwise have applied. Hispanic offenders, who were forty percent of all offenders, were forty-nine percent of those whose guideline range was completely exceeded by a statutory minimum penalty. Drug trafficking and firearm mandatory minimum penalties are the primary cause of trumping. In a small number of cases, 80 defendants in 2001, stacking of firearm counts resulted in statutory penalties that far exceeded the otherwise applicable guideline range.

On the other hand, charging decisions sometimes limit offenders’ exposure to punishment *below* the guideline range that would otherwise apply to their offense. In 2002, 1,379 offenders were convicted of charges carrying a statutory *maximum* sentence that was below the bottom of the guideline range that applied to their offense. This was most often due to conviction of a less serious immigration offense than they actually committed, or conviction for use of a communication facility to commit a drug trafficking offense instead of drug trafficking itself.

Sentences that result from avoidance of applicable penalties may seem to those most familiar with a particular case sufficient to meet the purposes of sentencing and more appropriate than the penalty required by strict application of the statutes and guidelines. Present practices, however, which lead to strict application in some cases and avoidance in others, result in disparity that cannot be accounted for by existing data and may be unwarranted. The fact that charging decisions disproportionately disadvantage minority offenders is further reason for additional research.

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<sup>115</sup> *Id.* at sec. I.B.6.



***Departures pursuant to plea agreements.*** Finally, evidence that plea bargaining has resulted in unwarranted disparity is found in data that “pursuant to a plea agreement” has been the most or second most-frequently cited ground for downward departures in recent years (USSC, *Sourcebooks*, 1997-2002, Tbl. 25). While the policy statements in Chapter Six have always attempted to prevent judicial acceptance of plea agreements that undermine the guidelines, these policy statements were amended in 2003 to reiterate that the fact of an agreement alone is not sufficient to justify downward departure absent other mitigating circumstances.<sup>116</sup> Whether this change will be sufficient to reinvigorate the standards for acceptance of plea agreements, which field research suggests are largely unknown and widely disregarded, is an important question for the future.

One danger is that restriction of explicit downward departures will lead to an increase in “hidden departures” achieved through fact bargaining or other methods that fall “below the radar screen.” Quantifying the extent of fact bargaining is among the most difficult research issues because the effects of the bargain are built into the offense level reported to the Commission. Only by inclusion of all real offense conduct in the presentence report can the extent of fact bargaining be detectable to researchers.

## ***5. Presentencing Stages, Disparity, and the Mechanisms Designed to Control It***

Although a lack of data raises a serious obstacle to quantitative research, a variety of evidence suggests that disparate treatment of similar offenders is common at presentencing stages. Disparate effects of charging and plea bargaining are a special concern in a tightly structured sentencing system like the federal sentencing guidelines, because the ability of judges to compensate for disparities in presentence decisions is reduced. While the guidelines contain some mechanisms to ameliorate the effects of disparate charging and plea bargaining practices—such as the relevant conduct and multiple count rules, and judicial review of plea agreements—some of these mechanisms are not working as intended. By their nature, some of these mechanisms tend to work in one direction. The relevant conduct rule, for example, can increase sentences to account for criminal conduct that was not charged or that was dismissed prior to sentencing. But there is no guidelines mechanism to decrease sentences for an offender who, for example, is convicted of several counts of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) and is therefore subject to multiple consecutive mandatory penalty enhancements. If some offenders are charged in this manner while other similar offenders are not, there is little a judge can do to compensate for the resulting sentencing disparity.

The remainder of this chapter is focused exclusively on sentencing. Uniformity is defined as similar treatment of offenders who appear to be similarly based on the charges of conviction and the facts established at the sentencing hearing. Achievement of the more ambitious goal of similar treatment of offenders who engage in similar real offense conduct will also depend on uniform treatment at presentencing stages.

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<sup>116</sup> USSG, App. C, Amend. 651 (Oct. 27, 2003).

## C. Inter-judge and Regional Sentencing Disparity

In the legislative history of the SRA, Congress identified unwarranted sentencing disparity among judges and, to a lesser extent, disparity among regions, as particularly disturbing national problems.

Sentencing disparities that are not justified by differences among offenses or offenders are unfair both to offenders and to the public. A sentence that is unjustifiably high is clearly unfair to the offender; a sentence that is unjustifiably low is just as plainly unfair to the public. Such sentences are unfair in more subtle ways as well. Sentences that are disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense create a disrespect for the law. Sentences that are too severe create unnecessary tensions among inmates and add to disciplinary problems in the prisons.<sup>117</sup>

With over fifteen years of experience under the guidelines, it is fitting to evaluate the success of the guidelines system at achieving this goal and to identify any problem areas that may remain.

Analyzing sources of inter-judge and regional disparity is complicated because the potential sources are so many, varied, and interacting. Differences among judges in sentencing philosophy has long been identified as an important source of variation in sentencing (Hogarth, 1971; Carroll, 1987). Research sponsored by the Department in the 1970s showed that judges differed in the importance they placed on various factors depending on the region in which they sat (Sutton, 1978; Rhodes & Conly, 1981). Sentencing can be influenced by differences among the districts and circuits in their sentencing case law and “personas” (Demlietner, 1994). These, in turn, are influenced by the political climates of different regions of the country. A great deal of research has established the importance of the local norms of different district courts—what some researchers have called court communities (Eisenstein & Jacobs, 1977; Ulmer & Kramer, 1996; Ulmer, 1997). The norms of different courts are also influenced by practical constraints, such as court workload and the availability of different types of sentencing options.

The use of sentencing guidelines was intended to control the effects of philosophical differences among judges and varying local conditions.<sup>118</sup> But even under a detailed and binding system like the federal sentencing guidelines, differences might arise among judges in how they use the guideline range, the available sentencing options, or the departure power, all of which could result in disparity. This chapter begins by examining whether implementation of the guidelines reduced inter-judge and regional sentencing disparity. It then turns to an examination of the various sources of inter-judge and regional disparity that may remain in federal sentencing today.

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<sup>117</sup> SENATE REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46 (1983).

<sup>118</sup> The legislative history of the SRA states “[f]or the first time, Federal law will assure that the Federal criminal justice system will adhere to a consistent sentencing philosophy.” *Id.* at 59.

## 1. *The Effects of the Guidelines on Inter-judge and Regional Disparity*

The “central question” about the success of sentencing reform is whether implementation of the guidelines reduced unwarranted sentencing disparity. In its 1992 evaluation of the guidelines system, the General Accounting Office declared that this question “remained unanswered” (GAO, 1992). Today, better data and methodological innovations permit a more complete answer. The results of the latest analyses indicate that the guidelines have significantly reduced inter-judge disparity compared to the preguidelines era. Although some inter-judge disparity remains, the influence of judges’ personal philosophy on sentencing decisions has been reduced.

Regarding regional disparity, however, the available data and the methods for analysis are less robust and the conclusions are less reassuring. The available evidence suggests that regional disparity remains under the guidelines, and some evidence suggests it may have even increased among drug trafficking offenses.

***The best and most recent statistical analyses indicate that the guidelines have significantly reduced inter-judge disparity compared to the preguidelines era.***

Rates of use of guidelines mechanisms for sentencing outside the presumptive guidelines range, such as downward departures for substantial assistance to the government or departures for other mitigating circumstances vary dramatically among the circuits and the districts. In addition, with passage of the PROTECT Act<sup>119</sup> Congress re-opened the question of what types of regional disparities are to be considered unwarranted by creating a new mechanism for regional variation, “early disposition programs.”<sup>120</sup>

## 2. *Evidence of Inter-judge and Regional Variation in the Preguidelines Era*

***Uncontrolled studies.*** Data showing wide variations in the percentage of offenders sent to prison by different judges or in different regions, or in the average length of prison sentences imposed, were well known in the years preceding guidelines implementation. Congress cited some of these data (Sutton, 1978) in the legislative history of the SRA.<sup>121</sup> However, as discussed further below, simple tabulations of variations in sentences do not demonstrate *unwarranted* disparity because different judges and different regions have different types of cases, with differing offense seriousness and offender criminal histories. Some variation in average sentences is fully warranted. Only by controlling for case differences can we determine how much, if any, of the variation was unwarranted.

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<sup>119</sup> Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650 (April 30, 2003).

<sup>120</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).

<sup>121</sup> SENATE REPORT, *supra* note 1, at 41.

***Primary judge effects and interaction effects.*** Congress was also presented data from experimental research, which controlled for case differences and isolated the disparity attributable to judges. The Federal Judicial Center’s Second Circuit Study (Partridge & Eldridge, 1974) found dramatic differences among judges in the sentences imposed on hypothetical offenders. Judges were sent presentence reports representing a range of typical offenses, based largely on actual cases. Differences of several years were common. In one case more than seventeen years separated the most severe from the least severe sentence. The data showed that differences in the *average* sentences—what researchers call the “primary judge effect”—was fairly small for the majority of judges, even though a handful of judges were consistently more severe or lenient than their colleagues. This average similarity masked more substantial underlying disparities, however. Judges varied significantly in their approach to different types of cases—what researchers call “interaction effects.” Some judges treated white collar offenders more harshly than their peers, but drug offenders less harshly, while other judges’ treatment was the opposite. A second study quantified these two different types of disagreement among judges (Forst & Wellford, 1981). Again using hypothetical cases, the researchers identified how much of the variance in sentences was due to offense and offender characteristics, and how much was attributable to judges. Twenty-one percent of the variance was attributable to the primary judge effect, while thirty-four percent was attributable to interaction effects. The researchers also demonstrated that differences among judges in sentencing philosophy helped explain their differences in sentencing decisions.

***Limitations of research using hypothetical cases.*** Research using hypothetical cases demonstrated that some disparity in sentences can be attributed to the judges to whom cases were assigned. However, critics have questioned whether these findings can be generalized to the real world (Stith & Cabranes, 1998; *see also* discussion of the limitations of using hypothetical cases to evaluate the guidelines in Hofer et al., 1999). Waldfoegel (1997) used data on real cases from one federal district to evaluate the extent of inter-judge disparity in the preguidelines era. Like previous researchers, he found that the primary judge effect was less important than the interaction effects, but these accounted for only 2.3 percent and 9 percent of the variance in sentences, respectively. Research using hypothetical cases may exaggerate the extent of inter-judge disparity in the actual caseload.

### ***3. Research Concerning the Guidelines’ Effects on Disparity***

The federal system has been evaluated perhaps more thoroughly than any other, by both the U.S. Sentencing Commission itself and outside researchers. However, this increased scrutiny did not initially result in consensus about whether disparity had been reduced. Early research, using a variety of research methods and assumptions, resulted in a spectrum of opinions that varied from those who believed disparity was reduced (USSC, 1991; Karle & Sager, 1991) to those who could not tell whether there had been significant change (GAO, 1991) to those who believed disparity had actually gotten worse under the guidelines (Heaney, 1991).

***Survey results indicate growing judicial support for sentencing guidelines.*** When the federal guidelines were adopted, many judges doubted that the guidelines would be effective in

reducing disparity (Alschuler & Schulhofer, 1989). As time passed and experience with the guidelines increased, judges began to have more favorable views on the guidelines system. A 1991 survey conducted by the Commission found that judges were evenly split between those that thought the guidelines increased disparity (31.8 percent), those that thought the guidelines decreased disparity (36.2 percent), and those that thought the guidelines had no impact on disparity (32.0 percent) (USSC, 1991). In later surveys, more respondents recognized that sentencing guidelines could be an effective tool to reduce unwarranted disparity. By 2001, more than a third (36.9 percent) of federal district judges indicated that the guidelines “almost always” avoided unwarranted sentencing disparity for similar offenders convicted of similar conduct. A similar proportion (32.1 percent) thought that the guidelines often avoided this form of disparity. Just about a quarter (25.4 percent) reported that the guidelines only sometimes avoided this disparity, and only a handful of judges (5.6 percent) reported that the guidelines rarely avoided disparity (USSC, 2002).

***Early empirical evaluations of the guidelines.*** While surveys provide insights into judges’ impressions of the effects of the guidelines, empirical research that examines data on changes in actual sentencing practices is necessary to assess if the guidelines have been successful. Even with such data, however, it is difficult to isolate the effects of the guidelines from the effects of other changes that occurred at the same time as guidelines implementation. Several early evaluations illustrate problems in isolating the effects of the guidelines from shifts in the types of cases sentenced in the preguidelines and guidelines eras. (Heaney, 1989; Karle & Sager 1991; GAO, 1992. *See* Hofer et al., 1999, for a review and critique of these early studies.)

The Commission’s previous attempt to evaluate the guidelines’ success at reducing unwarranted disparity was included in the Four-Year Evaluation (USSC, 1991, pp. 279-299). The report featured a “Distributional Analysis” that compared bank robbery, cocaine distribution, heroin distribution, and bank embezzlement cases sentenced during fiscal year 1985 with similar cases sentenced in the first months of full guidelines implementation. The Commission matched offenders from the two time periods on factors deemed relevant to sentencing, *e.g.*, the approximate amount of drugs, any injury caused to any victims, the defendant’s role in the offense and criminal record, and whether the defendant pled guilty or went to trial. Variations among the matched groups at each time period were compared in terms of the sentence imposed and the expected time the defendant would actually serve. Because only offenders who met the strict matching criteria could be included in the study, the number of defendants in each group was relatively small. However, the analysis showed that the distribution of sentences for each group under the guidelines was narrower than in the preguidelines era. The Commission concluded from these results that unwarranted disparity was reduced by the guidelines.

Several reviewers criticized the Commission’s methods, however, and questioned whether the study so clearly demonstrated success. (Tonry, 1997; McDonald & Carlson, 1993; Rhodes, 1992; Weisburd, 1992. For more thorough analysis of these criticisms, *see* Hofer et al., 1999.) At the request of Congress, the GAO re-analyzed the data on several offenses using somewhat different techniques. Their analyses replicated and confirmed the Commission’s basic findings, but the GAO concluded there was insufficient evidence to establish clearly that the guidelines had reduced

disparity (GAO, 1991). One of the problems identified by critics was the small and unrepresentative sample of cases used in the study, due to the use of matched groups to achieve comparability of cases. What was needed was a different method that could examine judge-created disparity in the caseload as a whole.

#### **4. Recent Research Concerning the Guidelines' Effects on Disparity**

**The “natural experiment” method.** In 1991, the economist Joel Waldfogel introduced a method that has since been used by researchers both inside and outside the Commission to evaluate the effect of the guidelines on inter-judge disparity (Waldfogel, 1991). This “natural experiment” method exploits a common court procedure: *random assignment* of cases to judges. By measuring variation in average sentences before and after guidelines implementation among judges in the same random assignment pool, the extent to which judges influence sentences can be quantified. Waldfogel’s initial study reported no decrease in disparity under the guidelines (Waldfogel, 1991). In 1997, Payne replicated Waldfogel’s approach in more districts, with mixed results (Payne, 1997). Limitations in these early studies, and the great promise of the natural experiment method, led researchers to extend the work using more recent data and more robust statistical models. (See Hofer et al., 1997, for further discussion of all studies using this methodology.)

**Later research using the “natural experiment” method.** Commission staff published results of its research in the *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* (Hofer et al., 1999) and details of the analysis can be found in the Technical Appendix accompanying that article. The statistical model permitted quantification of inter-judge disparity across all the different cities included in the study, while comparing each judge only to other judges in the same city who were part of the same random assignment pool. Both the primary judge effect and interaction effects between judges and seven different offense types were studied. In addition, measures of the amount of variation among different regions were calculated. The magnitude of the influence of each of the explanatory factors during the two time periods was measured with the R-squared—the percentage of variance in sentences accounted for by each factor.

The study compared sentencing in fiscal years 1984-85, immediately before implementation of the guidelines, with 1994-95, after the guidelines were fully implemented. Two sets of analyses were conducted. To control for changes in the composition of the bench, the first analysis involved only judges who sentenced during both time periods. This limited the analysis to just nine cities that had at least three judges meeting this criteria, however. The primary judge effect accounted for 2.32 percent of the variation in sentences in the preguidelines era. Under the guidelines, this dropped to 1.24 percent, a reduction of almost half. The effect of judges was statistically significant at both time periods, but was substantially reduced under the guidelines.

The second analysis included all judges who were part of a random assignment pool involving at least three judges, regardless of whether they sentenced during both time periods. This expansion allowed the analysis to include 41 cities. The overall pattern of results was similar to the nine-city analysis. Again, the primary judge effect was significant at both time periods, but was

reduced under the guidelines—2.40 percent in the preguidelines era and 1.64 under the guidelines, a reduction of one-third. In this 41-city analysis, the effect of the guidelines appeared more limited and differences among cities appeared more important.

As in studies conducted in the preguidelines era, the interaction effects between different offense types and judges were substantially larger than the primary judge effect. Judges disagree about the appropriate sentence for specific cases to a greater extent than is revealed by differences in the primary judge effect, which measures only the “tip of the iceberg” of sentencing disparity.

To examine whether the effects of the guidelines varied for different offenses and in different cities, results were calculated for seven offense types separately. The results suggest that the effect of the guidelines has not been uniform. For most offenses, the judge effect decreased under the guidelines, but for robbery and immigration offenses the influence of judges increased.

Most troubling were changes in the influence of cities on sentences, which actually increased in the guidelines era. Almost all of the increase was found in drug trafficking offenses, where the city effect increased from 6.2 before guidelines implementation to 12.7 percent under the guidelines. This suggests more regional disparity in the sentencing of drug cases under the guidelines. Interpreting the city effect is difficult, however, because cases are not randomly assigned to cities. In addition, policy changes between 1984-1985 and 1994-95 could exacerbate the effects of the guidelines. For example, the greater emphasis on drug quantity in sentencing following enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 could create greater disparity between small cities and large cities, which are distribution centers for larger quantities. Note also that fiscal years 1994-1995 were prior to adoption of early disposition programs in some districts, which may have contributed to growing regional disparity in other types of cases, such as immigration.

***Research outside the Commission.*** A reduction in inter-judge disparity under the guidelines was found in a study by researchers outside the Commission, who also used the natural experiment methodology and a highly sophisticated statistical model. Anderson, Kling & Stith (1999) studied sentencing patterns in 26 cities over 12.5 years among judges who sentenced in both the preguidelines and guidelines eras. They conducted rigorous tests to confirm the randomness of assignment to judges and constructed a statistical model that allowed them to test the significance of changes in inter-judge disparity over the entire period of their study. These improvements in the model allowed them to detect “changes . . . more pronounced than the mixed results of previous studies” (p. 294).

In the preguidelines era, the expected difference in sentence lengths between two typical judges was about 17 percent of the average sentence length. Under the guidelines, this difference fell to 11 percent. Because average sentences are lengthier in the guidelines era, a given percentage of disparity among judges results in a larger absolute difference in months of imprisonment. Taking into account these changes, the authors report: “For 1986-87 when the mean sentence length was 29, the expected inter-judge difference was 4.9 months, which fell to 3.9 months in 1988-93 when the mean sentence length was 35.” Further tests indicated that the switch to guidelines, and not

changes in the composition of the bench or in the types of cases sentenced over the period of their study, accounted for the decrease in inter-judge disparity.

These authors suggest that the enactment of mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses in 1986 may have contributed to the decrease in disparity for drug offenses. They also note that the effects of discretionary decisions by law enforcement officers and prosecutors at presentencing stages have greater influence under the guidelines system, since later actors have fewer opportunities to ameliorate any effect of disparate treatment prior to sentencing. Some of the inter-judge disparity in preguidelines sentencing was likely ameliorated by the parole guidelines, which affected the prison time actually served by offenders prior to implementation of “truth-in-sentencing.”

*The sentencing guidelines have reduced inter-judge disparity.* At this time, findings from research using the natural experiment method have not been challenged and it appears unlikely that a more powerful method for studying the effects of the guidelines on inter-judge disparity will be found. The convergence of findings by researchers both inside and outside the Commission lends additional credibility to the results. The conclusion is clear: the federal sentencing guidelines have made significant progress toward reducing disparity caused by judicial discretion.

*The sentencing guidelines have made significant progress toward reducing disparity caused by judicial discretion.*

## **D. Continuing Disparity Under the Guidelines**

Though clearly reduced by the guidelines, inter-judge sentencing variations that cannot be explained by differences in the caseload remain statistically significant today. Regional disparity also appears to remain and may have increased for some types of cases. How can disparity continue in a system of detailed and binding sentencing rules? The remainder of this chapter reviews the evidence that inter-judge and regional disparity continue to exist in federal sentencing and explores how it occurs.

### **1. Continuing Regional and Inter-judge Disparities**

The natural experiment method is best for establishing whether inter-judge disparity has been reduced by implementation of the guidelines, but it is not as precise as other methods for measuring the amount of inter-judge and regional disparity today and comparing the effects of judges and regions with the warranted effects of legally relevant considerations, such as the seriousness of the crime and the criminal history of the offender.

*Uncontrolled comparisons.* The Commission’s annual *Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics* and additional information found at the Commission’s website (<http://www.ussc.gov/LINKTOJP.HTM>) contain a wealth of information on departure rates and



other sentencing variations that some commentators have used to question the guidelines' success (Miller, 2002; Mercer, 2003). These data compare the sentencing practices of each federal district with other districts and with national rates and averages. The data show that the types of sentences imposed and the average sentence lengths for offenders convicted of various types of crime vary among the districts. The rates of departure for substantial assistance or other mitigating or aggravating conditions also vary substantially among the districts and circuits.

These regional variations do not necessarily indicate *unwarranted* disparity, however, because different districts sentence different types of crimes within the general offense categories found in the reports. The types of fraud sentenced in the Southern District of New York (average fraud sentence 23.5 months) are different than the frauds sentenced in the District of North Dakota (average sentence 11.4 months). The guidelines themselves require different sentences for frauds involving different amounts of monetary loss, different numbers of victims, and many other specific offense characteristics.<sup>122</sup> Similarly, variations in the rates of a particular type of departure among different districts must be evaluated within a larger context of each district's distinctive adaptation to the guidelines system. Inferring unwarranted disparity from uncontrolled comparisons of average sentences or rates of departure may be erroneous.

***Multiple regression studies.*** One source of variation in sentences that is clearly warranted is differences in the types of cases sentenced by each judge and in each district. Researchers have sought to control for legally relevant differences among cases using the statistical technique of multiple regression. Many studies of racial and ethnic disparity have also included measures of the district and circuit in which each case was sentenced. These studies suggest that differences in offense seriousness, defendant criminal history, or other legally relevant factors account for the largest share of variation among cases, but that some statistically significant variation among regions remains unexplained.

Albonetti (1997) reported that the probability and length of imprisonment for drug offenses sentenced in the early years of the guidelines was affected by region in about half of the circuits, after controlling for offense level, criminal history points, and a number of other legally relevant factors. Everett and Wojtkiewicz (2002) grouped the circuits into five regions and reported harsher sentencing in the southern circuits and more lenient sentencing in the northeastern and western circuits. Kautt and Spohn (2002) reported a statistically significant effect in drug cases sentenced in 1997-1998 in a minority of circuits. These studies did not use the presumptive sentence method, discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four and in Technical Appendix D, to control for legally relevant differences among cases. This introduces some avoidable errors in the results, because the effects of trumping mandatory minimum statutes, mandatory firearm sentencing enhancements, and other legally relevant considerations binding on the judge were not properly specified.

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<sup>122</sup> See USSG §2B1.1.

***A new approach: hierarchical modeling.*** Recent developments in the field of statistics (*see e.g.*, Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) have introduced researchers to a new method that may be superior to multiple regression for studying inter-judge and regional differences today. Hierarchical models avoid some types of statistical bias that can arise in multiple regression models and also permit researchers to explore the *direct effects* of factors on sentences and the *conditioning effects* of higher-level factors on lower-level factors. For example, the effect of district workload on the extent of departure in a district might be studied using a hierarchical model. Several studies have appeared in the last two years using these new methods to investigate regional variation in sentencing under the federal guidelines (Ulmer et al., 2001; Albonetti, 2003; Spohn, 2003). One such study has been published at the time of this writing (Kautt, 2002).

In a study of federal drug trafficking sentences, Kautt found variations between jurisdictions that could not be accounted for by the legally relevant differences included in her model. Districts and circuits both affected sentences, with the influence of districts more important than the influence of circuits. Districts also appeared to differ in the way that legally relevant factors influenced sentences. From these results Kautt concluded that “despite the federal system’s congressionally mandated return to determinate sentencing, extra-legal factors (specifically jurisdictional effects) continue to influence the federal sentencing system and its outcomes directly and indirectly . . . these findings indicate a far greater concern: that the mechanisms of federal structured sentencing may *foster* certain forms of extralegal sentence disparity” (Kautt, 2002, p. 659).

Hierarchical models are a powerful new tool for studying regional variation, but they are “delicate and complex” (Kautt, 2002, p. 645). Mis-specification of the relationship among explanatory factors might distort results in unpredictable ways. For this reason, using the presumptive sentence method to represent legally relevant considerations seems desirable. (Kautt considered but rejected the use of a presumptive sentence model for reasons that are unclear, *see id.* at 649, n. 15.) Additional research with hierarchical models using the presumptive sentence to control for legally relevant differences among cases could prove very useful.

***A new hierarchical analysis of inter-judge and regional disparity.*** For this report, a hierarchical model of the determinants of sentence length was developed, using the presumptive sentence to control for differences among cases in the legally relevant factors taken into account by the guidelines and mandatory minimum statutes. Both judges and districts were included as levels of analysis. All cases sentenced in 2001 with full information were analyzed, with the exception of cases handled by visiting judges. Appendix D contains additional details of this analysis.

The analysis showed that legally relevant differences among cases explain the vast majority of variation among judges and regions in sentence length. Fully 73 percent of sentence variation is accounted for by the guidelines and statutes. The amount of variation that is associated with judges or

***Research using the most current statistical models continues to show relatively minor inter-judge and regional disparity not explained by case differences.***

districts is relatively small. Of the 27 percent of variance that is not accounted for by the presumptive sentence, just 2.9 percent is associated with judges within each judicial district, and 2.8 percent is among judicial districts. The remaining is unexplained case variation. The judge and district levels provide relatively minor variation of sentences compared to case differences.

## **2. *Mechanisms for Disparity Within the Guidelines System***

Congressional attention has recently focused on potential disparity arising from varying downward departure rates for mitigating circumstances identified by judges (Mercer, 2003; PROTECT Act, 2003). Less attention has been paid to other potential sources of disparity. These include variation in rates of other types of departure, such as rates of departures for substantial assistance to the government or the extent of such departures for different forms of assistance (Saris, 1997; Maxfield & Kramer, 1998; Farabee, 1998). The PROTECT Act authorized a new ground for departure for defendants who participate in qualified early disposition programs. In addition, the guidelines give judges discretion over placement of the sentence within the guideline range, including, in some cases, whether to use a sentencing option such as probation.

***Relative contribution of different mechanisms to sentence variation.*** To assess the influence of each of these mechanisms on sentencing disparity, a multiple regression analysis of sentences imposed in 2001 was undertaken. Details of this analysis are provided in Technical Appendix D. In addition to the presumptive sentence, the analysis included variables indicating whether the case 1) received a sentence within the guideline range, but above the minimum of the range, 2) received an upward departure, 3) received a downward departure for a mitigating circumstance identified by the judge, or 4) received a downward departure for substantial assistance.

As in other analyses using the presumptive sentence, the guideline and statutory factors represented by the presumptive sentence accounted for the vast majority of variation in sentences in 2001—75 percent. (Slight differences in the amount of variation accounted for by the presumptive sentence are expected due to the different populations of cases included in each analysis.) Among the mechanisms, substantial assistance departures accounted for the greatest amount of the remaining variation in sentence length—4.4 percent. Other downward departures contributed 2.2 percent, while upward departures contributed just 0.29 percent. Only 0.07 percent of the variation was explained by use of the guideline range above the guideline minimum.

***Among discretionary mechanisms within the guidelines system, substantial assistance departures contribute the greatest amount to variation in sentences, while judges' use of the guidelines range contributes the least.***

It may be surprising that substantial assistance departures account for so much more variability in sentence length than other types of downward departures, because the *rate* of the two types of departure are similar—17.1 percent and 18.3 percent, respectively (USSC, 2001, Tbl. 26).

However, the *extent* of departure for substantial assistance is on average far greater. The mean departure length for substantial assistance was 43 months (or a mean 56 percent decrease from the guideline minimum), while the mean departure length for other downward departures was just 20 months (or a mean 47 percent decrease from the lower average guideline minimum found among offenders receiving these departures).

The relative unimportance of placement within the guideline range above the minimum may also be surprising. Almost 38 percent of offenders received a sentence above the guideline minimum in 2001, and 13.8 percent were sentenced at the guideline *maximum* (USSC, 2001, Tbl. 29). But the average difference between the guideline minimum and the sentence imposed in these cases was just 6.8 months. It should be noted, however, that at the lower end of the sentencing table a six month difference may be the difference between a sentence of simple probation and six months in prison—a distinction of considerable importance to the offenders involved.

A total of just over 82 percent of the variation in individual sentence lengths could be explained by the model. This does not mean that 18 percent of the variation in sentences is unwarranted. The model only identified the relative importance of different mechanisms—how frequently the mechanism is used and how far from the presumptive sentence offenders affected by the mechanism are sentenced. It did not attempt to determine if the mechanisms were being used appropriately and uniformly. For this we must turn to research specific to each one.

### ***3. Departures upon Motion of the Government***

Several types of sentence reductions can be made only upon motion of the government. Departures from the guidelines and guideline adjustments for various forms of defendant cooperation—such as “substantial assistance in the prosecution of other persons” under USSG §5K1.1, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 35(b); participation in an “early disposition program” under USSG §5K3.1 p.s.; and timely “acceptance of responsibility” under USSG §3E1.1(b)—may all be granted only upon motion of the government. Research on several of these mechanisms has revealed considerable regional variation, suggesting that uniform practices have not been in place. Policies put in place subsequent to the PROTECT Act are too new to be evaluated with the data available for this report.

***Downward departures for substantial assistance.*** Downward departures for substantial assistance to the government in the prosecution of other persons are made pursuant to USSG §5K1.1. The policy statement permits such a departure only upon the motion of the

***Rates of substantial assistance departures vary widely among the districts.***

government, but it does not require that the judge depart whenever the government so moves. Research has shown, however, that judges almost always grant these departures when a motion is made (Maxfield & Kramer, 1997). The rates of substantial assistance motions vary among the districts. In 2002, the national rate was 17.4 percent of all offenders. Five districts had rates twice

as high as the national rate, with three districts having rates over 40 percent (USSC, 2002, Table 26). On the other hand, 12 districts had substantial assistance departure rates less than half that of the national rate, while three had rates of less than five percent.

Policy statement, section 5K1.1 sets out a non-exhaustive list of reasons for judges to consider when determining the appropriate extent of a reduction. However, no detailed nationwide policies governing how substantial assistance motions should be used, nor how the extent of the departure should be determined, have been promulgated by either the Department of Justice or the Sentencing Commission (Lee, 1997; American College of Trial Lawyers, 2001). Case law has established some principles for determining the extent of departure in some circuits.<sup>123</sup> The Commission has received limited reports of standardized discounts in some districts, although in other districts, once a motion is made the determination of the sentence is left entirely to the discretion of the sentencing judge. The majority of sentencing judges reported cases where a defendant had substantially assisted the government, but had not received a motion for a departure on that ground (FJC, 1997).

Given the wide variety of behaviors that can qualify a defendant for a substantial assistance departure, some commentators have suggested that courts are given insufficient guidance regarding the appropriate extent of departure (Berman, 2002; Bowman, 1999). Some have argued that substantial assistance departures are a source of continuing unwarranted disparities (Tease, 1992; Marcus, 1993; Gyurici, 1994; Lee, 1994, 1997), although others have cautioned that differences in rates of departure do not necessarily result in sentencing disparities (Weinstein, 1998; Storto, 2002).

Empirical research on substantial assistance departures is extremely difficult because detailed information on the most important legally relevant consideration—the nature of the defendant’s assistance to the government—is available only to the prosecutors familiar with the case. While U.S. attorneys offices are required to document the reasons underlying every substantial assistance motion (DOJ, 1992), these records are not collected into a comprehensive database that can be used for empirical analysis. However, what research has been done indicates that substantial assistance departures may be a source of continuing sentencing disparity.

A comprehensive study of substantial assistance departures was undertaken by the Sentencing Commission in the mid-1990s (Maxfield & Kramer, 1998). It included a survey of U.S. attorney offices’ policies on substantial assistance, site visits to eight districts, and an examination of the types of cooperation given by a random sample of defendants receiving substantial assistance departures, as determined by analysis of the presentence reports prepared in the case. The research uncovered irregular and inconsistent policies and practices among the various districts.

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<sup>123</sup> See Federal Judicial Center, *Guideline Sentencing: An Outline of Appellate Case Law on Selected Issues*, § VI.F.2 (2002).

- (1) While every U.S. attorney office reported some review process for the approval of substantial assistance motions, and four out of five offices had written policies regarding the use of substantial assistance motions, review of a sample of cases showed that in practice districts frequently diverged from their stated policies.
- (2) Different U.S. attorneys offices were consistent in authorizing motions for offenders who provided information against other persons, or participated in the investigation of other persons, or testified against them. But different offices varied in whether and how they considered information offenders provided concerning their own criminal conduct.
- (3) Six out of ten offenders who provided some assistance did *not* receive a section 5K1.1 motion, suggesting that prosecutors generally require that the assistance be substantial.
- (4) Offenders at higher levels of a criminal conspiracy are *not* more likely to benefit from a departure for substantial assistance than are lower-level offenders. Although occurring in some specific cases, the so-called “cooperation paradox” in which more culpable offenders receive shorter sentences than less culpable offenders was not common.
- (5) Offenders providing similar types of assistance received varying magnitudes of departure. Offenders with longer presumptive guideline sentences tended to receive greater reductions.

A lower annual rate of substantial assistance departures for Blacks has been a consistent finding in the guidelines era. Minority defendants may, in fact, be less trusting of government officials, less willing to become “snitches” due to pride or fear of reprisal, or less well-positioned to provide useful information than White offenders. Maxfield and Kramer found that Whites and women were more likely to receive a motion after controlling for offense type, guideline range, weapon involvement, and a host of factors relevant to sentencing. However, a re-analysis by Langan (1996, 2001) found that part of the difference between the races was due to their different rates of pleading guilty, and that the statistical significance of the remaining difference was questionable. Neither of these studies could adequately evaluate whether there might be legitimate reasons for differences in substantial assistance departure rates among different groups due to lack of data on the nature of the assistance various offenders provide. Beginning in 1992, Department policy required prosecutors to “maintain documentation of the facts behind and justification for each substantial assistance pleading.”<sup>124</sup> No standards for how this information is to be recorded appear to have been promulgated and the data have not been compiled or made available to outside researchers.

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<sup>124</sup> Terwilliger Bluesheet, *supra* note 43.

***Rule 35 sentence reductions.*** In addition to substantial assistance departures, U.S. attorneys offices can file motions with the court to have previously imposed sentences reduced based upon post-sentencing cooperation by an offender. These are known as Rule 35(b) motions. Data on the use of Rule 35(b) motions or on factors that might account for their use have been very difficult to obtain (Marcus, 1985). The Commission does not reliably receive reports on sentence reductions following the sentencing hearing, so analyses using the Commission’s monitoring databases cannot detect their effects on sentences. However, a recent paper using data from the Federal Bureau of Prisons presented the first empirical look at these reductions (Adams, 2003). It suggests that regional variations in practice found with §5K1.1 motions may be present with Rule 35(b) motions as well.

The number of offenders receiving Rule 35(b) sentence reductions has increased dramatically over the guidelines era, from 30 offenders in 1988 to 1,453 offenders in 2000, the last year for which data are available. The average extent of the reduction has remained fairly stable through the years, varying between 30 and 42 percent of the originally-imposed sentence, although the extent varies by district. Drug offenders are by far the most frequent beneficiaries of Rule 35(b), accounting for 80 percent of the reductions. The use of Rule 35(b) varies significantly among the districts. Most districts account for less than one percent of offenders receiving Rule 35(b) reductions in any given year, but in one recent year ten districts accounted for over two percent of offenders receiving the reduction while one district accounted for over 15 percent.

***Downward departures for participation in early disposition programs.*** The Department recently informed the Commission that prosecutors in certain districts have developed early disposition, or “fast-track” programs, that grant participating offenders sentencing concessions.<sup>125</sup> How many districts have employed these programs, and for how long, is not known. These programs offer defendants a sentence reduction, in the form of a downward departure, charge dismissal, or some other benefit, in return for the defendant’s waiver of certain procedural rights. These rights might include a prompt guilty plea, a waiver of appeal rights, and in cases involving non-citizens, the defendant’s agreement to immediate deportation. Practitioners and commentators have expressed concern that the presence of these programs in some districts, and their absence from neighboring districts, could lead to disparate sentencing outcomes for offenders convicted of similar conduct (USSC Hearing, 2003). The absence of reliable information on the types of cases which are, and which are not, sentenced pursuant to early disposition procedures prohibits analysis of the impact of these programs on sentencing disparity. But as discussed below, the presence of fact track programs in some districts explains a great deal of regional variation in downward departure rates.

The PROTECT Act sought to formalize and standardize these practices. Per the act, the Sentencing Commission authorized a downward departure from the guidelines of “not more than

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<sup>125</sup> Letter from Eric H. Jaso, Counselor to the Assistant Attorney General, DOJ, to Hon. Diana E. Murphy, Chair, USSC, regarding “Fast-Track Program,” August 12, 2003.

four levels” for offenders who participate in these programs.<sup>126</sup> The Department has outlined criteria to be used to authorize early disposition programs in some districts.<sup>127</sup> Whether these developments will ensure uniformity of sentencing under these programs cannot yet be determined. Evaluation of these programs will be possible only if the Department and relevant U.S. attorney offices provide data which reveal the workings of the fast track process.

#### 4. *Variability of Within-Guidelines Sentences*

Congress recognized in the SRA that no set of rules could anticipate every circumstance relevant to the sentencing decision. In addition to authorizing departures in exceptional circumstances, Congress permitted the Commission to design guidelines that provide a limited range of prison time for each category of offender.<sup>128</sup> The Commission determined that in the lower zones of the sentencing table, judges should have discretion to sentence offenders to prison terms or to choose from a variety of sentencing options.<sup>129</sup> At the highest offense levels the guideline range is over six years and judges may impose sentences anywhere within it. Discretion within the guideline range permits consideration of subtle differences among offenses and offenders that are not considered by the guidelines, but that do not meet the exceptional standards for departure. Guidelines commentary encourages use of the range to take account of differences in offense seriousness in some circumstances.<sup>130</sup>

***Use of sentencing options.*** The Commission’s annual *Sourcebook* contains information on the use of the sentencing range and sentencing options for various types of offenses. Figure F from the 2002 *Sourcebook*, reproduced on the following page, shows the imprisonment rates of offenders who are eligible for a non-prison sentencing option for nine offense categories. Many offenders who could receive a sentence of probation under the guidelines are imprisoned instead. Imprisonment rates of probation-eligible offenders range from over 80 percent for immigration offenders (reflecting their frequent lack of a United States residence and imminent deportation) to about 20 percent for larceny offenders. All other offense types vary between 20 and 50 percent of probation-eligible offenders receiving imprisonment instead. These findings have remained fairly stable from year-to-year.

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<sup>126</sup> USSG §5K3.1 (policy statement).

<sup>127</sup> Ashcroft Fast-Track Memo, *supra* note 46, Sept. 22, 2003.


<sup>128</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2).

<sup>129</sup> USSG §5C1.1.

<sup>130</sup> *See e.g.*, USSG §2C1.2, comment. n. 3.



**Figure F**  
**IMPRISONMENT RATES OF OFFENDERS ELIGIBLE FOR**  
**NON-PRISON SENTENCES IN SELECTED OFFENSE TYPES<sup>1</sup>**  
**Fiscal Year 2002**



The Commission’s website contains this information for each district and each circuit. (See webpage for each jurisdiction at <http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/JP2002.htm>, Tbl. 6). Nationally, 45.9 percent of offenders for whom probation is an option receive imprisonment instead, but this rate varies significantly by district. In 2001, the rates in each district varied from a low of 9.3 percent to a high of 78.1 percent. (Districts that sentenced fewer than 30 probation-eligible offenders were excluded from these analyses because their rates can be dramatically affected by a small number of offenders.) The incarceration of probation-eligible fraud offenders, for example, varied from 17 percent to 38 percent between New Jersey and Pennsylvania, two contiguous districts.

Some of this regional variation can be accounted for by differences in the specific types of offenses and offenders sentenced in each region. A 1996 Commission report examined factors associated with judges’ use of sentencing options (USSC, 1996). Using a multiple regression model, it was found that criminal history, employment status, role in the offense, citizenship, and mode of conviction accounted for much, but not all, of the variation in the use of sentencing options. Judges are more willing to consider community placement for offenders who are employed, who plead

guilty, and who played a lesser role in their offense. The guidelines themselves discourage judges from using a probationary sentence for offenders with a criminal history category of III or above.<sup>131</sup>

***Placement within the guideline range.*** For offenders who do not receive a sentencing option or a departure, judges must decide on a term of imprisonment within the prescribed guideline range. The *Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics* provides the percentage of offenders who are sentenced at the bottom, lower half, middle, upper half, or top of the guideline range for 32 different offense categories (USSC, 2002, Tbl. 29). Overall, in 2002, 59.8 percent of offenders were sentenced at the bottom of the ranges, 14.8 in the lower half, 8.9 percent at the middle, 6.4 percent in the upper half, and 10.1 percent at the top of the range. This distribution is slightly skewed to the bottom of the range compared to state guidelines systems on which data are available. For example, the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission reports that in fiscal year 2003, 65 percent of offenders were sentenced below the midpoint, 16 percent at the midpoint, and 19 percent above the midpoint (Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, 2003, p. 18).

Judges in different guidelines systems, and different judges in the federal system, vary in how they approach the guideline range. In some state guidelines systems, the presumptive sentence is in the middle of the guideline range. (See e.g., Kansas Sentencing Commission, 2002, p. 42;

***Different guidelines systems, and to a minor extent different federal judges, use the guideline range differently.***

Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, 2000.) Judges use the lower and upper ends of the range for mitigated and aggravated sentences that do not rise to the level of a departure. In other systems, including the federal system, the bottom of the range is most typically used.<sup>132</sup>

There appears to be general consensus among federal judges about how to approach the guideline range. In addition, plea agreements often specify where in the guideline range the parties agree the sentence should fall. Only a few judges use another part of the guideline range more frequently than the bottom of the range. Among the 911 federal judges who sentenced at least ten cases between 1999 and 2001, the bottom of the range was the most typical sentence for 880 of them. Twenty-four judges, however, most typically sentenced between the bottom and midpoint of the range, while two most typically sentenced between the midpoint and the top. Just one judge used the midpoint of the range most frequently, while four judges sentenced at the top of the range most frequently. It seems likely that judicial sentencing philosophy, rather than differences among the types of cases sentenced, account for these different approaches to the guideline range. While

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<sup>131</sup> USSG §5C1.1, comment. n. 7.

<sup>132</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) requires judges to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of sentencing. When determining “the particular sentence to be imposed” the court shall consider “the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established” by the guidelines.

generating a form of inter-judge disparity, these atypical practices are not widespread and fall within the range of discretion reserved for judges by the SRA.

## **5. Departures for Exceptional Circumstances**

Commentators (Berman, 2000) and empirical analyses have suggested that departures for aggravating and mitigating circumstances articulated by the judge could be a continuing source of unwarranted sentencing disparity in the guidelines system (Gelacak et al., 1996; Farabee, 1998; Adams, 1998). Congress enacted the PROTECT Act to further limit the circumstances when downward departures are authorized. The Act became effective on April 30, 2003, and the Commission's guidelines amendments pursuant to it became effective October 27, 2003, after the data for this report were collected. Thus, the effects of the Act are not addressed in this report. Research on sentencing practices prior to the Act suggest that downward departures may well be contributing to inter-judge and regional disparities, but that the reasons for variations in downward departure rates have been poorly understood.

***The Commission's report on departures.*** As part of its Fifteen-Year Evaluation of the guidelines system, the Commission published a special report, *Downward Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines* (USSC, 2003), which discussed the PROTECT Act and some of the concerns that motivated it. Empirical analyses presented in the report demonstrate that the number of cases sentenced within the guideline range decreased from 1991-2001. Until 1994 this decrease was attributable largely to an increase in departures for substantial assistance to the government, but after 1995 these departures declined slightly and other downward departures for mitigating circumstances began to increase.

Rates of departure vary by offense type, with the rate of departure for immigration offenses increasing substantially over the same years that the number of immigration offenses increased substantially. Rates of departure also vary dramatically from district to district. While a clear majority of districts in 2001 had mitigating circumstance departure rates of less than ten percent, a quarter had rates of 10-20 percent and the remainder had rates even higher. Three districts had rates over 50 percent.

***Several possible factors have contributed to the increases and variations in downward departure rates.***

The Commission's departure report discussed several possible reasons for the increasing departure rate, as well as the concerns raised during debates preceding passage of the PROTECT Act. The Supreme Court's decision in *Koon v. United States*,<sup>133</sup> which held that an abuse of discretion standard applied to appellate review of departures, was discussed in Congress as a cause of increased departures. However, the Commission's report cited evidence suggesting that the impact of *Koon* was negligible. The report also showed that appeals of downward departures by the

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<sup>133</sup> 518 U.S. 81 (1996).

government were rare both before and after the *Koon* decision, only ranging between 25 and 43 cases per year in five recent years. The data suggested that in 2001, the government initiated at least 40 percent of all downward departures for mitigating circumstances, often as part of an early disposition program or other guilty plea arrangement. The rate of downward departures for reasons other than substantial assistance that were *not* initiated by the government appeared to be approximately 10.9 percent in 2001.

The causes of variation in the rates of departure, and their potential effect on unwarranted sentencing disparity, is a complicated issue that cannot be resolved through simple examination of the reported rates. Problems with document submission (Mercer, 2003) and data accuracy (GAO, 2003) also complicate careful analysis. The strengthened reporting requirements put in place by the PROTECT Act and data collection improvements undertaken by the Commission are expected to address some of these concerns. When assessing the role of departures in creating unwarranted sentencing disparity during the first fifteen years of guidelines sentencing, however, caution is advisable and caveats are unavoidable.

***District factors influence the rate of departure more than circuit factors.*** For this report, a new analysis using a hierarchical model compared the amount of variation in departure rates associated with circuits with the amount associated with districts. (Details can be found in Technical Appendix D.) The case law governing various grounds for departure varies somewhat from circuit to circuit (Nagel & Galacek 1996; Lee 1997; Johnson 1998) and different circuits have been recognized as having different climates or “personas” regarding their amenability to departure (Demlietner, 1994). But results from the hierarchical analysis suggest that differences in circuit case law or climate, while exerting some significant influence over departure rates, are less important than differences among the districts. Only about one quarter of the variation in downward departure rates is attributable to the circuits, while three quarters is attributable to districts.

***The GAO’s exploration of regional variations.*** Recent research by the GAO investigated how much regional variation in departure rates can be accounted for by differences in offense and offender characteristics (GAO, 2003). The GAO found “major variation among certain judicial circuits and districts” (*id.* at 3-4) in the likelihood of departure in drug trafficking cases, even after controlling for a variety of offense and offender characteristics, including the type of drug involved, the presence of a weapon, the severity of the offense, whether the defendant pled guilty, and whether the offense was eligible for a mandatory minimum penalty or the safety valve. Differences among circuits and districts in the likelihood of departure were usually reduced after controlling for these characteristics, indicating that some of the regional variation is due to the different types of cases and offenders in the various regions. Significant regional variation remained, however. For example, downward departure remained 6.78 times more likely in the Ninth Circuit than in the Eighth, even after controlling for offense and offender characteristics.

Because “empirical data on all factors that could influence sentencing were not available” the GAO noted that the remaining differences “may not, in and of themselves, indicate unwarranted sentencing departures or misapplication of the guidelines.” As the Commission noted in its response

to the draft GAO report, several factors that might help account for regional variation in departure rates were not included in the GAO's analysis. Most noteworthy, the GAO did not take into account the existence in several districts of formal, government-created "fast track" programs that offer departures as part of a plea agreement as an incentive for quick waiver of certain defendant rights.

***USSC replication and extension of the GAO analysis.*** To estimate the impact of "fast track" on regional variation in departure rates, the GAO's analysis was replicated including a variable indicating whether a "fast track" program involving departures was in place in a particular district. A letter from the Department of Justice to the Commission on August 12, 2003 was used to identify those districts having such programs during the years of our analysis. The results show that regional variation in downward departure rates is greatly reduced when the presence of "fast track" programs in some districts is taken into account. In particular, the increased odds of departure in the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits (when compared to the Eighth Circuit, the same circuit used for comparison in the GAO report) are reduced by more than two-thirds. The variation in departure rates accounted for by "fast track" programs is much greater than the variation accounted for by all of the offense and offender characteristics included in the GAO's analysis combined.

However, while the highest departure rates are clearly due to the presence in some districts of "fast track" programs, significant variation remains after controlling for these programs. The odds of receiving a downward departure for mitigating circumstances remain over three times higher in the Ninth Circuit than in the Eighth, almost three times higher in the Second, and two times higher in the DC circuit. In the Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, the odds of departure are just 17 percent that of the Eighth Circuit. As noted above, however, district practices are more important than circuit factors in determining the departure rate. Within the Ninth Circuit, the odds of departure vary from Montana, with odds less than half those found in the District of Minnesota (again, the comparison districts used by the GAO) to almost twice the odds in the Northern District of California. (Arizona and Southern California were excluded due to the unusual case types and workload found in these border districts.) Similarly, while most of the districts in the Fourth Circuit have lower odds of downward departure than Minnesota, the District of Maryland has slightly higher odds. Clearly, practices particular to each district have a substantial impact on the departure rates in those districts.

***Continuing debate over which regional variations are warranted.*** Identifying the reasons for regional variation in departure rates will not settle the policy question of whether the variation is warranted or unwarranted. Numerous commentators have argued that some regional variation is warranted by local conditions. In addition to different workload pressures (Braniff, 1993) commentators have suggested that different crimes generate different levels of public concern in different regions, which should be reflected in the sentences imposed (Broderick, 1993; Ragee 1993, Sifton, 1997). It has also been argued that departure can be used to ameliorate the unwarranted disparity that can arise when some offenders are prosecuted in federal court while others are prosecuted in state court where sentences are more lenient (O'Hear, 2002). Regional variation in sentencing has been, and will likely continue to be, a lively area of research and debate.

# Chapter Four: Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities In Federal Sentencing Today

## A. Examining Group Differences

### 1. *Disparity, Discrimination, and Adverse Impacts*

Fair sentencing is individualized sentencing. Unwarranted disparity is defined as different treatment of *individual* offenders who are similar in relevant ways, or similar treatment of *individual* offenders who differ in characteristics that are relevant to the purposes of sentencing. Membership in a particular demographic group is not relevant to the purposes of sentencing, and there is no reason to expect—and some might argue no to reason to care—if the *average* sentence of different demographic groups are the same or different. As long as the individuals in each group are treated fairly, average group differences simply reflect differences in the characteristics of the individuals who comprise each group. Group disparity is not necessarily unwarranted disparity.

***Discrimination.*** Sadly, however, history teaches that sometimes individuals are treated differently *because* of the racial, ethnic, or gender group to which they belong. The SRA singles out a number of demographic characteristics for special concern, directing the Commission to “assure that the guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders.”<sup>134</sup> Different treatment based on such characteristics is generally called *discrimination* (Blumstein, 1983). Discrimination may reflect intentional or conscious bias toward members of a group, or it may result from a distortion of rational judgment by unconscious stereotypes or fears about a group or greater empathy with persons more similar to oneself. Whatever the cause, discrimination is generally considered the most onerous type of unwarranted disparity and sentencing reform was clearly designed to eliminate it.

***Adverse impacts.*** In addition to discrimination, group differences may reflect a different type of problem. In its 1995 report to Congress, *Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy* (1995), the Commission recognized that discrimination cannot be the sole concern of those interested in fair sentencing. If a sentencing rule has a disproportionate impact on a particular demographic group, however unintentional, it raises special concerns about whether the rule is a necessary and effective means to achieve the purposes of sentencing. In its cocaine reports, the Commission was addressing the sentencing of crack cocaine defendants (over eighty percent of whom are Black) who are given identical sentences under the statutes and the guidelines as powder cocaine offenders who traffic 100

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<sup>134</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 994(d).


times as much drug (the so-called 1-to-100 quantity ratio). Congress chose to more severely penalize those dealing in crack cocaine because of a perception that crack had proven peculiarly harmful. The Commission stated that “the high percentage of Blacks convicted of crack cocaine offenses is a matter of great concern. . . . [W]hen such an enhanced ratio for a particular form of a drug has a disproportionate effect on one segment of the population, it is particularly important that sufficient policy bases exist in support of the enhanced ratio.” (USSC, 1995, p. xii.) For these reasons, the Commission carefully analyzed the relative harmfulness of the two forms of cocaine in its reports to Congress to arrive at its recommendation that cocaine sentencing be reconsidered (USSC, 1995, 1997, 2002).

This principle—that rules having a disproportionate impact on a particular group be necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose—is found in other legal contexts, such as employment law. The individual and societal interests at stake in criminal sentencing are even greater than in the employment context, and a similar analysis can apply and has been used in several criminal justice contexts (Gastwirth & Nayak, 1997). Sentencing rules that are needed to achieve the purposes of sentencing are considered fair, even if they adversely affect some groups more than others. But if a sentencing rule has a significant adverse impact and there is insufficient evidence that the rule is needed to achieve a statutory purpose of sentencing, then the rule might be considered unfair toward the affected group. These distinctions between warranted and unwarranted group differences, and between discrimination and adverse impacts, will be used in the examination of group differences in this chapter.

## **2. *A Growing Minority Caseload***

Elimination of any vestiges of discrimination and reduction of unsupportable adverse impacts are especially important as the proportion of minorities in the federal offender population grows. Figure 4.1 shows the percentage of federal offenders in each of the three major racial and ethnic groups sentenced in the federal courts from 1984 until 2001. (Unlike the Bureau of Prisons, the Commission classifies Hispanic offenders based on national origin, regardless of race. Thus, the White, Black, and Hispanic categories are mutually exclusive.) While the majority of federal offenders in the preguidelines era were White, minorities dominate the federal criminal docket today. Most of this shift is due to dramatic growth in the Hispanic proportion of the caseload, which has approximately doubled since 1984. This growth is due in large measure to the growth of prosecutions for immigration law violations.

A small but significant proportion of the federal caseload consists of Native Americans, who are included along with Asians and Pacific Islanders in the “other” category on the chart. Due to the special federal jurisdiction over Native American lands, they are subject to federal prosecution for many offenses, such as motor vehicle homicide or sexual assault, that are usually prosecuted in the state courts when committed by other groups. The Commission formed a special Native American Advisory Group to address the concerns of the Native American community, and their 2003 report is available on the Commission’s website at <http://www.ussc.gov/NAAG/NativeAmer.pdf>.




### 3. *A Growing Gap in Sentencing*

Figure 4.2 displays trends in average sentences for the three major racial and ethnic groups from the pre-guidelines era through the first fifteen years of guidelines implementation. The gap between White and minority offenders was relatively small in the pre-guidelines era. Contrary to what might be expected at the time of guidelines implementation, which was also the period during which large groups of offenders became subject to mandatory minimum drug sentences, the gap between African American offenders and other groups began to widen. The gap was greatest in the mid-1990s and has narrowed only slightly since then. Similar gaps or disproportionalities can be observed in the proportion of majority versus minority offenders who receive non-imprisonment sentences instead of prison terms.



**Figure 4.2: Estimated Time Served by Various Racial and Ethnic Groups 1984-2001**



*What explains the gap?* A great deal of research over many decades, in both state and federal courts, has established that most of any gap between majority and minority offenders reflects, to a great extent, legally relevant differences among individual group members in the types of crimes committed and in criminal records (Hagen, 1974; Spohn, 2000). No careful student of sentencing research seriously disputes this finding. A great deal of controversy remains, however, over how much, if any, of the gap remains after accounting for the effects of legally relevant factors, and whether any of this gap is due to discrimination on the part of judges. This question remains an active area of research both within the Sentencing Commission and in outside agencies and among academic researchers.

The definitions discussed at the beginning of this chapter give us three possible explanations for the gap among Black, Hispanic, and other offenders:

- **Fair differentiation:** Offenders receive different treatment based on legally relevant characteristics needed to achieve the purposes of sentencing.
- **Discrimination:** Offenders receive different treatment based on their race, ethnicity, gender, or other forbidden factors.
- **Unsupportable adverse impact:** Offenders receive different treatment based on sentencing rules that are not clearly needed to achieve the purposes of sentencing.

The remainder of this chapter details the evidence regarding how much each of these explanations contributes to the gap among different demographic groups in federal sentencing today. General conclusions can be summarized at the outset. Most of the gap among different groups results from fair differentiation among individual offenders in the seriousness of their crimes and in their criminal histories. Discrimination on the part of judges contributes little, if any, to the gap among racial and ethnic groups. Discrimination, in the form of paternalism, may make a small but significant contribution toward more lenient treatment of female offenders.

A significant amount of the gap between Black and other offenders can, however, be attributed to the adverse impact of current cocaine sentencing laws. In addition, other changes in sentencing policies over the past fifteen years, particularly the harsher treatment of drug trafficking, firearm, and repeat offenses, have widened the gap among demographic groups. Whether these new policies contribute to crime control or to fair and proportionate sentencing sufficiently to outweigh their adverse impact on minority groups should be carefully considered by policymakers.

## **B. Studying Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Discrimination in Sentencing**

### **1. Continuing Concern in the Guidelines Era**

Concern over possible racial or ethnic discrimination in federal sentencing remains strong today, fifteen years after implementation of guidelines designed to eliminate it. No sentencing issue has received more attention from investigative journalists or scholarly researchers. In recent years, feature articles in major newspapers have undertaken analyses of federal sentences and concluded that racial discrimination persists (Frank, 1995; Flaherty & Casey, 1996). Support for these allegations has been strengthened by academic researchers who reached similar conclusions in studies presented at conferences and published in professional journals (Albonetti, 1997, 1998; Hebert, 1998; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000, 2001; Kautt & Spohn, 2002; Mustard 2001; Kempf-Leonard & Sample, 2002; Everett & Wojtkiewicz, 2002; Schanzenbach, 2004; Spohn, 2004).

Gender discrimination has received less attention but also has generated an interesting range of views (Daly, 1995). Arguments that women properly should receive more lenient sentences based on their status as women has been criticized by advocates of formal neutrality (Nagel & Johnson, 1994; Segal, 2001) but defended by others who see women as often playing more mitigated roles in their offenses, or as having, because of their status as women, more family responsibilities that may justify more lenient sentences (Raeder 1993, Coughenour, 1995; Wald, 1995). Others have argued that gender differences should not be seen as representing excessive leniency for women but as excessive harshness for men, who are often subject to the same pressures and responsibilities as women (Daly & Tonry, 1997).

It is clear that the Commission must address these concerns and identify whether discrimination based on demographic status persists and, if so, how it is manifested and what can be done to eliminate it.

## **2. *Research on Discrimination under the Guidelines***

Proving discrimination is difficult if a decision maker chooses to hide it or is not even aware of it, but researchers have developed statistical methods that are widely accepted as means for inferring conscious or unconscious bias. The general approach is to examine a large number of cases and measure the influence of the legally relevant characteristics on the types and lengths of sentences imposed. The average sentences of different racial, ethnic, or gender groups are then compared *after accounting for the effects of legally relevant factors*. If, for example, men on average receive longer sentences than women, even after controlling for differences in the types of crimes they commit and in their criminal records, then we may infer that sentences are influenced by gender or something correlated with gender.

The advent of sentencing guidelines has been a boon to this kind of research. By definition, the guidelines identify almost all of the factors that are legally relevant to the sentencing decision (factors that may justify a departure are an exception). Like other sentencing commissions, the United States Sentencing Commission collects and disseminates large datasets that can be used to study federal sentencing decisions, and many researchers have used these data to study discrimination. Almost twenty different studies have addressed racial, ethnic, or gender discrimination in federal sentencing using these datasets in the fifteen years since full implementation of the guidelines. (They are listed in the bibliography, Appendix A.)

The studies agree on several general points. First, legally relevant considerations account for by far the largest share of variation in sentences among federal defendants. When disparity is found, it is more prevalent in cases receiving a departure than in cases sentenced within the guideline range. And unexplained differences in the sentencing of women compared to men are greater than any

***The studies agree that legally relevant considerations account for the largest share of variation in sentences among federal defendants***

unexplained differences in the sentencing of different racial and ethnic groups. On other important questions, however, the studies diverge. Different studies yield different answers as to whether discrimination influences sentences at all and, if so, how much. These studies also disagree on which racial and ethnic groups are discriminated against and exactly

where in the criminal justice process this discrimination occurs. Some of the variation in conclusions results from differences among authors in how they define disparity and discrimination. Many of the differences, however, result from the different research methodologies employed.

***Limitations in previous research.*** Several problems have plagued much of the existing research into discrimination in federal sentencing. Most difficult to overcome is the lack of good data on all the legally relevant considerations that might help explain differences in sentences. The lack of data is especially severe regarding circumstances that might justify departure from the guidelines. Since these circumstances are, by definition, expected to be unusual or atypical, data on them is not routinely collected. (Data are collected on the reasons for departure in cases that receive one, but whether the same circumstances are present in cases that do *not* receive a departure is not routinely collected.) This lack of data can cause some legally appropriate differentiations among offenders to appear as discrimination.

In addition, because we lack data on case characteristics that might justify departure in some cases, several researchers have ignored departures when modeling the legally relevant factors that might explain differences among groups, or have treated departure and non-departure cases separately. Given the known disproportionate rates of departure among different racial and ethnic groups (Kramer & Maxfield, 1998; Adams, 1998), failure to include departure status as a control variable inevitably leads to race and ethnicity effects. But these effects may, in fact, reflect the legally relevant differences among offenders that cause judges to depart in some cases but not in others.

Other problems with previous research include the complexity of the federal guidelines system and its interactions with mandatory minimum statutes. Mustard (2001) described the non-linear relationship between offense level and sentence length and offered one approach to model it. Hofer and Blackwell (2000) described the effects of mandatory minimum statutes that trump the guideline range in some cases. For example, conviction under a mandatory minimum statute has no effect in cases where the guideline range is higher than the minimum penalty, but in other cases the mandatory minimum penalty “trumps” the guideline range and forces judges to impose higher penalties than required by the guidelines. Simply including, in a standard regression equation, a variable indicating the presence of a mandatory minimum penalty will mis-specify these important legal differences among cases. Because mandatory minimum penalties disproportionately apply to minority offenders, failure to correctly specify these complex legal interactions will lead to exaggerated race and ethnic effects.

In an important article recommending a new approach to studying disparity in a guidelines system, Engen and Gainey (2001) argued that previous findings on disparity under sentencing guidelines had to be reconsidered.

Conventional approaches to modeling the effects of these variables on sentencing are not adequate in this context because they fail to specify the relationships prescribed by law between offense severity, offender history, and sentencing outcomes. As a result, extant research on the effects of legal and extralegal factors, in the context of guidelines, may have produced biased estimates and reached erroneous conclusions.  
p. 1208.

*A new “presumptive sentence” model for the federal courts.* The method suggested by Engen and Gainey, the “presumptive sentence” model, can be modified to solve several, although not all, of the problems that plagued earlier research on discrimination in federal guidelines sentencing. Legally relevant factors, and the complex interactions among them, can be specified with a single independent variable representing the “presumptive sentence,” *i.e.*, the minimum months of imprisonment required by the guidelines *or any trumping mandatory minimum penalty* applicable in the case. The effects of variations in departure rates among groups can be accounted for by including variables representing whether a particular defendant received any of the three types of departure. In effect, the model predicts that each defendant will receive the minimum penalty required by law unless they receive a departure, in which case their sentence will be reduced or increased by the average length for that type of departure among all offenders who receive one.

Once race, ethnicity, and gender are added to the model, we can investigate whether judges systematically vary from the model’s prediction to the disadvantage of any group. Use of the presumptive sentence model solves the problem of non-linearity noted by Mustard (2001), and also can control for the effects of trumping mandatory minimums described by Hofer and Blackwell (2000). Engen and Gainey showed that a presumptive sentence model out-performed (that is, accounted for more of the variation in sentences) than other approaches when studying disparity in Washington state. They also demonstrated that previous research using models that failed to address the non-linearity problem had exaggerated racial and ethnic effects. The presumptive sentence model cannot overcome a lack of complete data on all legally relevant considerations that might influence judges, but it is the best available method for investigating discrimination in federal sentencing today.

## **C. Results from Recent Research**


### **1. *Racial and Ethnic Disparity***

*The best-performing model.* Commission staff have used the presumptive sentence approach to test whether there is evidence of systematic discrimination against minorities or men in federal sentencing today. Details of the data and statistical models used can be found in Hofer and Blackwell (2002) and in Technical Appendix D. Analyses were performed using data on U.S. citizens sentenced under the guidelines in five recent years. (Inclusion of non-citizens, who are often non-White, confounds race and ethnicity effects with those of citizenship, detention prior to sentencing and pending deportation, lack of a U.S. residence, and other factors.) The Commission’s statistical model out-performed any other reported in the published research, accounting for over 80 percent of the variation in sentences imposed—an excellent result for regression research of this kind, and a measure of how thoroughly we understand the factors affecting federal sentencing today.

In order to get a sense of the relative degree to which various offender characteristics influence the sentencing decision, the model included—in addition to each offender’s race,

ethnicity, and gender—their age, college attendance, and whether they supported any dependents. To assess whether judges weigh some legally relevant factors differently than the guidelines rules themselves, several such factors were included in the model along with the presumptive sentence. These included the general type of offense (property, drug, white collar, or other), the type of drug involved in drug offenses, the offenders’ criminal history, whether they pled guilty, and whether they received a guideline adjustment for possession or use of a firearm.


**The decision to imprison.** Figures 4.3 and 4.4 display the results of the Commission’s analysis of judges’ decisions to use sentencing options other than imprisonment in those zones of the Sentencing Table where options are permitted. Figure 4.3 presents the percentage increase or decrease in various groups’ odds of going to prison in comparison to a contrast group. Odds for Blacks and Hispanics are compared with those for Whites, odds for offenders with no dependents are contrasted with those with dependents, odds for offenders with some college are compared with those who did not attend college, and odds for men are compared with women. In addition, for each of these five groups, which are listed along the bottom of the chart, results are further broken down into three offense groupings indicated with different bars. Reading from left to right, the black bar in each group represents results for the overall caseload, the white bar represents results for drug



offenses only, and the striped bar indicates non-drug offenses. Only results that are statistically significant are displayed: a missing bar means that the result for that group was not significantly different from their contrast group.

Beginning with results for Blacks and Hispanics on the left side of Figure 4.3, the black bars show that when considering the overall caseload, a typical Black or Hispanic offender has somewhat greater odds of being imprisoned when compared to a typical White offender. (“Typical” in this sense is an offender who has average values on all the other explanatory variables, such as an offense of average seriousness.) However, the white bars and the missing striped bars indicate that these greater odds are restricted entirely to drug trafficking offenses. The odds of a typical Black drug offender being sentenced to imprisonment are about 20 percent higher than the odds of a typical White offender, while the odds of a Hispanic drug offender are about 40 percent higher. The relative importance of race and ethnicity can be further evaluated by comparing it with the effects of having dependents or attending college. These factors reduce the odds of imprisonment for all types of cases, but generally by a smaller amount.

Figure 4.4 displays the results of separate analyses for males and females in each group. The white and black bars show that it is *male* Black and Hispanic offenders who have greater odds of imprisonment than White males. Female Black and Hispanic offenders actually have somewhat



lower odds of imprisonment than their White counterparts. While the benefit of having dependents or attending college is shared by both males and females, the disadvantage of being Black or Hispanic is borne entirely by males. Additional discussion of gender effects is found in a later section of this chapter.

Percentage changes in odds of the type reported in Figures 4.3 and 4.4, although common in the research literature, are notoriously difficult to interpret. An increase in odds does not directly equate with an increase in relative risk of imprisonment (Baldus, et al., 1990); nor does 40 percent increased odds mean that 40 percent more Hispanic offenders are imprisoned than White offenders. Langan (2001) has warned that reliance on odds ratios in reporting results of disparity research can easily lead to an overestimation of the importance of a factor in decision-making. He has supplied a method for translating odds ratios into measures of the “proportional reduction in error.” Using this method, the odds ratios were translated into estimates of the number of offenders for whom knowledge of race or ethnicity improves the ability to predict who receives sentences of imprisonment instead of alternatives. Knowledge of race or ethnicity helps account for the imprisonment decision in under twenty cases sentenced in the three years included in the analysis.

Some of the effects we observed could be due to unmeasured, but possibly legitimate, considerations that are correlated with gender, race, or ethnicity. If women are more likely to have child-rearing responsibilities that lead to longer departures, this would appear in our data as a gender effect. Another such possibility results from a presentencing decision: whether to detain offenders at their bail hearing rather than release them awaiting conviction and sentencing. Some offenders are routinely detained due to statutory presumptions in favor of detention for certain classes of crime,<sup>135</sup> or for other factors, such as risk of flight. Some of these detained offenders, who might otherwise have received probation or non-imprisonment options under the guidelines, are subsequently sentenced to prison “time served” upon conviction. If minority offenders are disproportionately represented among this group, it would appear as a race or ethnicity effect in this analysis.

***The length of imprisonment.*** For offenders whom judges choose to incarcerate, the question is whether similar offenders receive similar prison terms, or whether there are average differences among groups that cannot be accounted for by legally relevant characteristics. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 display differences in the lengths of sentence, expressed as a percentage of the average sentence, imposed on various groups compared to the same contrast groups as Figure 4.3 and 4.4. The black bar again shows differences for all offenses combined, the white bar shows drug offenses only and the striped bar shows non-drug offenses.


For Black offenders, the results are once again limited to drug trafficking offenses and to male offenders. The typical Black drug trafficker receives a sentence about ten percent longer than a similar White drug trafficker. This translates into a sentence about seven months longer. A similar effect is found for Hispanic drug offenders, with somewhat lesser effects also found for non-drug

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<sup>135</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).



**Figure 4.5: Lengths of Imprisonment Compared Offender Characteristics in Combined Years 1998-2002**



**Figure 4.6: Lengths of Imprisonment Compared Males & Females in Each Group for Combined Years 1998-2002**



and female Hispanic offenders. The race and ethnicity effects for drug offenders are greater than the effects of college attendance or having dependents.

Because the presumptive sentence model predicts that the sentence imposed will be the minimum sentence required by law adjusted uniformly for any departure that was granted, the effects we observe can arise in only two ways. Judges can 1) place some offenders above the presumptive sentence, that is, above the bottom of the guideline range or the minimum statutory penalty, or 2) depart from the guidelines non-uniformly. Because variables that indicate whether an offender received any of the three types of departure are included in the model, differences in departure *rates* among the groups are controlled in this analysis. Any departure effect must therefore arise from differences in the average *extent* of departure among the groups. These findings indicate that all types of Hispanic offenders are placed above the minimum required sentence more frequently than similar White offenders, or receive somewhat lesser reductions when receiving a downward departure. The same is true of Black drug trafficking offenders and Black males. Research regarding both of these possibilities is reported later in this chapter.

As with the analysis of the decision to incarcerate, it is possible that differences among groups in legally relevant characteristics on which we have no data may account for these findings in whole or in part. There may be differences among groups in numerous factors that judges legitimately may consider when deciding where to sentence within the guideline range or how far to depart. These could include differences in the seriousness of the offenses committed by the groups, or in their criminal histories, that are not adequately captured by the guideline offense level and criminal history score. Particularly with regard to departures, there may be differences in the kind and degree of aggravating or mitigating factors present in the cases. For motions based on a defendant's substantial assistance to the government, there could be differences in the type and degree of the offender's cooperation.


***Do these findings confirm the discrimination hypothesis?*** While any unexplained differences in the likelihood of incarceration or in the lengths of prison terms imposed on minority and majority offenders is cause for examination, there is reason to doubt that these racial and ethnic effects reflect deep-seated prejudices or stereotypes among judges. Most noteworthy is that the effects, which are found only for some offense types and for males, are also unstable over time. Separate year-by-year analyses, presented in Figure 4.7, reveals that significant differences in the likelihood of imprisonment are found in only two of the last five years for Black offenders, and four of the last five for Hispanic offenders.

As shown in Figure 4.8, the effects on sentence length are more persistent, but disappear for both Black and Hispanic offenders in the most recent year for which data are available. Offense-to-offense and year-to-year fluctuations in racial and ethnic effects are difficult to reconcile with theories of enduring stereotypes, powerlessness, or overt discrimination affecting sentencing of minorities under the guidelines.

**Figure 4.7: Odds of Imprisonment**  
Offender Characteristics Year-by-Year Analysis 1998-2002



**Figure 4.8: Length of Imprisonment**  
Offender Characteristics Year-by-Year Analysis 1998-2002




Skepticism that discrimination is a significant factor in sentencing under the guidelines is further reinforced by the findings of McDonald and Carlson (1993), the GAO (1992), and by previous work at the Commission (Katzenelson & Conley, 1997). McDonald and Carlson (1993) found some race effects in some years for some kinds of offenses, but none in other years or with other types of offenses. They warned “[a]ny findings that are sensitive to minor changes in model specification such as these must be interpreted with caution” (p. 106). Katzenelson and Conley found that when they learned more about specific court practices, findings that at first appeared to indicate discrimination turned out to reflect benign court practices that may have actually benefitted minorities. In their analysis of sentencing in the Ninth Circuit, Hispanic drug trafficking offenders received sentences averaging about five months longer than Whites. But further investigation revealed that one district charged drug couriers caught crossing the border from Mexico with significant amounts of drugs only with drug *possession* instead of the more serious charge of drug trafficking. The offense level of these largely Hispanic offenders (based on the drug possession guideline) under-represented the seriousness of their actual offense and their sentences tended to be higher than “similar” offenders at the same level. Due to the charging practices in that district, the presumptive offense level misrepresented the true seriousness of the offense and judicial compensation (sentencing higher than the presumptive sentence) appeared in the statistical analysis as an ethnicity effect.

Perhaps the best conclusion is that if discrimination affects the decisions of even some judges in some cases, the number of cases affected is small and the size of the effect is relatively minor compared to the consistent importance of the seriousness of the offense and the criminal history of the offender. As discussed in the final section of this chapter, discrimination contributes less to the gap between majority and minority offenders than do certain of the sentencing rules themselves, some of which may arguably represent an institutionalized unfairness that is a greater cause for concern than is discrimination by individual judges.

## **2. Gender Disparity**

Like the gap between Black offenders and other groups, the gap in average prison terms between male and female offenders has widened in the guidelines era, as shown in Figure 4.9. Unlike race and ethnic discrimination, however, the evidence is more consistent that part of this gap is due to different treatment of offenders based on their gender. The group on the right side of Figure 4.3 compares the odds of imprisonment for men with those of women for the overall caseload, drug trafficking offenses, and non-drug offenses. Gender effects are found in both drug and non-drug offenses and greatly exceed the race and ethnic effects discussed above. The typical male drug offender has twice the odds of going to prison as a similar female offender. The group at the right of Figure 4.5 shows the results for length of imprisonment. Sentence lengths for men are typically 25 to 30 percent longer for all types of cases. Additional analyses show that the effects are present every year.

**Figure 4.9: Estimated Time Served by Gender of Offender 1984-2001**



Consistent with these results from the presumptive sentence model, women have been shown in previous research to receive sentences at the bottom of the applicable guideline more frequently than men (Newton, et al., 1995) and to receive proportionately larger reductions when granted a downward departure (Kramer & Maxfield, 1997).

Whether these patterns of more lenient sentencing for women reflect unwarranted disparities or legitimate sentencing considerations that happen to disproportionately benefit women has been the subject of lively debate. Analyses of data and case law have suggested that judges' paternalistic attitudes toward women might hold women to be more vulnerable and sympathetic and less responsible than men (Nagel & Johnson, 1994; Segal, 2000; Schazenbach, 2004). Differences may arise from enduring attitudes that hold women more responsible for child care.

Part of the more lenient treatment may arise, however, from differences between the genders that are relevant to sentencing but not well captured by the available data. Several commentators have noted that women offenders are often among the least culpable members of criminal conspiracies, yet are subject to lengthy sentences due to the conduct of their accomplices, on whom they may be emotionally or financially dependent (Demleitner, 1995). Judges may seek to mitigate

the effects of strict application of the guidelines rules based on female offenders sometimes being dominated by more culpable male accomplices. There is also reason for judges to believe that women are more instrumental in raising their children than their male counterparts (Wald, 1995; Raeder, 1993), and may suffer more from imprisonment than do men due to greater separation from their families caused by the relative scarcity of prisons for women (Seldin, 1995).

### **3. *Research on Departures, Sentencing Options, and Placement within the Guideline Range***

Like the presentencing stages reviewed in Chapter Three, sentencing under the guidelines is actually a series of separate decisions. These include individual fact-findings, guideline interpretations, and the important decision whether to depart from the guideline range in exceptional cases or, where departure is not appropriate, where to place the offender within the guideline range and available options. Many of these separate decisions have themselves been the subject of empirical research designed to illuminate, as best as possible with available data, the factors influencing the decision and whether racial or ethnic disparity may be present.

***The decision to depart and how far.*** Departures have been the subject of several empirical analyses investigating possible racial, ethnic, and gender disparities. The GAO (1992) used a standard multivariate approach to examine if demographic characteristics account for whether an offender receives a downward departure for reasons other than substantial assistance, after controlling for offense seriousness, criminal history, offense type, and mode of conviction (*i.e.*, whether defendant pled guilty or went to trial). The sample used in the study was not sufficient to permit controlling for all the legally relevant factors simultaneously, so analyses were performed using each control variable one at a time. The findings were described as tentative and preliminary, but the researchers reported that race, gender, age, and other extra-legal factors did *not* affect likelihood of departure.

A more recent analysis by Adams (1998) reached the opposite conclusion. In a regression analysis, both race and gender predicted whether a defendant would receive a departure after controlling for a long list of offense and criminal history factors. Blacks were less likely than non-Blacks (odds ratio of .71), and women were more likely than men, to receive downward departures. Women and Hispanics were less likely to receive upward departures. Some of the demographic effects were found to remain significant when specific offense types were examined. Adams also examined the variation in the *extent* of departure. Among the entire population, gender was significant in predicting both downward and upward departure length, while race was not. The only demographic variable significant for specific offense types was that Hispanics received lengthier departures in fraud cases.

Maxfield and Kramer (1998) also used regression analyses to predict the extent of departure in substantial assistance cases, using various guideline offense characteristics as control variables. Rather than predicting months of departure, they predicted the *percentage* reduction of the sentence from the minimum in the otherwise-applicable guideline range. Women received larger reductions,

especially in drug trafficking cases, where their reduction was 10 percent larger than men's. Race and ethnicity was also significant in drug trafficking, with Whites receiving reductions three percent larger than Blacks and five percent larger than Hispanics. Among non-drug cases, only Hispanics showed a smaller degree of reduction than Whites.

It is not clear what policymakers should conclude from these contradictory findings. Research cannot possibly test whether discrimination is present in the departure decision without data on the most important control variables. For example, in the case of section 5K1.1 departures, information on the type of assistance provided to authorities by the defendant is needed. For other departures, information is needed on legally relevant factors that may make cases eligible for departure. Without these data, these findings only raise the possibility that discrimination may be influencing the departure decision.

***Use of sentencing options available under the guidelines.*** As described in Chapter One, imprisonment is an option in any case under the guidelines, but USSG §5C1.1 authorizes judges to impose alternatives to imprisonment, such as probation or home confinement, for defendants who fall in certain zones of the sentencing table. Except in immigration cases, the majority of offenders who qualify for a non-prison sentence receive one (USSC, 2002, *Sourcebook*, at Fig. F). A sizeable proportion of qualifying offenders do not get the benefit of an alternative, however, and there is some racial disproportionality in the use of these options.

A 1996 Commission research report examined the factors associated with judges' use of sentencing options (USSC, 1996). Data were available on several factors legally relevant to this stage, and these were found to explain the racial, but not the gender, disproportionalities. Criminal history, employment status, role in the offense, citizenship, and mode of conviction accounted for all the racial differences. However, women remained more likely to receive an alternative sentence than men even after controlling for these factors. It is possible that other factors such as a greater responsibility for the care of young children might explain the gender difference.

***Placement within the guideline range of imprisonment.*** For offenders who do not receive a departure or a sentencing option, judges must decide on a term of imprisonment within the prescribed guideline range. The width of the guideline ranges vary from a minimum of six months for the least serious crimes up to over six and a half years for the most serious, so where an offender is placed within the imprisonment range can make a real difference.

In its Four-Year Evaluation (USSC, 1991a), the Commission calculated the percentage of various racial and gender groups who were sentenced in each quartile of the range for a 25 percent random sample of cases. Women were more likely to be in the bottom quartile and less likely to be in the top. Blacks were slightly more likely than Whites to be in the top half of the range. Flaherty and Casey (1996) updated and extended this analysis. Excluding cases that received a departure or that were affected by mandatory penalties, Blacks received sentences, on average, two percentiles higher in the range than Whites. Whites and Hispanics showed no difference in one of the years that were analyzed and a two percent difference in the other year. Women received sentences ten percentiles lower than men.

The GAO's 1992 analysis also tried to determine whether race or gender accounted for placement within the range, after controlling for some additional factors. The 25 percent sample used in the study was not sufficient to permit controlling for all the factors simultaneously, so analyses were performed using each control variable one at a time. They, too, found that race, gender, age, employment, and marital status did affect placement within the sentencing range. Hispanic defendants were more likely to be sentenced in the middle of the guideline range. Blacks were most likely to receive sentences at the very top or bottom of the range. Women were more likely to be sentenced at the bottom of the range.

Like the evidence of disparity in departure decisions, it is not clear what policymakers should make of these findings. The presumptive sentence analysis, in conjunction with these findings, leaves little doubt that racial and ethnic *disparities* arise when judges decide whether to depart, how far to depart, and where to place an offender within the guideline range. But without data on whether these disparities might be accounted for by legally relevant considerations, it seems premature to conclude that they represent *unwarranted* disparity or discrimination on the part of judges.

## **D. Rules Having Significant Adverse Impacts**

Previous sections have evaluated how much of the sentencing gap between various groups is due to discrimination and how much reflects legally relevant considerations that judges are bound to take into account. One other possibility remains: some of the gap may result from sentencing rules that have a disproportionate impact on a particular offender group but that serve no clear sentencing purpose. A rule that serves no clear purpose would be questionable in any event, but rules that adversely affect a particular group deserve extra scrutiny. Chapter Three described how mandatory minimum penalties that trump the otherwise applicable guideline range, such as sentencing enhancements under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), fall disproportionately on African-American offenders. This section identifies several other sentencing rules that have such an adverse impact.

### **1. *The 100-to-1 Powder to Crack Cocaine Ratio.***

In 2002, 81 percent of the offenders sentenced for trafficking the crack form of cocaine were African-American.<sup>136</sup> The average length of imprisonment for crack cocaine was 119 months, compared to 78 months for the powder form of the drug. Average sentences for crack cocaine were 25 months longer than for methamphetamine and 81 months longer than for heroin.<sup>137</sup> The reason for the harsher treatment of crack cocaine offenses is the low threshold amounts for five- and ten-year mandatory minimum sentences that are built into the mandatory minimum penalty statutes and incorporated into the Drug Quantity Table of the guidelines, as discussed in Chapter Two. It takes

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<sup>136</sup> USSC, *Sourcebook* (2002), at Tbl. 34.

<sup>137</sup> *Id.* at Fig. J.



100 times as much powder cocaine to get the same five-year sentence as a particular amount of crack cocaine. Under the statutes, five grams of crack cocaine—an amount a heavy user might consume in a weekend with a street value under a thousand dollars—receives a minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment. Crack cocaine is the only drug for which simple possession of greater than five grams, even without an intent to distribute, is treated the same as drug trafficking.


The Commission has previously reported that the harms associated with crack cocaine do not justify its substantially harsher treatment compared to powder cocaine (USSC, 1995; 1997; 2001). The increased addictiveness of crack cocaine is due to its method of use (smoking), rather than to any pharmacological difference between the various forms of cocaine. Powder cocaine that is smoked is equally as addictive as crack cocaine, and powder cocaine that is injected is more harmful and more addictive than crack cocaine, although cocaine injection is relatively rare. Recent research has demonstrated that some of the worst harms thought to be associated with crack cocaine use, such as disabilities associated with pre-natal cocaine exposure, are not as severe as initially feared and no more serious from crack cocaine exposure than from powder cocaine exposure.

Powder cocaine is easily converted into crack cocaine through a simple process involving baking soda and a kitchen stove. Conversion usually is done at the lowest levels of the drug distribution system. Large percentages of the persons subject to five- and ten-year penalties under the current rules do not fit the category of serious or high-level trafficker that Congress described when initially establishing the five- and ten-year penalty levels. Most crack cocaine offenders receiving sentences greater than five years are low-level street dealers. For no other drug are such harsh penalties imposed on such low-level offenders. High penalties for relatively small amounts of crack cocaine appear to be misdirecting federal law enforcement resources away from serious traffickers and kingpins toward street-level retail dealers (USSC, 1997).

For these and other reasons, the Commission has repeatedly recommended that the quantity thresholds for crack cocaine be revised upward. In 2001 (USSC, 2001) the Commission recommended that the crack cocaine threshold be raised to at least 25 grams from 5 grams, replacing the current 100 to-1 ratio with a 20-to-1 ratio.

As shown in Figure 4.10, this one change to current sentencing law would reduce the gap in average prison sentences between Black and White offenders by 9.2 months. Among drug trafficking offenders only, the current gap is even wider—92.1 months for Blacks compared to 57.9 months for Whites—and the reduction would be even greater, 17.8 months. This one sentencing rule contributes more to the differences in average sentences between African-American and White offenders than any possible effect of discrimination. Revising the crack cocaine thresholds would better reduce the gap than any other single policy change, and it would dramatically improve the fairness of the federal sentencing system.

**Figure 4.10: Estimated Time Served 1984-2002  
with Projections for Recommended Ratio**



**2. Using Prior Drug Trafficking Convictions to Define Career Offenders.**

The SRA directs the Commission to “assure that the guidelines specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized by statute” for offenders who are at least 18 years old and who have been convicted of a crime of violence or a drug trafficking offense, and who previously have been convicted of two or more such offenses. The Commission implemented this directive by creating USSG §4B1.1, the “career offender” guideline. It places each offender with three violent or drug trafficking convictions in the highest criminal history category VI, and sets the offense level at the guideline range associated with the statutory maximum penalty for the offense.

In 2000, there were 1,279 offenders subject to the career offender provisions, which resulted in some of the most severe penalties imposed under the guidelines. Although Black offenders constituted just 26 percent of the offenders sentenced under the guidelines in 2000, they were 58 percent of the offenders subject to the severe penalties required by the career offender guideline. Most of these offenders were subject to the guideline because of the inclusion of drug trafficking crimes in the criteria qualifying offenders for the guideline. ( Interestingly, Hispanic offenders, while

representing 39 percent of the criminal docket, represent just 17 percent of the offenders subject to the career offender guideline.) Commentators have noted the relative ease of detecting and prosecuting offenses that take place in open-air drug markets, which are most often found in impoverished minority neighborhoods (Tonry, 1995), which suggests that African-Americans have a higher risk of conviction for a drug trafficking crime than do similar White drug traffickers (Tonry, 1995; Blumstein, 2000).

The question for policymakers is whether the career offender guideline, especially as it applies to repeat drug traffickers, clearly promotes an important purpose of sentencing. Unlike repeat violent offenders, whose incapacitation may protect the public from additional crimes by the offender, criminologists and law enforcement officials testifying before the Commission have noted that retail-level drug traffickers are readily replaced by new drug sellers so long as the demand for a drug remains high. Incapacitating a low-level drug seller prevents little, if any, drug selling; the crime is simply committed by someone else.

Most importantly, preliminary analysis of the recidivism rates of drug trafficking offenders sentenced under the career offender guideline based on prior drug convictions shows that their rates are much lower than other offenders who are assigned to criminal history category VI. The overall rate of recidivism for category VI offenders two years after release from prison is 55 percent (USSC, 2004). The rate for offenders qualifying for the career criminal guideline based on one or more violent offenses is about 52 percent. But the rate for offenders qualifying only on the basis of prior drug offenses is only 27 percent. The recidivism rate for career offenders more closely resembles the rates for offenders in the lower criminal history categories in which they *would be* placed under the normal criminal history scoring rules in Chapter Four of the *Guidelines Manual*. The career offender guideline thus makes the criminal history category a *less* perfect measure of recidivism risk than it would be without the inclusion of offenders qualifying only because of prior drug offenses.

There may be other rules that have unwarranted adverse impacts on minority groups without clearly advancing a purpose of sentencing. The use of some non-moving traffic violations in the calculation of the criminal history score is one such possibility but there are many others (Blackwell, 2003). Continued research on how well different rules that result in adverse impacts are fulfilling the purposes of sentencing will improve both the fairness and the effectiveness of federal sentencing.

## **E. Conclusion**

The federal criminal justice system must be both fair and perceived to be fair. A central aspect of fairness in America's multi-racial and multi-ethnic society is equal treatment under law, without regard to race, ethnicity, or gender. America's special concern with racial justice helped lead to the creation of a sentencing system based on racially neutral rules. Evaluating the success of this system at eliminating any vestige of discrimination must be a central component of evaluating the guidelines.

For these reasons, it is troubling that reports of continuing racial, ethnic, and gender discrimination continue to appear in newspaper stories and in academic journals. Such reports understandably undermine public confidence in the federal courts, particularly among minority groups. Public confidence also is threatened by data showing that the gap in average sentences between African-American and other offender groups grew wider in the years following implementation of the guidelines and mandatory minimum penalty statutes enacted shortly after passage of the SRA. These findings deserve the careful attention of policymakers.

To be useful to policymakers, evidence of continuing sentencing disparities must be both accurate and informative concerning *how* and *where* in the criminal justice process disparities arise, and whether they are justified by differences in the seriousness of the offenses committed by the members of each group or by other case characteristics that are important to achieving the purposes of law enforcement. The review of evidence in this chapter suggests that the importance of discrimination by judges has been exaggerated by the existing research, while other stages of the criminal justice process have been relatively neglected, in part because of the paucity of data that can be used to investigate them.

The evidence shows that if unfairness continues in the federal sentencing process, it is more an “institutionalized unfairness” (Zatz, 1987; Tonry, 1996) built into the sentencing rules themselves rather than a product of racial stereotypes, prejudice, or other forms of discrimination on the part of judges. Most of the difference between the average sentences of Blacks, Whites, and Hispanics is an impact of the offense and offender characteristics that have been made relevant to sentencing by the guidelines and the mandatory minimum penalty statutes.

Despite the Commission’s efforts to equalize the treatment of certain crimes, such “white collar” and “street” crimes involving similar economic harms, increasingly severe treatment of other crimes, particularly drug offenses and repeat offenses, has widened the gap among different offender groups. Today’s sentencing policies, crystalized into the sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum statutes, have a greater adverse impact on Black offenders than did the factors taken into account by judges in the discretionary system in place immediately prior to guidelines implementation. Attention might fruitfully be turned to asking whether these new policies are necessary to achieve any legitimate purpose of sentencing.

# Chapter Five:

## Summary and Conclusions

Chapter One described the goals of sentencing reform set out in the Sentencing Reform Act [SRA] and discussed the components of guidelines development and implementation that were created to achieve these goals. This final chapter assesses how fully the components of reform have been implemented and how successfully the goals have been achieved.

### A. Substantially Achieved Goals of the SRA

#### 1. *Increased Rationality and Transparency*

The most basic achievement of sentencing reform is so fundamental that it can easily be taken for granted—the guidelines have increased the rationality and transparency of federal sentencing. Recall that the SRA was initially part of a larger project to revise the federal criminal code. This project was ultimately abandoned (Gainer, 1998). Under the existing code, similar conduct can be charged in a variety of ways and there is no systematic grading of offenses to ensure punishment proportionate to the seriousness of the crime (Robinson, 2000). The guidelines brought order to the code by assigning the plethora of statutory offenses to generic categories representing the basic classifications of criminal conduct. These generic offenses were then graded in terms of seriousness, and specific adjustments for aggravating and mitigating circumstances were provided to adjust for the facts of each particular case. As described by one expert, the guidelines “are a systematic body of law in which a large amount of material relating to crime and punishment has been collected and organized. The guidelines impose a logical and rational order on most federal offenses and clarify the ambiguities that result from having a superfluity of sections describing virtually identical conduct” (Joost, 1997). In short, the guidelines have helped to rationalize the federal criminal law.

In terms of regulating criminal sentences, the SRA authorized the Commission to create an instrument of policy control—the sentencing guidelines—that simply did not exist in the era of indeterminate sentencing. This instrument allows policymakers to establish a consistent sentencing philosophy for the entire federal court system. Adjustments in policy, for example, to encourage the use of particular types of sanctions or to more severely punish certain types of crimes, are now possible in ways that were not feasible in a decentralized, discretionary system. Formalized rule making has replaced judicial discretion; the rule of law has replaced “law without order” (Frankel, 1972).

*Advantages of the new instrument.* Guidelines sentencing means that the *reasons* for sentences are much better understood today than they were in the preguidelines era. Statistics

provide a method for quantifying this increased understanding. Researchers could not account for most of the variance—the deviation of sentences around the average—among sentences in preguidelines statistical studies, meaning that we poorly understood the factors that controlled judges’ decisions (Rhodes, 1991). Today, approximately 80 percent of the variance in sentences can be explained by the guidelines rules themselves. This greater transparency makes it easier to dispel concerns that sentences vary arbitrarily among judges, or that irrelevant factors, such as race or ethnicity, significantly affect sentences.

Because most of the factors that determine sentences are known in advance, practitioners report that it is easier to predict sentences based on the facts of the case than it was in the discretionary preguidelines era (USSC, 1991; Bowman, 1996). The effects of changes in sentencing policy can also be anticipated more precisely. The prison impact model developed by the Sentencing Commission, and further elaborated by the Bureau of Prisons, has proven very accurate at projecting the need for prison beds and supervision resources (Gaes, et al., 1993). Managing correctional resources is made easier by the guidelines.

By making sentencing policies more transparent, the guidelines also facilitate debate and evaluation of the merits of particular policies. Evaluation of policies has been made easier by another benefit of sentencing reform—the creation of a specialized expert agency with a substantial research mission. The Commission has developed and maintains huge databases on the sentences imposed in each fiscal year, as well as intensive study samples, and numerous other specialized data sets focused on particular issues. These represent the richest sources of information that have ever been assembled on federal crimes, federal offenders, and sentences imposed, and are invaluable resources for policy research.

***Risks of the new instrument.*** While the creation of explicit sentencing rules has many advantages, commentators have noted that it also brings risks. One such risk has been called “factor creep” (Ruback & Wroblewski, 2001). Detailed rules implementing explicit policies make tinkering with the policies and adding to the rules very easy. While many guideline amendments have clarified ambiguous terms or simplified guidelines operation, other amendments have added to their complexity. It is possible to imagine countless circumstances that would make an offense more serious. For example, one might wish to enhance punishment for selling drugs 1) near a school yard, 2) near a prison, 3) near a drug treatment facility, 4) in the presence of a minor, 5) by employing a minor, or 6) to a pregnant woman. It is difficult to argue that any of these considerations are irrelevant, yet, as more and more adjustments are added to the sentencing rules, it is increasingly difficult to ensure that the interactions among them, and their cumulative effect, properly track offense seriousness.

Complex rules with many adjustments may foster a perception of a precise moral calculus, but on closer inspection this precision proves false (Breyer, 1999). Adjustments that appear necessary to achieve proportionate punishment may in actuality result in arbitrary distinctions among offenders. The original Commission recognized that “the number of possible relevant distinctions is endless. One can always find an additional characteristic X such that if the bank robber does X,

he is deserving of more punishment” (Breyer, 1988, pp. 13, 14). The Commission’s initial draft proposal attempted to identify a comprehensive list of distinctions among offenses and offenders, but it was judged unworkable by many reviewers. To limit such debilitating complexity, the Commission adopted drafting principles that began with offense distinctions that were sufficiently frequent and substantial to be evident in the Commission’s statistical analysis of data on past sentencing practices. Additional distinctions were then added only in limited circumstances when a specific policy need could be articulated and was accepted by a majority of the Commission (Nagel, 1990). The judicial departure power was relied on to ensure fine-tuning of sentences in atypical cases when needed to achieve the purposes of sentencing.

Pressure to add further adjustments has continued throughout the guidelines era, however. As evidenced in Appendix C, Congress frequently has directed the Commission to add aggravating adjustments to a wide variety of guidelines, in some cases formulating the specific wording and degree of adjustment. Commentators have noted that the need for these amendments has often not been demonstrated empirically and they have warned of the dangers of congressional “micro-management” (Parker & Block, 1988; 2001). Political pressure to respond to public concerns over high-publicity crimes could result in frequent revision of the guidelines without a sound policy basis (Rappaport, 1999). Regardless of the motivation, the steady accretion of guideline enhancements reflects Congress’s increasing interest and involvement in the development of guidelines sentencing policy, as well as Congressional preference for a detailed and “tough” guidelines sentencing scheme.

## **2. *Increased Certainty and Severity of Punishment***

Of all the goals for sentencing reform articulated in the SRA, increasing the certainty and severity of punishment has been most fully achieved. The sentencing trends for different offense types, described in Chapter Two, demonstrate substantial increases in the use of incarceration and in the length of prison time served. The guidelines have had effects on severity that are independent of mandatory minimum penalty statutes. Many offenses not subject to minimum penalty statutes have shown severity increases similar to offenses that are subject to statutory minimums. Further, while the severity of punishment has been increased for many types of crime, in some cases, severity has been decreased to create greater uniformity among similar offenses, thus proving that the guidelines are a flexible instrument of policy control that can work in both directions.

***Certainty and severity of imprisonment.*** The use of imprisonment has increased steadily, with 86 percent of all federal offenders in 2002 spending some time in prison, up from 69 percent fifteen years earlier. The percentage of offenders receiving simple probation—probation without confinement conditions—was cut almost in half by 1991 compared to the percentage in 1987. It has continued to decline to just 9.1 percent of all cases in 2002, just a third of the rate in 1987. Most notably, use of simple probation has been reduced by an increased use of intermediate sanctions, such as home, community, or intermittent confinement, which restrict offenders’ liberty to their homes, halfway houses, or weekends in jail. The guidelines make intermediate sanctions an explicit sentencing option for offenders in Zones A, B, and C of the Sentencing Table, and the availability of these options was increased early in the guidelines era.

For offenders who are imprisoned, the length of time served has increased substantially in the guidelines era. The average time served more than doubled after implementation of the guidelines. Since 1992 there has been a slight downturn in average time served, but the typical federal offender sentenced in 2002 will still spend almost twice as long in prison as in 1984, (the year the SRA was enacted) increasing from an average of just under 25 months to almost 50 months.

For some offenses, such as violent offenses, sentences imposed have actually decreased. But time served has increased due to the abolition of parole, which results in more of the sentence imposed actually being served. For other offenses, such as drug trafficking, sentences imposed increased even as parole was being abolished, resulting in increases in time actually served of two and a half times (to an average of 80 months) immediately after guidelines implementation. Despite a slight downturn in the late 1990s, following implementation of the “safety valve” and other changes, the average time served for drug trafficking remains over twice as long in 2001 as it was in 1984. Time served for immigration offenses also increased substantially due to both abolition of parole and increases in sentences imposed. For other offenses, such as manslaughter, the abolition of parole was offset by decreases in sentences imposed, resulting in continuity in average time served. This is consistent with the original Commission’s use of data on past practices to establish the guidelines levels for some types of crime. Recent amendments to some of these guidelines are likely to increase sentence severity in the future.

Increasing the certainty and severity of punishment were clear goals of the SRA. These goals were not intended as ends in themselves, but as *means* to the ends of just punishment and crime control through deterrence and incapacitation (Rappaport, 2003). Analyses currently underway at the Commission will measure the degree to which the increases in sentence certainty and severity have been “effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(1)(2) of Title 18, United States Code.”<sup>138</sup>

***Independent and bi-directional effects of the guidelines.*** It is extremely difficult to disentangle the effects of the guidelines from the effects of statutory minimum penalties for offenses subject to statutory minimums; the guidelines structure and severity levels reflect the structure found in the statutes. However, analyses of offenses *not* covered by statutory minimum penalties clearly demonstrate that the guidelines have increased severity levels independent from the statutes. Sentence severity for immigration offenses was increased by guideline amendments in the late 1980s and early 1990s and by additional amendments promulgated pursuant to congressional directives in the late 1990s. Average time served for firearm trafficking and illegal firearm possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) has been doubled in the guidelines era without enactment of any mandatory minimum penalties. (Statutory minimum penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for brandishing or discharging a firearm during a drug trafficking or violent offense were increased in 1998.)<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(2).

<sup>139</sup> Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469 (Nov. 13, 1998).



Sentencing severity for a small number of offenses was decreased by the guidelines. Average time served for larceny decreased after implementation of the guidelines due to the Commission's decision to decrease severity for simple property crimes, while increasing it for "white collar" offenses, in order to treat economic crimes involving the same amount of money more similarly. Other economic offenses show severity trends in both directions: increases for tax and fraud, decreases for forgery and embezzlement. The Commission's 2001 amendments pursuant to its "economic crimes package" increased sentences for offenses involving large numbers of victims and larger monetary losses. Later amendments pursuant to directives in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act increased sentences for a wider variety of economic crimes and further augmented the 2001 increase. These increases are just beginning to appear in the data currently available.

Clearly, the guidelines have had an effect on sentencing independent of statutory minimum penalties. In addition, while the guidelines have been generally used to increase sentence severity, they can be used to decrease sentence severity for targeted offenses or offenders, if policymakers choose to do so.

## **B. Partially Achieved Goals of the SRA**

### ***1. Reduction of Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity***

The central goal of the SRA was reduction of unwarranted sentencing disparity. Congress recognized, however, that disparity is not monolithic; it arises from multiple and discrete sources. Different components of the reformed sentencing system were designed to help control disparity arising from different sources. Evaluating the current system requires evaluating how well each source of disparity has been controlled.

***Inter-judge and regional disparity.*** Rigorous statistical study both inside and outside the Commission confirm that the guidelines have succeeded at the job they were principally designed to do: reduce unwarranted disparity arising from differences among judges. As described in Chapter Three, the "primary judge effect" was reduced by approximately one-third to one-half with the implementation of the guidelines, and "interaction effects" have been reduced even more substantially. Analysis of specific offense types shows that the guidelines reduced inter-judge disparity for most types of crime, with the exception of immigration and robbery offenses.

Although changes in the amount of regional disparity from the preguidelines to the guidelines era cannot be quantified as rigorously as can changes in inter-judge disparity, the available evidence suggests that it was reduced under the guidelines for some offenses. However, regional disparity may have *increased* significantly for drug trafficking offenses, reflecting both different adaptations to the guidelines and different types of offenses prosecuted in different regions. The increased severity of drug trafficking offenses in the guidelines era allows regional differences to be more pronounced. Regional disparity may reflect both the policies of U.S. Attorneys and the practices of judges.

Using hierarchical statistical modeling described in Chapter Three, and the presumptive sentence model described in Chapter Four to control for case differences, analysis reveals that 73 percent of the variation in sentence lengths in federal sentencing today is due to offense and offender differences that affect the guideline range. Though statistically significant, only 2.9 and 2.8 percent of the variation is attributable to judges and districts, respectively. Departures based on defendants' substantial assistance accounted for the greatest amount of variation in sentences—4.4 percent in 2001. Other downward departures contributed 2.2 percent of the variation in sentences. Upward departures and use of the guideline range contributed relatively little to the total variation in sentences. Determining how much, if any, of the variation in sentences created by these mechanisms is *unwarranted* is difficult because of limitations in the data. The available evidence suggests, however, that at least part of the variation in sentences resulting from these mechanisms may represent unwarranted disparity.

***Racial, ethnic, and gender disparity.*** As described in Chapter Four, any influence of racial or ethnic discrimination in sentencing decisions has been substantially controlled. By this important measure, sentencing reform has been successful. While some differences among groups in the likelihood of imprisonment or the length of prison terms imposed remains unaccounted for by legally relevant factors, the statistical significance of these differences fluctuate year-to-year, making deeply rooted prejudices or stereotypes an unlikely explanation for the differences. Some different treatment may result from legitimate considerations on which we have no data.

However, a significant difference in the treatment of similar male and female offenders remains unaccounted for, and may reflect lingering paternalism or, perhaps, sentencing-relevant differences between the genders on which data are not collected. Most important, policy changes effected by statutory minimum penalties, and incorporated into the guidelines' rules, have increased the gap in average sentences between African-American and other offenders. A significant part of this gap is due to policies that the Commission has found to be unnecessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing, such as the 100-to-1 quantity ratio between powder and crack cocaine.

***Disparity arising at presentencing stages.*** In order to prevent plea bargaining from undermining sentencing reform, the SRA directed the Commission to promulgate policy statements regarding judicial review of plea agreements. The Commission also established other policies—such as the relevant conduct rule in Chapter One, Part B and the multiple count rule in Chapter Three, Part D of the *Guidelines Manual*, and cross-references among guidelines—designed to ameliorate the effects of uneven charging and plea bargaining decisions.

While it is difficult to quantify the exact extent to which presentencing stages are contributing to unwarranted disparity today, due both to limitations in the data and to recent changes in Department of Justice policies, several lines of evidence suggest that uneven charging and plea bargaining remain a source of unwarranted sentencing disparity. As reviewed in Chapter Three, surveys of judges and probation officers, field research in several districts, and analysis of information provided to the Commission in presentence reports have suggested that uneven charging and plea bargaining undermine the guidelines and result in sentencing disparity in a substantial number of cases.

Presentencing decisions sometimes result in sentences that are disproportionately *lenient* compared to the penalty established by the guidelines as appropriate for the offender’s conduct. For example, research from three different time periods throughout the guidelines era has demonstrated that only a small minority of offenders who qualify for enhanced penalties under 21 U.S.C. § 841 for prior drug offenses receive such enhancements. Similarly, about a third of offenders who qualify for an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for use of a firearm during a violent or drug trafficking offense receive such an enhancement, about another third receive the guidelines’ instead of the statutory firearm enhancement instead, while another third receive no increase at all.

At other times, presentencing decisions result in sentences disproportionately *severe* compared to the guidelines range that would otherwise apply to the case. For example, a small number of offenders each year are charged with multiple violations of section 924(c) as part of the same indictment and sentencing hearing. Such “count stacking” increases the statutory minimum sentence far above the top of the otherwise applicable guideline range. The Commission’s multiple count rules cannot ameliorate the effects of charging variations involving statutory mandatory sentencing enhancements. The Department’s new charging policies attempt to regulate use of statutory sentencing enhancements, but they leave considerable discretion to individual U. S. attorneys and prosecutors to depart from guideline principles.

There is little empirical research exploring why enhanced penalties are sought in some cases and not in others, or whether their use reflects legally relevant factors, extra-legal factors, or arbitrary variation. Field research suggests a variety of explanations, including workload pressures and the desire to create incentives, beyond those contained in the guidelines themselves, for defendant cooperation with the government. Different prosecutors and different courts may simply have different views about how best to handle certain types of cases or what penalties are appropriate. The sentences that result from avoiding applicable penalties may seem to those familiar with a particular defendant sufficient to meet the purposes of sentencing and more just and effective than the sentence required by a strict application of every penalty provided by law. Present practices, however, which lead to inconsistent application or avoidance of statutory and guideline enhancements, result in unwarranted disparity and sentences that are often disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense.

## **2. *A High Standard of Sentencing Uniformity***

Congress established an ambitious goal for sentencing reform—“avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing policies.”<sup>140</sup> Recognizing that plea bargaining could undermine uniformity, Congress empowered the Commission to issue policy statements regarding judicial review and acceptance of

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<sup>140</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).

plea agreements,<sup>141</sup> and directed the Commission to study the effects of plea agreements and mandatory minimum penalties on sentencing disparity.

As described in Chapter One, the Commission developed guidelines that sought uniform treatment for most offenders based on their *real offense conduct* rather than merely the offense of conviction. The Department of Justice and the Judicial Conference also recognized that prosecutorial discretion could lead to disparity and put in place supporting policies designed to ensure uniformity in charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing. All of this added up to a highly ambitious program to control disparity and achieve uniform sentences. Commentators have noted that no other sentencing commission has attempted so ambitious a goal and moved so far toward real offense sentencing (Tonry, 1996; Frase, 2002; Reitz, 2003). Thus, it is not entirely surprising—and no reason to dismiss all of federal sentencing reform as a failure—to recognize that this goal has been only partially achieved. It is necessary, however, to assess in what respects the federal guidelines system has fallen short, to examine the implications of current practices, and to draw appropriate lessons.

## **C. Partial Implementation of the Components of Sentencing Reform**

Why has sentencing reform not achieved its goals in every respect? Program evaluators generally begin by examining whether the components of a new program have been fully implemented. Chapter One described the components of sentencing policy development and implementation envisioned in the SRA and in the policies and practices put into place by the Commission, the Department, and the Judicial Conference.

In theory, the Commission was to develop sentencing policy following consultation with judges, prosecutors, and other stakeholders, and after conducting and studying the latest criminological research. Congress was to review guideline amendments and recommendations for legislation in light of the policy reasons offered by the Commission. Prosecutors were to charge similar crimes uniformly. Plea agreements were to include complete and accurate accounts of offender's readily provable conduct. Defendant cooperation with the government was to be encouraged through sentence reductions built into the guidelines rules. As a check on prosecutorial discretion and the disparity that might result, probation officers were to conduct presentence investigations to inform judges' review of plea agreements. If necessary, judges were to reject agreements that would undermine the guidelines. Judicial departures were allowed only in consideration of aggravating or mitigating circumstances not adequately considered by the Commission, and appellate review of these departures and other guideline applications was intended to correct misapplications and ensure consistent sentencing nationwide.

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<sup>141</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(E).

In practice, the reformed sentencing system has fallen short of this ideal in several respects, which helps explain why the goals of sentencing reform have been only partially achieved.

## ***1. Components of Guidelines Implementation***

***Problems with presentencing stages.*** Uniform charging and plea bargaining have been implemented only partially. Guidelines mechanisms designed to control the effects of uneven charging and plea agreements successfully compensate in some cases, but these mechanisms do not always work as intended. The multiple count rules successfully compensate for charging variations in many cases, but cannot undo the effects of trumping statutory minimum penalties or “count stacking” of offenses carrying mandatory consecutive penalty enhancements.

The relevant conduct rule has long been a subject of critical commentary (*see, e.g.*, Sands & Coates, 1991; Lear, 1993; Reitz, 1993; Yellin, 1993; American College of Trial Lawyers, 2001) and is an admitted policy compromise that treats some offenses involving quantifiable amounts, such as drug trafficking, differently from other offenses, such as robbery. Evidence from field research suggests that remaining ambiguity in the rule, and reluctance to upset plea agreements that stipulate less than the full relevant conduct and subject defendants to the severe penalties that would result, limits the rule’s application. Preventing disparity due to uneven charging or plea agreements that limit offenders’ exposure to punishment has always depended on probation officers informing the court of each defendant’s real offense conduct. Informational asymmetry between the prosecution and the court, and limitations in resources needed to conduct presentence investigations, present a formidable challenge to the operation of the relevant conduct rule as a check on disparity arising from presentencing decisions.

Judicial review of plea agreements pursuant to the policy statements in Chapter Six of the *Guidelines Manual* appears to be very limited. Judges are reluctant (and, in some judges’ views, are not institutionally empowered) to infringe on the discretion of prosecutors to choose which charges and evidence to bring forward. Judicial review of plea agreements is sometimes hampered by limitations in the information available to probation officers for their presentence investigations. Tension between the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of evidence applicable at trial and the “preponderance of evidence” standard applicable at sentencing during the first fifteen years of the guidelines raises questions about which conduct must be accounted for in plea agreements. Rejection of plea agreements that undermine the guidelines, though not unknown, appears to have been relatively rare throughout the guidelines era (Adair & Slawsky, 1991).

The Department of Justice and the Commission have recently taken steps designed to bolster the previously existing policies calling for uniform charging, plea agreements consistent with the goals of the SRA,<sup>142</sup> and judicial review and rejection of plea agreements that undermine the

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<sup>142</sup> Ashcroft Charging Memo, *supra* note 24, Sept. 22, 2003.

guidelines.<sup>143</sup> While it is too early to assess the effects of these changes, it may be unrealistic to expect them to fully address these longstanding problems. Experience with previous Department policies that sought to impose uniform practices nationwide suggests that these recent policy changes alone may be insufficient to eliminate all disparate practices at presentencing stages. Commitment to the SRA's goal of systemwide uniformity naturally is more limited among front-line actors in different regions, facing different local conditions, than it is among national policymakers (Sifton, 1993). A fundamental issue for the future is how to increase the commitment of front-line implementers to their new responsibilities to ensure that the goals of sentencing reform are achieved.

***Sentencing and appeal.*** Other components of guidelines implementation appear to be more fully operational. Probation officers continue to conduct investigations and write comprehensive presentence reports, although workload and budgetary pressures have recently raised questions about the continuing viability of these efforts, particularly in districts implementing early disposition programs. Judges are conscientiously applying the guidelines to the facts as they know them. The availability of appellate review to correct guidelines misapplications has likely served to enforce the guidelines system, although the effects of waivers of the right to appeal, which are increasingly included in plea agreements, are a subject of ongoing investigation. Appellate review has frequently alerted the Commission to areas of ambiguity where clarification of the guidelines is needed, and the Commission has regularly responded with guideline amendments (Wilkins & Steer, 1993).

Appellate review has functioned less successfully in the area of departures. Appeals of downward departures have been relatively rare given the departure rate. The appellate courts have not developed a “common law” of departures sufficient to establish uniform national standards and reduce significant variation in the use of departures. The Commission has only recently, pursuant to the PROTECT Act, addressed departures comprehensively to help ensure that they occur only in exceptional circumstances where departures are needed to achieve the purposes of sentencing.

## ***2. Components of Guidelines Policy Development***

The three major components of guidelines policy development—collaboration among policymakers, implementers, and other stakeholders, use of research and criminological expertise, and political accountability—were introduced in Chapter One. Of these three, political accountability has been a prominent feature of sentencing policy development throughout the guidelines era. The Commission has worked to be responsive to the concerns of Congress. On only one occasion has Congress used the statutory review period provided in the SRA for guidelines amendments to disapprove Commission actions. The Commission's priorities and policymaking agenda have been greatly influenced by congressional directives and other crime legislation. Statutory minimum penalties and sentence enhancements remain a parallel system of direct legislative control over sentences, which bypass the processes of policy development outlined in the SRA.

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<sup>143</sup> See provisions amending commentary to USSG §6B1.2, Amend. 651, App. C (Oct. 27, 2003).

Appendix B details directives from Congress to the Commission, which along with statutory minimum penalties have substantially shaped the penalties for a majority of offenders sentenced in the federal courts today. Congress has sometimes alerted the Commission to its concerns and directed the Commission to study a problem, report its findings, and amend the guidelines as needed. However, at other times Congress has determined the penalties on its own. Legislation has sometimes directed the Commission to increase offense levels by a specific amount.

The PROTECT Act represents an extreme example of direct congressional control over the sentencing guidelines themselves. Congress bypassed the research and consultation procedures outlined in the SRA and directly amended the *Guidelines Manual* by statute. The Sentencing Commission is troubled by any breakdown in collaboration among the legislature, itself, and other criminal justice system policy actors. The Commission believes that it is uniquely qualified to conduct studies using its vast database, obtain the views and comments of various segments of the federal criminal justice community, review the academic literature, and report back to Congress in a timely manner.<sup>144</sup> These are the processes set out in the SRA, which established the Commission as the clearinghouse for information on federal sentencing practices and a forum for collaboration among policymakers, implementers, and other stakeholders. As an independent agency in the Judiciary, but with frequent interaction with the three branches of government, the Commission is well-positioned to develop fair and effective sentencing policy as long as it continues to receive the resources and support it needs to carry out its vital mission.

Policy development through the components created by the SRA offers advantages that have not been fully realized. The national conversation on sentencing policy sparked by the Supreme Court's decision in *Blakely* provides another challenging opportunity to tap the Sentencing Commission's potential as a forum for collaboration and a center of research. The results of the Commission's Fifteen-Year Evaluation of guidelines sentencing can help inform this analysis, as well as ongoing discussions and initiatives aimed at developing just and effective sentencing practices.

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<sup>144</sup> See letter from voting members of the United States Sentencing Commission to Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy, United States Congress, regarding "S. 151/H.R. 1104, Child Abduction Prevention Act of 2003," April 2, 2003.

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## Appendix B: Congressional Directives to the United States Sentencing Commission Subsequent to Enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act

Date	P. L. No.	Crime Type	Brief Description of Directive	Amend. No.
1/18/1988	100--690	Drug Crimes	Increase of at least 2 offense levels, minimum offense level of 26 for importation of controlled substances by aircraft or other vessel	134
1/18/1988	100--690	Drug Crimes	Increase of at least 2 offense levels, minimum offense level of 26 for drug offenses involving minors	135
1/18/1988	100--690	Drug Crimes	Increase of at least 2 offense levels, minimum offense level of 26 for drug offenses within federal prisons	203
1/18/1988	100--690	Drug Crimes	Promulgate a minimum offense level of 26 for common carrier operation under influence of alcohol or drugs if death results; minimum level of 21 if serious bodily injury results	141
1/19/1988	100--700	Economic Crimes	Promulgate appropriate penalty increases in fraud guidelines for conduct resulting in conscious or reckless risk of serious personal injury; Sentencing Commission to consider appropriateness of minimum 2-level enhancement of offense level for such conduct	156
8/9/1989	101--73	Economic Crimes	Promulgate a provision for substantial period of incarceration for violation of any of several bank fraud, bribery, and embezzlement statutes if conduct substantially jeopardizes the safety and soundness of a federally insured financial institution	317
8/9/1989	101--73	Economic Crimes	Ensure substantial period of incarceration for violation of any of several bank fraud, bribery, and embezzlement statutes if conduct substantially jeopardizes the safety and soundness of a federally insured financial institution	317
1/29/1990	101--647	Economic Crimes	Promulgate a minimum offense level of 24 for bank fraud if defendant derives more than \$1,000,000 in gross receipts	364
1/29/1990	101--647	Drug Crimes	Promulgate an increase of at least 2 offense levels for offenses involving "ice" methamphetamine	370
1/29/1990	101--647	Violent Crimes	Promulgate a minimum increase in kidnapping guideline for certain offenses involving child victims of 4 levels if victim intentionally maltreated, 3 levels if victim sexually exploited, 3 levels if for money or other consideration victim placed in care of person who does not have legal right to such custody, 2 levels if defendant allowed child victim to be subjected to any of above-specified conduct	363
1/29/1990	101--647	All Crimes	Report on mandatory minimum provisions in federal law; address 7 enumerated issues and any other information that would contribute to a thorough assessment	

<b>Date</b>	<b>P. L. No.</b>	<b>Crime Type</b>	<b>Brief Description of Directive</b>	<b>Amend. No.</b>
1/29/1990	101--647	Sex Crimes	Study and amendment of guidelines for sexual crimes against children to provide more substantial penalties if Sentencing Commission determines current penalties are inadequate	372
0/28/1991	102--141	Other Crimes	Promulgate a minimum base offense level of 10 in 2G3.1	437
0/28/1991	102--141	Sex Crimes	Promulgate a minimum base offense level of 13 in 2G2.4 plus minimum 2-level increase for possession of 10 or more items depicting sexual exploitation of minor	436
0/28/1991	102--141	Sex Crimes	Promulgate a minimum base offense level of 15 in 2G2.2 and at least 5 level increase for pattern of activity involving sexual abuse or exploitation of minor; extension of 2G2.2 to receipt or trafficking; limit 2G2.2 to simple possession	435
9/13/1994	103--322	Gun Crimes	Promulgate an appropriate enhancement of sentence for crime of violence or drug trafficking crime involving a semi-automatic firearm	531
9/13/1994	103--322	All Crimes	Promulgate an appropriate enhancement for any felony, committed inside or outside U.S., that involves or is intended to promote international terrorism	526
9/13/1994	103--322	Drug Crimes	Promulgate an appropriate enhancement for offenders who violate section 409 of Controlled Substances Act (drug free truck stops and safety rest areas)	534
9/13/1994	103--322	All Crimes	Promulgate an appropriate sentence enhancement if an offender over 21 years old involved a minor in commission of the offense; consider (1) severity of the crime, (2) number of minors involved, (3) proximity in age between offender and the minor(s), and (4) the fact that involving minors in crimes of violence is frequently more serious than involving minors in drug trafficking offenses	528
9/13/1994	103--322	Violent Crimes	Ensure penalties for crimes of violence against elderly victims are sufficiently stringent to deter such crimes, protect the public against additional crimes of such defendants, and reflect the heinous nature of such offenses; penalties must reflect (1) degree of physical harm caused to elderly victim and (2) vulnerability of victim; guidelines must provide enhanced punishment for offenders previously convicted of crimes of violence against the elderly	521
9/13/1994	103--322	Sex Crimes	Review and amend, where necessary, aggravated sexual abuse guidelines as follows if appropriate: (1) enhance penalties in offenses with more than one offender, (2) reduce unwarranted disparities between sentences for offenders known to the victim and offenders unknown to the victim, (3) render federal penalties commensurate with penalties for similar state offenses, (4) account for recidivism in sex offenses, the severity of sex offenses, and the devastating effects of sex offenses on survivors; report within 180 days on: (1) known versus unknown offenders, (2) federal sentences compared to state sentences, and (3) effect of rape sentences on populations residing in federal territory relative to other offenses	511

<b>Date</b>	<b>P. L. No.</b>	<b>Crime Type</b>	<b>Brief Description of Directive</b>	<b>Amend. No.</b>
9/13/1994	103--322	Gun Crimes	Promulgate an appropriate enhancement for offenders convicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) who have one or two prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses	522
9/13/1994	103--322	Other Crimes	Promulgate an appropriate enhancement for violating 18 U.S.C. 844(h) more than once	
9/13/1994	103--322	Economic Crimes	Promulgate an appropriate enhancement if the defendant used or carried a firearm during and in relation to a felony offense defined in chapter 25 of title 18 (counterfeiting and forgery)	513
9/13/1994	103--322	Drug Crimes	Promulgate appropriate enhancements for simple possession or distribution of drugs in a federal prison and for smuggling drugs into a federal prison; probation prohibited for such offenders	514
9/13/1994	103--322	Drug Crimes	Promulgate appropriate guidelines and amendments regarding the limitation on applicability of mandatory minimum penalties in certain drug cases; mandates a minimum 24-month low-end guideline sentence for offenders who qualify for a 5-year statutory mandatory minimum sentence	515
9/13/1994	103--322	Other Crimes	Study and report concerning recommendations for guideline amendments that relate to offenses in which an HIV infected individual engages in sexual activity with knowledge of HIV status and with intent to expose another to HIV	
9/13/1994	103--322	Sex Crimes	Promulgate appropriate amendments pertaining to repeat sexual offenders	511
9/13/1994	103--322	Drug Crimes	Promulgate an appropriate enhancement for a defendant convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. 860 (drug-dealing in drug-free zones)	
9/13/1994	103--322	Other Crimes	Defines "hate crime"; minimum enhancement of 3 offense levels for offenses the finder of fact at trial determines beyond a reasonable doubt to be hate crimes; Commission to ensure reasonable consistency with other guidelines, avoid duplicative punishments for substantially the same offense, and take into account any mitigating circumstances that might justify exceptions	521
9/13/1994	103--322	Economic Crimes	Review and amend guidelines to ensure adequacy of victim related adjustments for fraud offenses against victims over age 55; report to Congress in 180 days	521
0/30/1995	104--38	Drug Crimes	Submit to Congress recommendations regarding changes to statutes and guidelines governing sentences for crack and powder cocaine offenses; report should reflect 14 enumerated considerations; propose revision of drug quantity ratio of crack to powder cocaine; comment upon Dept of Justice report on charging and plea practices in money laundering cases	
2/23/1995	104--71	Sex Crimes	Report to Congress in 180 days concerning offenses involving child pornography and other sex offenses against children; address 5 enumerated areas in report	

<b>Date</b>	<b>P. L. No.</b>	<b>Crime Type</b>	<b>Brief Description of Directive</b>	<b>Amend. No.</b>
2/23/1995	104--71	Sex Crimes	Increase base offense level by at least 2 levels for 18 U.S.C. 2251( c)(1)(A) or 2252(a) offenses	537
2/23/1995	104--71	Sex Crimes	Increase base offense level for violation of 18 U.S.C. 2423(a) (transportation of children with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity ) by at least 3 levels	538
4/24/1996	104--132	All Crimes	Promulgate or amend guidelines to reflect changes made in Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996	571
4/24/1996	104--132	Other Crimes	Amend forthwith chapter 3 adjustment relating to international terrorism so that it applies more broadly to federal crimes of terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)	539
4/24/1996	104--132	Economic Crimes	Promulgate an appropriate enhancement for defendant convicted of 18 U.S.C. 470 (counterfeit acts committed outside U.S.)	554
4/24/1996	104--132	Other Crimes	Promulgate a minimum 6-month prison term for persons convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 1030(a) (terrorist activity damaging a federal interest computer)	551
9/23/1996	104--201	Other Crimes	Sense of Congress is that sentences for offenses involving importation and exportation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are too low; urges Commission to raise penalties	633
9/23/1996	104--208	Other Crimes	Promulgate appropriate increases in base offense level for failure to depart, illegal reentry, and passport and visa fraud	563
9/23/1996	104--208	Other Crimes	Promulgate appropriate increases in base offense level for failure to depart, illegal reentry, and passport and visa fraud	562
9/30/1996	104--208	Drug Crimes	Review guideline penalties for conspiring with or assisting an alien to commit an offense under the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act and ensure appropriately stringent sentences	
9/30/1996	104--208	Other Crimes	Amend guidelines to eliminate disparities between sentences for peonage, involuntary servitude, and slave trade offenses and kidnapping and alien smuggling offenses; ensure that guidelines for peonage, involuntary servitude or slave trade offenses are enhanced for a large number of victims, the use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, or a prolonged period of peonage or involuntary servitude	542
9/30/1996	104--208	Other Crimes	Raise base offense level for fraudulent use of government-issued documents by 2 levels; review number of documents enhancement and raise by 50%; impose enhancement for prior similar conviction in addition to the criminal history points given for such prior conviction; impose an additional enhancement for 2 similar prior convictions in addition to the criminal history points given for such prior convictions; consider aggravating/mitigating factors for upward/downward departures	544



<b>Date</b>	<b>P. L. No.</b>	<b>Crime Type</b>	<b>Brief Description of Directive</b>	<b>Amend. No.</b>
9/30/1996	104--208	Other Crimes	Raise base offense level in alien smuggling offenses by 3; increase enhancement for number of aliens by 50%; impose enhancements for having 1 or 2 prior similar convictions in addition to criminal history points; impose enhancement for bodily injury or death, firearm use or brandishment, or consciously or recklessly placing another in serious danger of death or bodily injury; consider downward adjustment if first offense involving smuggling of spouse or child; consider aggravating/mitigating factors for departure	543
10/3/1996	104--237	Drug Crimes	Amend guidelines to ensure the manufacture of methamphetamine is treated as a significant violation	558
10/3/1996	104--237	Drug Crimes	Determine whether sentences for dangerous handling of controlled substances are adequate and, if not, amend	555
10/3/1996	104--237	Drug Crimes	Increase penalties for methamphetamine offenses that reflect the rapidly growing incidence of such offenses, the high risk of addiction, the increased risk of violence, and the recent increase in importation of meth and its precursor chemicals	555
10/3/1996	104--237	Drug Crimes	Promulgate minimum 2 level increase of base offense level for certain list I chemicals; ensure that quantity is calculated on the basis of quantity that could reasonably have been manufactured in a clandestine setting using the quantity of list I chemical possessed, distributed, imported or exported	557
0/11/1996	104--294	All Crimes	Compile and analyze information relating to the use of encryption or scrambling technology to facilitate or conceal criminal conduct; annually report to Congress on nature and extent of such conduct	
0/13/1996	104--305	Drug Crimes	Review sentences for flunitrazepam offenses and amend as appropriate; submit a summary of review to Congress and explanation for any amendments made; ensure guidelines reflect serious nature of offenses	556
1/19/1997	105--101	Other Crimes	Promulgate a minimum 2 level enhancement for any offense against the property of a national cemetery	576
2/16/1997	105--147	Economic Crimes	Ensure guidelines for intellectual property crimes are sufficient to deter such crimes and provide for consideration of the retail value and quantity of the items with respect to which the crime against intellectual property was committed	590
4/24/1998	105--172	Economic Crimes	Provide an appropriate penalty for offenses involving the cloning of wireless telephones taking into consideration 7 enumerated factors and any additional factors the Commission deems appropriate	596
6/23/1998	105--184	Economic Crimes	Substantially increase penalties for telemarketing fraud; provide a sophisticated means enhancement, including but not limited to sophisticated concealment such as perpetrating the offense from outside the United States; provide enhancement for cases involving a large number of vulnerable victims	587

<b>Date</b>	<b>P. L. No.</b>	<b>Crime Type</b>	<b>Brief Description of Directive</b>	<b>Amend. No.</b>
0/30/1998	105--314	Sex Crimes	Promulgate an appropriate enhancement if defendant knowingly misrepresented the actual identity of the defendant with the intent to persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the transport of a child to engage in a prohibited sexual activity	592
0/30/1998	105--314	Sex Crimes	Review guidelines relating to sexual exploitation and abuse of children and clarify that "distribution of pornography" applies to the distribution of pornography for monetary remuneration and for a nonpecuniary interest	592
0/30/1998	105--314	Sex Crimes	Promulgate an appropriate enhancement for offenses involving the transportation of minors for illegal sexual activity	592
0/30/1998	105--314	All Crimes	Ensure consistency between Federal Sentencing Guidelines and avoid duplicative punishment under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines	
0/30/1998	105--314	Sex Crimes	Promulgate amendments to ensure an appropriate enhancement if the defendant used a computer in the sexual abuse or exploitation of a child	
0/30/1998	105--314	Sex Crimes	Increase sentences for offenses in which the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving the sexual exploitation or abuse of a minor	615
0/30/1998	105--318	Economic Crimes	Review and amend, as appropriate, to provide an appropriate penalty for each offense under 18 U.S.C. 1028 (identity fraud) after considering 7 enumerated factors plus any additional factors the Commission deems appropriate	596
12/9/1999	106--160	Economic Crimes	Implement emergency guideline amendments to implement section 2(g) of No Electronic Theft Act	590
0/12/2000	106--310	Drug Crimes	Amend guidelines for offenses involving manufacturing of amphetamine and methamphetamine; if offense created substantial risk of harm to human life or the environment, increase base offense level by 3 levels and to a minimum level 27; if offense involved substantial risk of harm to the life of a minor or incompetent, increase by 6 levels and to a minimum level 30	608
0/14/2000	106--310	Drug Crimes	Use emergency amendment authority to increase sentences for importation, exportation, manufacture or trafficking of Ecstasy; increase base offense level for any substance marketed as Ecstasy	609
0/17/2000	106--310	Drug Crimes	Amend guidelines for offenses involving list I chemicals; increase penalties for ephedrine, phenylpropanolamine, and pseudoephedrine such that those penalties correspond to the quantity of controlled substance that could reasonably have been manufactured using the quantity of ephedrine, phenylpropanolamine, or pseudoephedrine possessed or distributed; Commission must create table of manufacturing conversion ratios based on scientific, law enforcement, and other data the Commission deems appropriate; also increase penalties for other list I chemicals taking into account enumerated factors	611

<b>Date</b>	<b>P. L. No.</b>	<b>Crime Type</b>	<b>Brief Description of Directive</b>	<b>Amend. No.</b>
0/17/2000	106--310	Drug Crimes	Increase penalties for amphetamine offenses such that those penalties are comparable to the base offense level for methamphetamine offenses and reflect enumerated congressional concerns	610
0/17/2000	106--310	Drug Crimes	Review and amend guidelines to provide for increased penalties for Ecstasy such that the penalties reflect the seriousness of such offenses and need to deter them; ensure that new penalties reflect 6 enumerated factors and any other factor the Commission deems appropriate; sense of Congress that base offense levels for Ecstasy are too low and should be increased to be comparable with other drug offenses; base offense levels for importing and trafficking Ecstasy should be increased; within 60 days prepare a report describing factors Commission considered in promulgating Ecstasy amendments	609
0/28/2000	106--386	Other Crimes	Broaden scope of interstate stalking guidelines to include new statutory amendments	616
0/28/2000	106--386	Other Crimes	Amend, if appropriate, guidelines applicable to human trafficking offenses; consider enumerated grounds for sentence enhancements; consider conforming human trafficking guidelines to guidelines applicable to peonage, slave trade, and involuntary servitude offenses	627
11/1/2000	106--420	Economic Crimes	Enhance penalties for fraud or misrepresentation in connection with obtaining or providing, or furnishing of information to a consumer on, scholarships, grants, loans, tuition, discounts, awards, or other financial assistance for purposes of financing higher education; make those penalties comparable to penalties for misrepresentation that defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable, educational, religious, or political organization or a government agency	617
0/26/2001	107--56	Economic Crimes	Ensure individuals convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1030 can be subjected to appropriate penalties without regard to any mandatory minimum prison term	637
3/27/2002	107--155	Public Integrity Cri	Promulgate appropriate penalties for violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and report back to Congress.	648
7/30/2002	107--204	Economic Crimes	Review and amend guidelines to provide an enhancement for officers of publicly traded corporations who commit fraud	647
7/30/2002	107--204	Public Integrity Cri	Review and amend guideline penalties for obstruction of justice to ensure they are sufficient to deter and punish that activity.	647
7/30/2002	107--273	Other Crimes	Review and amend, as appropriate, in order to provide enhanced punishment for offenses involving the use of body armor.	659
11/2/2002	107--273	Other Crimes	Review and amend, as appropriate, guidelines to provide an enhancement for offenses involving assaults or threats on judges and certain other federal officers.	663

<b>Date</b>	<b>P. L. No.</b>	<b>Crime Type</b>	<b>Brief Description of Directive</b>	<b>Amend. No.</b>
11/2/2002	107--296	Other Crimes	Review and, if appropriate, amend guidelines relating to computer crimes in light of: (1) potential and actual harm; (2) level of sophistication; (3) intent to profit; (4) malicious intent; (5) privacy violations; (6) involved computer used for national defense, security, or administration of justice; (7) interfered with critical infrastructure; (8) threat to public health or safety.	654
4/30/2003	108--21	Violent Crimes	Increase base offense level for kidnapping from level 24 to 32, to delete specific offense characteristic decrease of two levels for release of victim within 24 hours, and to increase specific offense characteristic for sexual exploitation of victim from three to six levels.	651
4/30/2003	108--21	Sex Crimes	Adds several SOCs to 2G2.2 and 2G2.4 enhancing penalties if offenses involve between 10 and 150 (plus 2), 150 and 300 (plus 3), 300 and 600 (plus 4), if offense involves material depicting sadism or masochism (plus 4), and defines "pattern of activity" as "prohibited sexual conduct on at least two separate occasions." Directs Commission to ensure that penalties for sex offenses "adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense."	649
4/30/2003	108--21	All Crimes	Within 180 days Commission must: (1) review grounds for downward departure; (2)(a) ensure a substantial reduction in the incidence of downward departures; (2)(b) authorize a downward departure of no more than 4 levels for Government approved early disposition programs; (2)(c) limit enumerated grounds for downward departure in the area of sexual offenses	651
4/30/2003	108--21	Sex Crimes	Guidelines Manual amended by Congress to prohibit departures in certain child crimes and sex offenses for any reason not affirmatively and specifically identified as a permissible ground for departure in Chapter 5, Part K	649
4/30/2003	108--21	All Crimes	Distribute amendments, policy statements, and official commentary to U.S. Courts and Probation Offices incorporating provisions of the PROTECT Act; prohibits Commission from promulgating any amendments on or before May 1, 2005, that are inconsistent with amendments made pursuant to the Act or to add any new grounds for downward departures, or promulgate any amendments that would result in sentencing ranges that are lower than those that were established by the amendments to guidelines regarding sex offenses; and at no time promulgate any amendments that would alter or repeal the amendments made by the Act to the acceptance of responsibility guideline.	
4/30/2003	108--21	Sex Crimes	Applicable category of offense to be used for determining sentencing guidelines for persons convicted of crimes involving the obscene visual representation of the sexual abuse of children in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1466A shall be the category of offenses described in § 2G2.2 of the Guidelines; Commission may promulgate guidelines specifically governing offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1466A if such guidelines do not result in sentencing ranges that are lower than those that would have applied under § 2G2.2 of the Guidelines.	

<b>Date</b>	<b>P. L. No.</b>	<b>Crime Type</b>	<b>Brief Description of Directive</b>	<b>Amend. No.</b>
4/30/2003	108--21	Sex Crimes	Review, and if appropriate, amend the Guidelines and policy statements to ensure that penalties are adequate in cases involving interstate travel with the intent to engage in a sexual act with a juvenile, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423.	664
4/30/2003	108--21	Sex Crimes	Review and, as appropriate, amend the Guidelines and policy statements to ensure that the guidelines are adequate to punish and deter conduct involving violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (child pornography). With respect to guidelines for section 2252A(a)(3)(B) (depictions of minors engaging in sexual conduct), the Commission was directed to consider the "relative culpability of promoting, presenting, describing or distributing material" as compared with solicitation of such material	664
4/30/2003	108--21	Drug Crimes	Review the guidelines with respect to offenses involving the drug GHB and to consider amending the guidelines to provide for increased penalties that reflect the seriousness of offenses involving GHB	667
4/30/2003	108--21	Other Crimes	Ensure 3rd acceptance of responsibility point to be given only upon formal motion of the government	649
2/16/2003	108--187	Other Crimes	Directive in the CAN-SPAM Act (Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing) to provide penalties for violations of law prohibiting transmission of certain commercial electronic messages containing "sexually oriented material," and other offenses that may be facilitated by the sending of large quantities of unsolicited electronic mail. The Act also requires that the Commission consider providing sentencing enhancements for several factors, including obtaining electronic mail addresses through improper means	665
6/22/2004	108--237	Economic Crimes	Legislative history for the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement Act contains a directive to the Commission to revise the existing antitrust sentencing guidelines to increase terms of imprisonment for antitrust violations to reflect the new statutory maximum for these offenses, which was raised from three years to ten years. The legislative history states that no revisions are needed with regard to the fine provisions	
7/15/2004	108--275	Other Crimes	Amend the Abuse of Trust/Special Skill guideline at § 3B1.3 to include a defendant who exceeds or abuses the authority of his position to obtain unlawfully or use without authority any means of identification, and general directive to review and amend guidelines and policy statements to ensure that guidelines appropriately punish identify theft offenses involving an abuse of trust	

# Appendix C

## SUMMARY REPORT

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### U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION'S SURVEY OF ARTICLE III JUDGES

A COMPONENT OF THE  
FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT  
ON THE U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION'S  
LEGISLATIVE MANDATE



DECEMBER 2002

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## **SUMMARY REPORT ON THE U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION'S SURVEY OF ARTICLE III JUDGES**

The approaching fifteen-year anniversary of the federal sentencing guidelines brings an opportunity to reflect on the work produced by the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the effect of the guidelines on the criminal justice system. For this reason, the Commission undertook a survey to measure, from the judges' perspectives, how the federal guidelines have responded to the goals Congress set forth for them in the Sentencing Reform Act. All Article III judges were mailed questionnaires in January 2002. Response rates were 51.8 percent for district court judges and 33.9 percent for circuit court judges. A list of the statutory issues covered by the survey appears in Appendix A.

### **Reporting of Survey Results**

A portion of the survey asked each judge to rate the guidelines' effectiveness in achieving the various goals of sentencing on a scale ranging from a low value of "1" (for "Few" of the judge's cases meeting the goal) to a high value of "6" (for "Almost All" of the judge's cases meeting the goal). This summary report treats responses concentrated at the higher end of the scale (*i.e.*, "5" or "6") as indicating higher effectiveness in achieving these goals, responses in the center of the scale (*i.e.*, "3" or "4") as indicating moderate effectiveness in achieving these goals, and responses concentrated at the lower end of the scale (*i.e.*, "1" or "2") as indicating less effectiveness in achieving these goals.

### **Overall Rating of Guidelines**

When asked to provide a general overall rating of effectiveness of the federal sentencing guidelines in achieving the purposes of sentencing (Q18)<sup>1</sup>, approximately 40 percent of judges (38.4% of responding district court judges and 41.7% of responding circuit court judges) reported a higher degree of effectiveness, approximately 38 percent of judges (38.6% of responding district court judges and 37.5% of responding circuit court judges) reported a moderate degree of effectiveness, and approximately 22 percent of judges (22.9% of responding district court judges and 20.8% of responding circuit court judges) reported a lower degree of effectiveness.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>To assist in linking the survey finding to the relevant data table in the appendices, references to the survey question numbers are placed throughout the text. For example, the reference here to "Q18" indicates that this discussion is based on data from the survey's Question 18 topic (judges' ratings of overall guideline achievement).

<sup>2</sup>District and circuit court judges responding to the survey held comparable opinions about how the guidelines reflected their legislative mandates, often showing strikingly similar patterns of responding.

### **Areas of Most Effectiveness in Meeting the Sentencing Goals**

Both responding district and circuit court judges believed that the guidelines had been relatively effective in achieving four of the sentencing goals set forth in the Sentencing Reform Act:

- providing punishment levels that reflect the seriousness of the offense (Q1),
- providing adequate deterrence to criminal conduct (Q3),
- protecting the public from further crimes of the defendant (Q4), and
- avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct (Q6).

Responding district court judges were more likely than responding circuit court judges to report higher effectiveness in achieving these four goals, and a majority of responding district court judges also believed that the guidelines were highly achieving the additional goal of providing certainty in meeting the purposes of sentencing (Q7).

### **Areas of Least Effectiveness in Meeting the Sentencing Goals**

A plurality of both responding district and circuit court judges indicated that there were two areas in which the guidelines were less effective in achieving the purposes of sentencing:

- providing defendants with training, medical care, or treatment in the most effective manner, where rehabilitation was appropriate (Q5) and
- maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors (Q9).

Approximately 40 percent of responding district court judges, and slightly more responding circuit court judges, reported that few of their cases met these sentencing goals.

### **Variations Within Offense Categories**

The survey asked judges to provide responses specific to the most common types of offenses sentenced under the guidelines. The response patterns were similar across offense types, but noteworthy differences were observed for drug trafficking offenses. Compared to other offenses, a greater percentage of responding judges reported that drug sentences typically were:

- more likely to afford adequate deterrence (Q3) and to protect the public from further crimes (Q4) and

- less likely to provide fairness (Q8), to provide just punishment (Q10), to maintain sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences (Q9), and to avoid unwarranted disparities among similar defendants found guilty of similar conduct (Q6).

Consistent with these findings, the survey also affirmed the respondents' judicial belief that drug trafficking sentences were often longer than required to reflect the seriousness of the drug trafficking crime. (Q1iii).

With respect to other variations across offense types, responding judges also viewed firearms trafficking sentences as relatively effective in meeting the goals of adequate deterrence (Q3) and protection of the public (Q4). Further, when responding judges reported that certain guideline punishment levels did not reflect crime seriousness, immigration unlawful entry sentences more often were reported as too long, while fraud and theft sentences more often were reported as too short.<sup>3</sup> (Q1iii)

### **Mandatory Minimums**

With respect to drug trafficking offenses, more than 40 percent of responding judges reported that mandatory minimum statutes highly affect their ability to impose a sentence reflecting the statutory purposes of sentencing. In contrast, slightly more than one quarter of responding judges reported that few of their drug trafficking cases involved mandatory minimum provisions affecting the purposes of sentencing. These data also suggest that responding judges were more concerned with mandatory minimum effects on drug trafficking cases (compared to other offense types); roughly one-third more district court judges provided answers to the drug trafficking portion of this question than to the portions of this question addressing other offense types. Looking beyond drug trafficking offenses, approximately 40 percent of all responding district court judges reported that relatively few firearms trafficking cases involved mandatory minimum provisions affecting achievement of the purposes of sentencing. (Q2)

### **Offender Characteristics**

More than half of all responding judges would like more emphasis at sentencing placed on the offender's mental condition or the offender's family ties and responsibilities. Additionally, more than half of responding district court judges wanted more emphasis placed on offender age at sentencing. More than 40 percent of all responding judges also would like to see the following characteristics made more relevant at sentencing: emotional condition, employment record, public service (including military), and prior good works. More than 40 percent of responding district court judges also desired

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<sup>3</sup>The Commission's amendments to §2L1.2 (Unlawful Entry and Remaining) and §2B1.1 (Theft, Embezzlement, Receipt of Stolen Property, Property Destruction, and Offenses Involving Fraud or Deceit), effective November 1, 2001, may have since addressed some of the concerns underlying these responses.

greater guideline emphasis on several other offender characteristics: physical condition, drug or alcohol dependence/abuse, and role in the offense. (Q12)

### **Neutrality**

Most responding judges (approximately 90%) agreed that the guidelines “Almost Always” maintained neutrality regarding the offender’s religion or creed. Overall, the responding district court judges reported somewhat higher neutrality levels for all characteristics, with a large district court judge majority (74%-79%) also citing “Almost Always” neutrality with respect to national origin, ethnicity, or gender. Fewer district and circuit court judges (but still more than half) believed that there was “Almost Always” neutrality with regard to offender race (62%-68%) and socioeconomic status (54%-60%). Looking at the findings from a different perspective, however, these data reveal that a large minority of responding judges believed that neutrality was maintained only “Rarely” or “Sometimes” in all categories, with these percentages reaching as high as 20 percent for socioeconomic status and race. (Q13)

### **Judicial Factor Disparity**

Substantially less than 30 percent of all responding judges reported that the guidelines “Almost Always” avoided unwarranted disparity with respect to the sentencing circuit, district, or judge. (Q14)

### **Respect for the Law**

More than half of responding circuit court judges believed that the guidelines increased respect for the law among victims of crime and members of the general public. Responding district court judges were more likely to believe that the guidelines had no impact on respect for the law for these groups. (Q15)

### **Alternative Confinement Sentencing Options**

The vast majority of responding judges were positive about the availability of alternatives to incarceration and did not want to see this availability reduced. While a “No Change Needed” response was common (with typically 40% to 70% of judges providing this answer across offense types), the survey data highlighted certain types of offenses for which responding judges desired greater availability of alternatives to straight incarceration. For example, in sentencing drug trafficking offenders, more than half of responding district court judges (and a somewhat smaller proportion of responding circuit court judges) would like greater access to straight probation, probation-plus-confinement, or “split” sentencing options. Slightly more than 40 percent of both responding district and circuit court judges also would like greater availability of sentencing options (particularly probation-plus-confinement or “split” sentences) for theft and fraud offenses. (Q11)

## **Additional Information**

This Summary Report highlights only some of the survey's results. Other results can be found in the accompanying tables showing the distribution of responses for each survey question: Appendix B (for district court judge respondents) and Appendix C (for circuit court judge respondents). In addition, the Commission expects to release in the future a more detailed report on the survey, including discussions of the methodology and response rates, blank versions of the judge survey instruments, and graphs comparing total and offense type results.

**APPENDIX A**  
**SURVEY TOPICS AND STATUTORY REFERENCES**  
**Article III Judge Survey Conducted by the U.S. Sentencing Commission in January 2002**

<b>Topic</b>	<b>Statutory Reference</b>	<b>Survey Question</b>
Provide fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing	28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)	Question 8
Provide certainty in meeting the purposes of sentencing	28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)	Question 7
Avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct	28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)	Question 6
Maintain sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices	28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)	Question 9
Determine whether to impose a sentence to probation, a fine, or a term of imprisonment	28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)(A)	Question 11
Consider whether the following matters, among others, with respect to a defendant, have any relevance to . . . an appropriate sentence: age, education, vocational skills, mental and emotional condition, physical condition including drug dependence, previous employment record, family ties and responsibilities, community ties, role in the offense, criminal history, and degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood	28 U.S.C. § 994(d)	Question 12

<b>Topic</b>	<b>Statutory Reference</b>	<b>Survey Question</b>
Assure that the guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders	28 U.S.C. § 994(d)	Question 13
Assure that the guidelines and policy statements ... reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant	28 U.S.C. § 994(e)	Question 12
Reflect the seriousness of the offense	18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)	Question 1
Promote respect for the law	18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)	Question 15
Provide just punishment	18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)	Question 10
Afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct	18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)	Question 3
Protect the public from further crimes of the defendant	18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C)	Question 4
Provide defendants with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner where rehabilitation is appropriate	18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D)	Question 5
Avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct	18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)	Question 6

**APPENDIX C**  
**A Survey of Article III Judges on The Federal Sentencing Guidelines**  
**Responses of Circuit Judges**

**Question 1** Considering cases that have come to you on appeal, how often did the guideline sentences, as properly applied, provide punishment levels that reflect the seriousness of the offense?

**CIRCUIT JUDGES**

i. ii. Considering only defendants convicted of these crimes:

	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>1 Few</b>	1	1.4	7	9.6	3	4.3	3	4.2	3	4.2	0	0.0	4	6.2	9	13.0
<b>2</b>	7	10.1	15	20.5	3	4.3	8	11.1	6	8.5	5	7.5	9	13.8	10	14.5
<b>3</b>	12	17.4	17	23.3	9	13.0	10	13.9	13	18.3	6	9.0	10	15.4	11	15.9
<b>4</b>	15	21.7	6	8.2	10	14.5	17	23.6	12	16.9	16	23.9	9	13.8	12	17.4
<b>5</b>	17	24.6	11	15.1	21	30.4	18	25.0	23	32.4	16	23.9	17	26.2	13	18.8
<b>6 Almost All</b>	17	24.6	17	23.3	23	33.3	16	22.2	14	19.7	24	35.8	16	24.6	14	20.3
<b>Total</b>	69	100.0	73	100.0	69	100.0	72	100.0	71	100.0	67	100.0	65	100.0	69	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	7	—	3	—	7	—	4	—	5	—	9	—	11	—	7	—
<b>Mean</b>	4.3		3.7		4.6		4.2		4.2		4.7		4.1		3.8	
<b>Median</b>	4.0		3.0		5.0		4.0		5.0		5.0		5.0		4.0	

**Question 1** For those cases where you believe that the guideline punishment levels *do not reflect the seriousness of the crime*, was it because the punishment was generally *less than appropriate*, *more than appropriate*, or *sometimes greater/sometimes less*?

(continued)

iii. Considering only defendants where punishment did not reflect seriousness:

	Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>Less</b>	1	1.9	7	23.3	29	64.4	22	55.0	8	28.6	13	38.2	17	36.2
<b>Greater</b>	43	82.7	17	56.7	6	13.3	8	20.0	8	28.6	11	32.4	21	44.7
<b>Sometimes</b>	8	15.4	6	20.0	10	22.2	10	25.0	12	42.9	10	29.4	9	19.1
<b>Total</b>	52	100.0	30	100.0	45	100.0	40	100.0	28	100.0	34	100.0	47	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	24	—	46	—	31	—	36	—	48	—	42	—	29	—
<b>Mean</b>		2.1		2.0		1.6		1.7		2.1		1.9		1.8
<b>Median</b>		2.0		2.0		1.0		1.0		2.0		2.0		2.0

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, Circuit Judge Responses, January 2002.



## A Survey of Article III Judges on The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of Circuit Judges

**Question 2** Considering cases that have come to you on appeal, how often did the guideline sentences, as properly applied, involve mandatory minimum provisions that *affect* the court's ability to impose sentences that reflect the statutory purposes of sentencing?

CIRCUIT JUDGES i. ii. Considering only defendants with mandatory minimum convicted of these crimes:

CIRCUIT JUDGES	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>1 Few</b>	13	19.1	11	16.4	13	22.0	25	43.9	23	42.6	24	43.6	22	43.1	22	39.3
<b>2</b>	10	14.7	6	9.0	7	11.9	11	19.3	11	20.4	8	14.5	9	17.6	11	19.6
<b>3</b>	12	17.6	13	19.4	12	20.3	7	12.3	9	16.7	7	12.7	10	19.6	12	21.4
<b>4</b>	16	23.5	8	11.9	5	8.5	6	10.5	5	9.3	9	16.4	4	7.8	1	1.8
<b>5</b>	11	16.2	14	20.9	13	22.0	2	3.5	1	1.9	2	3.6	1	2.0	4	7.1
<b>6 Almost All</b>	6	8.8	15	22.4	9	15.3	6	10.5	5	9.3	5	9.1	5	9.8	6	10.7
<b>Total</b>	68	100.0	67	100.0	59	100.0	57	100.0	54	100.0	55	100.0	51	100.0	56	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	8	—	9	—	17	—	19	—	22	—	21	—	25	—	20	—
<b>Mean</b>	3.3		3.8		3.4		2.4		2.4		2.5		2.4		2.5	
<b>Median</b>	3.0		4.0		3.0		2.0		2.0		2.0		2.0		2.0	

**Question 3** Considering cases that have come to you on appeal, how often did the guideline sentences, as properly applied, afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct?

CIRCUIT JUDGES i. ii. Considering only defendants convicted of these crimes:

CIRCUIT JUDGES	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>1 Few</b>	3	4.8	7	10.9	4	6.6	3	4.9	1	1.7	2	3.3	4	6.9	8	12.9
<b>2</b>	4	6.5	3	4.7	2	3.3	4	6.6	4	6.7	3	4.9	7	12.1	9	14.5
<b>3</b>	6	9.7	5	7.8	5	8.2	16	26.2	16	26.7	13	21.3	13	22.4	13	21.0
<b>4</b>	11	17.7	3	4.7	5	8.2	9	14.8	10	16.7	8	13.1	5	8.6	1	1.6
<b>5</b>	19	30.6	13	20.3	16	26.2	11	18.0	13	21.7	13	21.3	12	20.7	11	17.7
<b>6 Almost All</b>	19	30.6	33	51.6	29	47.5	18	29.5	16	26.7	22	36.1	17	29.3	20	32.3
<b>Total</b>	62	100.0	64	100.0	61	100.0	61	100.0	60	100.0	61	100.0	58	100.0	62	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	14	—	12	—	15	—	15	—	16	—	15	—	18	—	14	—
<b>Mean</b>	4.5		4.7		4.9		4.2		4.3		4.5		4.1		3.9	
<b>Median</b>	5.0		6.0		5.0		4.0		4.0		5.0		4.5		4.5	

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, Circuit Judge Responses, January 2002.

## A Survey of Article III Judges on The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of Circuit Judges

**Question 4** Considering cases that have come to you on appeal, how often did the guideline sentences, as properly applied, protect the public from further crimes of the defendant?

CIRCUIT JUDGES	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
	<b>1 Few</b>	1	1.6	2	2.9	1	1.6	2	3.2	4	6.5	2	3.2	5	8.3	11
<b>2</b>	3	4.8	2	2.9	4	6.3	8	12.9	5	8.1	5	7.9	9	15.0	9	14.5
<b>3</b>	13	21.0	9	13.2	11	17.2	11	17.7	13	21.0	9	14.3	14	23.3	11	17.7
<b>4</b>	12	19.4	7	10.3	6	9.4	14	22.6	10	16.1	13	20.6	6	10.0	1	1.6
<b>5</b>	18	29.0	16	23.5	14	21.9	8	12.9	12	19.4	10	15.9	9	15.0	13	21.0
<b>6 Almost All</b>	15	24.2	32	47.1	28	43.8	19	30.6	18	29.0	24	38.1	17	28.3	17	27.4
<b>Total</b>	62	100.0	68	100.0	64	100.0	62	100.0	62	100.0	63	100.0	60	100.0	62	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	14	—	8	—	12	—	14	—	14	—	13	—	16	—	14	—
<b>Mean</b>	4.4		4.9		4.8		4.2		4.2		4.5		3.9		3.8	
<b>Median</b>	5.0		5.0		5.0		4.0		4.0		5.0		4.0		3.5	

**Question 5** Considering cases that have come to you on appeal, how often did the guideline sentences, as properly applied where rehabilitation was appropriate, provide defendants with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner?

CIRCUIT JUDGES	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
	<b>1 Few</b>	19	32.8	24	45.3	17	34.0	16	31.4	16	32.0	17	34.7	21	43.8	22
<b>2</b>	12	20.7	8	15.1	12	24.0	11	21.6	10	20.0	9	18.4	7	14.6	9	18.0
<b>3</b>	6	10.3	4	7.5	3	6.0	3	5.9	5	10.0	5	10.2	3	6.3	5	10.0
<b>4</b>	8	13.8	4	7.5	4	8.0	8	15.7	7	14.0	5	10.2	5	10.4	2	4.0
<b>5</b>	5	8.6	5	9.4	5	10.0	5	9.8	4	8.0	5	10.2	4	8.3	4	8.0
<b>6 Almost All</b>	8	13.8	8	15.1	9	18.0	8	15.7	8	16.0	8	16.3	8	16.7	8	16.0
<b>Total</b>	58	100.0	53	100.0	50	100.0	51	100.0	50	100.0	49	100.0	48	100.0	50	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	18	—	23	—	26	—	25	—	26	—	27	—	28	—	26	—
<b>Mean</b>	2.9		2.7		2.9		3.0		2.9		2.9		2.8		2.6	
<b>Median</b>	2.0		2.0		2.0		2.0		2.0		2.0		2.0		2.0	

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, Circuit Judge Responses, January 2002.

## A Survey of Article III Judges on The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of Circuit Judges

**Question 6** Considering cases that have come to you on appeal, how often did the guideline sentences, as properly applied, avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct?

CIRCUIT JUDGES i. ii. Considering only defendants convicted of these crimes:

CIRCUIT JUDGES	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>1 Few</b>	4	5.9	9	13.6	4	6.5	4	6.3	4	6.6	3	5.0	6	10.2	6	10.0
<b>2</b>	6	8.8	7	10.6	5	8.1	2	3.2	4	6.6	1	1.7	2	3.4	4	6.7
<b>3</b>	9	13.2	8	12.1	9	14.5	14	22.2	12	19.7	10	16.7	11	18.6	12	20.0
<b>4</b>	16	23.5	14	21.2	11	17.7	14	22.2	12	19.7	13	21.7	9	15.3	8	13.3
<b>5</b>	22	32.4	15	22.7	16	25.8	13	20.6	13	21.3	18	30.0	16	27.1	16	26.7
<b>6 Almost All</b>	11	16.2	13	19.7	17	27.4	16	25.4	16	26.2	15	25.0	15	25.4	14	23.3
<b>Total</b>	68	100.0	66	100.0	62	100.0	63	100.0	61	100.0	60	100.0	59	100.0	60	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	8	—	10	—	14	—	13	—	15	—	16	—	17	—	16	—
<b>Mean</b>	4.2		3.9		4.3		4.2		4.2		4.5		4.2		4.1	
<b>Median</b>	4.0		4.0		5.0		4.0		4.0		5.0		5.0		4.5	

**Question 7** Considering cases that have come to you on appeal, how often did the guideline sentences, as properly applied, provide certainty in meeting the purposes of sentencing?

CIRCUIT JUDGES i. ii. Considering only defendants convicted of these crimes:

CIRCUIT JUDGES	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>1 Few</b>	1	1.6	4	6.3	1	1.7	2	3.2	2	3.4	2	3.5	5	9.1	6	10.9
<b>2</b>	6	9.4	7	11.1	4	6.7	5	8.1	5	8.5	2	3.5	4	7.3	2	3.6
<b>3</b>	14	21.9	10	15.9	13	21.7	14	22.6	11	18.6	10	17.5	7	12.7	10	18.2
<b>4</b>	15	23.4	10	15.9	8	13.3	16	25.8	15	25.4	15	26.3	10	18.2	9	16.4
<b>5</b>	16	25.0	17	27.0	20	33.3	11	17.7	13	22.0	15	26.3	17	30.9	16	29.1
<b>6 Almost All</b>	12	18.8	15	23.8	14	23.3	14	22.6	13	22.0	13	22.8	12	21.8	12	21.8
<b>Total</b>	64	100.0	63	100.0	60	100.0	62	100.0	59	100.0	57	100.0	55	100.0	55	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	12	—	13	—	16	—	14	—	17	—	19	—	21	—	21	—
<b>Mean</b>	4.2		4.2		4.4		4.1		4.2		4.4		4.2		4.1	
<b>Median</b>	4.0		5.0		5.0		4.0		4.0		4.0		5.0		5.0	

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, Circuit Judge Responses, January 2002.

## A Survey of Article III Judges on The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of Circuit Judges

**Question 8** Considering cases that have come to you on appeal, how often did the guideline sentences, as properly applied, provide fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing?

i. ii. Considering only defendants convicted of these crimes:

CIRCUIT JUDGES	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>1 Few</b>	10	15.4	21	31.8	9	14.5	7	11.5	7	11.5	6	10.0	9	15.5	10	16.7
<b>2</b>	8	12.3	9	13.6	7	11.3	7	11.5	5	8.2	5	8.3	7	12.1	9	15.0
<b>3</b>	14	21.5	12	18.2	10	16.1	13	21.3	16	26.2	12	20.0	17	29.3	18	30.0
<b>4</b>	16	24.6	8	12.1	10	16.1	11	18.0	5	8.2	12	20.0	4	6.9	5	8.3
<b>5</b>	9	13.8	8	12.1	16	25.8	15	24.6	19	31.1	13	21.7	11	19.0	9	15.0
<b>6 Almost All</b>	8	12.3	8	12.1	10	16.1	8	13.1	9	14.8	12	20.0	10	17.2	9	15.0
<b>Total</b>	65	100.0	66	100.0	62	100.0	61	100.0	61	100.0	60	100.0	58	100.0	60	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	11	—	10	—	14	—	15	—	15	—	16	—	18	—	16	—
<b>Mean</b>	3.5		3.0		3.8		3.7		3.8		4.0		3.5		3.4	
<b>Median</b>	4.0		3.0		4.0		4.0		4.0		4.0		3.0		3.0	

**Question 9** Considering cases that have come to you on appeal, how often did the guideline sentences, as properly applied, maintain sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices?

i. ii. Considering only defendants convicted of these crimes:

CIRCUIT JUDGES	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>1 Few</b>	16	24.6	26	38.8	17	27.9	14	22.2	14	23.3	14	23.0	15	25.4	18	30.5
<b>2</b>	15	23.1	13	19.4	12	19.7	10	15.9	7	11.7	9	14.8	11	18.6	9	15.3
<b>3</b>	10	15.4	7	10.4	7	11.5	13	20.6	12	20.0	11	18.0	10	16.9	9	15.3
<b>4</b>	10	15.4	9	13.4	10	16.4	9	14.3	9	15.0	9	14.8	6	10.2	7	11.9
<b>5</b>	8	12.3	5	7.5	6	9.8	8	12.7	8	13.3	9	14.8	8	13.6	7	11.9
<b>6 Almost All</b>	6	9.2	7	10.4	9	14.8	9	14.3	10	16.7	9	14.8	9	15.3	9	15.3
<b>Total</b>	65	100.0	67	100.0	61	100.0	63	100.0	60	100.0	61	100.0	59	100.0	59	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	11	—	9	—	15	—	13	—	16	—	15	—	17	—	17	—
<b>Mean</b>	3.0		2.6		3.0		3.2		3.3		3.3		3.1		3.1	
<b>Median</b>	3.0		2.0		3.0		3.0		3.0		3.0		3.0		3.0	

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, Circuit Judge Responses, January 2002.

## A Survey of Article III Judges on The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of Circuit Judges

**Question 10** Considering cases that have come to you on appeal, how often did the guideline sentences, as properly applied, provide just punishment?

**CIRCUIT JUDGES**

i. ii. Considering only defendants convicted of these crimes:

	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>1 Few</b>	5	7.9	17	25.8	8	12.9	8	12.7	8	12.9	8	13.1	9	15.8	11	18.3
<b>2</b>	12	19.0	9	13.6	5	8.1	10	15.9	8	12.9	6	9.8	11	19.3	13	21.7
<b>3</b>	7	11.1	16	24.2	10	16.1	12	19.0	12	19.4	11	18.0	10	17.5	9	15.0
<b>4</b>	19	30.2	7	10.6	12	19.4	12	19.0	12	19.4	10	16.4	7	12.3	11	18.3
<b>5</b>	12	19.0	8	12.1	14	22.6	9	14.3	10	16.1	10	16.4	5	8.8	2	3.3
<b>6 Almost All</b>	8	12.7	9	13.6	13	21.0	12	19.0	12	19.4	16	26.2	15	26.3	14	23.3
<b>Total</b>	63	100.0	66	100.0	62	100.0	63	100.0	62	100.0	61	100.0	57	100.0	60	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	13	—	10	—	14	—	13	—	14	—	15	—	19	—	16	—
<b>Mean</b>	3.7		3.1		3.9		3.6		3.7		3.9		3.6		3.4	
<b>Median</b>	4.0		3.0		4.0		4.0		4.0		4.0		3.0		3.0	

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, Circuit Judge Responses, January 2002.

**A Survey of Article III Judges on The Federal Sentencing Guidelines  
Part II: Sentence Determination  
Responses of Circuit Judges**

**Question 11 Please identify where you believe that changes in the availability of guideline *sentence types* would better promote the purposes of sentencing.**

**CIRCUIT**

**Offense Type**

**JUDGES**

**STRAIGHT**

**PROBATION SENTENCE**

**More available**

**Less Available**

**No change needed**

**Total**

**Missing**

	<b>Drug Trafficking</b>		<b>Weapon Trafficking</b>		<b>Fraud</b>		<b>Larceny/Theft/Emb.</b>		<b>Robbery</b>		<b>Alien Smuggling</b>		<b>Unlawful U.S. Entry</b>	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
More available	31	44.9	13	20.3	22	32.8	26	40.6	9	15.0	10	16.4	18	29.0
Less Available	2	2.9	8	12.5	9	13.4	8	12.5	7	11.7	10	16.4	8	12.9
No change needed	36	52.2	43	67.2	36	53.7	30	46.9	44	73.3	41	67.2	36	58.1
<b>Total</b>	69	100.0	64	100.0	67	100.0	64	100.0	60	100.0	61	100.0	62	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	7	—	12	—	9	—	12	—	16	—	15	—	14	—

**PROBATION WITH**

**CONFINEMENT**

**CONDITIONS**

**More available**

**Less Available**

**No change needed**

**Total**

**Missing**

	<b>Drug Trafficking</b>		<b>Weapon Trafficking</b>		<b>Fraud</b>		<b>Larceny/Theft/Emb.</b>		<b>Robbery</b>		<b>Alien Smuggling</b>		<b>Unlawful U.S. Entry</b>	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
More available	33	49.3	13	20.0	29	43.9	28	43.8	10	16.7	15	24.6	23	37.7
Less Available	2	3.0	8	12.3	12	18.2	9	14.1	7	11.7	11	18.0	9	14.8
No change needed	32	47.8	44	67.7	25	37.9	27	42.2	43	71.7	35	57.4	29	47.5
<b>Total</b>	67	100.0	65	100.0	66	100.0	64	100.0	60	100.0	61	100.0	61	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	9	—	11	—	10	—	12	—	16	—	15	—	15	—

**IMPRISONMENT**

**PLUS SUP. RELEASE**

**CONFINEMENT**

**CONDITIONS**

**More available**

**Less Available**

**No change needed**

**Total**

**Missing**

	<b>Drug Trafficking</b>		<b>Weapon Trafficking</b>		<b>Fraud</b>		<b>Larceny/Theft/Emb.</b>		<b>Robbery</b>		<b>Alien Smuggling</b>		<b>Unlawful U.S. Entry</b>	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
More available	34	50.7	17	27.0	27	41.5	27	42.2	16	26.2	15	25.0	22	36.1
Less Available	1	1.5	5	7.9	10	15.4	8	12.5	6	9.8	8	13.3	6	9.8
No change needed	32	47.8	41	65.1	28	43.1	29	45.3	39	63.9	37	61.7	33	54.1
<b>Total</b>	67	100.0	63	100.0	65	100.0	64	100.0	61	100.0	60	100.0	61	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	9	—	13	—	11	—	12	—	15	—	16	—	15	—

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, Circuit Judge Responses, January 2002.

## A Survey of Article III Judges on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of Circuit Judges

**Question 12** Based on the cases that you personally have heard on appeal, do you believe that the  
**CIRCUIT** guidelines should place less or more emphasis on any of the following defendant  
**JUDGES** characteristics for sentencing determination?<sup>1</sup>

	<b>Total</b>		<b>Less</b>		<b>More</b>		<b>No Change</b>		<b>Missing</b>
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
<b>Age</b>	69	100.0	0	0.0	32	46.4	37	53.6	7
<b>Education</b>	68	100.0	1	1.5	20	29.4	47	69.1	8
<b>Vocational Skills</b>	68	100.0	1	1.5	17	25.0	50	73.5	8
<b>Mental Conditions</b>	69	100.0	0	0.0	37	53.6	32	46.4	7
<b>Emotional Conditions</b>	69	100.0	1	1.4	29	42.0	39	56.5	7
<b>Physical Conditions</b>	66	100.0	1	1.5	19	28.8	46	69.7	10
<b>Drug Dependence/Abuse</b>	69	100.0	0	0.0	25	36.2	44	63.8	7
<b>Alcohol Dependence/Abuse</b>	68	100.0	0	0.0	22	32.4	46	67.6	8
<b>Employment Record</b>	68	100.0	0	0.0	33	48.5	35	51.5	8
<b>Family Ties/Responsibilities</b>	70	100.0	0	0.0	44	62.9	26	37.1	6
<b>Community Ties</b>	68	100.0	2	2.9	25	36.8	41	60.3	8
<b>Role in the Offense</b>	68	100.0	2	2.9	26	38.2	40	58.8	8
<b>Criminal History</b>	69	100.0	5	7.2	16	23.2	48	69.6	7
<b>Criminal Livelihood</b>	68	100.0	1	1.5	24	35.3	43	63.2	8
<b>Public Service*</b>	69	100.0	0	0.0	29	42.0	40	58.0	7
<b>Employment Contributions</b>	68	100.0	1	1.5	20	29.4	47	69.1	8
<b>Prior Good Works</b>	69	100.0	1	1.4	30	43.5	38	55.1	7

\*Includes military, civic, charitable, or public service

<sup>1</sup> The Circuit Judges listed the following "other" defendant characteristics (number of responses): Respondents feel that gender (1) and when the defendant has learned lessons to avoid committing another crime (1) should receive more emphasis.

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, Circuit Judge Responses, January 2002.

## A Survey of Article III Judges on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of Circuit Judges

**Question 13** Based on the cases that you personally have heard on appeal, do you believe that the guidelines *maintain neutrality* with respect to the characteristics listed below?

CIRCUIT  
JUDGES

	Total		Rarely		Sometimes		Often		Almost Always		Missing
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
<b>Religion</b>	69	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	7	10.1	62	89.9	7
<b>Creed</b>	69	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	8	11.6	61	88.4	7
<b>National Origin</b>	68	100.0	2	2.9	5	7.4	9	13.2	52	76.5	8
<b>Race</b>	69	100.0	4	5.8	14	20.3	8	11.6	43	62.3	7
<b>Ethnicity</b>	69	100.0	2	2.9	12	17.4	8	11.6	47	68.1	7
<b>Gender</b>	69	100.0	3	4.3	7	10.1	12	17.4	47	68.1	7
<b>Socioeconomic Status</b>	69	100.0	3	4.3	13	18.8	16	23.2	37	53.6	7

**Question 14** Based on the cases that you personally have heard on appeal, do you believe that the guidelines *avoid unwarranted disparity* with respect to the characteristics listed below?

CIRCUIT  
JUDGES

	Total		Rarely		Sometimes		Often		Almost Always		Missing
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
<b>Defendants with Similar Records and Conduct</b>	69	100.0	4	5.8	19	27.5	23	33.3	23	33.3	7
<b>Sentencing Circuit</b>	66	100.0	3	4.5	13	19.7	31	47.0	19	28.8	10
<b>Sentencing District</b>	68	100.0	3	4.4	20	29.4	26	38.2	19	27.9	8
<b>Sentencing Judge</b>	69	100.0	3	4.3	22	31.9	29	42.0	15	21.7	7

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, Circuit Judge Responses, January 2002.



## A Survey of Article III Judges on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of Circuit Judges

**Question 15** Do you believe that the sentencing guidelines have increased, decreased, or had no impact on *respect for the law* for these groups?<sup>1</sup>

**CIRCUIT  
JUDGES**

	<b>Total</b>		<b>Increase</b>		<b>Decrease</b>		<b>No Impact</b>		<b>Missing</b>
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
<b>Federal Offenders</b>	73	100.0	25	34.2	16	21.9	32	43.8	3
<b>Crime Victims</b>	71	100.0	40	56.3	4	5.6	27	38.0	5
<b>The General Public</b>	70	100.0	39	55.7	7	10.0	24	34.3	6

<sup>1</sup>The Circuit Judges listed the following "other" groups: The guidelines increase respect for the law in Congress (1). Another respondent feels that family members (1) have a decreased respect for the law.

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, Circuit Judge Responses, January 2002.

## A Survey of Article III Judges on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of Circuit Judges

**Question 18**  
CIRCUIT  
JUDGES

Please mark on the scale below to indicate your rating of the federal sentencing guideline system's achievements in furthering the general purposes of sentencing as specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).

	n	%
<b>1 Low Achievement</b>	7	9.7
<b>2</b>	8	11.1
<b>3</b>	12	16.7
<b>4</b>	15	20.8
<b>5</b>	17	23.6
<b>6 High Achievement</b>	13	18.1
<b>Total</b>	72	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	4	—
<b>Mean</b>	3.9	
<b>Median</b>	4	

**Question 19A**  
CIRCUIT  
JUDGES

If you served as a Federal District Judge, have you sentenced any federal felony offender under Old Law (i.e., "pre-guidelines")?

	n	%
<b>Yes</b>	37	59.7
<b>No</b>	4	6.5
<b>Not Serve</b>	21	33.9
<b>Total</b>	62	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	14	—

**Question 19B**  
CIRCUIT  
JUDGES

While a Federal Circuit Judge, have you reviewed the sentence of any federal felony offender under Old Law (i.e., "pre-guidelines")?

	n	%
<b>Yes</b>	49	70.0
<b>No</b>	21	30.0
<b>Total</b>	70	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	6	—

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, Circuit Judge Responses, January 2002.

**APPENDIX B**  
**A Survey of Article III Judges on The Federal Sentencing Guidelines**  
**Responses of District Judges**

**Question 1** Considering cases that you have sentenced, how often did the guideline sentences provide punishment levels that reflect the seriousness of the offense?

**DISTRICT JUDGES**

i. ii. Considering only defendants convicted of these crimes:

	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>1 Few</b>	5	1.2	51	11.2	33	7.7	32	7.4	36	8.2	21	5.1	24	7.7	60	14.5
<b>2</b>	32	8.0	73	16.0	48	11.2	73	16.8	63	14.4	29	7.0	28	8.9	65	15.7
<b>3</b>	53	13.2	75	16.5	54	12.6	99	22.8	87	19.9	61	14.7	51	16.3	53	12.8
<b>4</b>	101	25.2	66	14.5	62	14.5	88	20.3	93	21.2	81	19.5	62	19.8	67	16.2
<b>5</b>	117	29.2	74	16.3	103	24.0	78	18.0	86	19.6	118	28.4	72	23.0	80	19.4
<b>6 Almost All</b>	93	23.2	116	25.5	129	30.1	64	14.7	73	16.7	105	25.3	76	24.3	88	21.3
<b>Total</b>	401	100.0	455	100.0	429	100.0	434	100.0	438	100.0	415	100.0	313	100.0	413	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	65	—	11	—	37	—	32	—	28	—	51	—	153	—	53	—
<b>Mean</b>	4.4		3.9		4.3		3.7		3.8		4.4		4.1		3.7	
<b>Median</b>	5.0		4.0		5.0		4.0		4.0		5.0		4.0		4.0	

**Question 1** For those cases where you believe that the guideline punishment levels *do not reflect the seriousness of the crime*, was it because the punishment was generally *less than appropriate*, *more than appropriate*, or *sometimes greater/sometimes less*?

(continued)

iii. Considering only defendants where punishment did not reflect seriousness:

	Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>Less</b>	11	3.1	57	23.1	200	63.1	164	56.6	93	44.7	59	33.0	48	17.0
<b>Greater</b>	261	73.7	104	42.1	33	10.4	36	12.4	28	13.5	54	30.2	158	56.0
<b>Sometimes</b>	82	23.2	86	34.8	84	26.5	90	31.0	87	41.8	66	36.9	76	27.0
<b>Total</b>	354	100.0	247	100.0	317	100.0	290	100.0	208	100.0	179	100.0	282	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	112	—	219	—	149	—	176	—	258	—	287	—	184	—
<b>Mean</b>		2.2		2.1		1.6		1.7		2.0		2.0		2.1
<b>Median</b>		2.0		2.0		1.0		1.0		2.0		2.0		2.0

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, District Judge Responses, January 2002.

## A Survey of Article III Judges on The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of District Judges

**Question 2** Considering cases that you have sentenced, how often did the guideline sentences involve mandatory minimum provisions that *affect* your ability to impose sentences that reflect the statutory purposes of sentencing?

i. ii. Considering only defendants with mandatory minimum convicted of these crimes:

DISTRICT JUDGES	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>1 Few</b>	59	14.8	62	14.2	91	25.3	175	58.5	177	58.8	142	48.8	131	53.9	145	49.7
<b>2</b>	82	20.5	63	14.4	55	15.3	37	12.4	38	12.6	41	14.1	31	12.8	33	11.3
<b>3</b>	65	16.3	53	12.2	42	11.7	32	10.7	31	10.3	42	14.4	27	11.1	29	9.9
<b>4</b>	78	19.5	78	17.9	60	16.7	29	9.7	27	9.0	20	6.9	18	7.4	21	7.2
<b>5</b>	60	15.0	82	18.8	59	16.4	10	3.3	12	4.0	19	6.5	18	7.4	27	9.2
<b>6 Almost All</b>	56	14.0	98	22.5	52	14.5	16	5.4	16	5.3	27	9.3	18	7.4	37	12.7
<b>Total</b>	400	100.0	436	100.0	359	100.0	299	100.0	301	100.0	291	100.0	243	100.0	292	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	66	—	30	—	107	—	167	—	165	—	175	—	223	—	174	—
<b>Mean</b>	3.4		3.8		3.3		2.0		2.0		2.4		2.2		2.5	
<b>Median</b>	3.0		4.0		3.0		1.0		1.0		2.0		1.0		2.0	

**Question 3** Considering cases that you have sentenced, how often did the guideline sentences afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct?

i. ii. Considering only defendants convicted of these crimes:

DISTRICT JUDGES	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>1 Few</b>	23	5.7	46	10.6	36	8.8	46	11.0	44	10.4	34	8.7	37	11.8	71	18.5
<b>2</b>	21	5.2	26	6.0	28	6.9	66	15.7	60	14.2	30	7.7	41	13.1	55	14.4
<b>3</b>	38	9.4	31	7.2	33	8.1	78	18.6	77	18.2	62	15.8	50	16.0	48	12.5
<b>4</b>	74	18.3	38	8.8	39	9.6	67	16.0	75	17.7	65	16.6	40	12.8	37	9.7
<b>5</b>	123	30.4	80	18.5	104	25.5	64	15.2	67	15.8	84	21.4	56	17.9	63	16.4
<b>6 Almost All</b>	126	31.1	212	49.0	168	41.2	99	23.6	100	23.6	117	29.8	89	28.4	109	28.5
<b>Total</b>	405	100.0	433	100.0	408	100.0	420	100.0	423	100.0	392	100.0	313	100.0	383	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	61	—	33	—	58	—	46	—	43	—	74	—	153	—	83	—
<b>Mean</b>	4.6		4.7		4.6		3.8		3.9		4.2		4.0		3.8	
<b>Median</b>	5.0		5.0		5.0		4.0		4.0		5.0		4.0		4.0	

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, District Judge Responses, January 2002.

## A Survey of Article III Judges on The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of District Judges

**Question 4** Considering cases that you have sentenced, how often did the guideline sentences protect the public from further crimes of the defendant?

DISTRICT JUDGES	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
	<b>1 Few</b>	13	3.3	23	5.3	25	6.1	40	9.5	37	8.7	25	6.5	34	11.0	76
<b>2</b>	15	3.8	30	6.9	22	5.4	72	17.1	65	15.3	38	9.8	49	15.9	58	15.2
<b>3</b>	42	10.7	33	7.6	41	10.0	87	20.6	82	19.3	58	15.0	52	16.9	50	13.1
<b>4</b>	107	27.4	56	13.0	72	17.6	75	17.8	85	20.0	72	18.6	47	15.3	45	11.8
<b>5</b>	118	30.2	100	23.1	103	25.1	62	14.7	63	14.8	88	22.7	46	14.9	52	13.6
<b>6 Almost All</b>	96	24.6	190	44.0	147	35.9	86	20.4	93	21.9	106	27.4	80	26.0	100	26.2
<b>Total</b>	391	100.0	432	100.0	410	100.0	422	100.0	425	100.0	387	100.0	308	100.0	381	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	75	—	34	—	56	—	44	—	41	—	79	—	158	—	85	—
<b>Mean</b>	4.5		4.7		4.6		3.7		3.8		4.2		3.9		3.6	
<b>Median</b>	5.0		5.0		5.0		4.0		4.0		5.0		4.0		4.0	

**Question 5** Considering cases that you have sentenced, how often did the guideline sentences, where rehabilitation was appropriate, provide defendants with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner?

DISTRICT JUDGES	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
	<b>1 Few</b>	73	18.8	101	24.6	88	23.4	83	21.7	81	21.5	77	21.3	86	29.8	124
<b>2</b>	87	22.4	72	17.5	73	19.4	70	18.3	73	19.4	66	18.3	61	21.1	72	20.9
<b>3</b>	53	13.6	69	16.8	78	20.7	72	18.8	69	18.3	69	19.1	40	13.8	44	12.8
<b>4</b>	68	17.5	50	12.2	47	12.5	64	16.8	67	17.8	60	16.6	39	13.5	34	9.9
<b>5</b>	55	14.1	61	14.8	42	11.2	46	12.0	42	11.1	44	12.2	28	9.7	37	10.7
<b>6 Almost All</b>	53	13.6	58	14.1	48	12.8	47	12.3	45	11.9	45	12.5	35	12.1	34	9.9
<b>Total</b>	389	100.0	411	100.0	376	100.0	382	100.0	377	100.0	361	100.0	289	100.0	345	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	77	—	55	—	90	—	84	—	89	—	105	—	177	—	121	—
<b>Mean</b>	3.3		3.2		3.1		3.2		3.1		3.2		2.9		2.7	
<b>Median</b>	3.0		3.0		3.0		3.0		3.0		3.0		2.0		2.0	

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, District Judge Responses, January 2002.

## A Survey of Article III Judges on The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of District Judges

**Question 6** Considering cases that you have sentenced, how often did the guideline sentences avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct?

i. ii. Considering only defendants convicted of these crimes:

DISTRICT JUDGES	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>1 Few</b>	34	8.5	61	14.0	43	10.4	35	8.3	36	8.6	32	8.1	33	10.4	46	11.9
<b>2</b>	39	9.8	56	12.8	35	8.5	37	8.8	34	8.1	30	7.6	28	8.9	32	8.3
<b>3</b>	40	10.0	68	15.6	45	10.9	73	17.3	66	15.7	48	12.2	41	13.0	44	11.4
<b>4</b>	76	19.0	51	11.7	62	15.0	66	15.7	70	16.7	56	14.2	41	13.0	50	13.0
<b>5</b>	105	26.3	91	20.8	104	25.1	101	24.0	105	25.0	113	28.7	81	25.6	100	25.9
<b>6 Almost All</b>	106	26.5	110	25.2	125	30.2	109	25.9	109	26.0	115	29.2	92	29.1	114	29.5
<b>Total</b>	400	100.0	437	100.0	414	100.0	421	100.0	420	100.0	394	100.0	316	100.0	386	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	66	—	29	—	52	—	45	—	46	—	72	—	150	—	80	—
<b>Mean</b>	4.2		3.9		4.3		4.2		4.2		4.4		4.2		4.2	
<b>Median</b>	5.0		4.0		5.0		4.0		5.0		5.0		5.0		5.0	

**Question 7** Considering cases that you have sentenced, how often did the guideline sentences provide certainty in meeting the purposes of sentencing?

i. ii. Considering only defendants convicted of these crimes:

DISTRICT JUDGES	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>1 Few</b>	28	7.2	39	9.4	26	6.6	31	7.6	28	6.9	25	6.6	25	8.3	41	11.0
<b>2</b>	23	5.9	32	7.7	27	6.8	40	9.9	33	8.1	21	5.5	23	7.6	31	8.3
<b>3</b>	41	10.6	48	11.5	48	12.1	63	15.5	68	16.7	57	15.0	40	13.2	45	12.1
<b>4</b>	82	21.2	71	17.1	70	17.7	81	20.0	80	19.7	60	15.8	50	16.6	60	16.1
<b>5</b>	124	32.0	117	28.1	118	29.8	102	25.1	108	26.5	122	32.2	91	30.1	107	28.7
<b>6 Almost All</b>	89	23.0	109	26.2	107	27.0	89	21.9	90	22.1	94	24.8	73	24.2	89	23.9
<b>Total</b>	387	100.0	416	100.0	396	100.0	406	100.0	407	100.0	379	100.0	302	100.0	373	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	79	—	50	—	70	—	60	—	59	—	87	—	164	—	93	—
<b>Mean</b>	4.3		4.3		4.4		4.1		4.2		4.4		4.3		4.1	
<b>Median</b>	5.0		5.0		5.0		4.0		4.0		5.0		5.0		5.0	

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, District Judge Responses, January 2002.

## A Survey of Article III Judges on The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of District Judges

### Question 8 Considering cases that you have sentenced, how often did the guideline sentences provide fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing?

i. ii. Considering only defendants convicted of these crimes:

DISTRICT JUDGES	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>1 Few</b>	37	9.4	96	22.2	52	12.7	52	12.3	41	9.7	42	10.7	38	12.3	75	19.3
<b>2</b>	61	15.5	88	20.4	57	13.9	58	13.7	59	13.9	39	9.9	43	14.0	67	17.3
<b>3</b>	75	19.1	82	19.0	68	16.5	96	22.7	99	23.3	58	14.8	53	17.2	60	15.5
<b>4</b>	93	23.7	69	16.0	81	19.7	90	21.3	89	21.0	80	20.4	48	15.6	58	14.9
<b>5</b>	87	22.1	52	12.0	88	21.4	71	16.8	75	17.7	98	25.0	71	23.1	76	19.6
<b>6 Almost All</b>	40	10.2	45	10.4	65	15.8	56	13.2	61	14.4	75	19.1	55	17.9	52	13.4
<b>Total</b>	393	100.0	432	100.0	411	100.0	423	100.0	424	100.0	392	100.0	308	100.0	388	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	73	—	34	—	55	—	43	—	42	—	74	—	158	—	78	—
<b>Mean</b>	3.6		3.1		3.7		3.6		3.7		4.0		3.8		3.4	
<b>Median</b>	4.0		3.0		4.0		4.0		4.0		4.0		4.0		3.0	

### Question 9 Considering cases that you have sentenced, how often did the guideline sentences maintain sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices?

i. ii. Considering only defendants convicted of these crimes:

DISTRICT JUDGES	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>1 Few</b>	110	27.4	151	34.6	110	26.8	102	24.2	100	23.6	98	24.7	81	26.0	121	30.8
<b>2</b>	71	17.7	110	25.2	82	20.0	69	16.4	62	14.7	58	14.6	47	15.1	75	19.1
<b>3</b>	66	16.4	58	13.3	66	16.1	77	18.2	83	19.6	67	16.9	47	15.1	55	14.0
<b>4</b>	57	14.2	45	10.3	45	10.9	63	14.9	65	15.4	51	12.8	40	12.8	49	12.5
<b>5</b>	65	16.2	38	8.7	67	16.3	75	17.8	73	17.3	73	18.4	58	18.6	56	14.2
<b>6 Almost All</b>	33	8.2	34	7.8	41	10.0	36	8.5	40	9.5	50	12.6	39	12.5	37	9.4
<b>Total</b>	402	100.0	436	100.0	411	100.0	422	100.0	423	100.0	397	100.0	312	100.0	393	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	64	—	30	—	55	—	44	—	43	—	69	—	154	—	73	—
<b>Mean</b>	3.0		2.6		3.0		3.1		3.2		3.2		3.2		2.9	
<b>Median</b>	3.0		2.0		3.0		3.0		3.0		3.0		3.0		3.0	

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, District Judge Responses, January 2002.

## A Survey of Article III Judges on The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of District Judges

**Question 10** Considering cases that you have sentenced, how often did the guideline sentences provide just punishment?

DISTRICT JUDGES i. ii. Considering only defendants convicted of these crimes:

DISTRICT JUDGES	All Sentencing		Drug Trafficking		Firearms Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>1 Few</b>	26	6.7	79	18.1	36	8.7	55	12.9	47	11.1	33	8.3	28	9.1	72	18.5
<b>2</b>	53	13.6	93	21.3	57	13.7	64	15.1	53	12.5	40	10.1	41	13.3	68	17.5
<b>3</b>	71	18.2	78	17.9	72	17.3	105	24.7	105	24.8	72	18.1	71	23.0	64	16.5
<b>4</b>	96	24.6	75	17.2	87	20.9	78	18.4	90	21.2	83	20.9	43	13.9	60	15.4
<b>5</b>	102	26.2	68	15.6	102	24.5	83	19.5	79	18.6	99	24.9	74	23.9	70	18.0
<b>6 Almost All</b>	42	10.8	43	9.9	62	14.9	40	9.4	50	11.8	70	17.6	52	16.8	55	14.1
<b>Total</b>	390	100.0	436	100.0	416	100.0	425	100.0	424	100.0	397	100.0	309	100.0	389	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	76	—	30	—	50	—	41	—	42	—	69	—	157	—	77	—
<b>Mean</b>	3.8		3.2		3.8		3.4		3.6		4.0		3.8		3.4	
<b>Median</b>	4.0		3.0		4.0		3.0		4.0		4.0		4.0		3.0	

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, District Judge Responses, January 2002.



**A Survey of Article III Judges on The Federal Sentencing Guidelines  
Part II: Sentence Determination  
Responses of District Judges**

**Question 11** Please identify where you believe that changes in the availability of guideline *sentence types* would better promote the purposes of sentencing.

DISTRICT JUDGES	Offense Type													
	Drug Trafficking		Weapon Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<b>STRAIGHT PROBATION SENTENCE</b>														
More available	244	55.5	126	29.9	165	38.2	175	40.6	85	20.7	104	30.5	167	41.4
Less Available	15	3.4	40	9.5	75	17.4	66	15.3	43	10.5	25	7.3	21	5.2
No change needed	181	41.1	255	60.6	192	44.4	190	44.1	282	68.8	212	62.2	215	53.3
<b>Total</b>	440	100.0	421	100.0	432	100.0	431	100.0	410	100.0	341	100.0	403	100.0
Missing	26	—	45	—	34	—	35	—	56	—	125	—	63	—

PROBATION WITH CONFINEMENT CONDITIONS	Drug Trafficking		Weapon Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
	More available	274	61.4	151	35.4	200	46.1	198	45.6	113	27.2	114	32.9	151
Less Available	14	3.1	33	7.7	49	11.3	40	9.2	36	8.7	25	7.2	23	5.8
No change needed	158	35.4	242	56.8	185	42.6	196	45.2	266	64.1	207	59.8	226	56.5
<b>Total</b>	446	100.0	426	100.0	434	100.0	434	100.0	415	100.0	346	100.0	400	100.0
Missing	20	—	40	—	32	—	32	—	51	—	120	—	66	—

IMPRISONMENT PLUS SUP. RELEASE CONFINEMENT CONDITIONS	Drug Trafficking		Weapon Trafficking		Fraud		Larceny/ Theft/Emb.		Robbery		Alien Smuggling		Unlawful U.S. Entry	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
	More available	238	54.1	149	35.0	185	42.9	183	42.6	120	29.3	107	31.0	130
Less Available	14	3.2	21	4.9	26	6.0	25	5.8	21	5.1	14	4.1	19	4.8
No change needed	188	42.7	256	60.1	220	51.0	222	51.6	268	65.5	224	64.9	251	62.8
<b>Total</b>	440	100.0	426	100.0	431	100.0	430	100.0	409	100.0	345	100.0	400	100.0
Missing	26	—	40	—	35	—	36	—	57	—	121	—	66	—

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, District Judge Responses, January 2002.

## A Survey of Article III Judges on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of District Judges

**Question 12** Based on the cases that you personally have sentenced, do you believe that the  
**DISTRICT** guidelines should place less or more emphasis on any of the following defendant  
**JUDGES** characteristics for sentencing determination? <sup>1</sup>

	Total		Less		More		No Change		Missing
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
<b>Age</b>	451	100.0	3	0.7	240	53.2	208	46.1	15
<b>Education</b>	451	100.0	6	1.3	146	32.4	299	66.3	15
<b>Vocational Skills</b>	449	100.0	3	0.7	132	29.4	314	69.9	17
<b>Mental Conditions</b>	449	100.0	4	0.9	277	61.7	168	37.4	17
<b>Emotional Conditions</b>	448	100.0	10	2.2	210	46.9	228	50.9	18
<b>Physical Conditions</b>	446	100.0	7	1.6	196	43.9	243	54.5	20
<b>Drug Dependence/Abuse</b>	452	100.0	13	2.9	200	44.2	239	52.9	14
<b>Alcohol Dependence/Abuse</b>	449	100.0	13	2.9	188	41.9	248	55.2	17
<b>Employment Record</b>	449	100.0	4	0.9	216	48.1	229	51.0	17
<b>Family Ties/Responsibilities</b>	451	100.0	10	2.2	266	59.0	175	38.8	15
<b>Community Ties</b>	446	100.0	17	3.8	155	34.8	274	61.4	20
<b>Role in the Offense</b>	444	100.0	10	2.3	190	42.8	244	55.0	22
<b>Criminal History</b>	444	100.0	15	3.4	115	25.9	314	70.7	22
<b>Criminal Livelihood</b>	442	100.0	5	1.1	159	36.0	278	62.9	24
<b>Public Service*</b>	444	100.0	17	3.8	191	43.0	236	53.2	22
<b>Employment Contributions</b>	442	100.0	14	3.2	141	31.9	287	64.9	24
<b>Prior Good Works</b>	445	100.0	15	3.4	209	47.0	221	49.7	21

\*Includes military, civic, charitable, or public service

<sup>1</sup>The District Judges listed the following "other" defendant characteristics (number of responses): Some respondents feel that drug quantity/role (2) and rehabilitation (1) should receive less emphasis. Others state that the guidelines should place more emphasis on aberrant behavior (1), acceptance of responsibility (2), adequacy of counsel (1), any characteristic deemed appropriate (2), drug quantity/role (1), economic compulsion (2), poverty (1), rehabilitation (6), religious (1), restitution (1), and if they are unlikely to recidivate (1). The following were listed but not rated: any characteristic the judge deems appropriate (2), guidelines make individualized sentences impossible (1), and "three-strikes" law (1).

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, District Judge Responses, January 2002.

## A Survey of Article III Judges on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of District Judges

**Question 13** Based on the cases that you personally have sentenced, do you believe that the guidelines *maintain neutrality* with respect to the characteristics listed below?<sup>1</sup>

DISTRICT  
JUDGES

	Total		Rarely		Sometimes		Often		Almost Always		Missing
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
<b>Religion</b>	453	100.0	10	2.2	8	1.8	17	3.8	418	92.3	13
<b>Creed</b>	452	100.0	10	2.2	8	1.8	20	4.4	414	91.6	14
<b>National Origin</b>	452	100.0	16	3.5	32	7.1	46	10.2	358	79.2	14
<b>Race</b>	456	100.0	32	7.0	65	14.3	50	11.0	309	67.8	10
<b>Ethnicity</b>	453	100.0	21	4.6	40	8.8	41	9.1	351	77.5	13
<b>Gender</b>	448	100.0	7	1.6	34	7.6	73	16.3	334	74.6	18
<b>Socioeconomic Status</b>	448	100.0	23	5.1	76	17.0	81	18.1	268	59.8	18

<sup>1</sup>The District Judges listed the following "other" characteristics (number of responses): One respondent states for immigration status (1) the guidelines rarely maintain neutrality. Others feel that the guidelines sometimes maintain neutrality with age (1), responsibility to family (1), and responsibility to community (1). A few respondents believe for powder/crack cocaine (2) the guidelines often and always maintain neutrality. The following was listed but not rated: these should not maintain neutrality (1).

**Question 14** Based on the cases that you personally have sentenced, do you believe that the guidelines *avoid unwarranted disparity* with respect to the characteristics listed below?<sup>1</sup>

DISTRICT  
JUDGES

	Total		Rarely		Sometimes		Often		Almost Always		Missing
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
<b>Defendants with Similar Records and Conduct</b>	445	100.0	25	5.6	113	25.4	143	32.1	164	36.9	21
<b>Sentencing Circuit</b>	402	100.0	39	9.7	113	28.1	145	36.1	105	26.1	64
<b>Sentencing District</b>	410	100.0	30	7.3	116	28.3	148	36.1	116	28.3	56
<b>Sentencing Judge</b>	433	100.0	23	5.3	95	21.9	181	41.8	134	30.9	33

<sup>1</sup>The District Judges listed the following "other" characteristics (number of responses): Some respondents feel for prosecutorial policies (3) unwarranted disparity is rarely avoided. Others believe that the guidelines avoid unwarranted disparity sometimes with respect to counsel for defendant (1), probation officer (1), and prosecutorial policies (4). One states that prosecutorial policies (1) almost always avoid disparity. The following were listed but not rated: geographic district (1), type of drug involved (1), prosecutorial policies (1), and consistency is not necessarily good (1).

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, District Judge Responses, January 2002.

## A Survey of Article III Judges on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of District Judges

**Question 15** Do you believe that the sentencing guidelines have increased, decreased, or had no impact on *respect for the law* for these groups?<sup>1</sup>

**DISTRICT  
JUDGES**

	Total		Increase		Decrease		No Impact		Missing
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
<b>Federal Offenders</b>	446	100.0	148	33.2	97	21.7	201	45.1	20
<b>Crime Victims</b>	438	100.0	175	40.0	49	11.2	214	48.9	28
<b>The General Public</b>	446	100.0	152	34.1	59	13.2	235	52.7	20

<sup>1</sup> The District Judges listed the following "other" groups (number of responses): Respondents believe the guidelines increased respect for the law for attorneys (1) and law enforcement (1). Others state for attorneys (4), drug offenders (1), family members (2), judges (7), and minority communities (1) the guidelines have decreased respect. Some Judges also mention that there has been no impact on respect for the law for drug offenders (1), judges (1), and media (1). The following were listed but not rated: attorneys (3), drug offenders (3), judges (1), and law enforcement (1).

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, District Judge Responses, January 2002.

## A Survey of Article III Judges on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Responses of District Judges

**Question 18**      Please mark on the scale below to indicate your rating of the federal  
**DISTRICT**      sentencing guideline system's achievements in furthering the general  
**JUDGES**      purposes of sentencing as specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).

	n	%
<b>1 Low Achievement</b>	38	8.5
<b>2</b>	64	14.4
<b>3</b>	69	15.5
<b>4</b>	103	23.1
<b>5</b>	131	29.4
<b>6 High Achievement</b>	40	9.0
<b>Total</b>	445	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	21	—
<b>Mean</b>	3.8	
<b>Median</b>	4.0	

**Question 19**      While a Federal District Judge, have you reviewed the sentence of any  
**DISTRICT**      federal felony offender under Old Law (i.e., "pre-guidelines")?  
**JUDGES**

	n	%
<b>Yes</b>	276	60.7
<b>No</b>	179	39.3
<b>Total</b>	455	100.0
<b>Missing</b>	11	—

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Survey of Article III Judges, District Judge Responses, January 2002.

# Appendix D: Data Sources and Statistical Methods

## Section A: Data Sources

### *USSC Monitoring Datasets*

The Commission publishes annual datasets on all federal felony and serious misdemeanor criminal cases sentenced under the guidelines and reported to the Commission in each fiscal year. Pre-SRA cases sentenced under the “old law” and petty offenses are not included in these datasets. Each federal court is required by law to transmit several sentencing-related documents to the Commission. Presentence reports, judgement of conviction forms, statements of reasons, and plea agreements are received for the vast majority of felony and serious misdemeanor cases. Staff in the Commission’s Monitoring Unit assign each case a unique identifier and enter information on over 200 variables involving guideline applications, offender characteristics, and case processing factors. Expansion of the dataset has added elements through the years. A research codebook, which defines the variables and lists the years for which each variable was coded, is maintained by the Office of Policy Analysis. Beginning in 1995, the Commission prepared and released a separate Appeals dataset, which tracks appellate review of sentencing decisions.

Data records in the monitoring dataset are established on a per offender/per sentencing basis; that is, each record is a consolidated sentencing of a single defendant. Multiple defendants in a single docketed case each appear as a separate record. Multiple counts and multiple indictments constitute a consolidated sentencing if all counts of conviction were sentenced at the same time and if a single PSR and guideline range were produced for the defendant. Defendants may appear in more than one record in a given fiscal year if they were subject to more than one consolidated sentencing.

Additional information about the annual datasets and information about how to obtain the datasets and codebooks is found in the Commission’s *Guide to Publications and Resources* (USSC, 2001), which can be obtained from the Commission or online at:  
<http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/Cat2004.pdf>.

### *FPSSIS*

The Federal Probation Sentencing and Supervision Information System [FPSSIS] was administered by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts from 1984 through 1990. Data were collected by probation officers assigned to perform presentence investigations and to supervise offenders on probation and parole. When the Sentencing Commission put its own monitoring system in place, FPSSIS was renamed FPSIS and revamped to eliminate sentencing information now collected by the Commission and emphasize information relevant to supervision. Additional information on the FPSSIS dataset and on the use of these data to investigate trends in the rate of imprisonment during the early years of guidelines implementation can be found at <http://ssdc.ucsd.edu/ssdc/icp09845.html> (last visited October 12, 2004).

### *Intensive Study Samples*

The Commission has instituted a periodic program of data collection to supplement the monitoring data routinely collected on all cases. These Intensive Study Samples [ISS] were collected on random samples of cases sentenced in fiscal years 1995 and 2000. Over 200 additional variables were collected on each offender. Additional information on drug trafficking cases was collected on a larger sample of cases [called the DSS].

The 1995 ISS is a five percent random sample of all offenders consisting of 1,922 cases. The DSS is a stratified random sample of drug cases, including a 10 percent sample of cases primarily involving powder cocaine, a 50 percent sample of cases involving methamphetamine, and a 20 percent sample of all other drug types. The DSS consists of 2,767 cases. Information collected included details of up to thirty criminal history events, including the types of prior offenses committed by the offender, the date, location, and jurisdiction of the offenses, the sanctions that were imposed, the offender's supervision history, and the effects of the prior convictions on the determination of the guidelines' criminal history score for the current offense. Offender characteristics collected include the defendant's family situation, both at the time of sentencing and as a youth, the defendant's education and employment history, drug or mental health problems, and other potentially mitigating factors. For drug cases, information was also collected on the types and amounts of drugs distributed in various time periods, weapons and victims involved in the offense, the nature of any organization of which the defendant was a part, the defendant's primary and most serious function within the organization, and other measures of the defendant's culpability. Information was also collected on the law enforcement techniques used in the case, the charges that were initially brought against the defendant as well as the ultimate charges of conviction, and the defendant's legal responsibility for any weapons involved in the offense.

The 2000 ISS is a 20 percent random sample of all cases sentenced that fiscal year. Data collected includes most of the same information collected for the 1995 ISS. For drug cases, somewhat less information on the types and amounts of drugs distributed at various times was collected.

Information on the offense in the ISS is based on the probation officer's description of the offender's real offense conduct. This is generally accepted as the most accurate information available to researchers on offenders' true criminal conduct, because probation officers can look beyond the conduct described in indictments and are not legally bound by factual stipulations contained in plea agreements made by the parties. They are directed by Judicial Conference policy to report to judges complete descriptions of offenders' actual criminal conduct as supported by all reliable evidence. In so far as the probation officer's report relies on information supplied by the parties or on information supplied by the case agent, it may understate or overstate the criminal conduct that might be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Section B: Analyses in Chapter Two

The following section describes the variables and procedures used in preparing the longitudinal graphs contained in Chapter Two. FPSSIS data for the years 1984-1990 and USSC monitoring data for the years 1991-2002 were used for these analyses. In addition, trends were checked by using data on sentences imposed obtained from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts [AO], which is available for all years but does not contain information on sentencing options. The sentence imposed trends were consistent with the general trends observed using the FPSSIS and monitoring data. (Results of the analysis using AO data are not reported here, but can be found in Hofer & Semisch, 1999.)

### *Determining Type of Sentence Imposed*

The FPSSIS dataset does not contain just a single variable describing the type of sentence imposed on an offender. Instead, it contains over ten variables relevant to sentencing options: one describing the amount of prison time imposed, one describing the amount of probation time imposed, another containing the amount of supervised release imposed, and several more indicating the imposition of community confinement, mandatory substance abuse treatment, community service, fines, and restitution. All cases in which either only prison time or some prison time was imposed were placed in the *imprisonment/split sentences* category. All cases in which only probation was ordered were placed in the *probation only* category. All cases in which some form of intermittent confinement was imposed in addition to a term of probation were placed in the *probation and alternatives* category. Offenders who were ordered to participate in a substance abuse treatment program or pay restitution or perform community service as a condition of their probation, but for whom no confinement was ordered, were placed in the probation only category. A separate fine only category was created, and these cases were excluded from the charts due to the small number of cases involved.

The USSC Monitoring dataset does contain a single variable, SENTIMP, which differentiates among the basic sentencing options displayed in our graphs. The variable provides for four separate categories: No prison or probation (fine only), prison only & prison with confinement conditions (imprisonment and split sentences), probation & confinement conditions (intermediate and alternative sanctions), and probation only. For the sake of comparability to the FPSSIS categories and to previous Commission analyses, fines were excluded from the graphs, and prison only and prison with alternatives were combined into a single imprisonment/split sentence category. Probation with alternatives and probation only were used as defined in the monitoring codebook. Intermediate sanctions include the community and intermittent confinement conditions captured by the FPSSIS data, and also home confinement sentences from the monitoring dataset. Home confinement was not available prior to 1989. Note that graph totals in a given year may not sum to 100% due to rounding.



Table 1  
Sentence Type and Adjustments in the Time Served Algorithm

Sentence Type	SENTSTAT CODE	Minimum Time Served	Good Conduct Time	Parole Eligible
18 Sec. 4205(a) <sup>1</sup>	0	One-third	Pre-Guideline	Yes
18 Sec. 4205(b)(2)	2	None	Pre-Guideline	Yes
18 Sec. 4205(f)	A	Half	Half	No
18 Sec. 5010(a) <sup>2</sup>	3	None	None	No
18 Sec. 5010(b)	3	None	Two Years	No
18 Sec. 5010(c)	4	None	Two Years	Yes
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act 1974	5	None	Pre-Guideline	Yes
18 Sec. 4253(a) <sup>3</sup>	6	None	Pre-Guideline	Yes
18 Sec. 3575 <sup>4</sup>	B	One-third	Pre-Guideline	Yes
Sentencing Guidelines	G	None	Guideline	No
Anti-Drug Abuse Act 1986	H	None	Pre-Guideline	No
Notes: 1. 18 USC 4205 specifies the time of eligibility for release on parole for non-guideline cases. 2. 18 USC 5010 (repealed October 12, 1984) provided for the imposition of a suspended sentence or sentence to the custody of the Attorney General in the case of youthful offenders. 3. 18 USC 4253(a) refers to the conditions in which an addicted offender can be committed to a treatment facility. 4. 18 USC 3575 provided for an increased sentence for dangerous special offenders.				

Table 2  
Good Conduct Time for Non-Guideline Sentences

Sentence Length (Months)	Good Conduct Time per month (Days)
Less than 6	1.5
6 to 11	6.5
12 to 35	7.7
36 to 59	8.7
60 to 119	9.1 + 36.5 days
120 or more	11.1 + 36.5 days

### ***Determining Mean Prison Sentences Imposed***

Offenders who received no imprisonment whatsoever were excluded from calculations of mean imprisonment terms. While including non-imprisonment sentences as zero would arguably give a better picture of the overall severity of punishment for various types of crime in any given year, it would underestimate imprisonment length for offenders who are sent to prison, particularly for offenses in which substantial portions of offenders receive probationary sentences. Readers are cautioned to interpret the mean sentences in conjunction with the data on rates of imprisonment. All offenders who received any prison term were counted, including terms that were part of split sentences.

### ***Estimating average time likely to be served.***

Changes in average sentences *imposed* tell us little about historic shifts in sentencing and correctional policy. Prior to the SRA, decisions about when offenders would be released were made in the majority of cases by the U.S. Parole Commission. Offenders typically served between 40 to 70 percent of their prison term, depending in part on the type of crime, the length of the prison term that had been imposed by the court, and the amount of good time the offender earned while incarcerated. Under the SRA, parole was abolished and offenders generally serve between 87 to 100 percent of the sentence imposed, depending largely on the amount of good time they earn while in prison. Early release to reward participation in a residential drug treatment program or due to a serious and terminal medical condition can reduce this time somewhat for a minority of offenders.

In order to ensure comparability between estimates of time likely to be served for offenders sentenced before the SRA with those sentenced after, an estimate for offenders in each group was computed based on separate algorithms. The time that old law offenders were likely to serve was estimated using algorithms developed by Commission staff that replicate the operation of the pre-SRA rules for earning the maximum allowable good time and the operation of the parole guidelines. The time that new law offenders were likely to serve was estimated also assuming that each offender received the maximum allowable good-time. For both old law and guideline offenders, the effects of any mandatory minimum prison terms were also taken into account.

Table 1 on the preceding page summarizes the different types of offenses and how each was treated in the algorithm for computing time served. The algorithm first determined preguidelines good time for cases where this was required (SENTSTAT=0,2,5,6,B,H). The rules used for determining preguidelines good time are provided in Table 2. For example, sentences of one month were eligible for 1.5 days of good conduct time, while sentences of two months received  $1.5 \times 2 = 3$  days. At the high end, sentences of 120 months received 11.1 days per month plus 36.5 days. Thus a defendant receiving a 10-year sentence was eligible to receive 1,369 days of good conduct time (about 3 years and 9 months).

Following the computation of good conduct time, the time served calculation for old law defendants convicted under the Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (SENTSTAT=H) was calculated as

the prison sentence length less good time, because these individuals were not eligible for parole. Next, for all but one of the offenses eligible for parole in addition to good time (SENTSTAT=2,5,6,0,B), the estimated time served was taken as the earliest possible release date after considering both good conduct time and the parole guidelines. Finally, for 18 USC § 5205 and 18 U.S.C. § 3575 sentences (SENTSTAT=0 OR B), the time served was corrected to be one-third of the original prison sentence if the above calculations had decreased the time served below one-third. In cases where both the upper and lower parole guidelines were missing for cases which were eligible for parole, the parole guidelines were set to missing as well. The effect of this was to set the estimated time served to the original sentence less the good conduct time. When the lower guideline was missing but not the upper, the lower value was set to zero and the value of the parole guideline (PAL) was set at half the upper guideline. When the upper guideline was missing but not the lower, then the upper value was assumed to be four years more than the lower value resulting in a value of the PAL which was two years larger than the lower guideline. The 18 U.S.C. § 5010 sentences had two variants, section 5010(a) sentences which were under six months and had no good time corrections, and sentences of 72 months. In the latter case, the good time was 24 months. The section 5010(c) sentences also had a two-year good time requirement. Once the good time was computed, then the parole guideline code was invoked similarly to the sentences described earlier.

For new law guideline sentences (SENTSTAT='G'), the good time discount of 13 percent was applied by reducing the sentence by 365/419 for sentences between 13 months and life. This was followed by computing time served with alternatives (OTHERDET), if any, and adding this time to prison. This procedure was followed for the section 4205(f) sentences, where the time served was set equal to half the prison term. For probation cases (SENTSTAT='C'), the time served was equal to the imprisonment for sentences up to six months, otherwise time served was set equal to missing. Finally, if SENTSTAT was not equal to any of the above categories, time served was set equal to missing.

Cases for which a term of imprisonment is ordered but the length is indeterminable are excluded. Prior to fiscal year 1993, the Commission defined life sentences as 360 months. However, to more precisely reflect life expectancy of federal criminal defendants and to provide more accurate length of imprisonment information, life sentences are now defined as 470 months.

Because these estimates assume that offenders earn all available good time credits, they underestimate the time that will actually be served by offenders who misbehave while incarcerated. Comparability of time periods is assured, however, because the identical assumption was made for both old- and new law cases. These estimation methods provide a reasonably accurate portrait of changes in policies regarding time to be served throughout our study period. It more accurately represents changes in policy than do data from "release cohorts"—*i.e.*, "average time served until first release" for groups of offenders released from prison during a given year. These data suffer from several well-known biases if used to draw conclusions about changes in sentencing policy. See Albert Biderman, *Statistics of Average Time Served Are Fallacious Indicators of the Severity of Punishment*. (Paper presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology in Boston, MA.)

Estimates of time likely to be served are inferior to data on how long prisoners actually spend behind bars. But obtaining such data requires a very lengthy follow-up time, given that many offenders receive long sentences. A recent BJS *Special Report* does the next best thing by calculating actual time served for offenders who were released during the study period, which included 72 percent of the offenders in the study. For old law offenders that remained imprisoned, estimates of the time likely to be served were made using data from release cohorts who committed similar types of crime. However, these will necessarily be underestimates, particularly for offenders convicted of serious crimes, because many of these offenders remained incarcerated at the end of the study period. For new law offenders, the BJS study estimated time likely to be served by multiplying the sentence imposed by .87—the same as our algorithms. For comparisons of the BJS estimates with the policy-based algorithms used in this report, see Hofer & Semisch (1999). Although the general trends are largely the same, the two estimates do not perfectly match, even for new law offenders. This probably reflects differences in definitions and in the populations studied; the BJS report utilized the BOP Sentry datafile, while our estimates were based on USSC data.

### ***Determining the Primary Offense Category***

Offenses were classified into primary offense categories using the method common to recent AO and Sentencing Commission reports, *i.e.*, according to the crime type of the statute of conviction carrying the lengthiest *maximum* statutory penalty. In cases of ties, the length of any *minimum* terms are used, followed by the highest permissible fines. In the small number of cases still tied after applying these rules, the offense type that best represented the nature of the criminal behavior is chosen by the coders in the Commission's Monitoring Unit.

The Commission has used this method for classifying primary offenses since 1991. Prior to that point the Commission and the AO used similar but slightly different coding schemes. Therefore, in order to compare the AO's pre-1991 FPSSIS data to post-1991 USSC monitoring data, the FPSSIS data was recoded into new offense categories. These new categories were based on similar rules as those described in the preceding paragraph and resulted in categories as close as possible to those used in the post-1991 data. What variation does exist between the two codes stems mostly from the changing statutory definitions and coverage, as well as the sparse documentation for the pre-1991 data files.

The *aggregated offense categories* used in Chapter Two were formed by combining the primary offense categories into relevant groupings in the following manner:

*Drug Trafficking* includes drug distribution/manufacture, drug distribution/manufacture-conspiracy, continuing criminal enterprise, drug distribution-employee under 21, drug distribution near school, drug import/export, drug distribution to person under 21, and establish/rent drug operation.

*Economic Crimes* includes larceny, fraud, embezzlement, forgery/counterfeiting, and tax offenses

*Immigration* includes smuggling, transporting, or harboring an alien, as well as unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States

*Firearm trafficking and possession* includes all firearm trafficking offenses as well as illegal possession and use of a firearm

*Violent crimes* include 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> degree murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, sexual abuse, assault, bank robbery, and arson.

*Sexual abuse, exploitation, and transportation* include sexual abuse of a minor, sexual abuse of a ward, criminal sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact, sexual exploitation, and transportation across state lines for the purpose of engaging in illegal sex acts.

More detailed offense categories used in thumbnail graphs were defined as follows:

*Murder* includes first degree murder, felony with death resulting, second degree murder, and conspiracy to murder (with death resulting).

*Manslaughter* includes both involuntary and voluntary manslaughter, as well as negligent homicide in the period covered by the FPSSIS dataset.

*Kidnapping/Hostage* includes ransom taking and hostage/kidnaping.

*Sexual Abuse* includes sexual abuse of a minor, sexual abuse of a ward, criminal sexual abuse, and abusive sexual contact.

*Sexual exploitation* includes the production, distribution, and possession of pornography as well as other forms of sexual exploitation

*Assault* includes attempt to murder, assault with intent to murder, threatening communication, aggravated assault, conspiracy with attempt to murder, obstructing or impeding officers, minor assault, and conspiracy that includes assault with attempt to murder.

*Bank Robbery* includes both bank and aggravated bank robbery.

*Personal or postal robbery*, includes those crimes plus car-jacking and other robberies.

*Forgery/counterfeiting* includes unlawful production or alteration of bank checks, currency, or other documents

*Firearm Possession* includes unlawful possession of firearms or ammunition.

*Firearm Trafficking* includes unlawful trafficking in firearms/explosives.

*Burglary/Breaking & Entering* includes post office burglary, burglary of DEA premises (pharmacy), burglary of other structure, bank burglary, and burglary of a residence.

*Larceny* includes bank larceny, theft from benefits plans, other theft-mail/post office, receipt/possession of stolen property (not auto), other theft-property, larceny/theft-mail/post office, larceny/theft-property (not auto), and theft from labor union.

*Fraud* includes odometer laws and regulations, insider trading, and fraud and deceit.

*Embezzlement* includes property embezzlement, embezzlement from labor unions, postal embezzlement, embezzlement from benefit plans, and bank embezzlement.

*Tax offenses* includes tax evasion, filing of fraudulent tax returns, and other tax offenses.

*Smuggling, transporting, or harboring an alien* includes all offenses associated with the trafficking of illegal aliens into the United States.

*Unlawfully entering or remaining* includes illegal entry, illegal re-entry, and illegal residence in the United States

### ***Contribution of the guidelines to average time served for drug trafficking offenses***

In order to estimate the relative contribution of statutory minimums and guideline increases above those minimums to the average sentence for drug trafficking cases, special analyses were conducted using all drug trafficking cases sentenced in fiscal year 2001. Of the 24,038 offenders sentenced for drug trafficking, 2,439 cases were excluded due to missing values. In addition, cases in which the defendant received the statutory safety valve were excluded, because the safety valve negates both the mandatory minimum and the original guideline minimum. Of the remaining 15,764 cases, 8999 were non-departure cases and 6765 were departure cases. For all of these cases, the statutorily required minimum sentence was subtracted from the actual guideline sentence imposed. This difference was treated as the guideline contribution to sentence length above and beyond the amount required by the statutory minimums.

## **Section C: Analyses for Chapter Three**

### ***Hierarchical Linear Modeling***

A multilevel hierarchical model was developed to examine the effect of region upon sentences imposed in federal cases. A standard ordinary least squares regression model would allow only limited partitioning of variance-covariance components. By incorporating the nested structure of the federal court system (*i.e.*, judges within courts, courts within districts, districts within circuits), multilevel hierarchical models allow for the computation of robust standard errors and the apportionment of variance between the different levels of the data structure.

Three hierarchical models were developed and tested on federal sentencing data from fiscal year 2001. The first model was an unconditional three-level model, using prison length imposed as the dependent variable. The individual case occupied level one. The sentencing judge occupied level two and the federal district occupied level three. (Because visiting judges are not nested in this way, the small number of cases handled by visiting judges were excluded from the analysis.) No fixed effects were added to the model and variance components were computed for each level. Hierarchical models can be created using any number of commercially available software packages including SAS, Stata, HLM, and Mlwin. The analyses described in this report were conducted using HLM version 5.0.

The second hierarchical model included the presumptive sentence (*i.e.*, the guideline minimum or the trumping mandatory minimum, whichever is higher) as a fixed effect at level one. Since all level-1 predictor variables contemplated or used during this experiment had meaningful values at  $X=0$ , the Natural X Metric was employed to center predictor variables. The explanatory power of this fixed effect was computed by comparing the overall explanatory power of the conditional and unconditional models.

The third model took as its dependent variable departure rates, rather than sentence lengths imposed, and included a district level nested within a circuit level. No fixed effects were included as control variables. About one-quarter of the variation in rates was attributable to the circuits, while three-quarters was attributable to districts.

### ***Regression Analysis of the Contribution of Different Mechanisms to Sentence Variation***

Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques were used to calculate the amount of variance explained by the four mechanisms described in Chapter Three—the three types of departure and placement within the guideline range—using data from fiscal year 2001. The effects of the guidelines and mandatory minimum statutes were first incorporated into the model using the presumptive sentence. (Use of the presumptive sentence as a variable to control for legally relevant factors is discussed further in Section D below.) Dummy variables were then added to the model indicating whether the offender received any of the three types of departure or a sentence above the minimum of the guideline or statutory range. All cases with a particular type of departure were coded as one, all other cases were coded as zero. Among non-departure cases, all cases sentenced

above the guideline or statutory minimum were coded as one, and all other cases were coded as zero. Cases with missing values were excluded from the analysis.

The results of this analysis can be used to apportion the contribution of each of the four mechanisms to sentence variation that is not accounted for by the presumptive sentence. The portion of this variance that is unwarranted, however, cannot be determined, because of a lack of data measuring factors that may legitimately determine the extent of departure or placement within the guidelines range.

## **Section D: Analyses in Chapter Four**

### ***Controlling for legally relevant factors using the presumptive sentence***

Studies of the effects of discrimination in sentencing must control for the effects of legally relevant differences among groups that may legitimately account for differences in the likelihood of imprisonment or in average sentence length. The most common method for this has been to gather data on as many of the factors deemed relevant to sentencing as possible and to model the separate effects of these factors on sentencing outcomes, using multiple regression analysis. Studies of the type of sentence imposed (e.g., imprisonment, intermediate sanctions, probation), use Tobit, Logit, or Probit analyses to assess the differences among groups in the likelihood of receiving any of these types of sanctions. Studies of variations in sentence lengths have used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to account for the effects of legally relevant and extra-legal factors on the months of imprisonment imposed.

Before the advent of guidelines, no specific instructions were given to sentencing judges on the weight with which to give particular legally relevant factors. For that reason, statistical models allowed the weight of each factor to be determined empirically by the estimation procedures used in the regression analysis. In addition, as described in Chapter Four, existing studies generally ignore or mis-specify the effects of mandatory minimum penalty statutes that require a minimum term of imprisonment for some classes of offenders. In 2001 researchers studying disparity under the sentencing guidelines of Washington State developed a method that permitted more precise specification of legally relevant factors (Engen and Gainey, 2001). Instead of including separate control variables for every legally relevant factor on which data are available, a single variable—the “presumptive sentence”—controls for the effects of all legally relevant factors taken into account by the guidelines and the statutes and properly specifies the weights and interactions among them. The model simply predicts that all defendants will receive the penalty required by law.

In the Washington State guideline system studied by Engen and Gainey, the midpoint of the recommended guideline range was the presumptive sentence. For the federal system, the guideline minimum is the presumptive sentence, based on empirical evidence that the majority of cases are sentenced at that point in the range. (See USSC, *Sourcebook*, 2002, Tb. 29.) The guideline minimum was calculated taking into account all mandatory minimums and guideline adjustments, including criminal history category. For example, if the guideline calculation was for the offender



to be sentenced to 57 to 63 months, the guideline minimum would be 57 months. If that same offender had a five-year consecutive weapons charge, the guideline minimum would then be 117 months.

### *Analysis of the effects of race, ethnicity, and gender*

The study of the effects of race, ethnicity, and gender for offenders sentenced in fiscal years 1998 through 2002 involved a series of analysis using two dependent variables. The first set involved the decision by the court whether to imprison the offender (the “in/out” decision); the second involved the length of time imprisoned offenders would spend incarcerated. For each of these outcomes, there were five separate populations measured: all offenders, drug offenders, non-drug offenders, males only, and females only. The model for all offenders was also run for the combined years of 1998-2002, and for each of the five years separately. Only offenders who were United States citizens and whose guideline and personal information were complete were used in these analyses.

The “in/out” decision was analyzed using logistic regression. The extra-legal predictive variables included in the models were: race/ethnicity of the offender (Black and Hispanic offenders compared to White offenders); the age and the square of the age of the offender; whether the offender had dependents or not; whether the offender attended college or not; and the gender of the offender (males compared to females). The legal factors included in the model were: the presumptive sentence; the type of offense (violent, drug, white collar and “other” offenses compared to property crimes); the criminal history category of the offender (Categories II, III and IV (or “medium” category), and Categories V and VI (“high” category) compared to Category I (“low” category); whether the offender was convicted of a mandatory minimum for a weapon; whether the offender received a Specific Offense Characteristic (SOC) adjustment for weapon use; the type of departure in the sentence (substantial assistance, upward and downward departure compared to no departure); whether the offender went to trial (compared to those who pled); and the zone in the sentencing table the offender’s offense level and criminal history score placed them in (Zones B, C, and D compared to Zone A).

Legal factors in addition to the presumptive sentence were included in the model to assess whether judges took these factors into consideration and weighted them *somewhat differently than the guidelines rules themselves*. To accomplish this, the parameter estimate of the presumptive sentence was restricted to a value of 1.0 (Bushway and Piehl, 2002). By doing this, the legally relevant factors that contribute to the presumptive sentence were given the weight assigned to them by the guidelines rules themselves. By including some of the same factors separately in the model, the extent to which courts weighted these factors somewhat differently than the guideline rules could be assessed. Because so many factors influence the presumptive sentence, collinearity with any of the separate legally relevant factors was not a problem.

As is common in the literature (Spohn, 2004), the analysis of sentence length used the logarithm of the length of the sentence imposed as the dependant variable and the logarithm of the presumptive sentence as a predictor variable (sentences of zero months were assigned a log sentence

of zero). The independent variables were exactly the same as those used in the “in/out” decision, except for two items, except that the zone of the sentencing table in which the offender fell was not used.

When analyzing the five separate populations, there were some slight differences in the model. In the “drug cases only” model, the type of drug that was the driving force behind the sentence imposed was added to the model, and the type of offense variables were excluded. Also, for the “males only” model and the “females only” model, the gender of offender was excluded from the model.

The complete results from the analysis of the “in/out” decision for all years and offenders combined were as follows.

In/Out decision  
Overall

The LOGISTIC Procedure

Model Information

Data Set	WORK.OPA
Response Variable	PRISDUM
Number of Response Levels	2
Number of Observations	131111
Model	binary logit
Optimization Technique	Fisher's scoring

Response Profile

Ordered Value	PRISDUM	Total Frequency
1	1	106604
2	0	24507

Probability modeled is PRISDUM=1.

Model Convergence Status

Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied.

Model Fit Statistics

Criterion	Intercept Only	Intercept and Covariates
AIC	126320.36	55930.438
SC	126330.15	56165.249
-2 Log L	126318.36	55882.438

R-Square 0.4156 Max-rescaled R-Square 0.6721

Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0

Test	Chi-Square	DF	Pr > ChiSq
Likelihood Ratio	70435.9250	23	<.0001
Score	66322.8765	23	<.0001
Wald	23240.5769	23	<.0001

In/Out decision  
Overall

The LOGISTIC Procedure

Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Parameter	DF	Estimate	Standard Error	Wald Chi-Square	Pr > ChiSq
Intercept	1	-1.8523	0.1057	306.8823	<.0001
black	1	0.1065	0.0263	16.3572	<.0001
hispanic	1	0.1889	0.0323	34.1422	<.0001
AGE	1	-0.00379	0.00513	0.5467	0.4597
age2	1	-0.00020	0.000062	10.4806	0.0012
educ	1	-0.1428	0.0235	37.0131	<.0001
male	1	0.2492	0.0247	102.1267	<.0001
numdep	1	-0.1227	0.0228	29.0296	<.0001
GLMIN	1	0.0297	0.000756	1539.4431	<.0001
violent	1	0.9007	0.0850	112.3039	<.0001
drug	1	0.7629	0.0444	295.0457	<.0001
whitecoll	1	0.5842	0.0396	217.7955	<.0001
othtype	1	0.2788	0.0434	41.3074	<.0001
medcat	1	0.8833	0.0263	1127.3585	<.0001
highcat	1	1.7462	0.0711	602.6940	<.0001
IS924C	1	1.4394	0.3456	17.3434	<.0001
WEAPSOC	1	0.2052	0.0844	5.9085	0.0151
subasst	1	-3.3542	0.0408	6772.4954	<.0001
upward	1	2.1702	0.2737	62.8744	<.0001
downward	1	-2.8978	0.0419	4777.5090	<.0001
NEWCNVTN	1	0.6906	0.0890	60.2189	<.0001
zoneb	1	0.8954	0.0354	641.4404	<.0001
zonec	1	3.7471	0.0482	6053.5024	<.0001
zoned	1	4.7272	0.0500	8930.7769	<.0001

Odds Ratio Estimates

Effect	Point Estimate	95% Wald Confidence Limits	
black	1.112	1.056	1.171
hispanic	1.208	1.134	1.287
AGE	0.996	0.986	1.006
age2	1.000	1.000	1.000
educ	0.867	0.828	0.908
male	1.283	1.222	1.347
numdep	0.885	0.846	0.925
GLMIN	1.030	1.029	1.032
violent	2.461	2.084	2.907
drug	2.144	1.966	2.339
whitecoll	1.794	1.660	1.938
othtype	1.322	1.214	1.439
medcat	2.419	2.297	2.547

In/Out decision  
Overall

The LOGISTIC Procedure

Odds Ratio Estimates

Effect	Point Estimate	95% Wald Confidence Limits	
highcat	5.733	4.987	6.590
IS924C	4.218	2.142	8.305
WEAPSOC	1.228	1.041	1.449
subasst	0.035	0.032	0.038
upward	8.760	5.123	14.979
downward	0.055	0.051	0.060
NEWCNVTN	1.995	1.676	2.375
zoneb	2.448	2.284	2.624
zonec	42.399	38.580	46.597
zoned	112.975	102.425	124.612

Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses

Percent Concordant	95.3	Somers' D	0.907
Percent Discordant	4.6	Gamma	0.909
Percent Tied	0.2	Tau-a	0.276
Pairs	2612544228	c	0.954

The complete results from the analysis of sentence length for all years and offenders combined were as follows.

Regression model  
Overall, restrict glmin

The REG Procedure  
Model: MODEL1  
Dependent Variable: logsent

NOTE: Restrictions have been applied to parameter estimates.

Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F Value	Pr > F
Model	19	367501	19342	27845.6	<.0001
Error	131091	91059	0.69462		
Corrected Total	131110	458560			

Root MSE	0.83344	R-Square	0.8014
Dependent Mean	2.87151	Adj R-Sq	0.8014
Coeff Var	29.02441		

Parameter Estimates

Variable	DF	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error	t Value	Pr >  t
Intercept	1	-0.60966	0.02487	-24.51	<.0001
black	1	0.03744	0.00547	6.85	<.0001
hisp	1	0.04366	0.00688	6.34	<.0001
AGE	1	0.00865	0.00120	7.18	<.0001
age2	1	-0.00014125	0.00001495	-9.45	<.0001
educ	1	-0.05920	0.00553	-10.70	<.0001
male	1	0.23871	0.00632	37.79	<.0001
numdep	1	-0.02476	0.00486	-5.10	<.0001
logmin	1	1.00000	0	Infty	<.0001
violent	1	0.16061	0.01452	11.06	<.0001
drug	1	0.12855	0.01086	11.84	<.0001
whitecoll	1	-0.15266	0.01112	-13.73	<.0001
othtype	1	0.02484	0.01135	2.19	0.0287
medcat	1	0.27084	0.00539	50.26	<.0001
highcat	1	0.35843	0.00730	49.08	<.0001
IS924C	1	0.03189	0.01357	2.35	0.0187
WEAPSOC	1	0.07162	0.00873	8.20	<.0001
subasst	1	-1.06707	0.00584	-182.66	<.0001
upward	1	0.65144	0.02723	23.93	<.0001
downward	1	-0.97860	0.00732	-133.64	<.0001
NEWCNVTN	1	0.13119	0.01092	12.02	<.0001
RESTRICT	-1	-758.54623	312.50988	-2.43	0.0152*

\* Probability computed using beta distribution.