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Reseña:
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Reseña:Judicial dependence is much discussed in political science and law, but the definitions areoften contradictory or inconsistent. Instead of defining judicial independence as apermanent feature of the institutional environment, we develop a model in which judicialindependence is an equilibrium outcome of a game between the judiciary, legislature andexecutive. Accordingly, the independence of the judiciary varies with changes in thecomposition of the branches of government. This approach to judicial independence helpsto explain some of the major confrontations between the judiciary and other branches ofgovernment in both the United States and other countries.Judicial dependence is much discussed in political science and law, but the definitions are often contradictory or inconsistent. Instead of defining judicial independence as apermanent feature of the institutional environment, we develop a model in which judicialindependence is an equilibrium outcome of a game between the judiciary, legislature andexecutive. Accordingly, the independence of the judiciary varies with changes in thecomposition of the branches of government. This approach to judicial independence helpsto explain some of the major confrontations between the judiciary and other branches ofgovernment in both the United States and other countries. |
