| dc.description.abstract |
Reseña:This Article uses comparative evidence to inform the ongoing debate about the selectionand discipline of judges. In recent decades, many countries around the world have createdjudicial councils, institutions designed to maintain an appropriate balance betweenjudicial independence and accountability. Our Article has two aims. First, we provide atheory of the formation of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions alongwhich they differ. Second, we test the extent to which different designs of judicial councilaffect judicial quality. We find that there is little relationship between councils andquality. We also offer a positive explanation for why judicial councils neverthelessremain attractive institutions.This Article uses comparative evidence to inform the ongoing debate about the selection and discipline of judges. In recent decades, many countries around the world have createdjudicial councils, institutions designed to maintain an appropriate balance betweenjudicial independence and accountability. Our Article has two aims. First, we provide atheory of the formation of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions alongwhich they differ. Second, we test the extent to which different designs of judicial councilaffect judicial quality. We find that there is little relationship between councils andquality. We also offer a positive explanation for why judicial councils neverthelessremain attractive institutions. |
