Paradoxes of Police Reform

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dc.contributor.author Kent Eaton
dc.coverage.spatial United States
dc.date.accessioned 2016-01-07T15:28:18Z
dc.date.available 2016-01-07T15:28:18Z
dc.identifier.uri http://desa1.cejamericas.org:8080/handle/2015/2973
dc.description.abstract This article focuses on three central impediments to police reform in Ar- gentina, each of which has generated an important, yet distinct, paradox. First, al- though advocates of federalism argue that police reform facilitates innovation, in practice, reform efforts at one level of government in Argentina have been sabotaged by officials at other levels of government. Second, although electoral pressures have pushed police reform onto the policy agenda, these same pressures have also ob- structed reform efforts because politicians depend on illicit party-police networks for campaign financing. Third, despite copious evidence of police involvement in criminal acts, Argentina’s crime wave has energized conservative civil society groups whose demand for a heavy-handed response to crime has derailed the most promising attempts to restructure the police force.
dc.language.iso English
dc.title Paradoxes of Police Reform
dc.ceja.source Fuente:  Latin American Research Review


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